ORDER: — This is a revision against an order passed by the Revenue Court, Tiruvarur, under section 3 (4) (a) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. This Act was avowedly passed for the protection of cultivating tenants from, unjust eviction. Section 3 (4) (a) enables a landlord to evict a cultivating tenant by filing an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer, popularly called the Revenue Court. Section 3 (4) (b) empowers the Revenue Court, after hearing the parties and after holding a summary inquiry, either to allow the application or dismiss it. Where the tenant had defaulted in payment of rent on the due date and had not also made any deposit in Court, then, under the provisions of section 3 (4) (b), the Revenue Divisional Officer is given the discretion to allow time to the cultivating tenant for depositing the arrears of rent inclusive of costs“. The provision lays down the guidelines for the exercise of the discretion in the matter of extension of time, in the following terms: “The Revenue Divisional Officer may allow the cultivating tenant such time as he considers just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant”. 2. The words of the section, which I have extracted, admit of no doubt. Even in a case where the tenant is admittedly in default in the payment of rent, it is still within the discretion of the Revenue Court to grant the tenant further time. That extension of time, however, must be just and reasonable in the judgment of the Revenue Court. That is the test of just and reasonable is also indicated by the section when it requires the Revenue Court to have” regard to the relative circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating “ten?nt”. The implication of this requirement is that the Revenue Court cannot merely go upon the factum of default in payment of rent, or the previous history of the default or the past duration of the default. The one and only criterior for granting of extension of time for payment and the measuring such time on the just and reasonable test, is to compare the relative circumstances of the landlord, on the one hand, and the cultivating tenant, on the other, as at the moment when the Revenue Court enters upon its decision. 3. The one and only criterior for granting of extension of time for payment and the measuring such time on the just and reasonable test, is to compare the relative circumstances of the landlord, on the one hand, and the cultivating tenant, on the other, as at the moment when the Revenue Court enters upon its decision. 3. The power of the Revenue Court to grant time for payment to a defaulter for the deposit of rent is a very important provision, not only under the scheme of the Act, but also functionally in the proceedings for eviction; Where a Revenue Court, after taking into consideration the relevant factors, grants time for payment to a tenant upon the terminus of time so granted would depend the further orders that might be passed by that Court. For the section says that if within the time granted by the Revenue Court, the tenant pays or deposits the rent, then the eviction application shall stand dismissed. On the other hand, if the tenant does not pay or deposit the rent within the time granted by the Revenue Court, then an order for eviction will follow as night follows the day. 4. Having regard to the important part played by the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of time by the Revenue Court and having regard to its vital importance in the relations between the landlord and the tenant and also having regard to the fact that these enabling provisions occur in a statute enacted avowedly to protect the tenants from unjust eviction, it is absolutely essential for every Revenue Court to abide by the terms of this section in every case that comes before it. 5. In the present case under revision, the landlord filed an application. before the Revenue Court for eviction of the tenants on the ground that they had committed default in the payment of rent for fasli 1388. The Revenue Court, after notice to the tenants, and after hearning them passed an order on 3rd September, 1979. recording a finding that the tenants were liable to measure the arrear of rent claimed by the landlord. The Revenue Court also determined the money value of the rent in arrear to be Rs. 2,517-70. The Revenue Court, after notice to the tenants, and after hearning them passed an order on 3rd September, 1979. recording a finding that the tenants were liable to measure the arrear of rent claimed by the landlord. The Revenue Court also determined the money value of the rent in arrear to be Rs. 2,517-70. In the same order, the Revenue Court directed the tenants to deposit the amount together with costs of Rs.10/-on or before 6th October 1979 and ported the case to 8th October, 1979. On 8th October. 1979, the tenants paid to the landlord a sum of Rs.100. The Revenue Court recorded that there was a part-payment of the rent arrear, and granted time for payment of the balance till 30th October, 1979. The case was posed for again being called on 31st October. 1979. On 31st October, 1979, the tenants made another payment of Rs. 100/-. Recording this part-payment the Revenue Court granted further time to the tenants for payment of the balance till 13th November, 1979, and posted the application to be called on 14th November, 1979, On 14th November,1979, the Revenue Court passed the following order: “Respondent is absent. No further payment also is made. The petition is, therefore, allowed”. 6. It is against this last order that the tenants have brought this civil revision petition. The main ground urged by the tenants’ learned counsel before me is that the Revenue Court had not cared to exercise its discretion in accordance with the guidelines in section 3(4) (b) of the Act. Learned counsel for the landlord, however, urged that having regard to the successive orders made by the Revenue Court, on successive adjourned dates of the application, the Revenue Court must be held to, have adhered fully not only with the letter of section 3(4) (b) of the Act, but also with its essential spirit. Learned counsel submitted that the last order of the Revenue Court now under revision cannot be read in isolation, but must be read and understood in the context of the previous orders passed by the Revenue Court at the previous hearings of the application. 