Jagdish Chander Soni v. Jabarmal Lodha — 1980 DIGILAW 313 (RAJ)

M.C. JAIN, J.—This is an appeal by the defendant-tenant against the judgment and decree dated July 24, 1980, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, affirming the judgment and decree of the Munsif City, Jodhpur, whereby the plaintiffs suit for ejectment was decreed. 2. The plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for eviction against the defendant appellant on the ground of sub-letting, nuisance, and also on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence by taking on rent another house in which he has started living. The learned Munsif decided the issues of sub-letting and acquisition of vacant possession of a suitable residence in favour of the plaintiff. However, the issue of nuisance was decided against the plaintiff. Consequently, the learned Munsif decreed the plaintiffs suit. The defendant went in appeal, which was ultimately heard by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, who affirmed the finding on issue No. 1 relating to acquisition of vacant possession of a suitable residence by the tenant. However, the finding on issue relating to sub-letting was reversed. In view of the finding on issue No. 1, the decree of eviction was upheld. It may also be stated here that during the pendency of appeal, the defendant submitted an application for amendment of the written statement. The defendant sought amendment that he had vacated the second set of premises taken on rent by him and has again started living in the disputed premises. There was one more amendment sought in the written statement, but it is not necessary to mention the same as it has not been pressed before me. 3. The learned Additional District Judge rejected the application for amendment by his order dated May 28, 1980. Dis-satisfied with the Judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 4. I have heard Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant and Shri L. R. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. 5. Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the appellant, has raised the following three contentions before me:- (1) that the courts below have misconstrued the provision contained in sec. 4. I have heard Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant and Shri L. R. Mehta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. 5. Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the appellant, has raised the following three contentions before me:- (1) that the courts below have misconstrued the provision contained in sec. 13(1) (i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and have wrongly held that the plaintiffs case is covered in the ground specified in clause (i) of subsection (1) of section 13 of the Act that the tenant has acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence. The expression "acquired vacant possession" of a suitable residence cannot be made applicable to the premises taken on rent by the tenant. In this expression would only fall premises over which the tenant acquires ownership or title and not the premises taken on rent ; (2) that the plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence and the finding regarding suitability arrived at by the courts below is erroneous; and (3) that the learned Additional District Judge erred in rejecting the defendants application for amendment of the written statement. Subsequent event regarding vacation of the new tenanted premises by the defendant and coming back into possession of the disputed premises, should be taken notice of and for which the defendants application for amendment ought to have been allowed. 6. I shall be dealing with each of the above contentions one by one. 7. As regards the first contention Shri Rewa Chand urged that the word "acquired" occurring in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act, should be construed in the sense of acquisition of ownership or title and not acquisition by taking premises on rent. He submitted that the word acquired" should take its meaning from its previous word "built". Under clause(i) a ground for eviction would arise in favour of the land-lord in case the tenant builds a suitable residence or acquires vacant possession of a suitable residence. He may acquire a suitable residence either by way of purchase, succession, gift, will or any other way whereby he may get title over the property. In support of his contention he placed reliance on Dwarkdas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. He may acquire a suitable residence either by way of purchase, succession, gift, will or any other way whereby he may get title over the property. In support of his contention he placed reliance on Dwarkdas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (1), Sasadhar Chandra Day vs. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi(2) and Kanuri Sri Sankara Rao vs. Kanuri Rajyalakshamma (3). 8. Shri Mehta, on the other hand, submitted that the word "acquired" should be given its ordinary meaning. It is a word of widest amplitude, which may even mean coming into possession". He also urged that the word should be given meaning in the context of the enactment and the object and policy behind it. Reliance was placed by him on Nathani Shivankers Ghanshyam Das v Shah Dhanalal Maneklal (4) and Soni Jagjivan Narsi v. Manchhaben Odhavji (5) He also referred to Swatantra Singh v. Nagendra Nath(6) and Ram Gopal v. Shanti Lal (7), Smt. Radhabai v. State of Maharashtra (8) and Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (9). 