M. RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) THE short question that arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioner as a, Class-I officer on the establishment of the karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) has the right to continue in service beyond the age of 55 years. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are as follows: The petitioner was a Class- iii employee in the service of the Corporation prior to 1965. There was an industrial truce between the management of the Corporation and its employees on 20122-3-1965; clause 7 of the said truce reads as follows: "7. Retiring age: The age of superannuation for all the class- iii and IV employees who as on 1-4-1965 do not complete 55 years of age shall be 55 years. However, this shall be extendible up to 58 years subject to medical examination and certification oi physical fitness by an authority to be stipulated by the management for each year of extension of service and subject also to the restrictions if any under any Act for the time being in, force and the rules thereunder. The dates of births as entered in the service registers of the employees upto this date shall be taken as final and shall not be liable to be questioned. ' according to the above clause a person who was holding a Class-II or a Class IV post and who had not completed 55 years of age prior to 1-4-65 was to retire at the age of 55 years, but the corporation could grant extension of service to such persons upto 58 years of age subject to their being medically fit and such extension could be granted to the extent of one year on each occasion. The petitioner was a class-III employee of the corporation prior to 1-4-65. But subsequently he secured promotion not only to class II cadre but also to class- i junior post. As he completed 55 years of age on 6-10-80 he has been asked to retire by the end of October 1980. ( 3 ) THE petitioner claims that in view of the said clause-7, the Corporation was under a duty to grant extension of service to him subject to his producing a medical fitness certificate as required under the said clause. ( 3 ) THE petitioner claims that in view of the said clause-7, the Corporation was under a duty to grant extension of service to him subject to his producing a medical fitness certificate as required under the said clause. Sri h. B. Datar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the benefit of the said clause 7 is being denied to the Petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had become class-I Officer and that the said stand taken by the corporation is untenable, and that the petitioner is entitled to be continued in service till he attains the age of 58 years by extending his service year by year in terms of the said clause. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel relied on the following decisions: S. Lingegouda v. KSRTC WP 538180 dt|- 2-4-80. R. V. Sadashiva Murthy v. "union of India ( (1969) 2mys. L. J. 276), union of India v. R. V. Sadashiva murthy CA 476-478/ 79 dt|- 15-7-69, S. C in which the Supreme court affirmed the judgment of this court in Sadashiva Murthy's case; and lalaram case (1969ser. L. R. 455 ). ( 4 ) IN W. P. 538)80 (1) this court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein under the same clause-7 on the ground that he was a Class-I officer as on 1-4-65. The question which arises for consideration in this writ petition did not arise in that writ petition. In Sadashiva Murthy's case (2) the question for consideration was whether he being a ministerial servant of the Railway Department had the right to continue in service till 60 years of age under rule 21046 (2) (b) of the Indian Railway Fundamental rules on the ground that he held a permanent post prior to 31-5-38. The said claim was upheld by this court and the decision of this court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The said rule on which reliance was placed in that case conferred a right for continuance in service till 60 years of age, on ministerial servants provided they were holding a permanent post prior to 31-3-38. Therefore, the ratio of that decision is not at all apposite for the facts of this case,. In Lalaram's case (4) also the question was similar to the one in Sadashiva murthy's (3) case. Therefore, the ratio of that decision is not at all apposite for the facts of this case,. In Lalaram's case (4) also the question was similar to the one in Sadashiva murthy's (3) case. The petitioner therein was a ministerial servant in the Railway Department at the time when he reached the age of 58 years. He claimed that he had a right to continue in service till 60 years of age under Rule 2046 (2) (b) of the said rules on the ground that he held a permanent post prior to 31-3-38. The claim was resisted on the ground that the petitioner therein was not holding a ministerial post prior to 31-3-38. But the Delhi High Court held that as that petitioner was a ministerial servant when he reached the age of 55 years and he was a permanent railway servant prior to 31-3-38 though he was not a ministerial servant on that day, he was entitled to continue in service till 60 years of age. The ratio of the said decision is also equally inapplicable to the facts of this case. ( 5 ) ON the other hand, the question raised for petitioner is fully covered against him by the judgment of the supreme Court in, Kailash Chandra v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 1346 . Rule 2046 (2) (a) fixed the age of retirement of a ministerial railway servant not governed by sub-clause (b) at 55 years but provided that ordinarily such railway servant should be continued till he reached the age of 60 years if he was found to be efficient. Kailash Chandra claimed that he had the right to continue till 60 years as he continued to be efficient in his work. Negativing the contention the Supreme court held that the right of railway servants under that clause was to remain in service only upto 55 years of age and the grant of extension of service thereafter upto 60 years was purely within the discretion of the railway Department and even if the concerned railway servant was found to be efficient he had no right to continue in service till 60 years of age. ( 6 ) THE ratio of Kailash Chandras case applies on all fours to this case. ( 6 ) THE ratio of Kailash Chandras case applies on all fours to this case. In the present case also, clause-7 of the truce only confers power on the corporation to continue the service of the employees to whom the said clause is applicable beyond 55 years if they are medically fit. It does not create a right in favour of such employees. Therefore, even assuming that clause- 7 is applicable to the petitioner even after he was promoted to class II and thereafter to a class-I post, on the ground that he was holding a class- iii post prior to 1-4-65, he has no right and consequently cannot seek for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Corporation to continue him in service beyond 55 years of age. ( 7 ) I am also convinced that the petitioner has no right to claim any benefit under clause-7 as he is now holding a class-I post. The, truce was entered into under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and obviously it wa,s meant to benefit the persons who answer the description of 'workmen' as defined in the industrial Disputes Act. If the petitioner had continued in class III post it was open to him to ask the corporation to consider his case for extension of his service and it would have been competent for the corporation to consider his case and to grant extension. But once he accepted the promotion to a higher post and ceased to be a class III employee he has no right to claim the benefit of clause-7. ( 8 ) AT this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is agreeable to come down to a class-Ill post and to continue in service till the age of 58 years. This is not a question on which I can express any opinion. Notwithstanding the dismissal of this petition, it is open to the petitioner to make a representation to the Corporation offering to come down to a lower post and to request them to grant extension of service till he reaches the age of 58 years and it is for the Corporation to consider such a request on its merits. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, I make the following order: - rule discharged. Writ petition dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .