JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Subramonian Poti J.- The Food Corporation of India, the plaintiff in the suit, has filed this appeal against the decision of the Additional Sub Judge of Tellicherry dismissing the suit. In response to the invitation for tenders issued by the Regional Manager of the plaintiff Corporation the defendant submitted a tender quoting 70 per cent above the schedule rates. The tender was accepted by the plaintiff and the contract was concluded. The plaintiff, the Food Corporation of India, is engaged in the work of undertaking the wholesale purchase of foodgrains and distribution of the same by sale at various places in India. The invitation by tender by the Regional Manager was for appointment of contractors for loading / unloading and transport of foodgrains etc. in and around Muzhappilangad and Cannanore for a period of two years from 11th September 1968 or such later date as may be decided. The period of two years was to commence on 11th October 1968 and that would expire on 10th October 1970. There was an option reserved in the plaintiff corporation under Clause.9(1) of the agreement to extend the period of contract by one more year and if such option was exercised by the plaintiff the defendant would be liable to carry out the work tendered for such extended period under the terms and conditions of the agreement. Evidently circumstances had changed by about the period of expiry of two years contemplated under the contract and in view of escalation in prices and rates a fresh tender was felt to he disadvantageous to the plaintiff corporation. By Ext. A3 letter, dated 31st July 1970 the Corporation exercised option to extend the term by one year by intimation to the defendant its intention to extend such term. Despite the attitude of the defendant who indicated that he was not willing to agree to it the Corporation by its letter, dated 29th September 1970 Ext. A5 insisted upon performance by the defendant of his obligation under the terms of the contract to work for one more year. Despite the attitude of the defendant who indicated that he was not willing to agree to it the Corporation by its letter, dated 29th September 1970 Ext. A5 insisted upon performance by the defendant of his obligation under the terms of the contract to work for one more year. In the meanwhile arrangements were simultaneously made by the Corporation ad hoc to see that the business of loading / unloading and transport did not come to a stand still if, on the expiry of the period of two years, the defendant did not choose to work further. But it was made expressly plain that this was being done because such arrangement was necessary. In other words the very issue of Exts. A3 and A5 by the plain tiff indicated that despite the ad hoc arrangements the plaintiff corporation was exercising its option to insist upon the performance by the defendant of its obligation to undertake the work for one more year. One Khalid Hajee was appointed to carry on the work evidently with a view to avoid the breakdown of the work of transport and supply of food articles. But the plaintiff had to pay higher rate to such contractor and that was so for the period from 11th October 1970 to 10th October 1971. The total amount that had to be paid to the new contractor was Rs. 5,58,852.91 in place of Rs. 4,22,244.39 which alone need have been paid to the defendant had he performed the same work under the terms of the contract. The excess amount thus paid Rs. 1,36,608.52 is claimed in the suit by the Corporation against the defendant as damages. 2. In this context we may mention that prior to the institution of this suit the contractor had filed a suit O.S. 82 of 1970 for declaration that the clause in the agreement entered into between the contractor and the Food Corporation concerning the option to extend for one more year was null and void and unenforceable and also seeking an injunction restraining the operation of certain clauses thereof. That suit O.S. 82 of 1970 was tried and dismissed and that decision has become final. 3. The present suit O.S. 136 of 1974 was resisted by the defendant on several grounds. That suit O.S. 82 of 1970 was tried and dismissed and that decision has become final. 3. The present suit O.S. 136 of 1974 was resisted by the defendant on several grounds. He of course raised the plea of unenforceability of the clause of the contract relating to extension for one more year at the option of the Corporation. We are no longer concerned with that plea since that contention is no longer available in view of the decision in O.S. 82 of 1970. It is further said that the plaintiff had suffered no damages and even if the plaintiff had, that could have been avoided or at any rate steps could have been taken at least to mitigate the loss. It is further contended that the suit is barred by limitation. 