M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS plaintiff's second appeal is against the divergent findings of the courts below. The appellant will be referred to as the plaintiff in the course of this order. The appeal is prosecuted by the legal representatives of the plaintiff who died while the litigation was in progress. Respondents 1 to 10 were defendants having the same rank in the trial Court and will be referred to as 'defendants' in the course of this order. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the plaint averments, the plaintiff was the only daughter and sole heir to her father one Sri Gundappa (since deceased) gundappa died on 15-1-1964 at bangalore. He had purchased the suit schedule properties measuring one acre 33 guntas situated at Yelachenahalli, uttarahalli hobli, Bangalore south Taluk, bearing Sy. No. 50|2 from defendants 4 to 10 on 2-8-1961 and his name had thereafter been entered in the R. T. C. Register as well as in the Khata maintained of the revenue lands in the village. After the death of Gundappa the plaintiff was personally cultivating the land and defendants 1 to 10 were interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land as the sole heir of her father Gundappa and therefore, she had prayed for declaration of title based on the saje deed and the fact that she was the sole heir of Gundappa cultivating the land in question personally. Further, she had prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment. ( 3 ) THE trial Court, after recording, evidence and examining several documents, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed in the suit and decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendants 1 to 3 filed an appeal in the court of the Civil Judge, Bangalore, who reversed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had no title to the suit schedule properties and that she was not entitled to an order of injunction both for want of title as well as for not having been in possession of the suit-schedule properties at any time prior to the filing of the suit. It is against the appellate order that the present second appeal is filed. It is against the appellate order that the present second appeal is filed. ( 4 ) A few other facts which require to be noticed are: that defendants 1 to 3 had come up to this Court in R. S-A. 817 of 1970 against the lower appellate Court's order dismissing the, appeal in respect of the same cause of action. That appeal came to be allowed and the matter was remanded to the lower appellate Court -with specific directions to consider certain material evidence which was not considered earlier while dismissing the appeal before it. It is, therefore, a second round of litigation for the parties in this Court. ( 5 ) THE brief facts leading to the dispute are as follows: in or about 1958, defendants 1, 2 and 3 filed an original suit in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore praying for declaration of title to the suit schedule properties as against the untenable claims and stand of defendants 4 to 10. That suit came to be dismissed on 1-8-1961. Immediately thereafter on 2-8-61 the suit sale deed was executed by defendants 4 to 10 in favour of the afroremenrtioned Gundappa, father of the plaintiff. Defendants 1, 2 and 3 had, in the meanwhile, filed R-A. 185 of 1961 in the Court of the Civil judge, Bangalore. In that appeaj, a memorandum of compromise was filed, by which defendants 4 to 10 conceded the title, to the suit schedule properties in favour of the appellants-defendants 1, 2 and 3. Thus the suit filed by the defendants 1 to 3 came to be decreed by the appellate- court. It is necessary to state at this point itself that the, plaintiff's fa,ther gundappa, was - Respondent-8 in the said appeal proceedings, having purchased the suit schedule properties by sale deed of 1961. However, the compromise was recorded and the suit was decreed in the appellate Court and he was deleted as a respondent. It is also necessary to state at this stage that all the respondents 1to 8 in that appeal were represented by a single Counsel. It is, in these circumstances, that the cause of action for os 254 of 1964 in the trial Court arose which, as earlier stated, came to be dismissed by the lower appellate court. ( 6 ) SRI. It is, in these circumstances, that the cause of action for os 254 of 1964 in the trial Court arose which, as earlier stated, came to be dismissed by the lower appellate court. ( 6 ) SRI. G. DAYANANDA,, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged two questions of law as sufficient grounds to set-aside the lower appellate Court's judgment and decree and restore that of the trial court. ( 7 ) FIRSTLY, he has contended that the lower appellate Court erred in law in totally ignoring the, effect qf deletion of respondent-8, namely, the father of the plaintiff in the appeal proceedings in R. A. 185 of 1961. In oihej words, the contention of the learned Counsel is that by virtue of his deletion he was not bound by the decree passed by that Court and therefore, his title to the suit properties under the sale deed of 2-8-61 continued. It is difficult to accept this