JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a plaintiff's second Appeal against the Judgment and decree dated April 6, 1977 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division allowing Appeal No. 50 of 1976-77, Jalaun and dismissing the plaintiff's suit by setting aside the Judgment and decree dated September 25, 1976 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer Kalpi district Jalaun in a case under Section 229-B of Act I of 1951 decreeing the plaintiff's suit. 2. Sheo Sagar Singh filed the suit against the State of U.P. and Gaon Sabha in respect of plot No. 1961 area 6.50 acres situated in village Lona, Pergana Kalpi, district Jalaun with the allegations; that the land in suit was of his Zamindari of Mohal Kasturi; that the plaintiff was its Sir Khudkasht-holder and became Bhumidhar after abolition of Zamindari of the disputed land; that the Lekhpal had recorded him Bhumidhar only on plot No. 196 area 1.67 acres and wrongly recorded the remaining area, i.e., the disputed area in the name of the Gaon Sabha although it was never 'Parti' or 'Banjar'. He claimed to be declared to be Bhumidhar in possession of the disputed plot. 3. The State of U.P. Denied the allegations of the plaint and alleged that the land in dispute is Gaon Sabha property. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the trial court has wrongly discarded the overwhelming testimony of the P.Ws., in preference only paper entries; that he being co-sharer in the Khewat of Mohal Kasturi was in possession as Khudkasht holder and became Bhumidhar; that the first appellate court's judgments is erroneous and is based on improper appreciation of evidence and no appreciation of oral evidence, therefore, is liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on Sahdeo Prasad v. Naubat, 1951 R.D. 104, Sahdeo Pandey v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, 1966 R.D. 131. 6. In reply the learned D.G.C. (R) Jhansi argued that the appellant was not the sole proprietor of the Mohal, his share has only about 1 pie. He was recorded on the undisputed area as a Khudkasht holder with a period of 2 years only and was not recorded in possession on the disputed area in 1369 Fasli. He cannot become Khudkasht-holder of the disputed area under the law. He was recorded on the undisputed area as a Khudkasht holder with a period of 2 years only and was not recorded in possession on the disputed area in 1369 Fasli. He cannot become Khudkasht-holder of the disputed area under the law. He was not in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli and had no title. His possession on the disputed area recorded from 1365 F. does not make him even Sirdar of the land in suit what to say of being Bhumidhar of it. The Judgment and decree of the first appellate court is based on proper appreciation of evidence and is not erroneous in any way and cannot be interfered with. 7. It was further argued that in view of the amendment under Section 210 of 1951 with retrospective effect, the appellant did not acquire any Sirdari right in the land in suit even if he had been in possession for more than 12 years, because this section will be deemed to have been in existence from the very beginning when Act I of 1951 came into force. Nagar Mahapalika v. Ram Prakash, 1979 R.D. 297. Second Appeal No. 157(z) of 1973-74, Banda, Vishambhar v. State 1979 A.W.C. (R) 398 decided on October 16, 1979 by this court. Chhattar Singh v. Sahayak Sanchalak, Chakbandi, 1979 R.D. 226, The Inspector/Assistant Commissioner, Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax v. V.M. Nambudripad, AIR 1974 S.C. 1369 , Sayeed v. Gaon Sabha, 1977 R.D. 151. The Junior High School Chandi Bishanganj, Raibareilly v. The Board of Revenue, Uttar Pradesh, 1967 R.D. 164, Sita Ram v. Gaon Sabha, 1973 R.D. 419 have been relied upon. Section 3(9) of the Tenancy Act defines Khudkasht as "land other than Sir cultivated by a landlord, and under-proprietor or a permanent tenure-holder as such either himself or by servants or by hired labour". Section 180(2) of U.P. Tenancy Act runs as follows:- "If no suit is brought under this section; or if a decree obtained under this section is not executed, the person in possession shall become a hereditary tenant of such plot, or if such person is a co-sharer, he shall become a Khudkasht holder, on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be." 8. The appellant claims to be a co-sharer in Khata Khewat Mohal Kasturi to which the disputed land pertains. He is recorded Khudkasht (3) of 1.57, the undisputed area and 6.50 the disputed area is recorded Bihar i.e. barren land. It means the disputed area was not in cultivatory possession of the appellant in 1359 Fasli and it was barren land. It was not Khudkasht of the appellant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and no cultivation in it was done in 1350 Fasli and no person was recorded as Quabiz. It, therefore, did not become Khudkasht of the appellant and it could not be deemed to have become Bhumidhari of the appellant under Section 18 of Act I of 1951 and it has vested in the State under Section 117 of Act I of 1951 and became Gaon Sabha land. I am supported in my view by Sita Ram v. Gaon Sabha (supra). 