JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated July 16, 1974 passed by G.S. Seth, Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, in appeal No. 205 of 1972-73, allowing the appeal and remanding the case to the trial court for decision afresh. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, and have gone through the record. 3. The plaintiff-respondent, Chandrika and others, had filed a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act against Maiku Lal and others. The trial court framed 9 issues of which issue No. 4 was to the effect 'Whether the suit was within the jurisdiction of the court' and issue No. 7 was 'Whether the suit was barred under Section 49 of the U.P. C.H. Act?' The trial court tired issues Nos. 4 and 7 as preliminary issues and held that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. C.H. Act and the court has no jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Chandrika and others, filed an appeal against this decision and the additional Commissioner has held that the trial court had jurisdiction and remanded the case for decision afresh. This order has been challenged in second appeal by Maiku Lal and Ram Prasad. 4. The grounds taken in the second appeal are firstly that the lower appellate court has erred in law in holding that the suit was not barred under Section 49 of the U.P. C.H. Act, secondly that the lower appellate court took a distorted view of the provisions of Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act and wrongly held that a suit in respect of grove was maintainable in the revenue court. 5. It is admitted to both the parties that consolidation has taken place in the village. The consolidation proceedings commenced before December 4, 1959 and were concluded on October 17, 1963 when de-notification under Section 52 of the U.P. C.H. Act took place. The present suit was filed before the revenue court on December 14, 1962. It was alleged in the plaint that the trespass took place on December 8, 1961 and June 10, 1962. Thus the material question for determination is whether a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act can be instituted in a revenue court, while consolidation proceedings are going. 6. It was alleged in the plaint that the trespass took place on December 8, 1961 and June 10, 1962. Thus the material question for determination is whether a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act can be instituted in a revenue court, while consolidation proceedings are going. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to Ram Adhar Singh v. Ramroop Singh, 1968 R.D. 83 in which a learned Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed this question and observed as follows: "Mr. S.B. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has raised two contentions (i) that suits, for recovery of possession of lands, from trespassers do not come within the purview of Section 5, as it now stands, after the 1966 amendment and hence no question of abatement arises (ii) if the amendment section applies to these proceedings, the legislation being one of the state Legislature, is ultra vires inasmuch as it takes away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to deal with the appeal. After a consideration of the contention of both the learned counsels, we are satisfied that the stand taken, on behalf of the respondent on both the points cannot be accepted. We have already extracted the provisions of Section 5 of the Act as it originally stood, and as it now stands, after the amendment in 1966 - No doubt, in Clause (b)(i) of Section 5 as it originally stood, suits for possession of land were mentioned and were also expressly dealt with. But under the amended Section 5, there is no direct reference to suits for possession of land. It is, on this difference in phraseology of the new section, that Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondent has urged that his client's suit being one of recovery of possession instituted under Section 209 of the Abolition Act, is not hit by the provisions of Section 5, as it now stands. Mr. Gupta points out that when in the original Section 5, there was a specific reference to suits for possession of land, which suits were to be stayed, there Section 5 was amended by omitting suits for possession of land. If the intention of the legislature was, Mr. Mr. Gupta points out that when in the original Section 5, there was a specific reference to suits for possession of land, which suits were to be stayed, there Section 5 was amended by omitting suits for possession of land. If the intention of the legislature was, Mr. Gupta points out, that the various types of suits or proceedings which had to be stayed under the old Section 5, have to be declared as abated, under the new section, the Legislature could have referred to all the type of actions which had been dealt with under the original section. No doubt this line of reasoning, on the face of it, may appear to be attractive, but we are not satisfied that there is any merit in that contention. Suits for possession as such has not been expressly referred to in the new Section 5, but in our opinion the expression every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land are comprehensive enough to take in suits for possession is accepted, the court will have necessarily, to adjudicate upon the rights on interest of the plaintiff, in respect of the disputed property, taking into account the claim of the opposite party. Therefore, in our opinion, the suit, instituted by the respondent is covered by the amended Section 5 of the Act." The same view has been taken by the learned Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Badal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1970 R.D. 240 in which the earlier view taken in Abdul Waheed Khan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1968 R.D. 57 that Section 49 of the U.P. C.H. Act did not bar a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act was overruled and it has been held as follows:- "Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act bars a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, if the land in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed is situate in an area under consolidation operations." 7. This view has further been reiterated by another learned Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kishan Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1973 R.D. 196. 8. This view has further been reiterated by another learned Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Kishan Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation, 1973 R.D. 196. 8. In view of the above learned pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the High Court, there is no doubt at all that the present suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. C.H. Act and the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in holding to the contrary. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to challenge the above view, but has referred to the lengthy litigation between the parties. This, however, does not affect the legal position at all. Once consolidation of holdings commenced, as a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act did not lie in a revenue court till the close of the consolidation operations. When consolidation operation is closed, the consolidations authorities are deemed to put the rightful tenure-holder into possession and to remove the trespasser from unlawful possession. If any trespass occurs after the close of the consolidation operations, the aggrieved party can seek remedy in the revenue court. Where trespass is alleged to have taken place while consolidation proceedings were going on, the revenue court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act or to grant any relief. 10. The result is that I hereby allow the second appeal, set aside the Judgment of the lower appellate court and restore the Judgment of the trial court.