JUDGMENT: Nainar Sundaram, J. — These appeals are directed against the orders dated 26th July, 1976, passed by N. S. Ramaswami, J., in Application Nos. 1931 and 1932 of 1976, on the file of the Original Side of this Court. The broad facts leading to the filing of these appeals are as follows: The respondent in these appeals is a film distributor, carrying on business at Indore and it shall hereinafter be referred to as the decree-holder. The appellant herein is a film producer in Madras and he shall hereinafter be referred to as the judgment-debtor. The parties entered into an agreement on 5th September, 1967, with regard to a Hindi Film “Bhai Behen” produced by the judgment-debtor. We are not concerned with all the clauses in the agreement governing the rights and liabilities of the parties and in these appeals, the controversy centres around the clause relating to arbitration. There are two copies of the agreement and clause 19 in each of them, which relates to arbitration, is divergently different from one another and we will have occasion to refer to this aspect subsequently in the course of this judgment. Obviously, disputes arose between the parties and the decree-holder, purporting to invoke clause 19 of the agreement, as per the copy thereof relied on by it, referred the matter to Central Circuit Cine Association, Bhusaval. The arbitrators rendered the award on 27th March, 1973, and that was the subject-matter of proceedings under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, before the District Judge, Indore, in Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 58 of 1963, and that Court, on 16th December, 1974, passed a judgment and decree in terms of the award. The decree-holder has proceeded with the execution of the said decree in E.P. Nos. 25 and 26 of 1975, on transfer to the Original Side of this Court, the former E.P. for attachment and sale of the movable properties of the judgment-debtor and the latter for attachment and sale of the immovable properties of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor filed two applications. Applications Nos. 1199 and 1202 of 1975, to declare the decree passed by the District Judge, Indore, as null and void and as such in-executable. The judgment-debtor filed two applications. Applications Nos. 1199 and 1202 of 1975, to declare the decree passed by the District Judge, Indore, as null and void and as such in-executable. It was contended before the Master that the arbitrators appointed by the decree-holder had no jurisdiction to pass an award in view of the relevant clause in the agreement, and as such the decree, based on such award, is null and void. The Master of this Court, by order dated 17th December, 1975, allowed the applications, declaring the said decree to be null and void as having been passed without jurisdiction, upholding the contention of the judgment-debtor. The Master further held that the District Court at Indore had also no territorial jurisdiction to pass the decree, even though the judgment-debtor did not put forth such a contention. Application No. 1931 of 1976 was preferred by the decree-holder by way of an appeal as against the order of the Master in Application No. 1202 of 1975 and Application No. 1932 of 1976 was preferred by the decree-holder by way of an appeal as against the order of the Master in Application No. 1199 of 1975. N. S. Ramaswami, J., considered the matter in the light of the contentions raised before him and found justification to set aside the orders passed by the Master in the applications referred to above. The learned Judge opined that in the present proceedings one is really not concerned as to whether the arbitration award itself was one without jurisdiction, for it has resulted in a decree; the question whether the award was passed without jurisdiction is one to be urged in the Court where the award was filed; and the judgment-debtor had raised the same in the District Court, Indore (where the award was filed), in a way, but inspite of that, the Court passed a decree on the award. The learned Judge, therefore, dealt with the question as to whether the decree itself was one passed without jurisdiction. The learned Judge, therefore, dealt with the question as to whether the decree itself was one passed without jurisdiction. The question seems to have been argued before the learned Judge on the contention that the District Court, Indore, had no territorial jurisdiction in view of the relevant clause in the agreement between the parties and the learned Judge, applying the well-known ratio in the light of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, declined to accept the plea that the decree in question could be impeached as a nullity in execution proceedings on the ground that it was passed by a Court having no territorial jurisdiction. 2. In the present appeals, the only point that was argued before us, is having reference to the relevant clause 19 in the agreement between the parties, the very reference to arbitration of the matter to the Joint Tribunal of the Central Circuit Cine Association, Bhusaval, was incompetent and invalid; the award passed by such arbitratons is a nullity and hence the decree passed on the award is also a nullity and could be impeached in execution proceedings. 