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Allahabad High Court · body

1980 DIGILAW 321 (ALL)

Ram Singh v. Des Raj

1980-03-10

I.B.SINGH

body1980
JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 28.9.75 passed by learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, allowing appeal No. 101/272 of 1973-74 district Banda decreeing plaintiff's suit for declaration to be co-bhumidhar or ?rd share in the land in suit setting aside the judgment and decree dated 16.11.72 passed by Assistant Collector Ist Class, Karvi, district Banda dismissing the plaintiff's suit. 2. Plaintiff respondents no. 1, 7 and 8 had filed the suit for declaration to be co-bhumidhar or ?rd share in the disputed land with defendant 1 to 4 and 6 as vendees of Sheokaliya with the allegations that the land in suit was of the time Ansuiya who had 3 sons Ramdin, Ram Kumar and Ram Deo; that defendants 1 to 4 are heirs of Ramdin and defendant no. 6 is heir of Ramdeo and Ram Kumar was inherited by his wife Dhokhiya who was inherited by his two daughters Sheokaliya and Sheoraniaya, that Sheoraniya had relinquished her share in favour of Sheokalia the vendor of the plaintiff whose mutation application was rejected, hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2. They did not admitted Sheokaliya as daughter of Dhokhiya; that Sheokaliya was not co-bhumidhar and was not in possession as she had relinquished her rights in favour of the contesting defendants on 17.10.46 in the mutation case and she is bound by it; that her name was recorded only for her consolation and she had no right to transfer the land. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 5. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the first appellate court wrongly considered the compromise in mutation case dated 17/22.10.46 to be a relinquished deed. It was actually family settlement and it did not required to be registered and wrongly decreed the plaintiffs suit. Reliance has been placed on Mst. Kalawati v. Sri Krishna and others, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 49, Krishna Behari Lal v. Gulab Chand, 1973 A.L.J. page 94 and Smt. Jagni v. D.D.C., 1972 R.D. page 96. 6. It was actually family settlement and it did not required to be registered and wrongly decreed the plaintiffs suit. Reliance has been placed on Mst. Kalawati v. Sri Krishna and others, A.I.R. 1944 Oudh 49, Krishna Behari Lal v. Gulab Chand, 1973 A.L.J. page 94 and Smt. Jagni v. D.D.C., 1972 R.D. page 96. 6. In reply in twas argued that Dhokhiya had inherited her husband Ram Kumar not as a co-parcener and notions of Hindu Law cannot be applied; she inherited in her own rights and Sheokali inherited her in her own right as her daughter; admission in mutation case in not admission in the regular suit and she was conferred bhumidhari rights by Act 1 of 1951 which cannot be abrogated in law. Reliance has been placed on Algu and others v. D.D.C. Jaunpur, 1979 R.D. Page 150, Rajpati v. D.D.C. Azamgarh, 1979 R.D. Page 152, Rajendra Pd. and another v. Joint Director Consolidation Faizabad etc, 1966 R.D. Page 92, Ramjit Dixit and others v. Bhrigunath and others, 1964 R.D. Page 81, Sheo Das v. Rajan Lal, 1971 R.D page 205, Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh and others, 1967 R.D. Page 191, Lalgopal alias Triloki Nath v. Mahangi and others, 1970 R.D. page 417. 7. In A.I.R. 1944 Oudh page 49 it was held that if mutation court's order embodying compromise order though not registered is binding on the parties and that compromise did require to be registered as the order of mutation court cannot be designated as an instrument, the view of former Oudh court regarding admissibility of admission in mutation cases has been different then the view of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, the latter is binding on the Board of Revenue. Further more this ruling is not helpful to the appellants because the compromise was not embodied in the order of mutation. 8. In 1973 A.L.J. page 94 it was held that "to consider a settlement as a family arrangement it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. If the dispute which is settle is one between near relations the settlement of such dispute can be considered as family arrangement" This ruling is also not applicable to the present case because consistent view of Hon'ble High Court had been that admission in mutation case is not admissible regarding title in a regular suit. 9. If the dispute which is settle is one between near relations the settlement of such dispute can be considered as family arrangement" This ruling is also not applicable to the present case because consistent view of Hon'ble High Court had been that admission in mutation case is not admissible regarding title in a regular suit. 9. There is no doubt that creation of co-tenancy rights by parties entering into compromise even in proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. if parties agreed to remain in possession in proportion to certain share they become co-tenants by admission and by estoppel. But in the present case the matter had been different. Here, by said compromise the rights created by statute are sought to be negatived. 10. In mutation cases only admission regarding possession is admission in regular suit and not regarding title as has been held in Bhure v. Pir Bux, 1979 R.D. page 150 and page 152 (Supra) and 1973 A.W.R. page 279. Therefore firstly the said agreement in the mutation case is not admissible against the title claimed by the plaintiffs on the basis of the sale deed by Sheokaliaya. 11. The said compromise was entered into before Act I of 1951 came into force. Section 18 and 152 of Act I of 1951 conferred bhumidhari rights on Sheokaliya which did not exist when that compromise was made. Smt. Sheokaliya cannot be debarred from transferring that right as he the land vested in the State and was settled with Sheokaliya with bhumidhari rights which are fresh rights. This view is supported by 1964 R.D. page 80, 1966 R.D. page 92 supra. 12. The mother of Sheokaliya was recorded after the death of her husband and she continued in possession in her own rights. The notions of Hindu Law cannot be drawn that she had widow's interest in the land in suit and that notion certainly cannot be drawn against Sheokaliay because she did not inherit as widow and inherited as a daughter of her mother as held in 1967 R.D. page 91 supra and her possession cannot be treated to be in lieu of maintenance under section 11 of Act I of 1951 as has been held in 1970 R.D. page 417 Supra. 13. 13. In view of the above, in my considered opinion, Sheokaliya had no limited rights like that of a widow and she was not in possession over her ?rd share in lieu of maintenance; the compromise in mutation case does not operate as estoppel against her and if she was not in possession in lieu of maintenance the admission in mutation case was not admissible against the title and she had full rights to transfer her share as bhumidhar which right was conferred on her by Act I of 1951. Therefore the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Commissioner are highly justified and his findings are hereby confirmed. This appeal has got no force and it is liable to be dismissed. 14. In view of the above this second appeal is dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree of the first appellate to court is hereby confirmed.