Judgment :- 1. These three petitions have been filed under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 seeking to quash the complaints filed by the Executive Officer, Vattamkulam Panchayat against the petitioners in S.T. cases Nos. 101/80,102/80 and 100/80 respectively on the file of the Judicial I Class Magistrate, Ponnani. 2. The petitioner is the Managing Director of Easwar Oil Industries (P) Ltd., Ponnani P. O., Edapal. The company was incorporated on 1-10-1974 with the object of setting up a modem coconut processing plant. The requisite machinery was installed and trial runs were being made. Meanwhile differences of opinion crept between the share holders and the working of the institution came to a standstill somewhere in July, 1979. 3. The Executive Officer of the Vattamkulam Panchayat filed a complaint in S. T. 101/80 against the petitioner alleging that the building tax for the year 1979-80 has not been paid and distraint proved impracticable. S. T. 102/80 was filed on the allegation that licence for the motor installed in the premises has not been renewed for the year 1970-80 and the licence fee is in arrears. S. T. 100/80 was on the allegation that profession tax for the year 1979-80 first half was not paid and distraint proved impracticable. 4. I shall first deal with the complaint in S. T. case No. 100/80 and 101 of 1980 relating to non-payment of building tax and profession tax. In the complaints in the two cases, it is alleged that the taxes were not paid and no cause was shown to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, that warrants were issued under R.24 of the Kerala Panchayats (Taxation and Appeal) R.1963 to distrain the movable properties of the accused, that distraints were found impracticable and by defaulting to pay the tax the accused is liable to be prosecuted under S.74 of the Kerala Panchayats Act (for short the Act). The complainant prayed that the court may take the complaints on file, summon the accused and deal with him according to R.26 of the Kerala Panchayats (Taxation and Appeal) R.1963 (for short the Rules). 5. In the petitions filed before this court, the main contention is that without seeking recovery of arrears of tax under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and without seeking recovery by distraint, complaint does not lie. 5. In the petitions filed before this court, the main contention is that without seeking recovery of arrears of tax under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and without seeking recovery by distraint, complaint does not lie. However, what is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the course of arguments is that the two complaints do not per se disclose commission of offence referred to in R.26 of the above Rules. It is argued that for a successful prosecution under R.26 of the above Rules, it has to be alleged and proved that there was wilful omission to pay the amount and also that the accused wilfully prevented distraint or sufficient distraint. It is unnecessary for me to consider whether both these elements have to be alleged and proved. For the purpose of this discussion it may be assumed that both these elements have to be alleged and proved. 6. I have already referred to the main allegations in the two complaints. The two complaints specifically refer to failure to pay tax in spite of demand, failure to show cause to the Executive Officer, the issue of warrants for distraint under R.24 and the conclusion of the Executive Officer that distraint was impracticable. It is true that the complaints did not specifically aver that the failure to pay tax was wilful or that there was wilful prevention of distraint. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that these ingredients of the offence are implicit in the complaints which allege that action should be taken in accordance with R.26 of the above rules. 7. Generally speaking a complaint may allege the facts and disclose necessary ingredients of an offence. There may be cases where all the ingredients are not specifically disclosed, but the complaint may refer to the provision of law which renders the act or omission punishable as an offence. In such cases, the ingredient; of the offence are implicit by the specific reference to the provision of law under which the act or omission is rendered punishable as an offence. The two complaints herein specifically refer to action to be taken in accordance with R.26 of the above rules. This must necessarily mean that the complainant does take the stand that the act of the accused or petitioner fell within the scope of R.26 of the Rules. The two complaints herein specifically refer to action to be taken in accordance with R.26 of the above rules. This must necessarily mean that the complainant does take the stand that the act of the accused or petitioner fell within the scope of R.26 of the Rules. Therefore the ingredients of the offence under R.26 of the Rules, though not specifically mentioned in the complaints, are implicit in the complaints. Whether the Executive Officer is able to establish the ingredients is a different matter which need not detain us here. I am therefore unable to see any reason to quash the complaints in S. T. 100/80 and 101/80. 8. S. T. 102/80 relates to non-payment of licence fee for the electric motor for the year 1979-80. The complaint is in a totally different form, unlike in the case of the two other cases. The complaint in S. T. 102/80 does not allege that distraint has been attempted or has become impracticable. There is no reference to the Kerala Panchayats (Taxation and Appeal) Rules, 1963 or to R.24 to 26 thereof. A reading of the complaint does not disclose any offence under S.74 of the Kerala Panchayats Act or R.26 of the above rules. Even viewed as an act of failure to take out a licence. I am afraid the necessary ingredients are not alleged and not even the relevant provisions of law are quoted. On the face of it the complaint in S. T. 102/80 does not disclose the commission of any offence. Hence the complaint therein deserves to be and is hereby quashed. 9. In the result, Crl. M. P. Nos. 678 and 682 are dismissed. Crl. M. P. No. 680/80 is allowed and the proceedings in S. T. 102/80 are quashed: