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1980 DIGILAW 314 (KER)

MOIDEEN v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR, LAND ACQUISITION

1980-11-21

K.BASKARAN

body1980
Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are residing in R. S. No. 94/2 of Beypore Village, Kozhikode Taluk. They along with about 13 other families are owners of small bits of land in that survey number, the total extent of which comes to 1.22 acres. In the year 1969 a notification was issued under S.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, (the Act) proposing to acquire the land for the purpose of construction of buildings for the Government School of Beypore. Pursuant to the notification under S 3 of the Act the Land Acquisition Officer, Kozhikode, issued notices to the various persons in occupation of the land under R.3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Rules in September 1969. A true copy of this notice is Ext. P1. The petitioners objected to the proposal for acquisition. However, the 2nd respondent, the Board of Revenue, issued a declaration in the Kerala Gazette under S.6 of the Act. Ext. P-2 is a copy of that declaration dated 8-6-1970 published in the Kerala Gazette dated 29-9-1970. Thereafter, to the petitioners' knowledge, nothing happened. However, on 26-9-1979 the 1st respondent issued notice calling upon the petitioners to file statements of their claim before him under S.9(3) and 10 of the Act. A true copy of this notice is Ext. P-3. Having known about the move to continue the proceedings for acquisition, the petitioners made representations even to the District Collector and the Chief Minister. Ext. P-4 is a true copy of the representation submitted to the Chief Minister. The petitioners by way of abundant caution had also submitted a statement of claims before the 1st respondent, the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kozhikode. 2. The submission made by the counsel for the petitioners is that the long delay between the declaration under S 6 of the Act in 1970 and the issue of notice under S.9(3) and 10 after nine years has seriously prejudiced the petitioners, and therefore further proceedings pursuant to Ext. P-1 notice should be quashed. 3. Sri. B. Moosakutly, the Government Pleader appearing for the State, submitted that there is no provision in the Act limiting the period within which the acquisition proceedings have to be completed once the declaration under S.6 of the Act is published. According to him, it must be presumed that the proceedings are alive once they are initiated for acquisition of land till they end or are withdrawn. According to him, it must be presumed that the proceedings are alive once they are initiated for acquisition of land till they end or are withdrawn. He would submit that there could be no hard and fast rule as to the time within which the proceedings are to be completed, as in each case the time lag for that purpose would depend upon the facts thereof, In this case, he would add, there was no deliberate laches on the part of the Government or the Land Acquisition Officer He has also a further contention that if at all the petitioners feel aggrieved, the proper remedy available to them is to institute a suit in the civil court without taking resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. 4. No doubt, as the Government Pleader has correctly pointed out, there is no provision in the Act fixing a time limit within which the acquisition proceedings are to be completed once the declaration under S.6 is published; even then, it would be too harsh and too unjust, and would in certain cases amount to a cruel joke, to delay the acquisition proceedings after the declaration under S.6 of the Act has been published, simply because there is no statutory deadline fixed for the completion of the process; it could be accepted as a salutary principle that public officers exercising quasi judicial jurisdiction vested in them are expected to wield their power with due diligence and such expedition as is expected of a reasonable man in the given circumstances. Right to property is a valuable right of the citizens, and interference therewith should be in public interest and to the minimum possible extent. Once the acquisition proceedings are initiated a state of suspense follows with respect to that land so far as the owner of the land is concerned till the proceedings are either completed or withdrawn, inasmuch as till the proceedings are completed he cannot expect to receive the compensation; and till the proceedings are withdrawn he has little freedom to effectively deal with the property; hence importance of reducing the time lag between the initiation and the completion of the proceedings for acquisition of land. It is true, where public purpose demands, acquisition of land is justified, and that right of the State cannot be denied to it to subserve the private or individual interest. It is true, where public purpose demands, acquisition of land is justified, and that right of the State cannot be denied to it to subserve the private or individual interest. However, considering the element of compulsion involved in the process, it is only just and fair that it should be so done as to cause no hardship or suffering to the owner of the land which could be avoided with due diligence on the part of the acquisition authority. In my view, in order to alert the officers charged with the duties of land acquisition, to make them aware of their responsibility towards the owner of the land and also to give a sense of protection to the owner of the land against arbitrariness and lethargical attitude of the land acquisition officers, it would be most welcome to have statutory provision fixing a certain time limit within which ordinarily the acquisition proceedings are to be completed. The time lag between the initiation and completion of the proceedings has considerable impact on the compensation the owner of the land receives during periods of inflation. Take for instance this case; the owner of the land would be entitled to receive compensation in 1980 or thereafter, when the proceedings at long last comes to an end, only at the market value which prevailed in 1969 during which year notification under S.3 of the Act was published. Judicial notice could be taken of the fact that for acquisition of the same extent of land, similarly situated, with similar advantages, the owners of the land who are deprived of their property would have to pay a far bigger amount than the compensation awarded on the basis of the market value prevailing at the time of the notification under S.3 of the Act. Of course, the gap of time between the notification under S.3 of the Act and the completion of the proceedings cannot be helped. All that I stress is the need on the part of the Land Acquisition Officers to feel a sense of urgency in the matter without dragging on the proceedings under lame excuses. Coming to this case, by no stretch of imagination could the period of more than nine years be justified for completion of the proceedings after the publication of Ext. P-2 declaration dated 8-6-1970. I am, therefore, of the view that the acquisition proceedings leading to Ext. Coming to this case, by no stretch of imagination could the period of more than nine years be justified for completion of the proceedings after the publication of Ext. P-2 declaration dated 8-6-1970. I am, therefore, of the view that the acquisition proceedings leading to Ext. P-5 award are to be quashed. For the view I have expressed herein I find support in the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Vishnu Prasad (AIR. 1966 S. C. 1593) and Gujarat State Transport Corporation v. Valji Mulji Soneji (AIR. 1980 S. C. 64) and also in the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna Iyer v. State of Madras (80 Law Weekly 544). 5. Though other contentions on merits also are raised in the writ petition. T have not considered them inasmuch as I am convinced that on the sole question of the inordinate delay between the publication of Ext. P-2 declaration and the passing of Ext. P-5 award the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The result, therefore, is that the writ petition is allowed quashing all proceedings leading to Ext. P-5 award passed by the 1st respondent, the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kozhikode. There will be no order as to costs.