JUDGMENT 1. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Alcobex Metal Workers Union (for short `the union) hereinafter through its president Shri Kirpu Ram against the State of Rajasthan (respondent No. 1) and the management of the Alcobex Metals Private Ltd. (respondent No. 2) (hereinafter referred to as`the company') seeking to quash the order (Ex. 5) dated February 18, 1980 passed by the State Government prohibiting the continuance of strike under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act (No. XVI of 1947) (for short `the Act' hereinafter). 2. The Alcobex Metal Workers Union has stated itself to be the representative Trade Union of the workmen of the company. A demand-chapter (Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 was submitted by the Union to the company. The company referred the matter for conciliation. The case of the petitioner is that the conciliation proceedings were taken in hot haste and no failure report was conveyed to the petitioner. It is said that the company in order to victimise the workmen, suspended about 20 of them on a plea that they were found sleeping in the night shift. Thereupon, notice (Ex. 2) dated January 26, 1980 was given to the company. After notice, neither the company nor the Union moved for conciliation in respect of the dispute raised nor the company conceded to the demand to withdraw the charge-sheet. This led the workmen to go on strike from Febuary 7, 1980. The State Government referred the dispute under Section 10(i) read with S. 12 (5) of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur in respect of the matters specified therein. Subsequent to this, a notification (Ex. 5) dated February 18, 1980 was issued prohibiting the continuance of strike. The grievance of the petitioner is that though the failure report of the conciliation proceedings was not conveyed to the union, yet, hurriedly under Section 10(1) of the Act, the dispute was got referred with an ulterior motive and collateral purpose for getting an order under Section 10(3) of the Act. This was with an object to victimise the workers. The order (Ex. 5) under Section 10(.) of the Act has been challenged in Writ Petition on the ground that it was without jurisdiction mala fide and in violation of the principles of natural justice. This was with an object to victimise the workers. The order (Ex. 5) under Section 10(.) of the Act has been challenged in Writ Petition on the ground that it was without jurisdiction mala fide and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It may be stated here that it was also stated in the Writ Petition that "discretion given under S. 10(3) of the Act is uncontrolled''and" "that it shall make the Section itself ultra vires the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution otherwise the order under challenge becomes contrary to Article 14 thereof." The writ petition was filed on February 21, 1980 for quashing the order, (Ex. 5) dated February 18, 1980. 3. Before noticing the pleadings of the parties the events leading to their filation may briefly be recalled. On behalf of respondent No. 1 as well as the company (respondent No. 2), caveat was entered. Replies to the writ petition as well as stay application were filed on behalf of the company contesting the writ petition on various grounds on February 25, 1980. An application was moved on February 25, 1980 by the learned counsel for the petitioner for leave to urge additional grounds. This application was resisted on behalf of the company by filing reply dated February 27, 1980. A rejoinder to the reply was filed on February 28, 1980 on behalf of the petitioner. Reply to the rejoinder alongwith the letter (Ex. 6) of the Union dated December 26, 1979, the letters (Ex. 7) dated December 29, 1979, the letter (Ex. 8) dated January 7, 980, the letter (Ex. 9) dated January 9, 1980 of the Union and the letter Ex sO) dated January 10, 1980 were filed To this rejoinder, a reply was filed on behalf of the company on March 3, 1980. The writ petition was admitted after hearing the learned counsel for the parties on March 4, 1980. On that day, after admission, learned counsel for the petitioner and the company stated that so far as the petitioner and the company are concerned, pleadings are complete in all respect. Learned Deputy Government Advocate stated on that day that reply of respondent No. 1 would be filed by March 10, 1980. It was, therefore, ordered that having regard to the circumstances of the case the writ petition should be listed for hearing on March 12, 1980. Learned Deputy Government Advocate stated on that day that reply of respondent No. 1 would be filed by March 10, 1980. It was, therefore, ordered that having regard to the circumstances of the case the writ petition should be listed for hearing on March 12, 1980. On March 12, 1980, reply on behalf on ' respondent No. 1 was filed contesting the writ petition. With the reply, a copy of failure report (Anx. R. 2) dated January 24 1980, a photostat copy of entry (Anx. R. 2) in the Peon Book of the Conciliation Officer and a copy of the corrigendum (Anx. R. 3) dated March 10, 1980 were filed. An application was moved on behalf of respondent No. 1 for condoning the delay in filing the reply. As the application was not opposed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 was taken on record. Arguments were heard in part on March 12, 1980. On March 13, 1980, learned counsel for the petitioner filed rejoinder to the reply of respondent No. 1. The rejoinder so filed was also taken on record as the learned counsel for the respondents had no objection. 4. In reply, respondent No. 1 stated that the company by its letter dated January 16, 1980 requested the conciliation officer to initiate conciliation proceedings on demand charter (Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980. The conciliation proceedings were taken up on January 17, 1980, January 18, 1980, January 19, 1980 and January 22, 1980. As the conciliation could not be arrived at, a failure report was made by the conciliation officer and that was sent by him to the Union vide letter No. 350/51 dated January 24, 1980. The allegation regarding hot haste was denied on the ground that the Demand Charter (Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 was referred for adjudication on February 11, 1980. It was stated that in the notification (Ex. 4) there was a clerical mistake regarding the number of days of casual leave and, therefore, the same was corrected vide the corrigendum (Anx. R. 3). It was denied that the order under S. 10 (3) was passed without any basis or due application of mind and in a mechanical way. The State Government before issuing the order (Ex. 4) there was a clerical mistake regarding the number of days of casual leave and, therefore, the same was corrected vide the corrigendum (Anx. R. 3). It was denied that the order under S. 10 (3) was passed without any basis or due application of mind and in a mechanical way. The State Government before issuing the order (Ex. 5) took into consideration all the relevant facts regarding the Company's pending supply to defence establishment of the raw material to different ancillary units. It was stated that "the Government had applied its mind to the facts of the case and necessary material which was before it." Some of the pleas raised by respondent No. 1 are similar to those which were raised by the Company and, therefore, they arc not stated here. On March 25, 1980, on behalf of respondent No. 1, clarification in regard to averments made in sub-paras (iii) & (iv) of para 11 of the reply was made by filing affidavit of Shri Gopal Sharma, Labour Welfare Officer, Jodhpur. In this affidavit, dated March 25, 1980, it was stated that order under S. 10 (3) of the Act was made by the State Government on the fulfilment of the requisite conditions laid down therein; that the order was made after applying the mind to the relevant facts; (i) that respondent No. 2 prepares and supplies raw material to various industries scattered throughout India and about 600 industrial units depend on raw material supplied by respondent No. 2 and that if the production in the factory of respondent No. 2 is not started, all those industrial units are likely to be affected resulting in overall decrease in production seriously affecting the already limping economy; and (vs) that the major portion of the product of respondent No. (2) is supplied for defence purposes to Ministry of Defence D. G. S. S. and ordnance factories and the continued strike even after the dispute has been referred to the Industrial Tribunal would continue to imperil the supplies necessary for the defence purposes of nation and as many as 31 orders of various defence agencies were pending supply at that time. In the affidavit, it was also stated that as the dispute had already been referred for adjudication, the order under S. 10 (3) was made. 5. The Company contested the writ petition on various grounds. In the affidavit, it was also stated that as the dispute had already been referred for adjudication, the order under S. 10 (3) was made. 5. The Company contested the writ petition on various grounds. It was stated that Prabhu Ram Choudhary Secretary of Union submitted a charter of demands (Anx. R. 1) dated November 20, 1978, to the General Manager of the Company; that after some negotiations, Shanker Pillai, the then President, Shri Prabhu Ram Choudhary, the then Secretary and Shri Ashraf Fojdar then the Labour Advisor of the Union, entered into a comprehensive settlement (Anx R. 2/2) dated January 6, 1979. This settlement was duly registered with the Deputy Regional Labou Commissioner, Jodhpur. After the registration of the settlement, Shri Prabhu Ram Choudhary, the then Secretary of the Union sent a letter (Anx. R. 2/3) dated February 28,1979 to the General Manager of the Company stating that the workmen, who became permanent in the year 1977-78 have not been properly fitted in the agreed grades. A further settlement (Anx. R. 2/4) dated March 30, 1979 was entered into, which, was also registered before the competent authority. According to the Company, these two settlements are in full force and they will continue to remain as such during the period mentioned therein. Fresh elections of the Union were held on November 4, 1979 and Shri Kirpa Ram an 1 Shri Dhan Raj were elected as President and Secretary of the Union, respectively. Shri Dhan Raj, Secretary of the Union sent afresh Charter of Demands (Ex. I) on January 14, 1980 to the General Manager of the Company and threatened that the workmen would go on strike from January 28.1.1980 in case the above demands were not met with. A reply (Anx. R. 2/6) dated January 16, 1980 was sent, wherein it was stated that the demands contained in the Charter (Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 have already been agreed upon and settled in terms of the Settlements dated January 6, 1979 and March 30, 1979 and that the settlements are operative for a period of five years. The demands mentioned in the Charter of Demands (Anx. R. 2/5/Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 were, therefore, said to be unjustified and illegal. The Secretary of the Union, however, reiterated the demands in the letter dated January 19, 1980. The demands mentioned in the Charter of Demands (Anx. R. 2/5/Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 were, therefore, said to be unjustified and illegal. The Secretary of the Union, however, reiterated the demands in the letter dated January 19, 1980. Before that the Company approached the Conciliation Officer (Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner) vide letter (Anx. R. 2/8) dated January 16, 1980. It was stated by the representative of the Union that they did not want to add anything in support of their Charter of Demands already submitted and that in case the Company was not agreeable to their demands, the Conciliation Officer should send a failure report to the Government. As the representative of the Union did not cooperate, the Conciliation Officer submitted his failure report on or about January 24, 1980 to the Government of Rajasthan and sent a copy of the said report to the Union as well as to the Company. The failure report was served on the Union on or about January 25, 1980. The Government of Rajasthan, on receipt of the failure report from the Conciliation Officer, made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act vide its order No. D. 1(1) (85) (Ex. 4) dated February 11, 1980. After the reference, the Company issued notices to the workmen to resume their duties as the Government has referred the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur. The workmen did not call off the strike. The Government of Rajasthan took into consideration the relevant material and issued the order (Ex. 5) under S. 10 (3) of the Act on February 18, 1980. Despite service of the order (Ex. 5) under S. 10 (3) of the Act, the strike was not called off. According to the Company, the order (Ex. 5) passed in exercise of powers conferred upon the State Government under S. 10 (3) of the Act was perfectly justified and valid. The following objection were raised in the additional pleas:- (1) that the Union is guilty of suppressing material facts mentioned in paras A to V of the reply and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground; (2) that the writ petition is not maintainable on account of the acts of violence etc. The following objection were raised in the additional pleas:- (1) that the Union is guilty of suppressing material facts mentioned in paras A to V of the reply and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground; (2) that the writ petition is not maintainable on account of the acts of violence etc. of the workmen of the Union, for, on account of reprehensible conduct, it is not entitled to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; (3) that the writ petition having been filed by Shri Kirpa Ram, in the absence of the authorisation by the Union, is not maintainable; (4) that the petitioner has not made any demand for justice from the State Government and as such the writ petition is not maintainable; (5) that the impugned order (Ex. 5) under S. 10 (3) of the Act (being an administrative order) was passed on the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned therein and as such, no writ can be issued for quashing it. 6. Certain other objections were also taken which need not be mentioned here. 7. Rejoinders to the replies filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 and the Company were separately filed. It was, inter alia, stated that the settlement (Anx. R. 2/2) was fraudulently obtained by the Company; that the Union Executive did not authorise Sarva Shri Shankar Pillai, Prabhu Ram Choudhary and Ashraf Fojdar to enter into such a settlement on behalf of the Union and that the said settlement was an outcome of fraud. On behalf of the Company, reply to the rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioner was filed denying that the settlement (Anx. R. 2/2) was fraudulently obtained by the Company and that the Union Executive did not authorise Sarva Shri Shankar Pillai, Prabhu Ram Chaudhary and Ashraf Fojdar to enter into such a settlement. 8. Arguments were heard and concluded on April 21, 1980 and the order was reserved. On May 19, 1980, a forwarding letter No. 2325 dated May 17, 1980, signed by the Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner, Jodhpur was filed stating that a settlement between the petitioner and the Company was arrived at through the intervention of the Officer of the Labour Commissioner. In the Settlement, one of the conditions mentioned is that the copy of the aforesaid Settlement will be filed for perusal and orders in this writ petition. In the Settlement, one of the conditions mentioned is that the copy of the aforesaid Settlement will be filed for perusal and orders in this writ petition. In pursuance thereof, a copy of the settlement dated May 16, 1980 was enclosed with the forwarding letter. This fact having been brought to my notice, the writ petition was listed `to be mentioned' on July 1, 1980. On that day, learned counsel for the parties wanted time to address the court regarding implications of the Settlement, arrived at between the parties on May 16, 1980. The next date fixed was July 14, 1980 and on that day the learned counsel for the parties addressed the court regarding implications of the Settlement. On that day, Mr. M.D. Purohit, learned Additional Government Advocate wanted time o obtain instructions from respondent No. 1 in regard to the Settlement. Time was granted. On July 15, 1980; Mr. Purohit stated that he would submit in writing his stand in respect of the Settlement. On July 17, 1980, learned Additional Government Advocate stated that the letter had already been sent to the concerned Department and so, one week's time may be allowed to him. On July 25, 1980, Mr. Purohit stated that despite efforts, he was not able to seek instructions from respondent No. 1 in connection with the settlement. On that day, an application was moved by the learned counsel for the petitioner stating that the writ petition may be decided on merits. On July 25, 1980, Mr. Purohit stated that despite efforts, he was not able to seek instructions from respondent No. 1 in connection with the settlement. On that day, an application was moved by the learned counsel for the petitioner stating that the writ petition may be decided on merits. It will be useful here to except paras 12 and 14 of that application, which read as under ;- " 12- ;g gS fd ;fn ;g U;k;ky; mDr vkS|ksfxd fookn ds fo"k; esa gq, le>kSrs dh csFkrk ,oa ftu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa djus ls dkexkjksa dks mls djus gsrq etcwj gksuk iM+k mudk ml ij D;k izHkko gS bl fo"k; esa orZeku dk;Zokgh esa tkap djuk mfpr le>rh gS rks bl fo"k; esa rF;ksa ds fo"k; esa foLr`r tkap djuk iM+sxk o nksuksa i{kksa dks lk{; ysdj fQj fu.kZ; djuk iM+sxk ftldk izHkko i{kdkjksa ds chp mifLFkr iwoZorhZ ,oa i'tkrcrhZ lHkh fooknksa ij iM+sxkA tks bl dk;Zokgh esa gksuk lEHko ugha gSA " " 14- ;g gS fd le>kSrk djrs le; Jh izcU/k i{k dh vksj ls ;g izLrko j[kk x;k Fkk fd fjV ;kfpdk fonM~k dj yh tk;s rFkk dkexkj i{k ds bl izLrko dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k o blh dkj.k ls bl fjV ;kfpdk dks fonM~k djus ckcr mYys[k ugha fd;k x;kA izcU/k i{k us bl ij ;g dgk fd bl dh izfr U;k;ky; esa izLrqr djus dk mYys[k dj fn;k tk,A D;ksafd dkexkj i{k v'oLr Fkk fd bldk fjV ;kfpdk ds fo"k; oLrq ls dksbZ laca/k ugha gSA vr% okrkZ Hkax gksus ds Mj ls etcwju dkexkj i{k us ;g Lohdkj dj fy;kA izca/;{k 'kk;n blh izdkj izfrfyfi izLrqr djus dk mYys[k dj 'kk;n v'oLFk ;k fd og blh ds vk/kkj ij fjV ;kfpdk esa fl) in fu.kZr u gksus ckcr U;k;ky; esa cgl dj ldsxkA " This application was replied on behalf of the Company by filing a reply on July 21, 980 i.e. before the application was actually filed in Court. The application has been hotly contested, inter alia, on the ground that the petitions cannot avoid the Settlement dated May 16, 1980, which is lawful. The insinuations made in the application were also denied. 9. The application has been hotly contested, inter alia, on the ground that the petitions cannot avoid the Settlement dated May 16, 1980, which is lawful. The insinuations made in the application were also denied. 9. Section 10(3) of the Act reads as under:- "(23) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference." 10. I propose to first dispose of the application. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Settlement 'dated May 16, 1980 has got nothing to do with the subject-matter of the Writ petition as it is directed against the order (Ex. 5) passed under Section 10(3) of the Act, and that as the subject-matter of the Settlement is foreign to the subject-matter of the writ petition, the writ petition may be disposed of on merits. This is opposed by the learned counsel for the, respondents and it is urged that it will be futile exercise to examine the writ petition on merits, for, it is decided on merits, the findings given in respect thereof may prejudicially affect the rights of the parties under the Settlement anted May 16, 1980. The State Government, vide Ex. 4, dated February 1980, has referred the dispute to the industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur in respect of the matters mentioned therein. In respect of item No. 1, mentioned in Ex. 4, there was a clerical mistake, regarding days of casual leave. 1 e same was corrected vide notification (Anx. R. 3) dated March 10, 1980 (for reading 10 days casual leave in place of 7 days casual leave). 11. In respect of item No. 1, mentioned in Ex. 4, there was a clerical mistake, regarding days of casual leave. 1 e same was corrected vide notification (Anx. R. 3) dated March 10, 1980 (for reading 10 days casual leave in place of 7 days casual leave). 11. It will be pertinent to refer to the relevant portion of the Settlement dated May 16, 1980 : " bl vof/k esa ;wfu;u us dkj[kkus esa gM+rky fnukad 7&2&80 ls izkjEHk dj nh] ftldks jksdus ds fy, jkT; ljdkj us vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 10 ( 3 ) ds vUrxZr fnukad 18&2&80 dks fu"ks/kkKk tkjh dhA bl fu"ks/kkKk ds fo:) ;wfu;u ds v/;{k Jh d`ik jke us fjV ;kfpdk jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr dh tks muds fopkjk/khu gSA fu;kstd rFkk jkT; ljdkj us bl fjV ;kfpdk dk fojks/k fd;k vkSj bl fjV ;kfpdk la0 470@80 esa fu.kZ; dh izrh{kk gSA " The following terms of the Settlement may also be reproduced: 1- " ;wfu;u us ;g Lohdkj fd;k fd os fnukad 7&2&80 ls izkjEHk dh xbZ gM+rky dks rRdky lekIr dj dkj[kkus esa dk;Z ij pys tk;saxsA tks Jfed uxj ls ckgj pys x;s gSa mUgsa dkj[kkus esa viuh M~;wVh ij gM+rky lekIr gksus ds lkr fnu ds Hkhrj tkuk gksxkA 2- " ;wfu;u@Jfedx.k ftl vof/k esos gM+rky ij jgs gSa] ml vof/k ds fy;s fu;kstd ls fdlh Hkh izdkj dk osru izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gksaxsA os bls Li"V djrs gSa fd " dke ugha] osru ugha " ds fln~/kkar ij vk/kkfjr os gM+rky dh vof/k dk fdlh Hkh izdkj ds osru Dyse ugha dj ldsaxsA 4- " ;wfu;u blls lger gS fd bl le>kSrs ls lyaXu lwfp esa ftu Jfedksa ds uke vafdr gSa vkSj tks fuyfEcr gS mUgsa dkj[kkus esa dke djus dh btktr gksxh vkSj budk fuyacu LFkfxr jgsxk ijUrq muds f[kykQ vkjksiksa dh tkap eSustesaV }kjk dh tkosxh vkSj uSlfxad U;k; ds fl)karksa dh ifjpkyuk djrs gq, eSustesaV dks bu Jfedksa ds fo:) vuq'kklukRed dk;kZokgh fu;eksa@LFkkbZ vkns'kksa ds vUrxZr djus esa rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij ;wfu;u o Jfed fdlh izdkj dh :dkoV iSnk ugha djsaxs rFkk 'kkfUriw.kZ okrkoj.k cuk;s j[ksaxsA " The penultimate para of the Settlement is as follows : " nksuksa i{k }kjk mijksDr 'krksZa ij le>kSrk lEiUu gksus ds i'pkr~ fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ vkS|ksfxd fookn vc 'ks"k ugha jgrk gSA bl le>kSrs dh ,d izfr ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; esa fjV ;kfpdk la0 470@80 ds lanHkZ esa izknsf'kd mi&Je vk;qDr tks/kij }kjk U;k;ky; ds voyksdukFkZ ,oa vkns'kkFkZ izLrqr dj nh tk;sxhA " According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the words used in the penultimate para " voyksdukFkZ ,ao vkns'kkFkZ " are redundant and superfluous, and the only object of writing these words was to bring it to the notice of the Court that some settlement has been arrived at. Here, it will be relevant to notice the relevant provisions of the Act. 12. Section 22 of the Act deals with Strikes and Lock-outs concerning public utility service. Section 23 relates to general prohibition of strikes and lock-outs and it applies to all industrial disputes including public utility service. Sub-section (1) of S. 24, inter alia, makes strike or lockout illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of S. 22 or S.23 or if it is continued in contravention of an order made under sub-s. (3) of S. 10 or sub-s. (4-A) of s. 10-A. According to S. 24 (2) if a strike or lock-out in pursuance of an industrial dispute has already commenced and is in existence at the time of the reference of the dispute to one of the authorities mentioned therein, its