4. The court below found against the case that Clause IX(i) of the annexure to the tender form evidenced by Ext. A1 was unenforceable and further found that breach of contract was committed by the defendant consequent upon which the Corporation sustained a loss of Rs. 1,36,608.52. The plaintiff had not given any indication at any time that it had waived the right to claim damages against the defendant. But on the question of limitation the plea of the defendant was accepted by the court below. The court found that the suit was barred by limitation since it had to be found on the conduct of the plaintiff that the contract was considered as having come to an end. On the breach committed by the defendant a new contractor was seen to have been appointed and this, according to the court below, denied an opportunity to the defendant to remedy the breach committed by him and to resume performance of the contract. The court found that consequently the suit filed more than 3 years after the expiry of the 2 years period would be barred by limitation. Of course if the suit was instituted 3 years after the date the cause of action arose it would be barred. The court found that consequently the suit filed more than 3 years after the expiry of the 2 years period would be barred by limitation. Of course if the suit was instituted 3 years after the date the cause of action arose it would be barred. Even though the plaintiff could have brought the contract to an end when defendant committed breach, if under S.39 of the Contract Act the plaintiff could nevertheless keep the contract open and plaintiff did so for the term of one year then the cause of action would arise only on the expiry of the 3 years term and the suit instituted within the above said 3 years period would be within time. So to resolve the question of limitation the short issue that arises is whether by reason of appointment of one Khalid Hajee as a contractor for the work which the defendant was obliged to do for the 3rd year, in case the plaintiff exercised the option to extend the contract for the 3rd year, has the plaintiff put an end to performance under the contract ? Was the plaintiff no longer keeping the contract open for performance by the defendant ? 5. The suit was instituted on 9th October 1974. Taking into account the one year term of extension the period of expiry of the contract would be 10th October 1971. The suit was filed just before the expiry of 3 years of that date and it is for that reason that the suit is said to be not barred by limitation. The court below which found that there was breach of the terms of the contract by the defendant, all the same dismissed the suit on the ground that since the corporation appointed another contractor in place of the defendant and entrusted the work to him it became impossible for the defendant to resume the performance of the contract even if he was inclined or willing to do so and therefore the suit had become barred, the breach having arisen not at the end of the 3 year period but at the end of the 2 year period. In fact the court noticed that if the corporation had only made ad hoc arrangement for the work to be done under the contract it could possibly have been argued that the corporation had not treated the contract as broken finally by the defendant and that it had left it open to him to resume performance of the contract at any time before the 3 year period was to end. But on the materials before it the court found that this was not what was done in the case and the suit filed beyond 3 years of the date the contract came to an end was barred by limitation as already stated. 6. The main contention urged by Sri G. Sankaran Nair, learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant, is that even if the defendant intimated his stand that he was not intending to perform his obligations under the contract by accepting the extension of one more year it was open to the plaintiff to keep the contract open so that if the defendant at any time felt otherwise he could resume work under the terms of the contract. S.39 of the Contract Act gives the right to a promisee under a contract the option to put an end to the contract when the other party to the contract had refused to perform or disabled himself from performing his promise in its entirety. But it is open to him to signify by order or conduct his acquiescence in its continuance. It is open to him to indicate by words or conduct that he proposes to treat the contract as having not come to an end. In such a case it is open to the other party to resume performance at any time before the period for performance expires. It is said that in this case the plaintiff was aware of the attitude of defendant who evinced his strong desire not to work the third year of the contract. All the same there can be no scope for doubt of the intention of the plaintiff as clearly evidenced by Exts. A3 and A5 letters. But the court below seems to think that because an alternate arrangement with Khalid Hajee was made that would indicate the intention on the part of the corporation not to keep alive the contract with the defendant. It is necessary therefore to examine the correctness of this stand. A3 and A5 letters. But the court below seems to think that because an alternate arrangement with Khalid Hajee was made that would indicate the intention on the part of the corporation not to keep alive the contract with the defendant. It is necessary therefore to examine the correctness of this stand. Long before the expiry of the two year term the contractor addressed the Regional Manager of the plaintiff by letter, dated 16th July 1970 intimating him that it was difficult for him to continue the work after the expiry of the period of contract, namely 10th October 1970. In