3. To appreciate and deal with this contention, it will be necessary for us to refer to the relevant clause 19 in the agreement between the parties. As we adverted to earlier, there are two copies of the agreement. In the course of the execution proceedings before the Master of this Court, the judgment-debtor produced and marked Exhibit R-2 a copy of the agreement dated 5th September, 1967. Clause 19 thereof reads as follows: “In case, any dispute arising out of these presents or the interpretations of any clause of this agreement, the same shall be referred to the arbitration each party appointing one arbitrator, as per Indian Arbitration Act or any modifications thereof, and their decision will be binding on both the parties. For all such arbitration, the jurisdiction shall be the city of Madras. The jurisdiction of this agreement is Madras only”. 4. A controversy was sought to be raised before us that this is not the true and correct copy of the agreement between the parties and pursuant to orders obtained from this Court, the entire records connected with the arbitration proceedings before the Central Circuit Cine Association, Bhusaval, have been summoned and placed before us. 4. A controversy was sought to be raised before us that this is not the true and correct copy of the agreement between the parties and pursuant to orders obtained from this Court, the entire records connected with the arbitration proceedings before the Central Circuit Cine Association, Bhusaval, have been summoned and placed before us. So also the records from the Income-tax Officer, G Ward, Circle I, Indore, have been produced before us. In the said records, we find copies of the agreement dated 5th September, 1967 and clause 19 in each of the said copies reads as follows-. “In case of disputes arising out of these presents or concerning interpretations of any clause of this agreement, the same shall be referred to the recognised arbitration in the film Trade prevalent in the area of distribution under these presents. The decision of such Arbitrator shall be binding on both the parties to this agreement”‘. From the above, it is clear that there is a material difference in the two sets of copies with reference to arbitration. The first question to be considered is the actual terms of the agreement entered into between the patties in relation to arbitration. The original agreement has not been produced in any of the proceedings and only copies have been produced. As far as the proceedings in this Court are concerned, the judgment-debtor has produced a copy marked as Exhibit R-2 and asserts that it is a correct copy of the agreement and the decree-holder having not taken any objection to the correctness of the said copy, the Court will have to proceed on the basis of the correctness of that copy alone. As against this, the decree-holder contends that the copy filed by it before the Arbitrators and before the Income-tax Officer constituted the correct copy, that the same had been produced at. the earliest possible opportunity and that therefore the Court must accept the same as the correct copy. The learned counsel for the decree-holder further contends that before the Income-tax Officer, Indore, the decree-holder had filed a copy of the agreement along with the balance-sheet for the year ended 31st March, 1968, and thus the correct copy had come into existence at the earliest possible time. The learned counsel for the decree-holder further contends that before the Income-tax Officer, Indore, the decree-holder had filed a copy of the agreement along with the balance-sheet for the year ended 31st March, 1968, and thus the correct copy had come into existence at the earliest possible time. The learned counsel further draws our attention to the fact that in the affidavit filed by the judgment-debtor before the District Court, Indore, he had referred to the agreement dated 8th July, 1970. It is the admitted case of the parties that there is no agreement between the parties dated 8th July, 1970, and the date ‘8-7-70’ finds a place in rubber stamp on the copy of the agreement filed by the decree-holder before the arbitrators and consequently the judgment-debtor should have known the contents of the agreement filed before the Arbitrator and that is the reason why he has referred to the date of the agreement as 8th’ July, 1970. It is further contended that the judgment-debtor has not raised any objection to the correctness of that copy filed before the Arbitrators and therefore the clause contained in that copy of the agreement must be taken to be the correct clause agreed to between the parties. What exactly were the terms of the clause relating to arbitration agreed to between the parties is of fundamental importance in this case, because if the clause is, as contained in the copy filed by the decree-holder, no objection can be taken to the arbitration proceedings and the resulting award. On the other hand, the question of any defect in the arbitration proceedings and the resulting award will arise only if Exhibit R-2 constitutes the correct copy of the agreement entered into between the parties. In view of this, at one stage we were inclined to remand the matter to enable the parties to produce the original of the agreement. However, both sides represented to us that it is not possible — the judgment-debtor putting forward the contention that inspite of his repeated requests to the decree-holder, the decree-holder had not returned to the judgment-debtor one of the signed copies of the agreement, and the decree-holder putting forward the contention that according to its auditors, the original had been filed before the Income-tax authorities. 5. There is one other aspect which should weigh with us, while considering this question. 