D. K. KAPUR ( 1 ) TWO writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution being C. W. No. 713-D/1963 and C. M. No. 872-D/68 were heard and disposed of together by means of a judgment dated 12th July, 1971, delivered by the learned single Judge, Tatachari, J. (as his Lordship then was ). These petitions both related to land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by means of notification dated 13th November, 1959, under Section 4 of the Act and another notification dated 13th November, 1962 under Section 6 of the Act. The land covered by the latter notification measured 9 Bighas and 18 Biswas situated in Khasra No. 359/1, situated in village Bahapur, Tehsil and District Delhi, out of this an area measuring 3 Bighas and 14 Biswas related to the two petitions. ( 2 ) THE background of the case is that M/s. Patiala Flour Mills Co. (P) Ltd. , had wanted to set up a flour mill in the State of Delhi and for this purpose they wanted to purchase some land at Okhla. Originally, they had wanted to purchase some other land measuring about 20 acres, but the same was already subject to an acquisition notice under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Eventually, the Ministry of Industry allowed the flour mill to be set up in plot Nos. 358 and 359 known as Basheshar Nath Garden situated in the Kalkaji Road adjoining the Okhla industrial estate. This land was included in a notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but was released from acquisition. After it had been released, a 99 year lease was taken by M/s Patiala Flour Mills from the owners Shri Panna Lal son of Lala Basheshar Nath and Shri Shiv Shankar Dass son of Lala Mithan Lal and the company proceeded to set up the flour mill. On 13th November, 1959, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in relation to an area measuring 34,070 acres which stated that the land described in the annexure to the notification was required by the Government for a public purpose, namely, the Planned Development of Delhi. On 13th November, 1959, a notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in relation to an area measuring 34,070 acres which stated that the land described in the annexure to the notification was required by the Government for a public purpose, namely, the Planned Development of Delhi. It was in furtherance of this notification that a notification was issued under Section 6 acquiring the aforementioned area of 9 Bighas and 18 Biswas out of which 3 Bighas and 14 Biswas was included in the property leased by Shri Panna Lal and Shri Shiv Shankar Dass to M/s. Patiala Flour Mills Co. (P) Ltd. ( 3 ) THE acquisition proceedings were challenged by the aforementioned Writ petitions on various grounds. Firstly, it was pointed out that previously also this land had been acquired and then released. Secondly, it was pointed out that there was nothing to show that this area of 3 Bighas and 14 Biswas was required for a public purpose. These contentions were not accepted by the learned Single Judge. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, another contention raised by the petitioners was accepted. This was to the effect that the notification under Section 4 dated 13th November, 1959, was not proclaimed at convenient places in the locality in accordance with Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was concluded that the petitioners were not aware of the notification and hence could not file objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The counter affidavit in reply to the petition had stated that the said notification under Section 4 was duly published in the Official Gazette and a public notice of tile substance thereof was given at all convenient places in the locality. It was also stated that a very wide publicity had been given to the said notification. The learned single Judge held, following the judgment in Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074 , that a public notice of the substance of the notification was to be given at convenient places in the locality and this was a mandatory provision and a non-compliance rendered the notification void and also the acquisition proceedings following the said notification. This contention was accepted by the learned single Judge who quashed the acquisition on this point. This contention was accepted by the learned single Judge who quashed the acquisition on this point. ( 5 ) IT may be pointed out that as part of the challenge to the application of the notification, it was also urged that there was a temple situated on a portion of the land acquired which meant that the notification did not apply to this part of the land. The learned single Judge held that this was a disputed question of fact as the existence of the temple was denied, so no decision was recorded on this point. ( 6 ) HAVING summarised the conclusions of the learned single Judge, it is necessary now to set out the substance of the matter, as a plan appended to the writ petition makes the factual position fairly clear. The land taken on lease by the Patiala Flour Mills Co. (P) Ltd. , (who were the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition No. 713-D/63), was taken on lease from the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition No. 872-D/63, who may be described as the owners. On the plot as a whole, a flour mill has been constructed. The portion which is the subject-matter of the acquisition is the front portion which adjoins the road. The rest of the plot on which the flour mill is constructed has largely been left as it is. The obvious purpose of the acquisition is the widening of the road which is described as the road to Kalkaji Temple in the plans so we can take it that the purpose of making the acquisition is the widening of the road and the main flour mill is left unaffected. Of course, a portion of the land on which there is some construction is also involved in the acquisition proceedings. Even if the whole of the land was acquired, it would