that letter, Ext. A2, the defendant requested that fresh tenders may be invited so as to award the contract to someone else. The defendant categorically mentioned in Ext. A2 letter that after the expiry of the period of 2 years under the contract, namely, after 10th October 1970, it may not be possible for him to undertake the work and hence at any cost the contract should not be extended for another one year. It is to this that Ext. A3 reply was sent by the Regional Manager of the Food Corporation. He pointed out that as per Clause IX(i) of the annexure to the tender the Regional Manager had the option to extend the contract on the same rate, terms and conditions for another one year and the defendant cannot resile from this obligation, The contractor was told that calling for fresh tenders did not in any way affect the rights of the Regional Manager to extend the terms of the contract and that all losses or damages suffered by the Food Corporation by failure of the defendant to fulfil the terms and conditions of the contract will be at the defendant's risk and expenses. Ext, A4 tender notice was published in Kerala kaumudi by the plaintiff. This was a notification, dated 20th August 1970. It is evident that reading Ext. A4 along with Ext. A3 the right to insist upon the performance under the contract with the defendant was not waived in inviting fresh tenders. Naturally the work of the Food Corporation could not be stopped even temporarily as that would paralyse distribution. Alternate arrangement had to be thought of, even though that may only be ad hoc and that was evidently what was done. Naturally the work of the Food Corporation could not be stopped even temporarily as that would paralyse distribution. Alternate arrangement had to be thought of, even though that may only be ad hoc and that was evidently what was done. This is more explicit from the letter of the Corporation, dated 29th September 1970, Ext. A5, addressed to the defendant. Specific reference was made in that letter to the right of the plaintiff for extension, of the term under clause IX(i) of the contract. It is seen that pursuant to the tender one Mohammad Hajee who had agreed to work the contract at 70 per cent above the rates given in the schedule of rates was told by letter, dated 28th October 1970 that his tender was accepted for working for a period of 3 months with immediate effect with the right of extension at Corporation's option for a further period of upto one year. Clause (3) of this letter, Ext. X2, refers to the arrangement as an ad hoc arrangement. It is significant that the offer made by the plaintiff was evidently an ad hoc arrangement. Ext. X3 shows that Mohammad Hajee to whom Ext. X2 letter was addressed wanted to back out from his tender because of some labour problem. Consequently by letter, dated 3rd September 1970 the ad hoc offer made to Mohammad Hajee was cancelled. It is seen that thereafter Sri Khalid Hajee entered into the agreement with the Corporation for the same work. The appointment of Khalid Hajee was under these circumstances. It was made evidently by reason of the fact that the defendant was not prepared to work and therefore some ad hoc arrangement had to be made. It cannot, for this reason alone be said that the right which the plaintiff had to keep open the contract, was not exercised. On the other hand letters to the defendant Ext. A3 and Ext. A5 show that it was exercised. The lower court was certainly in error in thinking that merely because some other arrangement was made the plaintiff had cancelled the contract with the defendant. The plaintiff could do only what it did. It could only intimate the defendant that it exercised its option to extend the term and that making any other arrangement did not mean that it was putting an end to obligation of the defendant. The plaintiff could do only what it did. It could only intimate the defendant that it exercised its option to extend the term and that making any other arrangement did not mean that it was putting an end to obligation of the defendant. We cannot therefore find that the contract had come to an end with the expiry of the two year period. It was open to the defendant to perform his part of the contract at any time till the end of the extended term of one year term and the plaintiff had done all he could to inform the defendant that he kept the contract open. 7. Though it may, at first sight, appear that on the above finding the suit must be found to be within time since it has been instituted within the expiry of the 3 year period reckoned from the date of expiry of the extended term 10th October 1971, learned counsel Sri S. Narayanan Poti, appearing for the respondent has enlightened us on an approach to the question of limitation which was evidently not attempted in the court below. That is the main question we are called upon to consider in this case. According to learned counsel, in a case where the defendant may be guilty of breach of the contract and that of continuing breach the plaintiff may keep open the contract for successive performances by the defendant and if the contract be considered as severable in performance the claim for damages would arise independently in respect of each of the defaults in performance. It would, in turn, mean that it is only those defaults to perform that fall within the period of 3 years prior to the date of suit that could be the basis of action in a suit. According to learned counsel Sri Poti the contract between the Corporation and the defendant envisaged advices from time to time from the Corporation to the defendant to load, transport and unload goods as and when such advices were issued to the defendant the defendant had obligation to carry out the work, and on such work being carried out the defendant was under the terms of the contract, entitled to payment of remuneration as fixed under the contract. In that event there was no question of withholding any amount due by way of payment for any work performed by the defendant according to the instructions issued to him. In that sense each performance was independent and severable and accounts in respect of each could be settled independently. Each non performance could then give rise to a cause of action enabling the plaintiff to sue within 3 years of such non performance. If so it is only the claim for damages in respect of such non performances as fell within 3 years of the date of the suit that could be successfully urged. There are no such non performances in this case within the three years of the date of the suit and therefore, it is said, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree. 8. Contracts may conceive of complete performance by one party as a condition precedent for performance of the obligations of the other party. In such a case breach by the former would result in repudiation of the whole contract. On the other hand there may be severable contracts, severable in the sense several parts of the contract may be performed independently. The breach in the performance of one such part may be a severable breach giving rise to a claim for compensation but not the right in the defaulting party to treat the whole contract as repudiated. Though usually the terms "entire" and "divisible" are used to refer to these two categories of contracts, it may be, the terms are misleading. In a contract whereunder there is an agreement for payment pro rata for the work done the contract is nevertheless only one. It is not as if there are several contracts between the parties for performance on successive occasions. The contract is severable only in performance. Obligation to pay consideration for the part performed would arise even without the performance of the whole. Though Text Book writers like Chitty (Chitty on contract Vol. I, Para.1278 and 1285) have used the terms 'entire contract' and 'divisible contract' there is a pertinent comment on this in Volume 17 of the American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition at page 757. Obligation to pay consideration for the part performed would arise even without the performance of the whole. Though Text Book writers like Chitty (Chitty on contract Vol. I, Para.1278 and 1285) have used the terms 'entire contract' and 'divisible contract' there is a pertinent comment on this in Volume 17 of the American Jurisprudence 2nd Edition at page 757. That runs thus: "As applied to contracts, the use of the term 'entire' or 'indivisible', on the one hand, or 'divisible' or 'severable', on the other, is confusing, if not misleading, where the term is used loosely or inexactly. Sometimes the word 'entire' is used to convey the meaning that there is but one, rather than several, contracts, while at other times the word is used in reference to just one contract to convey the meaning that it is not divisible. Ordinarily, the term is used in this latter sense and as the opposite of 'divisible.' On the other hand a 'divisible contract', using that term correctly, is one contract and not several. It differs from other contracts, ordinarily, in one respect only that on performance by one side of each of its successive divisions the other party become liable for his performance of that division. In other words, a 'divisible contract' is one the performance of which is divided into different groups, each set embracing performances which are the agreed exchange for each other". Para. 327 would give a better idea of what would be severable performance. It runs thus: "An agreement which embraces a number of distinct subjects that admit of being separately executed and closed is, as a general rule, to be taken distributively or severally as to each subject. A contract is severable where the part to be performed by one party consists of several distinct and separate items and the price to be paid by the other is apportioned to each item or is left to be implied by law. But this method of determining whether a contract is entire or severable will not override the clear intention of the parties, if such intention can be gathered from the whole subject matter of the contract. While the severable nature of the subject may often assist in determining the intention, it will not overcome the intent to make an entire contract when that is shown. While the severable nature of the subject may often assist in determining the intention, it will not overcome the intent to make an entire contract when that is shown. Ultimately, the entirety of a contract depends upon the intention of the parties, and not upon the divisibility of the subject or the number of distinct subjects". 