5. There is one other aspect which should weigh with us, while considering this question. The judgment-debtor in paragraph 4 of his affidavit filed; in support of the applications before the Master, has specifically stated as follows: “Quite contrary to the terms of an agreement entered into between me and the Respondent firm on 5th September, 1967 (a true copy of this agreement is filed herewith as Annexure-B) for the Hindi talkie picture Bhai Bahen for the territories of C. I., the Respondent referred the alleged dispute for arbitration to the Joint Tribunal of Central Artist Cine Association and All India Film Producers Corporation, although in the said agreement it was provided that an arbitrator should be appointed at Madras for deciding any dispute that might be raised. On the basis of an ex parte award obtained by the Respondent given by an arbitrator, who bad no jurisdiction to hear the alleged dispute and pass an award, obtained an ex parte decree in the District Court at Indore. The said decree is null and void and is un-executable”. The copy of the agreement annexed to the affidavit is the same as Exhibit R-2. 6. In paragraph 6 of the common counter-affidavit filed by the partner of the decree-holder, while refuting the allegations of the judgment-debtor in paragraph 4 of his affidavit referred to above, the averments run as follows: “I state that the allegations made in paragraph 4 of the affidavit are also contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case. The Respondent herein was perfectly right in filing a claim before the arbitrators and the arbitrators rightly passed the award after due notices to the defendant and since the award was passed at Indore, the Court at Indore rightly passed a decree in terms of the award. As such the decree is perfectly executable by this Hon’ble Court as there is no lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court that passed the decree. I state that it is incorrect to say that the decree is null and void and it is un-executable. I emphatically state that the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction does not go to root of jurisdiction and therefore the validity of decree cannot be challenged on that ground in execution proceedings. I state that it is incorrect to say that the decree is null and void and it is un-executable. I emphatically state that the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction does not go to root of jurisdiction and therefore the validity of decree cannot be challenged on that ground in execution proceedings. I further state that the objection as to local jurisdiction does not stand on the same footing as the objection to the competency of a Court to try a case. I submit that the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and the executing Court has to execute the decree as it stands. The petitioner herein can raise this objection only in the trial Court, i.e., the Court that passed the decree and the same point cannot be raised in the execution proceedings. I state that the District Court at Indore has an unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction and is also a competent Court which has passed the decree and does not lack in inherent jurisdiction”. 7. The decree-holder did not attack the copy of the agreement produced by the judg-mead-debtor as not the true and correct copy of the agreement entered into between the parties. We find that the copy of the agreement has been marked as Exhibit R-2 without any objection by the decree-holder and the controversy has been dealt with both by the Master of this Court and by N. S. Ramaswami, J., taking Exhibit R-2 as the true copy of the agreement between the parties. In the said circumstances, we have no other alternative but to proceed on the basis that Exhibit R-2 is the correct copy of the agreement between the parties and for the purpose of deciding the question relating to arbitration its invalidity or in-competency we are obliged to refer to Exhibit R-2 alone, even though we do not express any final opinion on the same. 8. Then the question is: “Could the validity of the reference to arbitration to the said arbitrators, rendition of the award by the said arbitrators and the decree that followed, be impeached in execution proceedings?” Before we deal with this question, we may have to examine the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act, X of 1940, hereinafter referred to as the Act, Chapter II of the Act deals with arbitration without intervention of a Court. We are not concerned with all the provisions contained in the said Chapter and it is sufficient for our purpose if we refer to sections 14 and 17 thereof. Section 14 (1) delineates as to what the arbitrators or umpire should do on their making the award and it enjoins them to sign it and give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof. Section 14(2) enjoins the arbitrators or umpire at the request of any party to the abitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court, to cause the award or a signed copy of it together with the relevant documents to be filed in the Court. The Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Section 14(3) deals with a special case stated by the arbitrators or umpire under section 13 (b) Section 15 deals with the power of the Court to modify the award and section 16 deals with the power of the Court to remit the award. Section 17 is more relevant and it is better to have it extracted for a better appreciation of the implications thereof: “Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise, in accordance with the award”. The other relevant sections are sections 30, 32 and 33 found in Chapter V of the Act and they read as follows: Section 30. — “An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, namely: — (a) that an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings; (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the arbitration