7. Learned counsel on both sides also touched upon certain aspects of the jurisdiction of this Court under section 6-B of the Act. 7. Learned counsel on both sides also touched upon certain aspects of the jurisdiction of this Court under section 6-B of the Act. There was a discussion, for instance, as to whether a revision in crises of this kind under section 6-B of the Act was or was not a continuation of the proceedings before the Revenue Court. There was also some discussion as to whether this Court in revision could exercise the power to extend the time to a cultivating tenant for payment of rent. In the course of the discussion of these jurisdictional aspects, there was citation of case-law on both sides. To five an indication as to the trend of discussion at the bar on these aspects. I may refer to the following cases: Muthukrishna Chettar v. Kanni Konar1, M. Voikkaran v. Sellathammal2, Sivasankara Devarayar v. Minor Prakash by guardian3and Kandaswamy v. Sowrirajan4. I do not, however, propose to go into any jurisdictional dissertation. For I believe that this case can be disposed of on the basis of what appears from the record and also on the basis of confining myself scrupulously within the conventional limits of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. It may be observed that section 6-B of the Act which confers revisional jurisdiction on this Court over the orders passed by the Revenue Court under section 3(4) (b) , readers the jurisdiction of this Court identical with that exercisable under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The scope of interference by this Court under section 6-A would therefore be to call for the record of any case from the Revenue Court and pass appropriate orders where it appears to this Court that the Revenue Court had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it bylaw or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 8. The grievance of the petitioners’ learned counsel in this case is that the Revenue Court does not seem to have been aware either of its role under the statutory scheme or of the manner or conditions of the exercise of its jurisdiction in the matter of passing a discretionary order granting extension of time to a tenant in default. 9. At the beginning of this judgment. 9. At the beginning of this judgment. I had endeavoured to analyse the scope of section 3 (4) (J) of the Act and to summarise the nature of the discretion of the Revenue Court and the lines on which the statute requires that discretion to be exercised by that Court in given circumstances. I had pointed out that the one and only criterion on the basis of which the Revenue Court is enjoined by the statute to exercise its discretion in the matter of grant of extension of time for payment of rent, is to weigh in the scales the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant and then grant such time to the tenant as would be just and reasonable from that standpoint. The question is whether in the present case, the Revenue Court did pay regard to these statutory imperatives? Having carefully considered the order passed by the Revenue Court in this case, I am satisfied that it had got its jurisdiction, all wrong when it proceeded to allow the eviction petition on the score that the tenant did not. appear on the last occasion when the application was called and did not make any further payment. I have narrated the earlier orders of the Revenue Court as well as its last order which is the subject of this revision. In none of these orders, was I able to find any remark or observation or even an indication by the Revenue Court of its having weighed in the scales the relative financial circumstances of the landlord, on the one hard, and the tenant, on the other, for the purpose of deciding what would be the just and reasonable time that should be granted to the tenant for deposit or payment of rent. 10. Mr. Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the landlord, urged that the Revenue Court must be regarded as having taken mental note of all the circumstances which are relevant under the statute, when it had made its earlier orders adjourning the application on the basis of payment; made by the tenants from time to time. 10. Mr. Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the landlord, urged that the Revenue Court must be regarded as having taken mental note of all the circumstances which are relevant under the statute, when it had made its earlier orders adjourning the application on the basis of payment; made by the tenants from time to time. Learned counsel submitted that even though the Revenue Court had not, in so many words, taken up for discussion the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the tenants, it can be fairly derived from the orders, by necessary implication, that the Revenue Court did exercise its mind on these questions Learned counsel further submitted that having granted time on two occasions, on both of which the tenant had made payments of Rs. 110 each, and having further adjourned the application for payment of the balance, the Revenue Court must be held to have granted a just and reasonable time to the tenant after weighing in the balance the relative circumstances of the tenants and the landlord. 11. I wish I could read what learned counsel apparently has been able to read into the several orders passed by the Revenue Court in this case. One thing which struck me during the hearing of this case was not only the mechanical Way in which the Revenue Court had been passing its orders, but also the mechanical aids which it had ready at its disposal to draw up its orders. For instance, in the order of the Revenue Court dated 3rd September, 1979, in which it recorded a finding that the tenant had defaulted and wherein it had reduced the arrears of rent in terms of money in a sum of Rs. 2,517-70, the original order on record is found to have been engrossed in a proforma printed form. The last order, which is the subject-matter of the present revision and which bears the date 14th November 1979, is similarly found to be a mechanical reproduction, in the sense that it is a reneod order wherein spaces, apparently left blank to start with, had later been filled in by the Revenue Court. Nor is this all. The Revenue Court seems to have got ready for its use rubber stamps even for its orders of adjournment. Nor is this all. The Revenue Court seems to have got ready for its use rubber stamps even for its orders of adjournment. The two or three orders of the Revenue Court to which I had made reference earlier in this judgment, and which I meticulously summarised, were, however, found to have been rubber-stamped orders. The rubber-stamp is in the following pro forma: “Part payment made. Petition filed for time for payment of Balance. Time granted till …………Call on ………. P.O.” The blanks have been filled every time the Presiding Officer had chosen to exercise his jurisdiction. 