Hansaria, J.:- The points involved in these three petitions are same. They were therefore heard jointly and a common order is being passed to cover all. Facts involved in Civil Revision 91/80 alone would be noted which were placed before me and would unfold the canvass on which both the sides have drawn their own pictures. 2. The General Secretary of the Sadau Assam Karmachari Parishad, for self and on behalf of officers, employees, teachers and workers affiliated to the Parishad (except Assam Civil Service Class I and II Police Officers) filed a suit before the learned Sadar Munsiff, Gauhati for declaration that the order contained in Memo No. AEP 556/79-A dated 27.4.80 and Memo No. PEG. 4/80/Pt. dated 28. 4. 80 are invalid, illegal and inoperative. By these two memos, the period of absence of Government servants from 22nd to 26th and 28th April, 1980 (which might have been at the call of the organi­sers' of the present movement here) was regarded as unautho­rised 'and it' was ordered that no pay be given for the above period to those who had remained absent without satisfactory explanation. The learned Munsiff, by an order passed on 5.5.80 restrained the defendants from giving effect to these orders. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants have approached this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, mainly on the ground that the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 3. Shri Bhattacharjee appearing for the opposite party takes a preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the petition. The learned counsel submits that as the impugned order, even though ad-interim in nature was appealable in view of the decision of this Court in United Club vs. Nowgong Football Asson, AIR 1964 A & IN 81, section 115 of the Code cannot be invoked in view of insertion of sub­section (2) in the section by C. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 which states that- The High Court shall not under the Section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordi­nate thereto". The amended provision thus makes it clear that re visional jurisdiction of this Court could not have been invoked in the present case. The amended provision thus makes it clear that re visional jurisdiction of this Court could not have been invoked in the present case. As to Article 227, it is submitted that in view of the existence of the adequate alternative legal remedy, recourse to Article 227 should not be permitted. Reference has been made by Shri Bhattacharjee to Maneck Custodji vs. Sarafazali, 1977(1) SCC 227 , in para 6 of which it has been observed by Bhagawati, J. that it is well settled that the High Court does not ordinarily entertain a special application under Article 227 where an adequate remedy is available. The strong feeling expressed in this para owes its origin to the fact that the matter was entertained under Article 227 though an appeal against the order lay to the High Court itself. The position is not so in the present case. My attention is also invited to Vishesh Kumar vs. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 829, in para 22 of which a prayer to remit the case to the High Court for consideration of the petition under Article 227 was rejected after it had been held that the petition under Section 115 of the Code was not maintainable. 4. The present is not a case of conversion of the petition under Article 227, because this Article was specifically invoked while approaching this Court. As regards the alternative remedy by way of appeal, it may be stated that the defendants have approached this Court, not so much against the order of in­junction but they have challenged the entire jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff in entertaining the suit. This being the posi­tion, I do not think that the petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground raised by Shri Bhattacharjee especially when the point involved deserves decision at the hand of this Court in view of its importance and larger public interest involved, albeit temporarily. 5. On the merits, the contention of learned Government Advocate is that the jurisdiction of a civil court stands barred in the matter like the present because of the provi­sions in Assam Admistrative Tribunal Act, 197(7 (for short, the Act) and the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The learned Govt. Advocate presses into service section 9(2) of the Act, which reads :- "9(2). The learned Govt. Advocate presses into service section 9(2) of the Act, which reads :- "9(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in any law no civil court or other authority shall entertain any civil suit or other proceedings with respect to any of the matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal or question in any form any order passed by the Tribunal in any appeal or review with respect to any matters when an appeal could have been pre­ferred under the provisions of this Act or with respect to any other matter which arises out of the exercise of powers under this Act." 6. From a reading of the section it is apparent that the jurisdiction of civil court has been barred relating to matters which are within the jurisdiction of the Administra­tive Tribunal which has been dealt with by section 4 of the Act. This may be read :- "4(1). Save as other wise expressly provided in sub­section (2) below the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals preferred by Civil servants against any order passed by a competent authority in respect of any condition of service. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1) above, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdic­tion with respect to any order passed, when the civil servant has not availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules, executive instructions or orders : Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the above paragraph the Tribunal may entertain an appeal from a civil servant, if any appeal, revision petition or representation filed by him under the relevant service rules before the competent authority has not been finally disposed of by the competent authority within a period of six months from the date of filing such appeal, revision petition or representation. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I) above, the Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of appeals against any order passed by a competent authority under Article 311(2) provisos (a), (b) and (c) as also under F. R. 56(b)". 7. This section clearly shows that except where the pro­vision to section 4(2) is attracted, the Tribunal has no original jurisdiction in matters relating to conditions of service of the civil servants. 7. This section clearly shows that except where the pro­vision to section 4(2) is attracted, the Tribunal has no original jurisdiction in matters relating to conditions of service of the civil servants. Even where the proviso is attracted, the compe­tent authority (see section 2(2) of the Act) must have been approached and period of at least six months must have expired after the approach. The fact that under Section 9(3) of the Act a pending matter relating to conditions of service over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction would have stood transferred cannot be a ground to bar further jurisdiction in relation to matters which could not have come directly to the Tribunal. It cannot be denied that the present grievance of the petitioner could not have been agitated for the first time before the Tribunal. As such, section 9(2) of the Act cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff. 8. Realising this position the learned Government Advo­cate submits that the Act and the Rules must be read toge­ther to form one Code and must be taken as interpreting and enforcing each other, as they are to be understood as legisla­tions in parimateria. Inspiration has been drawn in making this submission from J. K. Steel Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1173 . In that case the interpolation of entry 63(36) in the First Schedule of the Tariff Act along with the entry 26AA inserted by the Finance Act, 1972 had come up for consideration. The learned Government Advocate refers to para 29 of the judgment which finds place in the minority decision rendered by Hegde, J. who was of the opinion that both the entries must be interpreted harmoniously as the two Acts were parts of one Code and so entries in one must throw light on the other. This reading of the two entries was however not favoured by the majority, as would appear from para 10 of Sikri, J's judgment with which Bachawat, J. bad agreed- Though on facts the Hon'ble Judges had differed, it cannot be gainsaid that provisions appearing in statute, which are pari materia have to be taken and considered together, as one system, and as explanatory of each other. This has been stated at page 66 of Maxwell's 'The Interpre­tation of Statutes' 12th Edn.' It has further been stated at that page that statutes are said to be part materia when they deal with the same person or thing or class; it is not enough that they deal with a similar subject matter. It may thus be that the Act and the Rules are in pari materia as they deal with class of persons which is by and large same, as would appear from the definition of 'Civil servant' in the Act and of 'government servant' in the Rules. But then there is no question in the case at hand of interpreting section 9(2) of the Act with the aid of any provision in the Rules. When section 9(2) has-ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only with regard to matters 'within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal', the same can­not be extended to cover matters falling within the jurisdic­tion of the 'competent authority' of which reference has been made in section 4 of the Act. To do so would be to add words in section 9(2) which is not permissible. 9. The learned Government Advocate has an alternative submission also. According to him the Rules have impliedly barred the jurisdiction of the Court inasmuch as the Rubs have provided a remedy for a grievance like the present and anybody aggrieved at the order passed by an authority under the Rules can further approach the Administrative Tribunal under the Act. As such, a complete and effective machinery has been provided to adjudicate the grievances like the present, and so remedy by way of suit is impliedly barred. 10. As to the applicability of the Ruler, my attention is invited to Rule, 16, which allows appeals against orders, inter alia, denying or varying to the disadvantage of a Government servant his pay. As the grievance in the present matter is relating to pay cut, the submission is that the Government servants could have filed appeals under this rule. Assuming arguando that this could be done, the moot point is whether the remedy provided by the Rules barred approach to the Civil Court. As the grievance in the present matter is relating to pay cut, the submission is that the Government servants could have filed appeals under this rule. Assuming arguando that this could be done, the moot point is whether the remedy provided by the Rules barred approach to the Civil Court. As one of grievances of the petitioners is that the pay cut was a penalty which had been inflicted without having given any opportunity, the submission is that the right to impose the pay cut if it was a penalty had been given by the Rules which have also provided the remedy; as such, recourse to any other remedy impliedly barred. Strong reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. Js. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) I SCC 496. In that case, a suit was filed to prevent threatened breach of the rights of the plaintiffs (members of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, referred to as Sabha Union in the judgment), which flowed from a settle­ment reached between the Sabha Union and the Company. A point was raised that the suit was not maintainable. The Supreme Court accepted this contention. In coming to this conclusion a large number of English and Indian decisions were noted. The principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in relation to an industrial dispute were stated thus in para 23- (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act." 11. Before that, the Supreme Court had noted the classic enunciation of the law and classification of these cases into three classes by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. Before that, the Supreme Court had noted the classic enunciation of the law and classification of these cases into three classes by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. vs. Hawkesford (1859) 6 CB (NS) 336 : 141 ER 486 which was quoted by Viscount Haldane in Heville vs. London "Express'' Newspaper Ltd. 1919 AC 368 (HL). The three classes were enumerated thus : "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute. There is that class where there is liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of pro­ceeding under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created liability, but has given no special remedy for it; there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it......with respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute." 12. The decision of the House of Lords in Barraclough vs. Brown, 1897 AC 615, was regarded as very much to the point. The special statute under consideration had given a right to recover expenses in a court of Summary Jurisdiction from a person who was not otherwise liable at common law. The decision of the House of Lords in Barraclough vs. Brown, 1897 AC 615, was regarded as very much to the point. The special statute under consideration had given a right to recover expenses in a court of Summary Jurisdiction from a person who was not otherwise liable at common law. Lord Herschell, after refering to the rights conferred under the stat­ute "to recover such expenses from the owner of sue vessel in a court of a summary jurisdiction" stated : "I do not think the appellant can claim to recover by virtue of the statute and at the same time insist upon doing so by means other than those prescribed by the statute which alone confers the right." Lord Watson stated : "The right and the remedy are given uno flatu and the one cannot be dissociated from the other." The Supreme Court then observed- ......"In other words, if a statute confers a right and in the same breath provides for a remedy for enforce­ment of such right, the remedy provided by the statute is an exclusive one." 13. The discussion in Premier Automobiles shows that if a statute has conferred aright which was not availabe under the general or common law, then the remedy prescribed by that statute alone can be availed of and not any other. In the suit which had been filed by member of the Sabha Union which had come up for examination in the Premier Automo­bile the plaintiff had based their claim on a memorandum of settlement arrived at with the employer. The Court examined various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act relating to settlement and its enforcement etc. and came to conclusion in para 31 that the suit was in relation to the enforcement of a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act, and so held that the suit was barred following the summing up of the law in para 23 of the judgment. 14. The right of an employee to receive pay from his employer, more particularly, the right of the Government servant to receive pay from the Government, has not been conferred according to me by Rules. That is a general right of an employee. The remedy provided in the Rules, relating to pay cut cannot therefore be regarded as the only remedy available. That is a general right of an employee. The remedy provided in the Rules, relating to pay cut cannot therefore be regarded as the only remedy available. It has to be regarded as alternative leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy. Principle No. 2 of Premier Automobiles, as quoted above, is therefore applic­able in the present case. Really, Rule 4 of the Rules has stated that nothing in the Rules shall operate to deprive any govt. Servant of any right or privilege to which he is entitled to by or under any law for the time being in force. The submission that the right claimed by the plaintiff in the suit relating to affording of opportunity before ordering pay cut is a right flowing from the Rules, cannot also be accepted inasmuch as Rules have embodied in this regard only the principles of natural justice. It is really the rule of audi alteram partem which require hearing before any adverse order is passed and the Rules have merely incorporated this principle. So, it cannot be stated that the right of hearing has flowed from the Rules. I would rather regard this right as a part of general or common law. 15. The last attack on the inpugned order is on the gro­und that the suit being not maintainable because of (i) no notice under section 80 C.P.C. having been served on the peti­tioners; and (ii) requirements of Order 1, rule 8 having not been complied with, the suit being in representative capacity, the learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to entertain it and then to-pass the impugned order. A reference to the order however shows that these aspects have been gone into and leave was granted both under Section 80(2) and Order 1, rule 8 CP-C. While doing so whether any illegality was committed is a matter which cannot be gone into the present proceeding as the same, even if any, would be an "error within jurisdiction," which is not amenable to correction by a writ court. 16. In view of all the above, it cannot be held that the suit is barred. The contention of the petitioner that the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit cannot, therefore, be accepted. 16. In view of all the above, it cannot be held that the suit is barred. The contention of the petitioner that the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit cannot, therefore, be accepted. As the approach to this Court is in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction the merits of the impugned order has not been examined; indeed cannot be examined. 17. The result is that the petitions stand dismissed. Des­pite this outcome, the strenuous and sincere efforts made by the learned Government Advocate to salvage the petitions need appreciation.