9. For the proper appreciation and adjudication of the controversy, I may read the relevant provision : — "Section—13—Eviction of tenants—(l)Notwithstanding anything contained in any law of contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied — xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (i) that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence." 10. It would appear from the above clause that in order to pass a decree in favour of a land-lord, the court has to satisfy that the tenant has either built a suitable residence or acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence or has been allotted a suitable residence A suit for eviction by the land lord would be maintainable against the tenant, if any of the above three conditions are satisfied, as embodied in clause (i). It would further appear that the three conditions are varying conditions. Even when a suitable residence is allotted to the tenant the landlord acquires a right to sue for eviction. Allotment of a suitable residence furnishes a good cause of action to the landlord for eviction. It would further appear that the three conditions are varying conditions. Even when a suitable residence is allotted to the tenant the landlord acquires a right to sue for eviction. Allotment of a suitable residence furnishes a good cause of action to the landlord for eviction. Similarly, if a suitable residence is built by the tenant, it will also furnish a good cause of action to the landlord for eviction. In the same manner if a tenant acquires vacant possession of a suitable residence, then also the landlord can maintain an action for eviction. The question, however, arises as to when it can be said that the tenant has acquired vacant possession. It may be stated that possession has to be distinguished from mere occupation and further possession has to be a lawful possession, but that is not the controversy in the present case. The entire controversy centres round on the interpretation or construction of word "acquired". If a wider interpretation is given to the word "acquired", it will include acquisition by way of lease and if narrower and restricted meaning is given to the word "acquired", then it can be said that it will include acquisition of possession in any manner whereby ownership or title vests in the tenant. It may be pointed out that the word "acquired" may take its shape and colour from the context of the enactment, that is, from the object and policy behind the provision. No rigidity in giving meaning to the word "acquired" can be adopted. The word "acquired" in its ordinary grammatical sense or in its ordinary every day meaning may mean to receive or to come into possession " The word "acquired" as occurring in clause (1), is not in any way inhibited in its sense, so it is not necessary to put a restricted meaning on this word. The three words built, acquired, and allotted further go to point out that these words are not of one and the same specie and as such the word "acquired" can be given its widest connotation. If the meaning to be given to this word, is viewed in the light of the object to the provision, then as well the word should be given its ordinary meaning. If the meaning to be given to this word, is viewed in the light of the object to the provision, then as well the word should be given its ordinary meaning. The object behind this provision appears to be that if the tenant acquires vacant possession of a suitable residence in any manner, then he may be required to vacate the premises, so that the landlord may let it out to some one also. The abject behind the provision is, as is the object of law itself that paucity and shortage of accommodation may properly be dealt with. If the tenant has taken the premises on rent or on lease, there does not appear to be any justification to allow the tenant to continue with the possession of the original tenanted premises. It may be pointed out that suitability of residence, whether built, acquired or allotted, is no doubt an important consideration, in the absence whereof the landlord will not have any right to maintain an action for eviction. But in case the tenant builds, acquires vacant possession or has been allotted a suitable residence, then certainly the landlord will have a right to sue the tenant for eviction. From the scheme of the section, it would reveal that a proper balance has been struck between the interest of the landlord as well as the tenant. Thus, having regard to the object, policy and scheme of the law, in my opinion, the word "acquired" occurring in clause (i), should be given a wide connotation, so as to cover the taking of premises on rent by the tenant, which may be suitable for him for his residence. I shall presently considering the authorities referred to by both the parties, but having regard to the nature of the provision, viewed in the light of the scheme and the object thereof, narrower meaning is not called for to be given to the word "acquired". The dominant idea appears to be that the tenant roust have a suitable residence in any of the three ways and one of the ways may be by taking another suitable premises on rent which will certainly be covered within the expression "acquiring vacant possession of". 11. In Dwarkadas Shriniwas vs. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. The dominant idea appears to be that the tenant roust have a suitable residence in any of the three ways and one of the ways may be by taking another suitable premises on rent which will certainly be covered within the expression "acquiring vacant possession of". 11. In Dwarkadas Shriniwas vs. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (supra) their lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provisions contained in Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. I have been referred to paragraphs 26 and 27 of the report. It may be stated that the observations made in these paras, do not in any way help the appellant. This proposition that the expression acquisition" has the concept of vesting of title in the State, was not approved and it has been observed that the true concept of the expression "acquisition" in our Constitution as well as in the Government of India Act is the one enunciated by Rich, J. and the majority of the Court in 68-Com-WLR (G) and it was further observed that "With great respect I am unable to accept the narrow view that "acquisition" necessarily means acquisition of title in whole or part of the property." It was further observed that "The word "acquisition" has quite a wide concept, meaning the procuring of property or the taking of it permanently or temporarily. It does not necessarily imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the property taken possession of." 12. The other two cases cited by Shri Rewa Chand, relate to the interpretation placed on section 14 (1)(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act provided that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. There is an explanation appended to sub-section (1) and further sub-section (2) excluded the operation of sub-section (1) in certain situations. It is pertinent to note here that section 14 (1) conferred rights on a female Hindu to full ownership over the property which was possessed by her, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. It is in that context it was observed that the word "acquired" must be given the widest possible connotation. It is pertinent to note here that section 14 (1) conferred rights on a female Hindu to full ownership over the property which was possessed by her, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. It is in that context it was observed that the word "acquired" must be given the widest possible connotation. The explanation being restricted to sub section (1), recourse to it was not intended by the legislature to be taken for construing sub-section (2) of section 14. In my opinion both these judgments are not of any assistance in construing the word "acquired" occurring in sub-section 13(1)(i). 13. Shri Mehta has cited two direct decisions of the Gujarat High Court, wherein a similar provision came up for construction and the provision was extended to the acquisition of premises by the tenant on rent. Reference may be made to Nathani Shivan Kumar Ghanshyam das v. Shah Dhana Lal Maneklal (supra). There was similar provision contained in section 13(1)(i) of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Under that provision it is necessary to prove that the tenant had acquired vacant possession of suitable residence for him. It was observed in that case that "possession means legal possession Any occupation by any person of any premises does not amount to possession. Possession connotes transfer of interest in the premises. Unless, therefore, there is evidence to show that there is transfer of interest it cannot be said that the tenant is in possession of a house or bungalow. The second ingredient which is required to be proved by sec. 13(1)(i) is that the defendant must have acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence. Suitability of a residence may depend upon the extent of living area available, the size of the family which is to be accom-modated therein and the availability of facilities or amenities therein. Any temporary occupation does not amount to residence. The expression "residence" used in section 13 (1) (i) means, residence with the object of settling down. Unless there is evidence to show that a tenant has shifted to a new premises in order to settle down, it is extremely difficult for the Court to hold that he has shifted for residence and obtained it for that purpose." In that case on facts it was found that the two ingredients have not been proved, so the decree was set aside. It would appear that the provision has been made applicable to the acquisition of new premises by the tenant on rent. 14. In the other case of the Gujarat High Court, namely, Soni Jagjivan Narsi v. Manchhaben Odhavji (supra) it was observed that if evidence shows that the new premises which a tenant has taken on rent are sufficient to accommodate him and all his dependants, then certainly he can be evicted under section 13 (1) (i) of the Act. But if the new premises are not sufficient for accommodating his large family and if he himself resides in his new premises and if his dependants continue to occupy or reside in his old premises, he cannot be evicted under section 13 (1) (i) of the Bombay Rent Control Act, because his new premises are not "suitable" for accommodating his entire family. 15. That apart, so far as the legal position is concerned, it would appear that the provision contained in section 13 (1) (i) has been extended to a case where the tenant takes on rent new premises which may be suitable for his residence and the word "acquired" includes even such a situation within its embrace, ambit or scope taking of second set of tenanted premises. 16. Ramgopal v. Shanti Lals case (supra) cited by Shri Mehta, is a case wherein the provision contained in section 12(1) (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961) came up for interpretation. That provision is similar to the provision contained in section 13 (1) (i) of the Act. In that case the provision was interpreted in the light of the object and scheme of the Act. That was a case where the tenant had obtained vacant possession of his own house in the same city, though that house was subsequently sold by the tenant prior to the filing of the suit. It was on the basis of the sale of house by the tenant the availability of the ground under clause (1) was contested by the tenant. That is not the case of the tenant taking another set of premises on rent. The other case cited by Shri Mehta reported at page 544 in Swatantra Singh v. Nagendra Nath, in the same volume, is related to the allotment of a Government quarter to the tenant. 17. That is not the case of the tenant taking another set of premises on rent. The other case cited by Shri Mehta reported at page 544 in Swatantra Singh v. Nagendra Nath, in the same volume, is related to the allotment of a Government quarter to the tenant. 17. In Smt. Radhabai vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court was concerned with the expression of the word "acquired any land by transfer or partition" occurring in the amended sub-sec. (7) of sec. 38 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958. Their Lordships in para 16 observed as under: — "If the word "acquire" is assigned its more generic connotation, namely, that it means to receive or to come into possession of, then in the context of transfer or partition, that word can be given its full meaning without any violence to language used. In our opinion, there was no difficulty therefore in reading the word "acquire" to convey that meaning in the new context of the amended Act, that is to say, in the context of partition. On the other hand, what the learned Judge has done is to allow the meaning of the word "acquire" to remain the same, although the context is changed and to seek to reconcile the language used by giving a new connotation to the word "partition", and in this, as we shall presently show, the learned Judge missed the whole purpose and object of the enactment. In our opinion, there was no anomaly created by the use of the word "acquire" even after the addition of the words, "or partition" in sub-section (7) of Section 38. The proper construction of the amended section should be to read the word acquire" in a wider sense which it is capable of bearing in the context of the addition of the words "or partition", and if so read, the whole meaning of the statute becomes clear." 18. The above observations only reinforce the principle that the word has to be given meaning in the context of the enactment without losing sight of the whole purpose, and object of the enactment. 19. In Badri Prasad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provision of sec. The above observations only reinforce the principle that the word has to be given meaning in the context of the enactment without losing sight of the whole purpose, and object of the enactment. 19. In Badri Prasad vs. Smt. Kanso Devi (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provision of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and in that connection observed that the word "acquired" in sub-section (1) has also to be given the widest possible meaning. This would be so be cause of the language of the Explanation which makes sub-sec. (1) applicable to acquisition of property in the manners mentioned therein. 20. How and in what manner a particular word in a particular provision of any law, is to be construed would necessarily depend on the purpose and object of the enactment and the policy behind the same. Words cannot be construed divorced from the object, policy and scheme of the Act and further if the words can be given their literal meaning and it is consonance with the object of the Act, then, in my opinion, such connotation is to be given to the word This is the golden rule of interpretation that the words should be given their ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning, as such an interpretation causes no violence to the language used. There does not appear to be any reason, whatsoever, to put restricted or narrow meaning to the word "acquired" occurring under section 13 (1) (i) of the Act, and if this word is construed in the light of the go den rule or litera legis, then in my opinion, the word "acquired" would cover within its ambit taking of premises on rent by the tenant, which may be suitable for his residence. In the light of what I have considered above I am unable to accept the contention of Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the appellant, that the present case is not covered within the expression "acquired" vacant possession". In the light of what I have considered above I am unable to accept the contention of Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the appellant, that the present case is not covered within the expression "acquired" vacant possession". It is not in dispute in the present case that the defendant tenant took another set of premises on rent and it has been stated at the Bar that the second set of premises were taken on rent in the year 1977 and the same continued to be occupied till February 1980 and were vacated