not make much difference to the legal position because if the notification under Section 4 is good, it would apply equally to all the land. The learned single Judge held that the notification was ineffective because it was not given publicity as required by Section 4 of the Act, which in turn requires the Collector to give a public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. The learned single Judge held that the notification was ineffective because it was not given publicity as required by Section 4 of the Act, which in turn requires the Collector to give a public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. ( 7 ) ALTHOUGH the learned single Judge has held the notification to be had because it was not shown as to where the public notice was given, we are of the opinion that this judgment cannot be sustained on this ground. The notification in question related to an area of 34,070 acres all around Delhi. The same notification has been attacked in numerous cases and there are a number of reported cases concerning the same. There is no doubt that the area was about 500 square- miles and thousands of objections under Section 5-A were filed in relation to the same notification. It is not possible to say that the notification is bad merely because details of where the public notice was given have not been furnished in the affidavit in reply to the writ petition. It may also tee mentioned that the notification was issued in November, 1959, and the writ petition was filed in 1963, so it would be very difficult to give details of where exactly the public notice was given after the lapse of so many years. The learned single Judge dealt with the point in the following words: "the petitioners averred clearly in paragraph 20 and ground No. 5 of their writ petition filed as early as 12-9-1963 that as, far as their knowledge went, public notice of the substance of the notification was not caused to be given at any place in the locality with which the petitioners were concerned. Yet, beyond a bare assertion that public notice of the substance of the notification, was given at all convenient places in the concerned localities, no particulars have been given in the counter-affidavit or in the reply to the rejoinder as regards the convenient places at which and the manner in which the public notice of the substance of the notification was caused to be given, so far as the petitioners land was concerned. Such a bare assertion can hardly be regarded as proof of compliance on the part of the land acquisition authorities with the mandatory provision in Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Such a bare assertion can hardly be regarded as proof of compliance on the part of the land acquisition authorities with the mandatory provision in Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In the absence of such proof, which the respondents alone could produce, the contention of the petitioners has to be accepted, and it has to be held that the notification under Section 4 (Annexure J) dated 13-11-1959, and the notification (Annexure K) dated 13-11-1962, under Section 6 of the Act, as well as the further acquisition proceedings taken pursuant to the said notifications including award were all illegal and void, so far as the extent of 3. bighas 14 biswas in Khasra No. 359/1 belonging to the petitioners was concerned. "the objection to this conclusion is twofold. Firstly, the very same notification has been upheld in numerous cases and in fact the area of 500 square miles covered by the same notification shows that it could not be physically possible to give a public notice at convenient, places beyond a limited extent. If a small plot of land is acquired, no doubt a notice would be given on that very land or to the owners thereof. However, if a very large area of land is acquired, then the notice has necessarily to be given, by a different type of publicity. ( 8 ) THIS very notification, i. e. , the was under Section 4 made on 13th November, 1959 was the subject-matter of several proceedings in which objections were filed under Section 5a. One of the points raised in those cases was that only one notification could be filed under Section 6 and thereafter the notification under Section 4 (1) was exhausted. This led to the passing of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1987, which was challenged before the Supreme Court in Udai Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138 . The Amending Act which was retroactive was held to be intra vires which meant that different reports under Section 5-A could be covered by different notifications under Section 6 and the same were valid for the period mentioned in the Act. In another judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, Aflatoon v. Lt Governor, Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 . the history of the self-same notification as given in the judgment is self-explanatory. In another judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, Aflatoon v. Lt Governor, Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 . the history of the self-same notification as given in the judgment is self-explanatory. It was observed as follows : "as regards the second contention that there was inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, and that the appellants and writ petitioners were deprived of the appreciation in value of the land in which they were interested, it may be noted that about 6,000 objections were filed under Section 5a by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1-967 challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter. "thus, it would clearly appear that at least 6,000 objections were filed under Section 5a referring to the same notification under section 4. In addition to this, learned counsel for the State has produced before us a very large number of objections filed under section 5a concerning land adjacent to the one involved in the present Writ petitions, i. e. , relating to the