Judgment: The petitioner obtained a decree for injunction on February 7, 1972 restraining the opposite party No. 6 from using certain land and put the decree into execution on February 4, 1976. Meanwhile, on May 24, 1975, the opposite party No.6 sold the land to the opposite party Nos. 1 to 5. In the execution proceeding the purchasers/opposite parties 1 to 5 filed an application under S. 47. If the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 thereinafter referred to as the Code) challenging the maintainability of the execution proceeding against them on the ground that they had been wrongly impleaded as judgment debtors in the execution case as they were not parties to the original suit and the decree was not executable against them. The executing court rejected the application on the ground that they being purchasers of the land from the judgment debtor were bound by the decree and the execution proceeding was maintainable against them The learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal preferred against the said order of the leaned Munsif, set aside the order of the learned Munsif and rejected the application for execution observing that a decree for permanent injunction was a personal decree and did not run with the land and as such in absence of any statutory provision, it could not be enforced against a purchaser from a judgment-debtor. In so observing the learned Judge relied upon a judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case Dahyabhai v. Bapalal, reported in ILR X XVI Bombay page 140 Against the said order of the learned District Judge, the present rule was obtained by the decree-holder. 2. The only question therefore that falls for determination in this Rule is whether a decree for injunction can be executed against a person who has purchased the suit land from the judgment debtor Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner. contended that in view of the provisions of S. 146 of the Code a proceeding for execution of a decree for permanent injunction is maintainable against such a person as he was claiming under the judgment debtor. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner. contended that in view of the provisions of S. 146 of the Code a proceeding for execution of a decree for permanent injunction is maintainable against such a person as he was claiming under the judgment debtor. Mr. Shyama Charan Mitter on the other hand, contended that as S. 146 has been made subject to the other provisions of the Code and Order 21 rule 32 of the Code provides a specific mode for enforcement of a decree for injunction by attachment of the property of the judgment debtor and by his detent on in Civil prison the Code a different mode of such execution cannot be legally availed by invoking S. 146 Mr. Mitter further submitted that a decree for injunction, which is an equitable relief, acts in personam and does not run with the land and consequently it cannot be enforced against anyone other than the judgment-debtor. Several decisions were cited by the learned Advocates in support of their respective contentions to which I will refer in course of the judgment. 3. To appreciate the contentions of the respective parties it would be necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Code. Under S. 2(10) "judgment-debtor" means any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made Section 2(11) defines 'legal representative" to mean a person who in-law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Section 50(1) provides that where a judgment debtor does before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased. Sub-section (2) of S. 50 limits the liability of the legal representative to the extent of the property which comes to his hands. Sub-section (2) of S. 50 limits the liability of the legal representative to the extent of the property which comes to his hands. Section 146 lays down that, save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may he taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him. 4. In the case of Dahyabhai (supra) a Division, Bench of the Bombay High Court held that an execution could not go against a purchaser from the judgment-debtor as an injunction did not run with the land. In the case of Sakarlal v. Bai Parvati Bai, reported in ILR XXVI Bombay, page 283 it was urged, relying upon the decision in Dahyabai's case that as the original judgment-debtor was dead, the decree for injunction could not be enforced against his son. In distinguishing Dahyabhai’s case, the same Division Bench observed that-their earlier decision was concerned with an application to enforce an injunction against a purchaser of land, and for such a case there case there was no statutory provision (emphasis mine) but such a decree could be enforced against the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor in view of the express provision of S. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It will be thus seen that the basis for the decision in, the case of Dahyabhai that an injunction could not be enforced against a purchaser of land was absence of any statutory provision in the Code of 1882 but relyin upon S. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882 (which corresponds to S. 50 of the Code of 1908) the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held in the case of Sakarlal (supra) that a decree for injunction could be enforced against the son of the judgment-debtor. While negativing a contention raised therein by Mr. Kharo that S. 234 had no manner of application, the Court observed:- "It is not difficult to see that if we were to accede to Mr. Kharo's argument we would be placing yet another obstacle in the way of a successful litigant's reaping the benefit of a decree passed in his favour" 5. Kharo that S. 234 had no manner of application, the Court observed:- "It is not difficult to see that if we were to accede to Mr. Kharo's argument we would be placing yet another obstacle in the way of a successful litigant's reaping the benefit of a decree passed in his favour" 5. Section 146 was introduced for the first time in the Code of Civil Procedure 1909, obvio1u'ily with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons in whom they came to be vested by devolution or assignment and of stultifying any attempt on the part of a judgment-debtor to avoid the decree by transferring his right to the suit property to some other person The absence of a statutory provision to have a decree executed against a purchaser from the