or after arbitration proceedings have become invalid under section 35; (c) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid”. Section 32: — “Notwithstanding any law for the time being in force, no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award, nor shall any arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act”. Section 33. — “Any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or an award or to have the effect of either determined shall apply to the Court and the Court shall decide the question on affidavits: Provided that where the Court deems it just and expedient, it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also, and it may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit.” 9. Even a bare reading of section 17 leaves no room for doubt that if the Court sees no cause to remit the award on any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration under section 16 or to set aside the award, the Court, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired or such application having been made, after refusing it, has no other alternative but to proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow. It further lays down that no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. 10. In this particular case, when the award was filed in the District Court of Indore and the judgment-debtor was given notice of the same, he filed on 17th August, 1974, before the District Court of Indore a counter putting forward the contention that the application under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, deserved to be dismissed. In the said counter he stated that the agreement entered into between the parties on ‘8th July, 1979’ provided that in case of any dispute arising between the parties, the same shall be, referred to arbitration, each party shall appoint one arbitrator and their decision will be binding on the parties and that for all arbitration the jurisdiction shall be the City of Madras only. It is further stated therein that in the light of the above arbitration agreement, the Indore Court had no jurisdiction to hear the application filed by the decree-holder, that the judgment-debtor never appointed the Arbitrator in question to be his Arbitrator and that therefore the award passed by the Arbitrator was null and void, as he had no jurisdiction to give the same. The third contention put forward before the District Court of Indore was that the award was not given on the proper stamp paper and that therefore it could not be taken into consideration. We are mentioning this only for the purpose of pointing out that the judgment-debtor had participated in the proceedings before the District Court, Indore, upto a stage and remained ex parte thereafter and he had the opportunity of filing an application under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, for setting aside the award. 11. In the instant case, the power under section 16 has not been exercised by the Court, namely, the District Court at Indore, whose decree is the subject-matter of execution in the present proceedings. Equally so, no application has been filed to set aside the award on any of the grounds contemplated either under section 30 or under section 33 of the Act. There is no dispute before us that at the time when the District Court, Indore, pronounced the judgment which was followed by the decree, the time for making an application to set aside the award had expired. No appeal has been preferred against such decree even on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. The language of the section is unambiguous and must lead one to the conclusion that such a decree, in the said circumstances, must have become final and cannot be impeached. Clauses (a) to (c) of section 30 set out the grounds on which an award could be set aside; and section 33 further adds on that the challenge could be also with reference to the existence and the validity of an arbitration agreement or an award. Clause (c) of section 30 has come up for consideration in judicial precedents, as to whether invalidity of reference would fall within the meaning of the expression “or is otherwise invalid” found in the said clause. We shall presently refer to them. Clause (c) of section 30 has come up for consideration in judicial precedents, as to whether invalidity of reference would fall within the meaning of the expression “or is otherwise invalid” found in the said clause. We shall presently refer to them. If no steps are taken to set aside the award under sections 30 and 33 of the Act, an unassailable result must follow under section 17 of the Act and such a decree is not open to challenge except by way of an appeal under the two grounds mentioned in the said section. Whatever may be the ground of impeachment, it has got to he agitated under sections 30 and 33 of the Act and if there is an omission to do so, one cannot avoid the implications of section 17. Section 32 is mandatory in nature when it lays down that no suit shall lie on any ground whatsoever for a decision upon the existence, effect or validity of an arbitration agreement or award and it further says that no arbitration agreement or award be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in this Act (Italics is ours). Hence, invalidity or in-competency of reference and the rendering of an award on such reference and the judgment and decree that follow could not be the subject-matter of challenge in any manner whatsoever except under proceedings under the Act itself, as exemplified in the provisions thereof. The provisions do not admit any qualification or exemption and the way to challenge the award has to be found under the Act itself, and the failure to take steps to challenge the award under the Act on the ground of any infirmity whatsoever must lead to the result under section 17. There is no escape from it and the decree passed under section 17, except by way of an appeal and that too on the grounds set out therein, cannot be challenged elsewhere on the ground that the reference is invalid and hence the award is invalid. 