Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the Manager of Janatha High School, Naduvattam. The 3rd respondent is a Physical Education Teacher of the school now under suspension. The petitioner suspended the 3rd respondent by Ext. P-2 proceedings dated 15-12-1975 under R.67(1)(a), Chap.14-A of the K.E.R, for 15 days with effect from 17-12-1975. The 2nd respondent-District Educational Officer, Ottappalam by Ext. P-3 granted permission to place the 3rd respondent under suspension beyond 15 days. Thereafter, on 1-1-1976 the petitioner issued Ext. P-4 memo of charges to the 3rd respondent and forwarded the records to the 2nd respondent for an enquiry under R.75 Chap.14-A of the K.E.R. As the enquiry was not completed, the petitioner sent Ext P-5 reminder to the 2nd respondent who by Ext. P-6 informed the petitioner that the enquiry against the 3rd respondent was kept in abeyance because of a criminal case filed against the 3rd respondent. Nothing was heard about the matter for a considerable period. Then the petitioner received Ext. P-7 order of the 2nd respondent dated 19-8-1978 directing ; reinstatement of the 3rd respondent. Against Ext. P-7 the petitioner submitted Ext. P-8 revision to the 1st respondent-State pointing out that Ext. P-7 direction of the 2nd respondent was not in accordance with the relevant rules in Chap.14-A of the KER. governing the procedure for the imposition of major penalties against a teacher. The 1st respondent disposed of Ext. P-8 revision by Ext. P-9 letter which reads: "With reference to the revision petition cited I am to request you to reinstate Shri T. V. John as ordered by the District Educational Officer and to conduct the Departmental proceedings if you desire so." The petitioner challenges Exts. P-7 and P-9 in this original petition. 2. The facts which led to the suspension of the 3rd respondent teacher are: There was a Scout Camp in December 1975. On 7-12-1975, the last day of the Camp, at about 8.30 p.m. the scouts, the teachers in charge of the Camp, the District Scout Organiser, the Headmistress of the School and others were getting ready for the camp fire. The 3rd respondent was found heavily drunk and was behaving in a disorderly manner creating notice and uttering vulgar words. As all attempts to control him or to send him away failed, the Police was called and they removed the 3rd respondent to the Police Station. The 3rd respondent was found heavily drunk and was behaving in a disorderly manner creating notice and uttering vulgar words. As all attempts to control him or to send him away failed, the Police was called and they removed the 3rd respondent to the Police Station. The next day, the Headmistress of the school sent Ext. P-1 report to the petitioner and it was on the basis of that report that the petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation, took statements from the teachers and others present in the school at the time of the incident and called for the 3rd respondent's explanation After going through the explanation, the 3rd respondent was placed under suspension by Ext. P-2. 3. The 3rd respondent has filed a counter-affidavit. Along with the counter-affidavit a copy of the judgment of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Pattambi has been produced as Ext. R-1. It is seen from Ext. R-1 that the 3rd respondent was acquitted on benefit of doubt. The allegations in the original petition are denied in the counter-affidavit. The fact that the Police took him into custody and removed him to the Police Station at 12 p.m. in the night is admitted in the counter-affidavit. It is stated that the Police came at the instance of the Headmistress of the school who was inimical to the 3rd respondent. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 also. It is stated in para 3 of the counter-affidavit that before the enquiry against the 3rd respondent under rule 75 could be completed, the Munsiff-Magistrate, Pattambi issued summons in the case charged against the 3rd respondent and hence it was decided to take up the enquiry after the disposal of the case pending before Court. Thereafter, on 12-6-1978 the 3rd respondent informed the 2nd respondent that he was acquitted in the case and requested for reinstatement. It was thereupon that Ext. P-7 order was passed by the 2nd respondent. The petitioner's revision against Ext P-7 was disposed of by the 1st respondent by Ext. P-9. It is pointed out in Para.4 that there is no illegality in rescinding the orders permitting suspension beyond 15 days and directing the management to reinstate the teacher. It was thereupon that Ext. P-7 order was passed by the 2nd respondent. The petitioner's revision against Ext P-7 was disposed of by the 1st respondent by Ext. P-9. It is pointed out in Para.4 that there is no illegality in rescinding the orders permitting suspension beyond 15 days and directing the management to reinstate the teacher. It is pointed out in para 5 that as the Court has pronounced the 3rd "respondent not guilty it was incumbent on the part of the District Educational Officer to revoke the permission given to place the 3rd respondent under suspension beyond 15 days. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit contending that 'an acquittal in a criminal case is as regards the offence but the proceedings by way of departmental enquiry are with a view to explore the desirability of such a person being maintained in the department'. It is also pointed out in the reply affidavit that the 3rd respondent was under suspension on an earlier occasion and punishments also were imposed on him. 4. The points that arise for consideration are: (1) When once permission to place a teacher under suspension beyond 15 days was given under R.67(8), Chap.14-A of the K.E R. can that permission be revoked before the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings pending against the teacher; (2) Whether by the acquittal of the teacher in the criminal case on benefit of doubt the disciplinary proceedings pending against the teacher cm be discontinued even if the cause for the disciplinary proceedings and for the criminal case was the same; and (3) whether the State Government can direct the Manager to conduct the disciplinary enquiry which was half way when the enquiry is one under R.75, Chap.14-A of the KER. 5. 