same area of village Bahapur. There is no doubt that the court can take judicial note of the fact that objections have been filed by others from the same area which would largely establish that a public notice was given because otherwise nobody could have filed objections. We cannot, therefore, accept the conclusion of the learned single Judge that there is no proof of a public notice being given. ( 9 ) IN addition to this; it may be pointed out that the court was dealing with a writ petition and a disputed question of fact, as serious as the one now in contemplation, could not have been decided merely on an interpretation of the affidavit filed in reply to the writ petition. If this fact had to be adjudicated upon, it would require a great deal of evidence, and no evidence was led. It is therefore not possible to conclude that a public notice was not given in the case of the notification dated 13th November, 1959, and we would reverse the judgment on this point. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the writ petitioners, respondents in this case. It is therefore not possible to conclude that a public notice was not given in the case of the notification dated 13th November, 1959, and we would reverse the judgment on this point. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the writ petitioners, respondents in this case. has urged that even otherwise there was an estoppel in operation against, the acquisition because this very land had previously been released from a previous acquisition. We are not satisfied that the release of the land from a particular acquisition means that the land cannot he acquired for some other purpose such as the Planned Development of Delhi. Particularly as the land is now required for widening the road. If Delhi is to expand, it necessary follows that roads to far-flung places have to be widened. The free flow of traffic to far-off places has become a necessity because of the expansion of the town. Nobody could imagine that the expansion of Delhi would require wider roads at a distant place, but since the plan requires the expansion of the city, it would follow that the roads have to be widened to give proper access to places which were previously not even inhabited. The release of the property in 1958 could, therefore, not operate as an estoppel for a future need which arose as a result of the Planned Development of Delhi. The conclusion of the learned single Judge that a future public requirement cannot be covered by the release from acquisition at an earlier date is, therefore, unobjectionable and we uphold the same. There is also a conclusion by the learned single Judge that the question whether there is a temple or not cannot be gone into in a writ petition. In this rase, the alleged temple is supposed to exist inside the area which has been acquired which adjoins the road. As it happens, the whole area is covered by the factory. It does not appear to as that the temple, if any, is anything more than a private building. The exclusion of land from the operation of the notification dated 13th November, 1959, is stated as follows : "it is hereby notified that the land measuring 34070 acres and marked with blocks Nos. It does not appear to as that the temple, if any, is anything more than a private building. The exclusion of land from the operation of the notification dated 13th November, 1959, is stated as follows : "it is hereby notified that the land measuring 34070 acres and marked with blocks Nos. A to T and X m the enclosed map(annexure I) and the description of which has been given in annexure II, excepting the following land in the blocks referred herein. (a) Government land marked as evacuee land; (b) the land already notified, either under Section 4 or under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, for any Government scheme, (c) the land already notified under Section 4 or under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for House Building Cooperative Societies mentioned in Annexure III; (d) the land under graveyards, tombs. shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and wakf property; is likely to be acquired for the above purpose. "the land excluded is the land under graveyards, religious institutions and wakf property. This refers not to private temples but to places of a public religious nature. It is nowhere made out in the case of the petitioners that there was a public temple on the land in question. There is a difference between a shrine and a private temple. Many Hindus may use part of their property for religious purposes, but they do not necessarily become a shrine nor can it be said that they are attached to religious institutions or become wakf property. The exclusion from the notification is obviously intended to cover places which have religious significance. The exclusion has to be read ejusdem generis and means places like graveyards, tombs, shrines and land attached to religious institutions or wakf property which are all of religious significance but of different faiths. It was not the object of the notification to touch these places of public importance whether they were for religious purpose or merely for historical reasons. It cannot be said that the temple, if any, situated in the factory could be described as being a shrine in any acceptable sense of the words. ( 11 ) HENCE, leaving aside the question whether there was or was not any temple, it does not appear to us that the notification was intended to be nonoperative qua the petitioners property. ( 11 ) HENCE, leaving aside the question whether there was or was not any temple, it does not appear to us that the notification was intended to be nonoperative qua the petitioners property. ( 12 ) THE result would be that we would have to accept these appeals and reverse the judgment in appeal as the same has decided both the writ petitions. In consequence, both the writ petitions will stand dismissed. However, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.