at that time and the original tenanted premises were re-occupied It is entirely a different question as to whether the second set of premises taken on rent were suitable or not and whether the plaintiff has been able to prove that the second set of premises were suitable for the residence of the tenant. So far as the first contention of Shri Rewachand, learned counsel for the appellant, is concerned, I do not find any force in it. 21. Next I take up the second contention regarding suitability of the second set of premises. It may be stated here that both the courts have concurrently found that the second set of premises taken on rent by the tenant, were suitable for his residence, so Shri Mehta urged that it is a finding of fact and it is not open to be challenged in second appeal and reliance has been placed by Shri Mehta on the two decisions of this Court in Ved Prakash v. Anand Prakash (10) and Dr. Ram Chandra Saxena v. Chail Behari Lal(ll). Shri Rewachand tried to meet this contention by arguing that the finding recorded regarding suitability is based on no evidence inasmuch as the burden of it was on the plaintiff and the plaintiff has utterly failed to discharge the burden, The plaintiff has not deposed in his statement that the second set of premises were at all suitable to the tenant for his residence and he also submitted that the courts below were wrong in placing reliance on the previous statement of the tenant (Ex 6), which has been confronted to the tenant in his cross-examination, wherein the tenant has explained his statement. I have been carried through the evidence of the parties consisting of the plaintiffs statement as P. W. 1 Rangroop Mal Lodha, P. W. 2 Varvir Prakash and DW. I have been carried through the evidence of the parties consisting of the plaintiffs statement as P. W. 1 Rangroop Mal Lodha, P. W. 2 Varvir Prakash and DW. 1 Jagdish (defendant). I have also been carried through the findings recorded by both the courts below on the question of suitability of residence. Having gone through the evidence and the findings I find force in the contention of Shri Mehta that the findings recorded on the question of suitability of residence are, the findings of fact and it cannot be challenged in the second appeal. It cannot be said that the findings is based on no evidence. Had that been the case, this court would have certainly interfered with that finding. After going through the evidence. 1 am clearly of the opinion that there is evidence on record to the effect that the premises, which were taken on rent by the defendant were suitable for his residence. The learned courts below have examined the question in" the light of the plaintiffs statement and the statements of his witnesses and also in the light of the statement made by the defendant himself in his previous statement with which he has been confronted and the correctness of which has been admitted by him in his statement recorded in this case. Apart from, as to whether such a finding of fact is open to challenge in this appeal or not,T have myself examined the evidence led by the parties. It is true that the plaintiff in his statement has not stated that the second set of premises were suit able to the tenant. In his cross-examination, a question was put to him as to whether the disputed premises were insufficient for the defendant or not. While answering this question, he stated that he cannot say whether the disputed premises were insufficient or not. But he further stated that the defendant did tell him that the accommodation in dispute is short and now the defendant has taken a new house on rent at the rate of Rs. 275/- per month. The plaintiff denied that the disputed premises are being made use of by the tenant by putting his goods. So far as the question of suitability is concerned, there is a clear statement of Varvir Singh (P. W2.). 275/- per month. The plaintiff denied that the disputed premises are being made use of by the tenant by putting his goods. So far as the question of suitability is concerned, there is a clear statement of Varvir Singh (P. W2.). In his examination-in-chief he categorically stated that the new house taken on rent by the defendant, is sufficient for him. A lengthy cross-examination was directed, in which this witness has given the description of the rooms taken on rent in the second set of premises It may be stated that what is more significant in the present case, is that the tenant himself in his earlier statement (Ex.6) admitted that the new set of premises taken on rent by him. were sufficient for him. In that statement he gave out elaborate description of the new set of premises. Having given the details, he stated that the new house was sufficient for the residence of his family. It may be stated that the statement Ex. 6 was recorded on July 20, 1978, and his statement in this case was recorded on May 7. 1979, much time has not passed. In his statement in this case in cross-examination he volunteered after admitting the correctness of portion A to B in Ex. 6, that he is facing difficulty in connection with the studies of his children and in storing the goods, so both the premises put together, are sufficient for him. To me, it appears that the statement, which has been voluntarily made, has only been made to come out from the admitted position, as stated in portion A to B in Ex 6 The explanation offered is difficult to believe. When once the tenant has admitted that the new set of premises are suitable for the residence of his family, then it cannot be said that the same is rendered insufficient. Thus, even on facts I concur with the findings arrived at by the courts below. 