9. It may be appropriate here to refer to a very instructive passage in the article entitled "Partial performance of entire contracts" by Glanville L. William in the Law Quarterly Review Vol. LVII, page 373. Though in the article the learned writer is examining the scope of partial performance of entire contract the Article is prefaced by a consideration of the distinction between an entire contract and a severable contract. That distinction may be of relevance here. "A preliminary word is necessary on the nature of an 'entire contract'. Although it is not used with perfect consistency, the term 'entire contract' means, for the present purpose, either a contract in which it is agreed that complete performance shall be a condition precedent to recovery on the contract, or else a contract in which the consideration is a lump sum (or other entire consideration), and no provision is made for setting off a portion of this consideration against a portion of the performance. An entire contract in this sense is contrasted with a severable (or divisible) contract. Whether a contract is entire or severable depends primarily upon the intention of the parties, but the following rules may be laid down:- (1) Severable contracts may be divided (perhaps rather scholastically) into two kinds: those infinitely severable, and those made up of an agglomeration of entire parts. A contract is infinitely severable (a) if, although a consideration is specified in the contract, there is an express or implied agreement for payment pro rata, that is, in exact proportion to the extent of performance, or (b) if no consideration is specified. In the latter case the rule is that a reasonable remuneration is payable for the work actually done, so that again the payment is in exact proportion to the extent of performance. It seems to be immaterial, in case (b), that it is expressly agreed that the whole of the work shall be done; 'the contract is still not entire' unless it is also expressly agreed that complete performance shall be a condition precedent to any recovery. It seems to be immaterial, in case (b), that it is expressly agreed that the whole of the work shall be done; 'the contract is still not entire' unless it is also expressly agreed that complete performance shall be a condition precedent to any recovery. Severable contracts made up of an agglomeration of entire parts are those in which separate considerations are specified by the contract each being appropriated to different portions of the performance, and there being no agreement that complete performance shall be a condition precedent to any recovery on the contract. Here the contract is divisible into several parts, but each part is entire in itself and not capable of further subdivision; thus the rules as to entire contracts do not apply to the contract as a whole but do apply to each part. Common examples of this type of contract, so far as the common law goes, are periodic tenancies and periodic hirings. (2) A contract is entire (a) if it is agreed that complete performance shall be a condition precedent to recovery on the contract or (b) if the consideration is a lump sum and is neither agreed to be paid pro rata nor split up and appropriated to different portions of the contract". 10. In this context reference may be made to the case National Coal Board v. Galley, 1958 (1) WLR 16 , which came up before the Court of Appeal in England. The respondent in that appeal who was the defendant in the case was employed by the plaintiffs as a deputy in their colliery at Oxcroft in Derbyshire. He deliberately refused to attend for work at the plaintiffs' mine on Saturday voluntary shifts. It was alleged that this was in breach of his terms of employment. On account of the refusal of the defendant to turn up for work on Saturday the plaintiffs claimed that damages had been caused and the plaintiffs issued a writ against the defendant claiming damages for breach of contract. Plaintiffs succeeded in the writ and thereupon the defendant appealed. One of the points urged in connection with the claim for damages was whether in assessing damages the court can take into account matters that occurred after the issue of a writ. Plaintiffs succeeded in the writ and thereupon the defendant appealed. One of the points urged in connection with the claim for damages was whether in assessing damages the court can take into account matters that occurred after the issue of a writ. The Judge found that he was entitled to do so and took into consideration the continued abstention of the defendant from the Saturday shifts from June 16, 1956 until February, 1957. If the Judge was not entitled to take into account matters that occurred after the issue of the writ the only Saturday that fell to be considered in the case as pleaded was the Saturday, June 16, since there was no reference to earlier Saturdays in the statement of claim and the writ was issued on June 21. It is in this context that the Court of Appeal asked the question whether it can be said that the defendant's failure after the 21st of June, when the writ was issued, to work the Saturday voluntary shift on each of the alternate Saturdays, on which it was his turn to do so, was a continuation of the cause of action constituted by his failure to work the Saturday voluntary shift on June 16? The Court took the view that it was not