contention. It is true that defendants 4 to 10 had executed the sale deed in respect of the suit schedule properties on 2-8-1961. But, by that sale, deed, defendants 4 to 10 could only convey such title which they bad to the vendee gundappat. If their title, disappeared on account of the decree passed by the appellate Court in R. A. 185 of 1961 it cannot be said that the plaintiff's father acquired any valid title apparently knowing about the litigation concerning thei suit schedule properties. In fact, this has been the observation made in the course of the order passed by Malimath, J, in the regular Second Appeal mentioned by me earlier. It is equally well settled principle of law that if the vendee's title became defective by the action either of the vendor or any other person, then the only cause of action that the vendee has is against his ostensible vendors who are to, perfect his title. It is evidenced from the facts already narrated that neither Gurvdappa, the father of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff ever called upon their vendors of the suit schedule properties (defendants 4 to 10) to perfect their title. It is evidenced from the facts already narrated that neither Gurvdappa, the father of the plaintiff nor the plaintiff ever called upon their vendors of the suit schedule properties (defendants 4 to 10) to perfect their title. In this view of the master, it cannot be said that the lower appellate Court's view that the plaintiff did not acquire valid title, under the sale deed in question, cannot be said to be incorrect- in law- Therefore the contention of the plaintiff has to be rejected. ( 8 ) IT was next contended by the learned Counsel fo,r the appellant that the lower appellate Court erred in not taking into account several material documents such as Exs. P10, p11, P12, P13 and P17 which were clear evidence of the fact that subsequent to the execution of the sale, deed on, 2-8-1961 by defendants 4 to, 10, possession of the land had been, given to gundappa; and that Gundappa was thereafter cultivating the land and after his death, the plaintiff was in possession and cultivation of the suit schedule properties. It canp. pt be said that the lower appellate Court has not considered these documents. On the other hand, from the judgment of the lower appellate court, it is clear that after reappreciating the evidence recorded by the trial Court, it gave grea,- ter weight to the oral testimony of the 4th defendant who was P. W. 6 in the trial Court and relied upon her statement on oath that even though the sale deed was executed in favour of gundappa, the possession of the suit schedule properties continued with them and that they were all along cultivating the same till they handed over the suit schedule properties to defendants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to the compromise decree in R. A. 165/61. It is a question of the lower appellate court choosing one set of documentary. evidence not corroborated by the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff as to possession and personal cultivation! as against the qther set of documentary evidence corroborated by the evidence of the defendants themselves and their witnesses. If the lower appellate Court has chosen to believe the latter, it cannot be said that there is non-appreciation of material evidence by the lower appellate court. Therefore, this contention also is rejected. as against the qther set of documentary evidence corroborated by the evidence of the defendants themselves and their witnesses. If the lower appellate Court has chosen to believe the latter, it cannot be said that there is non-appreciation of material evidence by the lower appellate court. Therefore, this contention also is rejected. ( 9 ) LASTLY, a strenuous attempt was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate court should have taken into account the conduct of parties in R. A. 185 of 1961. I have perused the original records and certified copies of documents produced and marked as exhibits in the suit. I have already pointed out earlier that all the respondents in that appeal were represented by a single Counsel. Of the eight respondents the first five have signed the compromise petition. In that circumstance, while the learned Counsel remained on record for those who had signed the compromise petition, retired for respondents who had not signed the compromise petition including respondent-8 who had been made a formal respondent as he had purchased the suit schedule properties in question. The learned Counsel does not appear to have raised any objection whatsoever for the deletion of respondent-8 as a necessary and proper party in the appeal nor any attempt wag made by respondent-8 or his legal representative, the plaintiff, to get that order set aside in appropriate proceedings. Having not done so the right cannot be revived in this second appeal. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons staged abbve, i do not think the questions raised for consideration in this second appeal have any merit. The same is rejected. But, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. --- *** --- .