continuance shall not be deemed to be illegal unless either at its commencement it was not in contravention of the provisions; of the Act or its continuance lad not been prohibited under S. 10 (3) or S. 10-A (4-A). Section 26 deals with imposing on penalty for illegal strikes and lock-outs. According to the learned counsel for the company, the strike commenced on February 7, 1980 was itself wholly unjustified end unwarranted and further it became illegal when it was continued after the prohibitory order under S. 10 (3) of the Act was passed on February 18, 1980. From the terms of the Settlement dated May 16, 1980, it is clear that the workmen, who had gone on strike from February 7, 1980, were required to immediately start doing work in the factory and those, who had gone out of city, were required to join duty within seven days from the date of the Settlement, it was also stipulated that the striking workmen would not get salary of the period of the strike, on the ground `no work no pay. The order of suspension passed against some of the workmen was suspended but the Management was allowed to proceed to investigate the charges against them and to conduct disciplinary enquiry also keeping in view the principles of natural Justice and standing orders. The Union and the workmen both were not to obstruct in this regard. The order of suspension passed against some of the workmen was suspended but the Management was allowed to proceed to investigate the charges against them and to conduct disciplinary enquiry also keeping in view the principles of natural Justice and standing orders. The Union and the workmen both were not to obstruct in this regard. The adjudication on the question whether the order under S. 10(3) of the Act was legal or not would necessarily affect the decision on the question whether the strike which was commenced from February 7, 1980 was legal or illegal ? In other words if the order under S. 10 (3) is held to be illegal, the continuance of the strike by the workmen after the order (Ex. 5) would be legal, and if the order under S. 10 (3) is held to be legal, then the continuance of the strike after the date of the prohibitory order would be contrary to law. According to the Settlement the striking workmen are not to get wages for the period during which they remained on strike. If the strike is held to be legal, the liability as to wages etc. may arise against the Company to pay the wages to them as it was legal despite the prohibitory order under S. 10 (3) of the Act. If a finding is given that the order under S. 10 (3) was legal, then the continuance of strike shall be contrary to law and for that action under S. 24 of the Act may be initiated. The Settlement dated May 16, 1980 rules out both, for, the striking workmen are not to get wages during the period of strike and the Management has been permitted to proceed to investigate the charges. Having regard to the terms of the settlement, I am of opinion that the parties did not intend that the writ petition should be decided on merits and that is why it was incorporated in it that this settlement may be produced in this court for perusal and orders. 13. It is not necessary to hold an enquiry as to under what circumstances the Settlement dated May 16, 1980 was entered into, for, the Settlement dated May 16, 1980 was arrived at through the intervention of the Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner and it was registered and certified by the Conciliation Officer in the presence of the concerned parties. 13. It is not necessary to hold an enquiry as to under what circumstances the Settlement dated May 16, 1980 was entered into, for, the Settlement dated May 16, 1980 was arrived at through the intervention of the Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner and it was registered and certified by the Conciliation Officer in the presence of the concerned parties. S. 18 of the Act provides on whom settlements and awards are binding, S. 19 (1) makes provision regarding period of operation of settlements and awards. S. 19 (2) deals with termination of settlement. No steps for terminating the settlement have been taken by the petitioner. Not only this, it is provided in the settlement that the Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner shall file its copy for perusal and orders in this writ petition. In these circumstances the Settlement which was filed by the parties has to be given effect to as it is in force and has not been terminated. 14. As learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that the writ petition may be disposed of on merits end as I had heard learned Counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection end merits, 1 proceed to exmine them but, nothing said hereinbelow while examining the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties will prejudice or affect. adversely the rights of the parties under the Settlement dated May 16, 1980. 15. Mr. Mehta has raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition has been filed by the Union through its President Kriparam and since it cannot be said to be an `aggrieved person', it (writ petition) is not maintainable, for, it is only an `aggrieved person under Article 226 of the Constitution, who can maintain the writ petition. According to the learned counsel each, of the workmen are affected by the order (Ex. 5) under S. 10(3) of the Act and not the Union and, therefore, it cannot maintain the writ petition and S. 36 of the Act cannot be invoked. 16. The material portion of S. 36 is as under:- "36. According to the learned counsel each, of the workmen are affected by the order (Ex. 5) under S. 10(3) of the Act and not the Union and, therefore, it cannot maintain the writ petition and S. 36 of the Act cannot be invoked. 16. The material portion of S. 36 is as under:- "36. Representation of parties (1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in am proceeding under this Act by:- (a) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member; (b) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workmen employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) ..... ..... ..... ..... (3) ..... ..... ..... ..... (4) ..... ..... ..... ..... 17. The Allahabad High Court in Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary to the Government, AIR 1951 All. I , held that though Article 226 makes no mention as to who shall apply for an appropriate order under the Article, other writs, direction or orders cannot be placed on the same footing as the writ of habeas corpus and only those persons whose interests are directly affected by a statute or an order can apply for redress under the Article. In that case, an application on behalf of the Indian Sugar Mills Association through its president was filed and the relief sought in that case was against the State of Uttar Pradesh, certain officers of the State and also against three Labour Federations. It was held that it is the interest of the applicant which must be directly affected by the statute or the order complained against the applicant cannot claim that its interests are directly affected. It was held that it is the interest of the applicant which must be directly affected by the statute or the order complained against the applicant cannot claim that its interests are directly affected. In Govt Press E. Assoon v. Government of Mysore, AIR 1962 Mysore 25 , it was held that an application for issue of writ must be by an aggrieved person and in Association although registered had no locus standi to make an application under the Article, for, the personal and individual grievances of some of the members and not of the association it self. In that case, the question for consideration was about the maintainability or otherwise of writ petition sought to be presented by the Government Press Employees' Association represented by its General Secretary as the petitioner. It was observed in para 5 of the report as follows:- "It is further clear that the grievances of these several employees cannot fall within the description of a class injury or an injury to a class of persons similarly situated. The highest that could be stated in this respect is that their grievances may flow from, or arise out of, one or more orders of the Government prescribing the conditions of eligibility or promotion. The fact that the reason or the basis for the grievances of several persons may may be..................................................................................................................... same does not convert the separate grievances of the several individuals into a common grievances of a class". The question whether the principle of S. 36 is applicable to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or not arose before a learned single . Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Gen. Secry E.Z.I.E. Asson v. Zonal \Manager, L.I. Corpn, AIR 1962 Cal. 45 . It was held that an application under Article 226 ?of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of the nature mentioned therein "can only be made at the instance of an individual who is himself an aggrieved person and if one, who is not himself; aggrieved by any action wants to move the court for redress it must be shown that he is competent under the law to make the application. In para 16, it was observed: "Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act does no doubt permit a representation of an aggrieved person by another who is not himself aggrieved but such representation is only possible in a proceeding under that act alone and there is no reason for following the same procedure in proceedings not under that Act. Procedure is but a hand maiden of the legislature and can only work at the will of the latter. Courts of law are not free to adopt procedure prescribed by law in a particular case to another set of circumstances unless sanctioned. Hence, a person who has not been aggrieved cannot seek a relief under Article 226 in a representative capacity for others." Another learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Director General Ordnance Factories Employees Association v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Cal 149 , has observed as under : "Even where an association is permitted by law to bring a legal proceedings, it can bring an application under Articles 226 only when its rights as a collective body as distinguished from the aggregate rights of its members are affected by the act challenged in the proceedings." It was observed in G. Y. K. K. Singh v. State of Bihar, 1970 LIC 1482 as under : "Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act permits the representation of an aggrieved person by another who is not himself aggrieved, but such representation is only possible in a proceeding under the Act. I can see no reason why in any proceeding not under the Act, the same procedure should be followed. Courts of law are not free to adopt the procedure prescribed by law in a particular case to another set of circumstances unless sanctioned. Petitioner No. 1 has not been prejudiced by the action of the respondents. Therefore, the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution at its instance is not maintainable." Indian Sugar Mill's case (I) and Govt. Press's case(2) were not noticed in G. Y. R. K- Singh's case. Mr. Shrimalee has referred Barrackpore Bus Syndicate v. Sarafuddin, AIR 1946 Calcutta 444 , which was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act (No. IV of 1939). A Division Bench of this Court in Azmer Motor Mazdoor Union v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 Raj. Press's case(2) were not noticed in G. Y. R. K- Singh's case. Mr. Shrimalee has referred Barrackpore Bus Syndicate v. Sarafuddin, AIR 1946 Calcutta 444 , which was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act (No. IV of 1939). A Division Bench of this Court in Azmer Motor Mazdoor Union v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 Raj. 225 , took the view that the petitioner-union, in that case, was an aggrieved party as it requested the State Government to refer the dispute. The facts of that case were that the petitioner-union took up the dispute in regard to discharge of one of its members and requested the State Government to refer the said dispute for adjudication under S. 10 of the Act. The State Government, on a consideration of the failure report of the Conciliation Officer, refused to refer the dispute for adjudication without assigning any reasons whatsoever. The writ petition was filed by Ajmer Motor Mazdoor Union. A contention was raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner-union could not be considered to be an aggrieved party. The decision in Govt. Press's case(2) and General Secretary's case(3) were distinguished on facts. The Division Bench held that a writ of mandamus, in the circumstances of that case, issued to the State Government, in a petition filed by the union, under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable. In W.B.P.W. E. Union v. AM. P. Works, AIR 1962 Cal. 649 , the learned single Judge, while dissenting from In a Sugar Mill's ease(l), and distinguished Govt. Press's case and General Secretary's case, opined as under:- "Since the workers' union of association of employees in a position to raise an industrial dispute and to help the workmen before Courts and Tribunals under the industrial Disputes Act, on a reference made on such a dispute and since such unions or organisations are deemed to be parties before the Industrial Courts or Tribunals and since it is their duty to look after, to maintain and to further the interests of workmen, it is unthinkable that such unions or organisations are to be deemed to be unaffected by an award to which they object. Also, if the law confers on them a right to raise an industrial dispute and also a right of representation, then there is no reason to hold that they do not have a legal right to enforce those rights by a writ petition. Their right is the collective right of workmen or the right which entitles them to spouse individual grievances. Their is the right to see that workers are not victimised, subject to unfair labour practice and that they are paid fair wages, bonus and other emoluments and be allowed to work under fair working conditions. If industrial awards go against the rights of workmen it is for the unions of workmen to seek relief elsewhere. If industrial awards go against the rights of workman it is for the unions of workmen to seek relief elsewhere. If they are not allowed to carry on the fight in vindication of the right, there is a limitation put on that right, which the Industrial Disputes Act does not contemplate. The Demand Charter was submitted by the Union. The reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal in respect of the matters contained in Ex. 4. After submitting of the demand charter (Ex. 1) the letter dated January 19, 1980 was sent by the Union justifying the demands. The Conciliation proceedings took place between the company and the Union. The failure report was sent to the Union. It is clear from the facts contain;d in the pleadings of the parties that the dispute for adjudication under S. 10(1) of the Act was referred on the failure report. The cause of the workmen was espoused by the Union and, therefore, when ?he order under S. 10(3) was passed, it cannot be said that the Union was not an aggrieved party. The principles laid down in Ajmer Motor Mazdoor's case(7) are applicable to this case and I hold that the Union is entitled to maintain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is, therefore, overruled. 18. Now, I propose to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. Mr Shrimalee has challenged the impugned order (Ex. 5) under S. 10(3) of the Act on three grounds : (1) that the order (Ex. The preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is, therefore, overruled. 18. Now, I propose to examine the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. Mr Shrimalee has challenged the impugned order (Ex. 5) under S. 10(3) of the Act on three grounds : (1) that the order (Ex. 5) entails penal and civil consequences and so it could not have been passed without notice and affording an opportunity of hearing. It being in violation of audi alteram partem rule is bad ; (2) that the whole dispute on the basis of which the strike commenced was not referred and, therefore, the impugned order (Ex. 5) under S. 10(3) could not be made; and (3) that even if the conditions laid down under S. 10(3) are satisfied, there are certain other factors, which ought to have been taken into account before passing the discretionary order under S. 10(3) of the Act and as the necessary factors have not been taken into consideration, the order (Ex. 5) stands vitiated. 20. I take up ground No. (1) first viz. whether the order (Ex 5) under S 1013)' of the Act is bad, as no notice and opportunity of being heard were given to the Union before passing it. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order under 5 10(3) entails penal and civil consequences. In support of his argument, he referred to Ss 22, 23, 24 26 27 and 28 of the Act. He further submitted that the order (Ex. 5) having been made without notice and affording opportunity of being heard is in violation of the principles of natural justice. He invited my attention to D. L. Board Calcutta v. Jaffar Imam, AIR 1966 SC 282 E. E. & Co Ltd. v. State of W. B., AIR 1975 SC 266 Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 and Mohmler Singh v. Election Commr., AIR 1978 SC 851 . 21. It is correct that as far as possible where the rights of a party are affected by an order, the affected party must on the principles of natural justice be given an opportunity to state its case and to show-cause against the issue of any such order but there are certain well recognised exceptions to the application of the principles of natural justice, in Wiseman v. Borneman, 1967 (3) All. E.R. 1045 , Lord Reid observed as follows:- "Even a body acting judicially, there must be a balance between the need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to the defendant to see material against him." In Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, AIR 1970 SC 1269 , Hidaya-tullah, C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed as under:- "This is not a case of any particular individual who is being charged with adoption of unfair means but of the conduct of all the examinees or at least a vast majority of them at a particular centre. If it is not question of charging anyone individually with unfair means but to condemn the examination as ineffective for the purpose it was held, must the Board give an opportunity to all the candidates to represent their cases? We think not. It was not necessary for the Board to give an opportunity to the candidates if the examinations as a whole being cancelled. The Board had not charged anyone with unfair means so that he could claim to defend himself. The examination was vitiated by adoption of unfair means on a mass scale. In these circumstances it would be wrong to insist that the Board must held a detailed enquiry into the matter and examine each individual case to satisfy itself which of the candidates had not adopted unfair means." It may be mentioned that the Act is designed to provide a machinery for just and equitable settlement of disputes by adjudication, by negotiation and by conciliation etc. instead of by a trial of strength by strike or lock-out S 10{1) enables the Government whenever an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, to refer the dispute to a Board, the Court of inquiry Labour Court or a Tribunal for adjudication. The mam object of S 10(3) is to maintain an atmosphere of peace and calm when the matter referred to is being adjudicated upon by the Tribunal or the Labour Court. It will not be conducive to industrial peace if side by side with the adjudication of the dispute by the Tribunal strike or lock-out continues. In other words, the object is that there should not be a truce and a war at the same time. The Government has been clothed with power to prohibit the continuance of strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute. In other words, the object is that there should not be a truce and a war at the same time. The Government has been clothed with power to prohibit the continuance of strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute. The object underlying S. 10(3) of the Act would be defeated if it is made incumbent on the Government to issue a show-cause notice to the concerned parties as to why they should not be prohibited from continuing of such strike. If a notice is given to the employees to show-cause notice the continuance of a strike, the management would also insist upon an opportunity to show cause that the strike should be prohibited Similarly, in the case of lock-out, an opportunity to the management would also involve an opportunity to the employees to rebut the case of the Management. The Government will be faced with the responsibility of deciding the respective cases of the parties to some extent even though the main dispute is pending before the Tribunal for adjudication. This would also cause considerable delay in passing the order prohibiting the continuance of the strike or lock-out. Under S. 12(5) of the Act if on a consideration of a report by the Conciliation Officer that the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference, it may make such a reference and if it does not make a reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefore. Here, the safeguard while refusing to refer is that the Government should record its reasons and communicate them to the parties. No opportunity to the parties before passing an order refusing to refer the dispute, is contemplated. In Keventers Karamchari Sangh v. Lt. Governor Delhi, 1971(2) LIJ 975 it was held that the opportunity to show cause will defeat the very object with which S. 10(3) was enacted and such an order is not one, which requires the giving of an opportunity to show cause. This decision was not approved by the Supreme Court in Delhi Admn. v. Workmen Edward Keventers, AIR 1978 SC 976 so far as it decided that where there are three demands and only one demand is referred, still such a reference makes a strike with reference to all the demands, a strike "in connection with such dispute" and it is open to the Government to prohibit such a strike. v. Workmen Edward Keventers, AIR 1978 SC 976 so far as it decided that where there are three demands and only one demand is referred, still such a reference makes a strike with reference to all the demands, a strike "in connection with such dispute" and it is open to the Government to prohibit such a strike. However, the view taken in regard to the requirement of opportunity to show cause against the proposed action under S. 10(3) of the Act, remained untouched by the Supreme Court. In E. Press Workers Union v. Govt, of A.P., 1979 LIC 330 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that it is not necessary that before an order is passed under S. 10(3) of the Act, a notice to show cause why such an order should not be passed should be given to the employees or the management, as the case may be. S. 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deals with the power of the State Government to prevent strikes, lock-outs etc. According to it, if in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the Community, or for maintaining employment, it may by general or special order, make provisions, amongst others, for prohibiting, subject to the provisions, of the order, strikes or lock-outs generally ora strike or lock-out in connection with any industrial dispute. The power of the State Government under S. 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are analogous to that of S. 10(3) of the Act. S.3 of the U.p. Industrial Dispute, Act, 1947 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Basti Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., 1979 (2) SCC 88 . In Para 26 of the report, his Lordship K. Iyer, speaking for the court, observed as under:- "Section 3 serves the limited purpose of lagalising administrative intervention to prevent disorder without prejudice to judicial justice which will eventually be allowed to take its course." 22. I respectfully adopt the view taken in E. Press Workers Union's case. A.K. Kalliappa Cheriar & sons v. State of Kerala, 1970 (1) LLJ 97 , on which reliance was place by Mr. I respectfully adopt the view taken in E. Press Workers Union's case. A.K. Kalliappa Cheriar & sons v. State of Kerala, 1970 (1) LLJ 97 , on which reliance was place by Mr. Shrimalee is a case relating to lock-out and is reliance was place by Mr. Shrimalee is a case relating to lock-out and is distingushable, in view of the decisions reported in Workmen I.L.T.D Co. v. I.L.T.D Co. Gunter, AIR 1970 SC 860 and Express Newspapers {P) Lid. v. Workers, AIR 1963 SC 569 , the rights to a closure of business is a fundamental right and thus a case of lock-out stands on different footing from the case of a strike. Apart from this, I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the view taken in the aforesaid Kerala case (19) that opportunity has to be given before an order under S. 10(3) id passed as this was based in the ground that power exercised under S. 10(2) is a quasi-judicial power and ground that power ex based without giving a reasonable opportunity to these who would be affected by the order to state and establish their case. It is well settled by this time that S. 10(1) confers a discretionary power and this discretionary power can be exercised on being satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The power conferred on the appropriate Government is an administrative power and the action of the Government in making the reference is an administrative action, Reference in this connection may be made to A.S. Production Agencies v. Ind. Tribunal Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 170 . Even in this case, it was reiterated that there cannot be any hard and fast rule with regard to the scope and application of the principle of natural justice and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was also pointed out that audi alteram partem rule would be excluded, if importing the right to be heard has the affect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands. It was also pointed out that audi alteram partem rule would be excluded, if importing the right to be heard has the affect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands. The learned Author (S.A. de Smith) in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, has stated as follows: "In administrative law a prima facie right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard may ne held to be excluded by implication where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially action of a prevention or nature." In sub-s. (1) of S. 10 of the Act the words used are `is of opinion'. In In Sub-s. (2) of S. 10 the words used are 'if satisfied,' whereas in sub-section(3), no such words have been used. The absence of words 'of opinion' and 'if satisfied' in s. 10(3) clearly shows that on the fulfilment of the two conditions, namely (1) that there is industrial dispute and that such dispute has been referred to by the appropriate Government and (2) that on the date of reference there should be a strike or lock-out in existence in connection with such dispute, it can, by order, prohibit the continuance of strike in connection with such dispute which may be in existance on the date of the reference. This also lends support to the view that notice and reasonable opportunity of being heard are excluded before making an order under S. 10(3).In Menaka Gandhi's case (II) one of the contentions raised was that before an order impounding a passport is made, the person concerned should be given an opportunity to show cause why the passport should not be impounded. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt with one of the principles of natural justice viz. principles of audi alteram partem, and he d that it applies to such a case and ordered that the order impounding the passport of the petitioner was in violation of the rule of natural justice embodied is that maxim. In Mohinder Singh's case (12). the Election Commissioner having been satisfied that the counting in an election was disturbed by violence in that some ballot papers had been destroyed by violence and as a consequence of which it was not possible to complete the counting of votes in the constituency cancelled the roll. In Mohinder Singh's case (12). the Election Commissioner having been satisfied that the counting in an election was disturbed by violence in that some ballot papers had been destroyed by violence and as a consequence of which it was not possible to complete the counting of votes in the constituency cancelled the roll. It was held by the Supreme Court that fair hearing is a postulate of decision making in cancelling a poll and it cannot be fair if apprising the affected and apprising the representations is absent. These decisions, in my opinion, are not any benefit to the petitioner, for, they deal with the situations totally differents from that which is present in the case in hand. 23. For all these reasons, I am not inclined to accept the contention that before prohibiting a strike under S. 10(3) of the Act, it was necessary for the State Government to have issued notice and given an opportunity to the parties concerned to show cause against such an action. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order Ex. 5 under s. 10(3) of the Act is bad (as no notice to show cause was given and as no opportunity of being heard was afforded) being in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, is, therefore, rejected. The second around of attack raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that is all the demands mentioned in the Charter of Demands (Ex. 1) dated January 14, 1980 were not referred to the Industrial Tribunal for which the strike was commenced, the order (Ex-5) under S. 10(3) of the Act could not have been passed. 24. In para 7 of the writ petition, it was mentioned that neither the Company not the petitioner moved for conciliation in respect of the fresh dispute, not did the Company concede to the demands to withdraw the charge sheets and because of the fresh dispute, workmen were compelled to go on strike. In para 8 of the writ petition, it was averred that the Company by wielding its influence over the Government, with an unusual haste, got a reference made in respect of some of the demands mentioned in the Demand Charter dated January 14, 1980. It will, thus, be noticed that there are no clear averments as to what demands were referred and what demands were not referred. It will, thus, be noticed that there are no clear averments as to what demands were referred and what demands were not referred. No reference has been made to the Settlements Anx. R2/2 dated January 6, 1979 and Anx. R2/4 dated March 30, 1979. The case of the petitioner is that the Settlement Anx. R2/2 was fraudulently obtained by the company and it was the outcome of fraud. Reference could only be made in respect of demands which were nor covered by the aforesaid Settlements In Ex. 1, 11 demands have been mentioned, which are as under : (1) Casual leave according to standing order. (2) Bonus for the Year 1975-76 @ 20%. (3) Doduction in Dearness Allowance. (4) Temporary labour should be given permanency. (5) Labour Colony. (6) Dress : Two cotton and one woollen- (7) Contractorship. (8) Further revision of pay scale. (9) Dearness Allowance should be added for 1977-78 to the newly and permanent labour. (10) Service of workmen cannot be discontinued (11) (a) Cycle Allowance and (b) Night Allowance. Annexures R2/2 and R2/4 are the Settlements which were arrived at between the Company and the Union on behalf of the workmen. These Settlements were duly registered. The Settlements were to remain in force for a period of five years. The case of the Company is that after the negotiations, a comprehensive Settlement (Anx. R2/2) dated January 8, 1979 was arrived at and that was duly registered with the Deputy Regional Labour Commissioner, Jodhpur on the very date. Thereafter, Shri Prabhu Ram Choudhary, Secretary of the Union sent a letter dated February 28, 1979 to the General Manager of the Company amongst others, requesting that the workmen who became permanent in 1977-78 have not been property fitted in the agreed grades. That necessitated a further settlement (Anx. R. 2-/4) dated March 30, 1979, which was also registered before the competent authority. According to the Company, in view of the operation of the existing settlements, the demands raised by the Secretary of the Union were wholly illegal arid unjustified. It is clear from Ex. 4 that demands Nos. j, 2, 4, 6, 8, and II (a) were referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government. Demand No. 3 was not referred as it was fully settled in the settlement (Anx. R. 2/2,) Demands Nos. It is clear from Ex. 4 that demands Nos. j, 2, 4, 6, 8, and II (a) were referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government. Demand No. 3 was not referred as it was fully settled in the settlement (Anx. R. 2/2,) Demands Nos. 7, 10, and 11 were not referred as they are covered by the settlement (Anx. R. 2/2). Demand No. 9 was not referred as it was settled by the settlement (Anx. R. 2/4) dated March 30, 1979. Under S. 19, both the settlements are in operation and until they are terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Art. they are binding. Demand No. 5 is with respect to labour colony. It was not referred as according to Mr. Mehta it cannot be said to be an 'industrial dispute'. It is not free from difficulty as to whether demand for labour colony can be connected with the conditions of labour of any person. Schedule II and III of the Act enumerates matter within the jurisdiction of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals respectively labour colony is not a matter enumerated therein. 25. The question is whether it could be referred as an 'industrial dispute'. S. 2 (K) defines `industrial dispute', which runs as under:- "(K) Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person". S. 10 (3) of the Act lays down that an appropriate Government may prohibit the continuance of the strike in connection with the dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference. After submitting of the Demand Charter (Ex. 1) and on failure report of the Conciliation Proceedings, the State Government referred the dispute mentioned in its order (Ex. 4) dated February 11, 1980 to the Industrial Tribunal. It thus follows that it declined to refer some of the disputes even assuming that they are industrial disputes. No other dispute was in existence except those which were impliedly declined by the State Government for making reference to the Industrial Tribunal. If some of the disputes were not referred assuming them to be industrial disputes, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to take steps for getting them referred to the Industrial Tribunal. No other dispute was in existence except those which were impliedly declined by the State Government for making reference to the Industrial Tribunal. If some of the disputes were not referred assuming them to be industrial disputes, the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to take steps for getting them referred to the Industrial Tribunal. Reference may be made to A. S. Production Agencies's case (22). The demand for Labour Colony cannot be said to be connected with the terms of employment or the condition of labour of any person. The connection of the dispute with the "terms of employment or condition of labour" of the workers is a condition precedent. It may be mentioned about rent free accommodation, it was decided vide settlement (Anx. R. 2/2) dated January 6, 1979 that additional burden in this respect should not be put on the Company. The demand for labour colony for the workmen cannot be examined and adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal. The "industrial dispute" was referred to the Tribunal and so the State Government could prohibit the continuance of strike in connection with the dispute which was in existence on the date of the reference. The contention that the whole dispute on the basis of which the strike commenced were not referred and, therefore, the order under S. 10 (3) could not have been passed is, therefore, repelled. 26. The only argument that now remains to be examined is whether the other factors besides the fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned in S.10 (3) should also be taken into consideration e.g., expediency, dangerate public safety etc. 27. It is not in dispute that passing of the order under S. 10 (3) is discretionary with the Government S. 10 is a self-contained Code as it were so far as its subject-matter is concerned. The prohibitory power springs into existence only when such dispute has made the subject of reference under S. 10(1) of the Act. It was held in Delhi Admn.'s case (17) that the suchness of the dispute is abundantly brought out in the preceding portion of the sub-section. The prohibitory power springs into existence only when such dispute has made the subject of reference under S. 10(1) of the Act. It was held in Delhi Admn.'s case (17) that the suchness of the dispute is abundantly brought out in the preceding portion of the sub-section. It was further held that two conditions which are necessary for making an order under S. 10 (3) of the Act are (1) there must be an industrial dispute in existence and that strike must have commenced in connection with such dispute and (2) that such dispute must have been already referred for adjudication. If the two conditions laid down under S. 10 (3) are satisfied, then, the appropriate Government has power to prohibit the continuance of strike in respect of the referred dispute. His Lordship Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, in Delhi Admn.'s case (17) observed as under : "Clearly there must be an industrial dispute in existence. Secondly, such dispute must have been already referred for adjudication. Then, and then alone, the power to prohibit in respect of such referred dispute can be exercised." In this case, the conditions laid down under S. 10 (3) of the Act existed and, therefore, the State Government in exercise of its discretion, was proper in prohibiting the continuance of strike, which commenced on February 7, 1980. The dispute was referred on February II, 1980 to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The State Government passed an order under S. 10 (3) of the Act prohibiting the continuance of the strike. It may be mentioned that in the affidavit of Shri Gopal Lal Sharma, the circumstances that led to the passing of the order under S. 10 (3) of the Act have been mentioned. The pre-requisite two conditions under S. 10 (3) were satisfied when the State Government passed the order under S. 10 (3) of the Act and the discretion cannot be said to have been exercised in disregard of the well-recognised principles for exercising the same. The third argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 28. For the reasons mentioned above none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has any force. There is no infirmity in the order (Ex. 5) dated February 18, 1980 of the State Government. The third argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 28. For the reasons mentioned above none of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has any force. There is no infirmity in the order (Ex. 5) dated February 18, 1980 of the State Government. The writ petition is accordingly, dismissed subject, to the observations made hereinabove to the effect that the rejection of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner will not prejudice or affect adversely the rights of the parties under the settlement dated May 16, 1980. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******