ORDER Chandra Pal Singh, J. 1. By this petition, Ashfaq Mohammad seeks interference with the order of the Sessions Judge, Rajgarh of 26-9-1979 quashing the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate of 11.7.1979 and the proceedings in Misc. Criminal Case No. 9 of 1979 initiated' by the petitioner under section 126 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside the exparte order of maintenance passed against him and in favour of respondent No. 1 Saida Qureshi. 2. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 are husband and wife. The wife moved an application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code against the husband, for being maintained, successfully before the Chief Judicial Magistrate; Rajgarh, who in the absence of the petitioner finding that he inspite of the service of the summons had refused to attend the Court, granted her maintenance at the rate of Rs.200/- per month. The husband preferred Criminal Revision No. 19 of 1979 before the Sessions Judge, Rajgarh on 2.4.1979 for setting aside the exparte order against him. The learned Sessions Judge by his order of 25-5-1979 dismissed it in limine. In the meantime on 13-4-1979 the husband had also preferred an application under section 125 (2) Criminal Procedure Code for setting aside the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 3-3-1979 and inter alia prayed for the staying of the operation of the order granting maintenance to his wife. The wife opposed this application on the grounds that the exparte order passed against the petitioner was proper and that there was no power for staying the operation of the order passed earlier. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order of 11-7-1979 staying the operation of the order for realizing the amount of maintenance from the husband, adjourned the case for further proceeding on 2-8-1979. 3 Dissatisfied the wife preferred Criminal Revision No. 37 of 1979 before the learned Sessions Judge, Rajgarh, who by his order, which is being challenged finding that the order passed by the Magistrate staying the realization of the maintenance allowance was not an interlocutory order and that the matter regarding the granting of maintenance allowanance had already stood decided, quashed the order of the Magistrate of 11.7.1979, as also the entire proceedings in Misc. Criminal Case No. 9 of 1979. 4. Criminal Case No. 9 of 1979. 4. The contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner-husband is that the order of the Magistrate staying the realization of the maintenance allowance was merely an interlocutory order and hence the learned Sessions Judge could not have entertained a revision petition because of the bar contained in section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code. 5. The question whether an order is interlocutory or final has not yet been finally judicially decided. There is of course no statutory definition of an interlocutory order in the Code. Ordinarily speaking an interlocutory order is one, which is not final, although in relation to a particular it age of the proceeding that order may be final and not in relation to other stages of the proceeding. The meaning of the word 'interlocutory' in contradistinction with 'final' has to be judged in relation to a particular purpose. In Amarnath and others Vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1977 SC 2185 ), their lordships of the Supreme Court while interpreting 'interlocutory, order' have laid down as follows:- "The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term 'interlocutory order' as appearing in sub-section (2) of S. 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term 'interlocutory order' is a term of well-know legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary interlocutory has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sence and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in S. 397 (2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sence and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially effects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which effect or adjudicate the right of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court." 6. Then again their Lordships of the Supreme Court in, Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1978 MPLJ 24), while interpreting an order for the purpose of letting the bar contained in section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code not come in the way of exercising by the High Court its revisional powers, laid down that there may be an order passed during the course of the proceeding which may not be final but yet may not be interlocutory pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. The relevant observations are as follows:- "Though ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order' such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power conferred by section 397, Criminal Procedure, Code. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power conferred by section 397, Criminal Procedure, Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained revisional powers of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code though it put a bar in relation to interlocutory orders. In such a situation the real intention appears to be not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of 'final order'. There may be an order passed during course of a proceeding which may not be final but yet may not be interlocutory pure or simple. Same kinds of order may fall in between two. The bar in section 397(2), Criminal Procedure Code is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders though they may not be final far purposes of Article 134, Constitution of India. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of such orders. But it would be just and proper to apply the same kind of test as is applicable under section 115, Civil Procedure, Code to find out whether an order is 'a case decided', far finding out the real meaning of the expression 'interlocutory order' in section 397 (2), Criminal Procedure Code. The finality of the order is not to be judged by co-relating it with the controversy in the earn plaint. The fact that the controversy still remained is irrelevant. An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceedings will surely not be interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397 (2), Criminal Procedure Code." It is, however, clear that to constitute a final order, it is not sufficient merely to decide an important and even a vital issue in the case. If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but if the suit is still left alive and has gat to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order, (Per Mukherjee, J. in Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. v. Dominion of India AIR 1950 FC 77 quoted in Tarapore and Co. Madras v. Tractors Export, Moscow ( AIR 1970 SC 1168 ). 7. Madras v. Tractors Export, Moscow ( AIR 1970 SC 1168 ). 7. The order of the Magistrate, pursuant to an application before him by the husband (petitioner) under the proviso to clause (2) of section 126 Criminal Procedure Code, restraining the proceedings for the realization of the maintenance allowance by the wife was, therefore not a final order. It was no doubt an important order and vital far the wife (respondent); nonetheless it was not an order finally disposing of their rights. It had merely suspended the realization of the amount. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, was clearly in error in having construed that order as a final order. 8. The argument that the Magistrate could not have made, the order restraining the wife from realizing the maintenance allowance in the absence of a specific provision in the Code, ignores the [maxim: "Quando lex aliquid aliqui concedit, concedere videtur id quo res ipsa esse non potest," meaning that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing given itself would be unavailable. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide far all the furture eventualities that may possibly arise, arise it is an established principle that Courts possess inherent powers, which are necessary to their existence enabling them to effectively discharge the duties cast upon them by law. It is true that unlike the provisions contained under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, there is no corresponding enactment providing for similar powers with regard to subordinate Courts but it has been held on a number of occasions that the terms of section 482 do not create any new power, they only declare whatever powers the High Court already had. The scope of those powers is restricted in the sence that the orders that may be made under section 482 are: (i) to give effect to any order passed under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or (iii) otherwise secure the ends of justice. Thus, the order of the Magistrate temporarily suspending the realization of the maintenance allowance being an incidental order was proper. 9. Section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code clearly bars the exercising of revisional powers against an interlocutory order. Thus, the order of the Magistrate temporarily suspending the realization of the maintenance allowance being an incidental order was proper. 9. Section 397 (2) Criminal Procedure Code clearly bars the exercising of revisional powers against an interlocutory order. We have seen that the order of the Magistrate suspending the realization of the amount of the maintenance allowance from the husband till he finally disposed of his application for setting aside the exparte order against him was an interlocutory order. But that is not the only ground on which the learned Sessions Judge had assumed jurisdiction to decide the revision petition. The main ground for entertaining and deciding the revision petition appears to be that the matter regarding the granting of maintenance allowance had already stood concluded by his earlier decision in Criminal Revision No. 19 of 1979. 10. The aggrieved husband had two alternative remedies open to him one by way of revision before the Sessions Judge and the other by moving an application under the proviso to section 126 (2) Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that he pursued them both simultaneously without caring to inform either the Sessions Judge or the Magistrate what he had done before the other. He wanted to have, as it were, the better of the two worlds. His revision petition before the Sessions Judge, as already pointed out while narrating facts, was dismissed in limine. In other words he had already exhausted one of the alternative remedies available to him. He cannot now be allowed to bypass that order by pursuing his alternative remedy also under section 126 before the Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly referred to section 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code and observed that the Magistrate had ignored the provisions of that section. He cannot now be allowed to bypass that order by pursuing his alternative remedy also under section 126 before the Magistrate. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly referred to section 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code and observed that the Magistrate had ignored the provisions of that section. Section 405 Criminal Procedure Code lays down that when a case is revised under this Chapter by the High Court or a Sessions Judge, it or he shall in the manner provided by section 388, certify its decision or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed, and the Court to which the decision or order is so certified shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified; and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith.' The Magistrate therefore, could not have" proceeded under section 126 (2) Criminal Procedure Code; to hold otherwise would amount to letting the Magistrate sit over the decision of the Sessions Judge. 11. The argument for the petitioner that the initial order of the Magistrate granting maintenance to the wife was nonest because the procedure for summoning the husband had not been followed in the circumstance, of the case, is not sound. Firstly it appears that in Criminal Revision No. 19 of 1979, the petitioner (husband) had not challenged the order of the Magistrate being nonest. That" matter has stood concluded by the order of the Sessions Judge of 25th May 1979. The petitioner did not prefer any revision petition before this Court challenging that order of the Sessions Judge. Secondly the person moving an application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code is not a complainant or a prosecutor, nor the person proceeded against an accused. The proceedings contained in Chapter 9 are not strictly criminal and the remedy available is only a summary one. They are also not strictly civil. They could be described as quasi-criminal or quasi-civil quasi-criminal because they appear in the Criminal Procedure Code and quasi-civil because of the procedure which though compressed would be appropriate in a suit claiming maintenance. The proceedings contained in Chapter 9 are not strictly criminal and the remedy available is only a summary one. They are also not strictly civil. They could be described as quasi-criminal or quasi-civil quasi-criminal because they appear in the Criminal Procedure Code and quasi-civil because of the procedure which though compressed would be appropriate in a suit claiming maintenance. Their partaking of the nature of quasi-civil proceedings is further reflected in the proviso to clause (2) of section 126 Criminal Procedure Code, which is almost akin to the procedure laid down the Order 9 rule 13, Civil Procedure Code though without an explanation appended to that rule. 12. No doubt strictly speaking there is no provision m Chapter 6 excepting in the case of a Corporation for summoning a person proceeded against by a registered letter acknowledgment due as was done for summoning the husband before the Magistrate. But a perusal of the proceedings before the Magistrate makes it abundantly clear that the service on the husband was not being effected. A person in matters of procedure does not have a vested right. The maxim is 'audi alteram partem'. In this case there had been substantial complaisance with this principle. In Joginder Singh Vs. Balkaran Kaur, (1972 Criminal Law Journal 93), it was held that 'once the Magistrate has given a finding about his satisfaction of the avoidance of service or neglect to attend the Court on the part of the respondent before him being wilful, an order passed exparte by him would be an order so made notwithstanding the fact that in reality the avoidance of service or the neglect to attend the Court was actually not wilful a fact which on being proved before the Magistrate would entitle the party aggrieved by the exparte order to have it set aside". In Sunil Kumar Phukan v. Pratima Buragohain, (1973 Criminal Law Journal 401) the service of notice by registered post was held to be a proper service. 13. A number of decisions have been cited under Order 9 rule 13 Civil Procedure Code laying down that where an appeal against an exparte decree had been preferred after the application to set aside the exparte decree and the appeal had been dismissed, the trial Court ceases to have jurisdiction to set aside the exparte decree. 13. A number of decisions have been cited under Order 9 rule 13 Civil Procedure Code laying down that where an appeal against an exparte decree had been preferred after the application to set aside the exparte decree and the appeal had been dismissed, the trial Court ceases to have jurisdiction to set aside the exparte decree. The same principle applies to the facts of the instant case also taking into account the proviso to clause (2) of section 126 Criminal Procedure Code. The argument for the petitioner that the position is different because of the explanation appended to Order 9 rule 13 Civil Procedure Code is only apparent but not real. Expiation is sometimes appended to a section only to explain the meaning of the words contained in that section for the purpose of removal of some possible doubt. An explanation certainly is a part of the section itself but unless the context otherwise makes it clear it merely explains that has already been laid down in the section. The explanation to Order 9, rule 13 Civil Procedure Code serves precisely that purpose. In substance, therefore, the scope of the proviso to clause (2) of section 126 Criminal Procedure even without the explanation appended to it, remains the same and if in the meantime there has been a decision by a revisional Court, no application shall lie for setting aside the exparte order or no application if already preferred shall continue for setting aside the exparte order. 14. As a result of forgoing conclusions, the matter between the petitioner (husband) and the respondent (wife) having already stood concluded by the order of the Sessions Judge of 25-5-1979 the proceedings being continued before the Chief Judicial Magistrate are without jurisdiction. The learned Sessions Judge h as rightly set aside those proceedings by his order of 26-9-1979 in Criminal Revision No. 37 of 1979. 15. There is no force in this revision petition. It is dismissed.