9. Sahdeo Prasad v. Naubat (supra) is not applicable to the present case because in that case in a Lamberdari Mahal a co-sharer who had become Khudkasht-holder was held to have right to eject trespasser by bringing an ejectment suit. Sahdeo Pandey v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (supra) is also not applicable to the present case because in that case it was held that if the land assumed character of Khudkasht land and was in possession of the intermediary although it had not been cultivated by the intermediary immediately before the date of vesting still it will be deemed to be the Khudkasht land of the intermediary for the purposes of Section 18 of the Act is that Sir or Khudkasht plots do not cease to be such by excavating a tank in them. Similarly tenants who dig tanks or ponds in their tenancy holding do not cease to be such tenants of the holding or part thereof which are covered by the tank or pond. 10. The appellant as held above was not Khudkasht-holder of the land in suit just preceding the date of vesting, therefore, he did not become its Bhumidhar. Entries of his possession on some area started in 1366 Fasli. The suit was filed on August 8, 1975 i.e. in 1383 Fasli after more than 12 years, therefore, it was argued that the appellant became Sirdar by prescription. 12 years limitation was in force prior to Aug. Entries of his possession on some area started in 1366 Fasli. The suit was filed on August 8, 1975 i.e. in 1383 Fasli after more than 12 years, therefore, it was argued that the appellant became Sirdar by prescription. 12 years limitation was in force prior to Aug. 14, 1971 and August 14, 1971, 30 years' limitation was prescribed, therefore, 12 years' limitation had expired in 1376 Fasli but proceeding under Section 122-B of Act I of 1951 was dropped against the appellant on September 27, 1969 according to plaint allegation of para 8 i.e. in 1377 Fasli, therefore, the fresh limitation from that date of the dropping of the proceeding started and 30 years limitation came into force before any right could accrue to the appellant and lastly no limitation was provided with retrospective effect. Appendix III, Serial 30. Item IV(a) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Rules prior to the amendment dated June 30, 1978 by Notification No. 110/2-I(IV)-76-Rajaswa I was as follows:- S1. 30, IV "(a) 1 2 3 4 5 6 (a)Where action under rule 115-C has been started before the expiry of the period of limitation under sub-item (b)." Twelve years From the date of the order under rule 115-E Ditto 11. Thus no rights accrued to the appellant as limitation started to run against him from the date of the order under Rule 115-E and it was subsisting when 30 years' limitation came into force which too was substituting when no limitation with retrospective effect was provided by the latest amendment of 1976. 12. The amendment of Section 210 providing no limitation regarding Gaon Sabha land is retrospective in view of Section 15 of Act XXXV of 1976 which substituted Section 210 with the words that it shall be deemed always to have been substituted and in consequence of this amendment clause (iii) of Section 210 would be deemed not to be there in the Act and the appellant who could have claimed on the basis of said sub-clause Sirdari rights its very foundation is demolished with retrospective effect and he cannot be held to be Sirdar. The Legislature has power to affect substantial rights by enacting laws which are expressly retrospective and in such cases the law with retrospective effect operates from an early date than the date of commencement and affects rights which, but for such operation, would have continued undisturbed. The Legislature has power to affect substantial rights by enacting laws which are expressly retrospective and in such cases the law with retrospective effect operates from an early date than the date of commencement and affects rights which, but for such operation, would have continued undisturbed. I am supported in this view by 1978 A.W.C. (R) page 89, 1979 R.D. page 277, decision of S.A. No. 157(z) of 1973-74 Banda Bishambhar v. State, decided on October 16, 1979, 1979 A.W.C. 388, 1979 R.D. 226, 1969 (S.C.) 1436, 1977 R.D. 58 (supra). 13. In view of the above in my considered opinion this appeal has got no force and it is liable to be dismissed, hence it is hereby dismissed with costs and the Judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court are hereby confirmed.