a case of continuing breach of his obligation to work on June 16 and that the breach constituted by that failure was "complete, over and done with on June 16, and could not be continued thereafter". Any subsequent failure to work the shift on any subsequent Saturday gave rise to a subsequent cause of action and that arose only when there was such failure. The court further found - "The fact that the defendant prior to June 16 manifested an intention not to work the Saturday voluntary shift any more, coupled with his actual failure to do so on June 16, might have entitled the plaintiffs to treat the contract as repudiated and to claim damages on that footing, but they did not do so. They chose to allow the contract to remain in force, and while it stood their cause of action in respect of his failure to work the Saturday voluntary shift on any given Saturday when it was his turn to do so arose if and when he failed to work the shift on that day and not otherwise." The court concluded by saying - "A continuing cause of action is not in our view constituted by repeated breaches of recurring obligations nor by intermittent breaches of a continuing obligation. There must be a quality of continuance both in the breach and in the obligation." 11. The consequence was that the court refused to deal with the claim as a continuing cause of action and held that if the plaintiffs wished to pursue their remedy in respect of them they must issue a fresh writ. 12. To a suit for compensation for the breach of any contract express or implied not in writing registered and not specifically provided for in the Limitation Act, 1963, the Article which applies is 55 corresponding to Art.115 of the Limitation Act of 1908. The period is 3 years from the date the contract is broken and in the case of successive breaches the date when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs. There may be breach which is continuing in which case the period of 3 years commences at the end of the term. Where the breach is not continuing but there are successive breaches in respect of each breach the period will commence when such breach occurs and the period will be 3 years. Where under an agreement defendants in a suit were bound to give to the husband of the plaintiff 1/10th of the total catch of fish obtained by use of the fishing implements mentioned in the agreement a question arose whether successive default will give rise to successive breaches and whether the cause of action for each successive default should be taken to arise from the respective dates of default. The High Court of Travancore - Cochin held that it would be so and the suit would be in time with regard to the breaches which fell within 3 years of the suit. This was in Md. Noohu v. Kathiradima AIR 1953 TC 272. The High Court of Travancore - Cochin held that it would be so and the suit would be in time with regard to the breaches which fell within 3 years of the suit. This was in Md. Noohu v. Kathiradima AIR 1953 TC 272. In Rhotas Industries Ltd. v. Maharaja of Kazimbazar China Clay Mines, ILR 1951 (1) Calcutta 420, the defendant firm agreed to make monthly supply to the plaintiff of 5 wagons of china clay for a period of one year beginning from July 1, 1941 and ending with June 30, 1942. Only two wagons were delivered under the contract. The question of limitation arose in that case as against one of the parties who was impleaded in the suit only later. He was impleaded as a party in December 22, 1944 and by December, 22,1941 five monthly deliveries had become due but had been not made. The question then was whether the cause of action in respect of breach of contract for failure to deliver in 1942 arose at the end of each of the months or at the end of the contract period. If it arose at the end of each of the months the suit would be barred in regard to the claim for five months. Referring to the decision in Barmingham v. Smith, 1874 (31) LT 540 the court held that in contracts like the one before it, a breach of contract had been committed as often as a month expired without the proper quantity having been delivered and therefore the cause of action in respect of such breach had accrued then. In that view the claim for damages for non delivery during the months of July to November, 1941 was held to be barred against the party so impleaded later. We are only referring to instances where courts had occasion to consider the severability of performances under the contract based on an appreciation of the scope and nature of the contract. 13. Summing up: If under the terms of a contract parties envisage that from time to time one party is obliged to perform his part of the contract for which he is entitled to receive consideration pro rata from the other party, on non performance on any one occasion there would be no repudiation of the whole contract. 13. Summing up: If under the terms of a contract parties envisage that from time to time one party is obliged to perform his part of the contract for which he is entitled to receive consideration pro rata from the other party, on non performance on any one occasion there would be no repudiation of the whole contract. It is open to the promisee to treat the breach as a severable breach and keep alive the contract so as to enable the performance of the other parts of or the rest of the contract. Cause of action to claim damages for the breach committed may arise to the promisee. Subsequent breaches by the promiser will give rise to subsequent causes of action in respect of such breaches. In a contract whereunder performance is severable despite one or more of such severable breaches the contract may be kept alive without being repudiated for the benefit of the party against whom default has been committed. 14. Having discussed the law on the point we will now come to the facts of the case to consider how far the performances contemplated between the parties here could have been independently made and how far there is scope for holding that if there be breach on any one occasion it will be a severable breach so that if the party against whom the default has been committed intended to keep open the contract despite such breach he could have done so. 15. Ext. A1 is the tender form with conditions attached submitted by the defendant to the Food Corporation of India pursuant to its invitation and on which the parties acted by reason of the acceptance by the Corporation. It is agreed that this governs the relationship of the parties. The work contemplated under the contract was one of unloading / loading of foodgrains bags from / into Railway vagons, trucks, etc., stacking the foodgrains bags, bagging, rebagging, weighment, standardisation, clearing of foodgrains, etc., and transporting of foodgrains from Railway Station to Corporation godowns or vice versa of transporting them from any place to any other place in and around Muzhappilangad and Cannanore. No definite volume of work to be performed daring the currency of the contract was to be guaranteed. No definite volume of work to be performed daring the currency of the contract was to be guaranteed. The particulars given in the Appendix were intended merely to give the tenderers an idea of the approximate quantum of work to facilitate and to make their own assessment for giving quotation in accordance with the conditions of the contract. The tenderers were clearly told that it should be understood that no guarantee was given that all the items of work as shown in the annexure to Tender will be required to be performed. The annexure in the body of the tender form contains terms and conditions governing the contract. Clause IX concerns the period of the contract. That provided that it shall initially be in force for a period of two years with the right to extend for one more year with the right in the Corporation to terminate the contract at any time during the currency of the period. Clause XXI which is of main relevance here required the contractors to carry out services assigned or entrusted to them by the Regional Manager, or an officer acting on his behalf from time to time and such contractors were to abide by all instructions issued to them from time to time by the said officer. That meant that the work that they had to carry out from time to time was such as they were advised or instructed to do. What work they were to do was specified in clause (1) of Part I. Clause XVI concerned payment. Payment was to be made by the concerned District Manager of the Corporation on submission of bills in triplicate. The bills were to be submitted in triplicate duly supported by consignee receipt / or work certificates issued by the Regional Manager or an officer acting on his behalf as the case may be. Clause XV(a) provided that the contractors were to be paid the remuneration ia respect of the services described in Para XX and performed by them at the contract rates. 16. A reading of the terms of the contract would show that it is not as if the contract was for completion of particular work for which the remuneration was fixed but for carrying out work from time to time, which work would be evaluated and payment made from time to time. 16. A reading of the terms of the contract would show that it is not as if the contract was for completion of particular work for which the remuneration was fixed but for carrying out work from time to time, which work would be evaluated and payment made from time to time. Therefore when advice was received in respect of an item of work that had to be completed and the bill thereof could be submitted along with a work certificate. Thereupon payment was to be made. Therefore such work carried on from time to time on instructions or advice was independent though under the same contract. This is a clear instance where there could be successive breaches each such breach arising on non performance on advice on each occasion. In that event cause of action in respect of each breach would arise under Art.55 of the Limitation Act on the date of such breach and the period would be 3 years therefrom. If this be the view the suit would be barred with regard to any breach falling beyond the period of 3 years prior to the date of suit. That there are no breaches within that period is undisputed. In that view there will be no claim which would be within the period of limitation. The suit will stand dismissed for that reason. Therefore for reasons different from that indicated by the court below we agree with its decision that the suit should stand dismissed, the appeal is therefore dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case we direct parties to suffer costs.