5. In Nanappan Pillai v. State of Kerala (1977 KLT 298) it is said: "The scope of the doctrine of double jeopardy enshrined in the maxim 'Nemo debt bis vexari' a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence is confined to proceedings before a Court or judicial tribunal in the nature of prosecution or criminal trial for an offence, and cannot be extended to proceeding before any other body which by law is not required to decide the matter in dispute judicially on evidence on oath and which by law is not authorised to administer oath, such as tribunals entertaining a departmental or administrative enquiry even if they be statutory bodies. If so, nor can it be said that either of the pleas, autrefois convict or autrefois acquit, would be attracted to., or by reason of. proceedings before a Tribunal other than a Court or judicial tribunal." In Spadigam v. State of Kerala (1970 KLT 1047) it is said: "The judgment of a criminal court acquitting an accused on the merits of a case would not bar disciplinary proceeding against him on the basis of the same facts. The judgment would not operate as a conclusive evidence in the disciplinary proceedings. The reason for it is not far to seek. A Criminal court requires a high standard of proof for convicting an accused. The case must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal of an accused by a criminal court only means that the case has not been proved against him beyond reasonable doubt. Such a standard of proof is not required for finding a person guilty in a disciplinary proceeding. It would be enough if there is a preponderance of probability of his guilt. The object of criminal law and its enforcement through criminal proceeding is different from that of disciplinary proceeding. A criminal proceeding is mainly intended to punish persons who have broken 'the king's peace' and thus to show the indignation of the community to criminals, whereas disciplinary proceeding is intended to maintain the purity and efficiency of public service". In Sankaran v. D.I.G. of Police (1980 KLT 825) it is said: 'To attract R.10(b)(iii) of the Rules, the departmental action initiated should be founded on facts which were not relevant for the charge for which the Government servant was prosecuted. In Sankaran v. D.I.G. of Police (1980 KLT 825) it is said: 'To attract R.10(b)(iii) of the Rules, the departmental action initiated should be founded on facts which were not relevant for the charge for which the Government servant was prosecuted. To ascertain as to whether this condition is satisfied a comparison of the charges framed against the accused in the criminal proceedings with the memorandum of charges and the statements of allegations or misbehaviour would be absolutely necessary; they have to be considered as a whole to get at the pith and substance of the respective actions, and unless they are found to be based on different sets of facts, and the facts on which departmental action is based are found to have not been relevant for the criminal prosecution which ended in favour of the Government servant, there is no scope for the disciplinary authority to invoke R.10(b)(ii). Having considered Exhibits P3 and P4 charge memos and the statement of allegations annexed thereto and the substance of the charge in the criminal prosecution discernible from Ext. P-1 judgment, I am fully satisfied that no case for invoking R.10(b)(ii) of the Rules has been made out to sustain the departmental action initiated against the petitioners." It is to be noted that R.10 of the Kerala Police Inquiry Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 contains certain restrictions on instituting departmental enquiry against a Police Officer, if the facts which form the basis for the enquiry and which formed the basis for a criminal case against him before a criminal court are the same. It has to be taken that it was because of this that it was held in the above case that a subsequent departmental enquiry cannot be had. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1723) it is said: "The Enquiry Officer in stating that the judgment of the Magistrate in a criminal trial against the public servant could not always be regarded as binding in a departmental enquiry against that public servant does not commit any error." It is true that the 3rd respondent - teacher under suspension was acquitted in the criminal case on benefit of doubt. But the question is what is the effect of this acquittal on the disciplinary proceedings which was pending against him It is now settled law that simply because of an acquittal in a criminal case the disciplinary proceedings pending against that officer cannot be dropped even if the facts which led to the criminal case and the facts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings are the same. Enforcement of criminal law through criminal courts is different from disciplinary proceedings. So, the rule of autrefois acquit is not available to the officer who is facing a disciplinary proceeding. In this view of the matter, the stand taken by the 2nd respondent-District Educational Officer in Ext. P7 that the disciplinary proceedings against the 3rd respondent need not be continued is nothing but wrong. By Ext P-9 the 1st respondent-State has directed the petitioner - Manager to conduct the disciplinary proceedings. First of all, the Manager of a school cannot conduct a disciplinary enquiry under R.75 Chap.14-A of the K.E.R The power is with the department and. as a matter of fact, the enquiry was half way. The 1st respondent also has directed the reinstatement of the teacher. When once permission to place the teacher under suspension beyond 15 days has been given under R.67(8), Chap.14-A of the K.E.R , the teacher will have to continue under suspension till the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings. The scheme of the rules is that and there is no indication in any of the rules which enables the departmental authorities or the State Government to direct a reinstatement of the teacher under suspension before the disciplinary proceedings are over. In this view of the matter, the direction of the 1st respondent in Ext. P9 to reinstate the 3rd respondent teacher and to conduct the disciplinary proceedings if the petitioner Manager desires is against the relevant rules in the K.E.R. Hence I set aside Exts P7 and P9. It is for the 2nd respondent-District Educational Officer to continue the disciplinary enquiry, complete the same as expeditiously as possible and forward his report to the petitioner Manager. As the teacher is under suspension for the last 5 years it is only proper that disciplinary proceedings are completed without any further delay. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent should do everything possible to complete the disciplinary proceedings within 3 months from today. 6. As the teacher is under suspension for the last 5 years it is only proper that disciplinary proceedings are completed without any further delay. The petitioner and the 2nd respondent should do everything possible to complete the disciplinary proceedings within 3 months from today. 6. In the result, the original petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Issue carbon copies of this judgment to the Government Pleader and the counsel appearing in the case.