22. Lastly it is contended that the learned first appellate court was wrong in rejecting the defendants application for amendment and the subsequent event vacating the second set of premises and re-occupation of the original premises should have taken notice of and the defendant should have been allowed to introduce this subsequent even in his written statement. 22. Lastly it is contended that the learned first appellate court was wrong in rejecting the defendants application for amendment and the subsequent event vacating the second set of premises and re-occupation of the original premises should have taken notice of and the defendant should have been allowed to introduce this subsequent even in his written statement. The application for amendment has been rejected and in my opinion, rightly, on the ground that the cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff and now the plaintiff cannot be divested of the same and reliance has been placed by the learned Additional District on a authority of this court in Dr. Rajeswar Dayal vs. Dhan Kumar(l2). Shri Rewa Chand urged that the cause of action should have continued to exist to the date of the decree and not only to the date of the suit and when a cause of action ceased to exist till the date of the decree, no decree for eviction could be passed, and so such a subsequent event can be taken notice of. It is true that subsequent event at times can be taken notice of and the amendment in embodying or introducing such a subsequent event, can be allowed But here the question is as to whether the cause of action should subsist till the date of the decree or the plaintiff can bring the suit on the basis of cause of action, which has once accrued to him This court is consistently taking this view that the cause of action, which has accrued to the plaintiff landlord, by seeking amendment, the plaintiff-landlord cannot be divested of that cause of action. The view taken in Dr. Rajaswar Dayals case (supra), has further been reitara-ted in Ved Prakash vs. Anand Prakash (supra). In that case the house constructed by the defendant, was sold during the pendency of the suit. It was contended that the case does not fall within the ambit of section 13(1)(i) of the Act and the defendant can still claim protection under section 13 of the Act. After extracting the relevant passage from Dr. Rajaswar Dayals case (supra), to which agreement was expressed, the contention was turned down and it was held that the suit was rightly decreed. A similar contention was advanced in Ramgopals case (supra). After extracting the relevant passage from Dr. Rajaswar Dayals case (supra), to which agreement was expressed, the contention was turned down and it was held that the suit was rightly decreed. A similar contention was advanced in Ramgopals case (supra). In this case a house was sold by the tenant before filing of the suit for eviction. It was hold that the tenant is liable to vacate and reliance was placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Gappulal vs. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji(13) and Gajanan Dattrya vs. Sherbanu Hosang Patel(14). It may be stated that a bare perusal of sec. 13(1) (i) will make it clear that after a particular act is performed before filing of the suit, as contemplated under sec. 13(l)(i) of the Act, then it will furnish a cause of action to the plaintiff. If such a construction is not placed, then the tenant by his subsequent or act conduct may at any time defeat the landlords action. Suppose the tenant sublet the premises or has caused nuisance in the premises or has materially altered the premises, then he can subsequently defeat the action of the land lord by vacating the sub lessee or by removal of the nuisance or by bringing the premises in its original condition. In my opinion, once the tenant acts in a manner, as provided in the different clauses giving the landlord a right to sue, then by subsequent act or conduct, the tenant cannot divest the landlord from that right. In this view of the matter, the subsequent event cannot be taken notice of, as the tenant has already incurred the liability for eviction on account of his own act of acquiring vacant possession of a suitable residence. In the view, as considered above, the application for amendment has been rightly rejected by the lower appellate court. 23. No other point survives for consideration. 24. In the result, this appeal has no force, so it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. In view of the fact that caveat was entered. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that the appellant may be given reasonable time for handing over the vacant possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff-landlord. Four months time is allowed to the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff landlord from today. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, urged that the appellant may be given reasonable time for handing over the vacant possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff-landlord. Four months time is allowed to the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff landlord from today. The time is allowed subject to the submission of undertaking by the appellant that he will handover the vacant possession to the plaintiff within four months from today.