12. This view of ours, as we already pointed out, is not without the support of judicial precedents, including those of the Supreme Court. 13. 12. This view of ours, as we already pointed out, is not without the support of judicial precedents, including those of the Supreme Court. 13. In Bahadur Singh v. M. S. Dass1, disputes arose between the tenants and the landlord: pursuant to an agreement between the tenants and the son of the landlord, the matter was referred to arbitration: an award was passed by the arbitrators which was signed by the arbitrators, the tenants and the son of the landlord and it was attested by the landlord; the award was filed in Court under section 14 of the Act; the tenants and the son of the landlord stated in Court that they had no objection against the award; the Court pronounced judgment according to the award and a decree followed; when the landlord and the son applied for execution of the decree, the tenants objected that: (i) the award was beyond the scope of the reference and was invalid and the decree based on the invalid award was void; (ii) the decree was passed in contravention of the Delhi and Aimer Rent Control Act, 1952, and was void: and (iii) the landlord could not execute the decree. In the said context, at page 43? of the Report, the Supreme Court held as follows: “The following points arise for determination in these appeals: (1) Can the objection as to the validity of the award be raised after the decree is passed on the award, and can the decree be pronounced to be a nullity on the ground that it was based on an invalid award; (2) Is the decree directing the tenants to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord a nullity on the ground that it was passed in contravention of the Rent Act; (3) Is this portion of the decree enforceable either by the landlord or by Muni Subrat; and (4) Is the decree in so far as it directs removal of the machinery valid and enforceable by Muni Subrat?” “The award was filed in Court under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, and on notice to the tenants and in their presence a decree was passed according to the award under section 17. It is not open to the tenants now to take the objection that the award was in excess of the authority of the arbitrators or was otherwise invalid. It is not open to the tenants now to take the objection that the award was in excess of the authority of the arbitrators or was otherwise invalid. Having regard to the scheme of sections 14 to 17 and 31 to 33 all questions regarding the validity of the award had to be determined by the Court in which the award was filed and by no other Court. An award which is invalid on any ground can be set aside under section 30. After a decree is passed on the award it is not open to the parties to the reference to raise any objection as to the validity of the award. As between them the decree conclusively determines that the award is valid. Nor can the decree be pronounced to be a nullity on the ground that the award was invalid. A decree passed on an invalid award in arbitration in suits under the second schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, stood on the same footing. See Rabindra Deb Manna v. Jogendra Deb Manna1, where Rankin. J., observed: An award made out of time, or otherwise invalid, is no longer a nullity; it is liable to be set aside by the Court, but, if not set aside, a decree made for its enforcement is not without jurisdiction. Shib Kristo Daw v. Satish Chandra Dutt2.” 14. In Union of India v. Om Prakash1, there were applications for setting aside the awards and the contention raised was that the Court, after appointing an arbitrator under section 8 (2) of the Act, became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to refer the cases to the arbitrator, and the reference by the Court being without jurisdiction, the awards were invalid. The Supreme Court dealt with the question as to whether the awards could be set aside as invalid because the reference was incompetent and held that the matter would come within the scope of clause (c) of section 30 of the Act. The following observations of the Supreme Court at page 1749 are elucidative: “The words ‘or is otherwise invalid’ in clause (c) of section 30 are wide enough to cover all forms of invalidity including invalidity of the reference. We do not find any reason why the general and unqualified language of clause (c) should not include an award on an invalid reference which is a nullity”. 15. We do not find any reason why the general and unqualified language of clause (c) should not include an award on an invalid reference which is a nullity”. 15. Apart from the Supreme Court, the question had been the subject-matter of the decisions of the High Courts also, including those of this Court. In Seethamma v. Anna Purnamma2, a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Govinda Menon and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ., held that a suit in which the existence and validity of the reference to arbitration and the award passed in pursuance of such arbitration is agitated is not maintainable. Govinda Menon, J., rendering the judgment on behalf of the Bench, referred to the following observations occurring in an earlier Bench judgment in Moolchand Jethajee v. Rashid Jamshed Sons and Company1: — “The Act of 1940 was intended to consolidate and amend the law of India relating to arbitration matters. The scheme of the Act is to prevent the parties to an arbitration from agitating questions relating to the arbitration in any manner other than that provided by the Act. The suit which the appellants filed clearly raised the question with regard to the existence and validity of the award, and such a suit is expressly barred by section 32”. 