JUDGMENT V.D. Mishra, C.J.—The petitioner was tried and convicted under sections 304-A, 337 and 338 Indian Penal Code by Chief Judicial Magistrate Kangra at Dharamsala. The petitioner was awarded rigorous imprisonment of two years under the first count, six months under the second count and one year under the third count. His appeal was dismissed by Shri D.P. Sood Additional Sessions Judge. He has come to this Court in revision. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The only contention raised is whether on the given facts it can be said that the petitioner was guilty of rashness or negligence. 3. The petitioner is a driver of truck No. KPK 268. On 25th April, 1975 a marriage party consisting of about 25 persons boarded this truck. The bride and bridegroom sat beside the driver while others sat in the body of the truck. It was to go from Sahara to Dargola. Before reaching one of the curves the driver raised an alram that the brakes of the truck had failed. The driver swerved the vehicle and dashed against the hill side. The truck turned turtle and two persons, namely, Behari Lal and Beer Singh, died as a result of the accident whereas various other persons received injuries. It was alleged that the petitioner was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently and, therefore, the accident took place. 4. The defence of the petitioner was that the accident was the result of failure of brake and that he was neither rash nor negligent. Both the courts below have accepted that the accident was the result of the sudden failure of the brakes. The only reason for holding the petitioner guilty is that he allowed the truck to be used for carrying human beings whereas it was meant to carry goods. The relevant part of the judgment of the lower appellate court reads:— "In the instant case, as indicated above, the appellant was incharge of the truck, driving the same, though at a normal speed but with the full knowledge that in case any accident happens, that would result in the grievous injuries sustained to the persons sitting in the rear part of the truck. According to the learned counsel for the appellant it cannot be said that there had been a direct nexus between the death of the persons and the act of the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant it cannot be said that there had been a direct nexus between the death of the persons and the act of the appellant. As mentioned earlier the appellant had full knowledge of atleast of the fact that the truck Was a public goods carrier vehicle and that in case any accident happened the injuries could be sustained by him and damage could be caused to the goods loaded therein. It is urged that mere loading the passengers doss not tantamount to a sufficient evidence to hold the appellant to be liable for the commission of the offence under section 304-A, I.P.C. As indicated above the circumstantial evidence and the knowledge of the appellant in the instant case are sufficient to hold that direct nexus of the cause of death of two persons in the instant case and injuries to the other persons can be attributed to the appellant." 5. Now it is well settled that merely because a person contravenes some rules and regulations he does not make himself liable for rashness or negligence. To mike a person liable for criminal negligence or rashness, it is necessary to show a nexus between the wrongful act of an accused and the injuries received by another. The injuries suffered must be the immediate result of the wrongful act and not a remote consequence. 6. The Supreme Court in Amba Lal D. Shut v. The State of Gujarat, [A.LR, 1972 S.C. 1150], observed thus;— "It appears to us that in a prosecution far an offence under section 304- \, the mere fact that an accused contravenes certain rules or regulations in the doing of an act which causes death of another, does not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act or that any such act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death." The Court also quoted with approval the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap [(1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 679], that the act of causing the deaths "must be the cause causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non\ 7. L.R. 679], that the act of causing the deaths "must be the cause causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non\ 7. In Suleman Rahiman Mulani and another v. State of Maharashtra, [A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court 829], the accused driver had a learners licence and he was driving a car without a driver by his side when he injured a person. It was held that this by itself was not sufficient to warrant a con viction under section 304-A, Indian Penal Code. 8. The question thus to be decided is to what extent the contravention of the rules by carrying human beings in a truck meant for carrying goods can be said to be the cause causans of the accident. Admittedly the immediate cause of the accident was the failure of the brakes of the truck. The petitioner, of coarse, was violating the law in carrying human beings in his truck. And he can be punished for that. But, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the conduct of the petitioner in carrying human beings in the truck meant for carrying goods was the cause of the accident which resulted in the death of the two persons and injuries to others. Carrying of persons in the circumstances of the case cannot be said to be a rash or negligent act of the petitioner. I cannot agree with the learned lower court that the mere knowledge of the petitioner that in case an accident happens it can result in grievous injuries to the persons sitting in the truck was sufficient to hold the petitioner liable under section 304-A, Indian Penal Code since this knowledge had nothing to do with the immediate cause of the accident for which the petitioner admittedly was not responsible. 9. The petition is, therefore, accepted. The conviction of the petitioner fs hereby set aside and he is acquitted. Petition allowed.