judgment-debtor as noted by the Bombay High Court in the case of Sakarlal (supra) therefore need not be felt now in view of the enactment of S. 146 of the Code. 6. The next question that requires determination is whether the inclusion of the words “save as otherwise provided by this provided by this Code” in the S. 6 stands in the way of executing a decree for permanent injunction against the purchaser of the land in view of order 21 rule 32 of the Code as contended by Mr. Mitter. The limitation, on the exercise of the right as provided by the expression "save as otherwise provided by this Code" would mean, so far as it is relevant for our present purposes, that if the code permits a proceeding to be taken or application to be made against a party then in the absence of a provision to the contrary (emphasis mine) S. 146 would enable initiation of the proceeding against a person claiming under such a party. For example S. 73 of the Code permit rateable distribution of assets only when the decrees are against the same judgment debtor. Section 146 in such a case cannot enlarge the scope of S. 73, by permitting an executing court to make reteable distribution by including decree pagsed against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor as that would mean acting contrary to the provision of the Code. In this connection reference may by made to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Judge Kishore v. Taw Cotton Co. In this connection reference may by made to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Judge Kishore v. Taw Cotton Co. reported in AIR 1955 SC 376 while interpreting S. 146 of the Code :- "It is said: what, then, is meant by the word "save as otherwise provided by this Code ?" The answer is that those words are not meaningless but have effect in some cases. Take, by way of an illustration, the second proviso to O. 21, R. 16 which provides that where a decree for payment of money against two or more persons his been transfer red to one of them it shall not be executed against the others. This is a provision which forbids one of the judgment-debtors to whom alone the decree for payment of money has been transferred from making an application for execution and, therefore, he call not apply under S. 146 as a person claiming udder the decree-holder. As the respondent company do not fall within O. 21, R. 16 because the document did not cover the decree to be passed in future in the then pending suit that rule cannot be a bar to the respondent company making an application for execution under S. 146 if they satisfy the other requirement of that section, namely, that they can be said to be claiming under the decree-holder." 7. Mr. Mitter relied upon the Full Bench judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of Basari v. Zilla Singh reported in AIR 1970 Punjab & Haryana page 215 in support of his contention that a decree for preemption, which like one for injunction, was a personal decree could not be executed against the purchaser from the pre-emptor under S. 146. This decision is of no avail to Mr. Mitter as the Supreme Court has expressly overruled the said decision in Zilla Singh v. Hazari reported in AIR 1979 SC 1966 by observing that right of pre-emption was not a personal right and it could be executed by the vendee of the pre-emptor either under Order 21 Rule 16 or S. 146 of the Code: 8. Mitter as the Supreme Court has expressly overruled the said decision in Zilla Singh v. Hazari reported in AIR 1979 SC 1966 by observing that right of pre-emption was not a personal right and it could be executed by the vendee of the pre-emptor either under Order 21 Rule 16 or S. 146 of the Code: 8. It has next to be decided whether order 2l rule 32 so far a, it relates to decree for injunction provides a mode of execution which will offend its execution against the purchaser of the land by invoking S. 146 of the Code Notwithstanding the fact that a decree for permanent injunction is a personal deer e and does not run with land it can be executed against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor under S. 50 of the Code as held by the Bombay High Court in the decision" earlier referred to, with which I respectfully agree. In other words, a decree .for permanent injunction can be executed against the legal representative of the judgment-debtor in accordance with Order 21 rule 32 of the Code subject to the limitations of sub-s. 2 of S 50. The principle therefore that an injunction does not run with the land stands deviated in the case of legal representative on the death of the judgment-debtor by the express provisions made in S. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Then again, having regard to the fact that in the suit, from which the instant Rule stems, the right to the suit property was directly in question, the decree could be executed under S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act against the transferee in case of any transfer by the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit or the execution proceeding as held by the Bombay High Court in the case of Krishnabai v. Saralavam, reported in AIR 1927 Bombay 93. It does not stand to reason therefore that such a decree can not be executed against the transferee of the judgment debtor merely because such a transfer had taken place after the passing of the decree and before initiating the execution proceeding. It does not stand to reason therefore that such a decree can not be executed against the transferee of the judgment debtor merely because such a transfer had taken place after the passing of the decree and before initiating the execution proceeding. Any other interpretation would mean that a judgment-debtor can make a decree for injunction in-fructuous by transferring the land in question to another person and thereby compelling the decree-holder to institute a fresh suit for the self same relief against the purchaser, occasioning multiplicity of proceeding. Having given my anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter I am of the view that Order 21 rule 32 is not a provision which is contrary to S. 146 of the Code and consequently, a decree for permanent injunction as in the present case can be 'executed against the' purchaser from the judgment-debtors. 9. In the result, the application succeeds and the s: me is hereby allowed, The impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge is hereby set aside and that of the learned Munsif restored. The rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.