16. In A. R. Savkur v. Amritlal Kalidas1, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, consisting of Chagla, CJ., and Dixit, J., considered the scope of sections 17 , 30 and 33 of the Act and the following extracts from the judgment of Chagla, CJ., are enlightening: “Therefore, the scheme of section 17 is that after an award has been filed an opportunity is given to the party challenging or disputing the award to file an application to set aside the award and the application has got to be filed within the period of limitation. If no application is filed, the party in whose favour the award is made is entitled to a decree upon the award, or if the application is filed and has been dismissed on merits, then also the party in whose favour the award is made is entitled to a decree. If no application is filed, the party in whose favour the award is made is entitled to a decree upon the award, or if the application is filed and has been dismissed on merits, then also the party in whose favour the award is made is entitled to a decree. It is only when an application to set aside an award having been made in time and the application having succeeded that the party in whose favour the award is made is not entitled to a decree in terms of the award under section 17 ………… It is well-settled that a decree which is a nullity may be ignored and it is not necessary to have such a decree set aside. But what the Arbitration Act , contemplates is that if an award is on the file of the Court, unless steps are taken to have that award set aside a certain definite result must follow and that definite result is the result indicated by the Legislature in section 17. Therefore, it is not open to a party to assume that an award which has been filed and in respect of which a notice has been served upon him is a nullity. He must go to Court and get it set aside, and the Legislature in section 30 has stated the grounds on which the party can succeed in setting aside an award”. 17. In Saha and Company v. Ishar Singh2, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider the relative scope of sections 30 and 33 of the Act and the majority of the Full Bench held that the Act contemplates that all applications challenging an award must be made under section 33 irrespective of the ground of the challenge and that they must be applications for setting aside the award except in cases where the existence of an award in fact is challenged; and the non-existence or invalidity of the reference can be a ground for setting aside an award based on such invalid or non-existent reference including the case of an award in an arbitration without the intervention of the Court. 18. 18. In Shri Ram v. Shripat Singh1, while considering the scope of the bar under section 32 of the Act, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, consisting of Agarwal and Beg, JJ., held that no suit lies for declaring that the award is not binding or is otherwise invalid and this relief should be obtained by means of an application made within 30 days of the receipt of the, notice for filing of the award in Court under section 14 or if no such notice is issued, by means of an application under section 33 of the Act. 19. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtor very strongly relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that the decree of the District Court of Indore is a nullity and therefore it is open to the judgment-debtor to challenge that decree at any stage. The first decision is Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others2, and the second is the Bombay Gas Company Limited v. Gopal Bhiva and others3. In the former case, it was observed: “It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties”. In the latter decision, it was observed: “There is no doubt that if a decree put in execution is shown to be a nullity, the executing Court can refuse to execute it”. 20. In the latter decision, it was observed: “There is no doubt that if a decree put in execution is shown to be a nullity, the executing Court can refuse to execute it”. 20. We are of the opinion that the decisions of the Supreme Court in these two cases will not be of any avail in relation to a decree passed on the basis of an award under section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, having regard to the special provisions that have been made in the Arbitration Act to enable a party to challenge the award before the award is made a judgment or decree of Court and the various circumstances mentioned in section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, before the Court can pass a judgment and decree on the basis of the award. Further, as held by the Supreme Court in Bahadur Singh v. M. S. Dass1, already referred to, the decree cannot be pronounced to be a nullity on the ground that the award was invalid. 21. The position being clear as above, we do not find any warrant for interference with the orders of N. S. Ramaswami, J., on the ground urged before us. Accordingly, these appeals fail and they are dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. S.J. ----- Appeal dismissed.