12. Learned counsel for the landlord, who apparently has experience of the Revenue Courts in the district, represented that I should not make much of the laboursaving devices employed by the Revenue Court and mistake them for a mechanical or mindless procedure on the part of the Revenue Court. Learned counsel submitted that the roneod forms and the rubber-stamps are but the consequences of the intense pressure of work on the presiding officers of Revenue Courts. According to Mr. Balasubramanian, notwithstanding the devices employed by the Revenue Court in this case, still a proper consideration of the proceedings as a whole their several stages and the nature of the order passed at every hearing, would all show that the Revenue Court did allow its mind to be exercised to the fullest extent on considerations which are laid down as relevant by section 3 (4) (b) of the Act. 13. There may be something in what learned counsel for landlord had described apparently from first-hand information of the functioning of Revene Courts. But I am not prepared to accept that in this case the Revenue Court had done its duty by the statute. After recording a finding that the tenants were in default and after determining the money value of the rent arrear, the Revenue Court seemed to enter on the subject of granting time for payment to the tenants. But I am not prepared to accept that in this case the Revenue Court had done its duty by the statute. After recording a finding that the tenants were in default and after determining the money value of the rent arrear, the Revenue Court seemed to enter on the subject of granting time for payment to the tenants. But neither in the first order dated 3rd September, 1979 not in the three subsequent orders dated 8th October, 1979, 3rd November, 1979 and 14th November, 1979, is there the slightest indication to show whether the Revenue Court did go into the question of grant of time either from the point of view of the just and reasonable test or from the point of view of the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the tenants. 14. Mr. Balasubramaniam submitted that on the last occasion when the case was called by the Court the tenants absented themselves, and if they had done so it was their own fault and the Revenue Court could not be blamed for not entering a finding when there was no material provided there for by the party interested, namely, the tenants. It seems to me that it is precisely in taxing note of the absence of the tenants that the Revenue Court had signally failed in its duty under section 3 (4) (b) of the Act. It seems to me that the order of eviction, when it came to be passed, was rather the reflex of the Revenue Court seeing that the renant was absent at the hearing than on any reasonable consideration of the merits of the request for granting reasonable time to them. If we leave aside the last order passed by the Revenue Court dated 14th November, 1979, then there is nothing in the previous three orders on record to show whether and to what extent the Revenue Court had taker. note of considerations such as the relevant circumstances of the landlord and the tenant and considerations pointing to what would be the just and reasonable time to afford the tenants for making payment. Admittedly, the tenants were present at all the earlier hearings, and it is not suggested that they were not available for the Revenue Court to produce materials on these important consideration. 15. Admittedly, the tenants were present at all the earlier hearings, and it is not suggested that they were not available for the Revenue Court to produce materials on these important consideration. 15. Having regard to all these aspects of the proceedings of the Revenue Court, I am satisfied that there has not been a proper exrecise of jurisdiction by it under section 3 (4) (b) of the Act. Either there has not been any exercise at all of its discretion, or the discretion had been exercised on the basis of wholly irrelevant considerations, such, for instance, as, the absence of the tenants at the hearing when called. The order of the Revenue Court has, therefore, to be set aside. 16. Mr. Balasubramaniam drew my attention to an unreported decision of Ratnam, J., in G. R. P. No. 1055 of 1980, dated 4th August, 1980. Learned counsel described the case before that learned Judge as almost identical on facts with the present case. In that revision, the learned Judge declined to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the Revenue Court There also the tenant after having made a few payments, on the respective adjourned hearings of the landlord's eviction petition had defaulted in appearance on the last day when the application was called, with the consequence that the Revenue Court passed an order of eviction. Ratnam, J. in revision upheld the Revenue Court's order on the ground that sufficient time was granted by that Court to the tenant and the tenant had not paid the rent within that time limit. In that view, the learned Judge upheld the eviction order in that case. 17. With respect to the learned Judge, the decision in that case on its facts must be correct. The question before the learned Judge was whether an eviction order could follow in the circumstances of that case. The learned Judge held that ample time was granted to the tenant, but the tenant did not make any payment within the extended time granted by the Revenue Court. I regard the decision as a clear case where the eviction order tended automatically to follow the default in payment by the tenant within the time granted by the Revenue Court. The learned Judge held that ample time was granted to the tenant, but the tenant did not make any payment within the extended time granted by the Revenue Court. I regard the decision as a clear case where the eviction order tended automatically to follow the default in payment by the tenant within the time granted by the Revenue Court. The learned Judge had in so many words, accepted the finding of the Revenue Court to the effect that adequate time had been granted to the tenant in that case. In the present case, however, whether adequate time was or was not granted is the very question which has been debated before me, and, as vital to that discussion, the inquiry too was directed to finding out whether the Revenue Court had properly instructed itself in the law in regard to the scope of its discretion and the conditions in which it had to be exercised. Manifestly these considerations have not been adverted to, or discussed in the judgment of Ratnam, J., I, therefore, do not derive any assistance from that judgment, least of all regard it as an authority which I am bound to follow in the interest of the comity of Judges. 18. For all the above reasons, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Revenue Court is untenable. The civil revision petition is accordingly allowed and the order of the Revenue Court is set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs. R.S. ----- Revision allowed.