Judgment :- 1. The defendants 1 and 2 in O. S. No. 531 of 1980, Sub-Court, Salem, are the petitioners in this C.R.P., which is directed against an order appointing a Commissioner, on an application taken out by the respondents 1 to 5 herein, I. A. No. 932 of 1980 in O.S. No. 531 of 1980. The respondents 1 to 5 herein instituted O.S. No. 531 of 1980 for a division of Clenpeak Estate into eight equal shares and also certain movables and for the allotment of one such share to them and for recovery of possession and the relief of accounting and other incidental reliefs. According to them, the Clenpeak Estate an asset of the partnership, is a very valuable item of property yielding substantial income by way of products, such as coffee, fruits, like oranges, jack fruits, plaintain, etc, and other forest produce and timber and that the petitioners and the sixth respondent have been in-charge of the said Estate for several years past, but that they have not furnished respondents 1 to 5 with details of any income. Claiming that the respondents 1 to 5 herein also are entitled to a share in the Estate and to an account of the income from the Estate and that to ascertain this it is essential to fix the area of the cultivation of several crops and the nature of the crops and the approximate yield there from, respondents 1 to 5 prayed that it would be necessary to depute a commissioner to make a local inspection and submit a report; which according to the respondents 1 to 5 would help the court to avoid unnecessary evidence and assist in assessing and appreciating such evidence in this regard as may be let in. This application was opposed by the second petitioner whose counter was adopted by the first petitioner. The objection of the petitioners was that the application for the appointment of a Commissioner has been filed only for the purpose of fishing out information which is not necessary before the stage of the passing of the preliminary decree and that the application is premature. It was also the further objection of the petitioners that other properties of the partnership have to be ascertained and brought in for a division and that without doing so, the suit itself is not maintainable. It was also the further objection of the petitioners that other properties of the partnership have to be ascertained and brought in for a division and that without doing so, the suit itself is not maintainable. However, the petitioners prayed that the Commissioner, if appointed, may be directed to ascertain the other properties as well. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge, Salem, who enquired into this application held that there was no dispute that Clenpeak Estate which formed the “A” schedule property in the suit was purchased by a partnership in which the petitioners and the respondents 1 to 5 are shares and that the relief claimed by the respondents 1 to 5 cannot be prima facie denied. The management of the Estate by the second petitioner and the non-submission of the accounts by him not having been disputed by him, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the report of the commissioner containing the details and data with reference to the Estate would considerably curtail the voluminous oral evidence and that under these circumstances it would be necessary to appoint a Commissioner. On this conclusion, the petition for the appointment of a Commissioner filed by the respondents 1 to 5 was allowed and an Advocate was appointed as Commissioner. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that as there are assets and properties belonging to the firm in which the petitioners and respondents 1 to 5 are sharers those properties have not been included within-the scope of the sit, the suit as framed is not maintainable and, therefore, the appointment of a Commissioner cannot be made. It does not appear that the petitioners and the sixth respondent have filed any written statement as such setting out these objections and giving details of the properties which belong to the firm and which according to them have been left out. There is only a passing reference in the counter affidavit filed in the paragraphs 15 and 16 and it is obvious that even the petitioners seem to be unaware of the details of those properties, as otherwise, there is no reason as to why the petitioners have stated that the Commissioner should be directed to ascertain the market value of those properties as well as the income therefrom. The materials placed before the Court do not establish that there are other properties which have been omitted to be included in the suit. In the absence, therefore, of clinching materials to establish this, it cannot be assumed that consequent to the omission of some of the properties belonging to the firm from the scope of the suit, the suit itself is not maintainable and, therefore, so relief could be given to the respondents 1 to 5 in their application for the appointment of a commissioner. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, even the petitioners do not seem to be sure about the so-called other properties of the firm as revealed by their request that the commissioner may be directed to inspect those properties and find out the market value as well as the income therefrom. Under these circumstances the existence of the other properties, apart from the properties in the suit has not been satisfactorily established and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the suit is not maintainable owing to the omission of other properties from the suit cannot be countenanced. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that before respondents 1 to 5 establish their entitlement to a share in the properties of the firm, the application for the appointment of a Commissioner is premature. It is not disputed as noticed by the learned Subordinate Judge that Clenpeak Estate which is the “A” schedule property in O.S. No. 531 of 1980 was purchased by the partnership in which the petitioners and the respondents 1 to 5 are admittedly sharers. If that is so, then the respond ents 1 to 5 will be entitled to partition and separate possession of their share to work out which the suit had been instituted. The management of the Estate by the second petitioner and the non-furnishing of accounts with reference to the income and expenditure from the Estate have also not been disputed by the petitioners and this case has also been adverted to in paragraph 5 of the order of the Court below. Prima facie therefore, respondents 1 to 5 have made out a case to ascertain the extent of cultivation in the Estete, the nature of the crops, etc. Prima facie therefore, respondents 1 to 5 have made out a case to ascertain the extent of cultivation in the Estete, the nature of the crops, etc. and since the relief of accounting is also prayed for by the respondents 1 to 5 in the suit, it would be very necessary to ascertain the extent under cultivation as welt as the crops therein in order to fix the income from the estate. Besides, such data from its peculiar nature can be obtained only on the spot. Indeed, as pointed out by the Court below, the report of a Commissioner after local inspection would considerably cut down the large volume of evidence that may be necessary. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the application for the appointment of a Commissioner is premature in the sense that it could be done only after the passing of the preliminary decree in favour of the respondents 1 to 5. They have, as pointed out already, prima facie established their entitlement to a share of the properties in question. 5. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the attempt of the respondents 1 to 5 in seeking to get a Commissioner appointed is only to fish out evidence and, therefore, it ought not to be permitted. The estate had been in the management of the second petitioner herein and, as stated earlier, no account of the income and expenditure therefrom had been furnished to the respondents 1 to 5 and it is in this state of affairs the respondents 1 to 5 have come forward with the suit praying for the relief of accounting as well. If the position of the respondents 1 to 5 as partners is not in dispute, as stated by the Court below in partnership they are entitled to know how the property of the partnership is being managed and the appointment of a Commissioner to go and make a local inspection cannot be termed as a device to fish out evidence as such. The report of the Commissioner would undoubtely assist the Court in granting the relief prayed for by the respondents I to 5 and it is equally open to the Court to reject the report of the Commissioner for valid reasons. The report of the Commissioner would undoubtely assist the Court in granting the relief prayed for by the respondents I to 5 and it is equally open to the Court to reject the report of the Commissioner for valid reasons. Therefore, the attempt by the respondents 1 to S.who are sharers to ascertain the method and the manner of management and the income of the Clenpeak Estate which is one of the items of the partnership properties by the appointment of a Commissioner cannot be equated to that of fishing out evidence as such. This contention or the learned counsel for the petitioner has also to fail, 6. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, strenuously contends that even if the learned counsel for the petitioners is well-founded in the above contentions, no ease as such for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under S. 115, C.P.C. has been made out. Particularly, he relies upon the proviso to S. 115, C.P.C. introduced by Act 104 of 1976 to the following effect: “Provided that the High Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the Court of a suit or other proceeding, except where— (a) the order, if It had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom It was made,” 7. A reading of the aforesaid proviso indicated that the scope of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction mentioned in Cls. (a) to (c) in S. 115(1), C.P.C. is further circumscribed or narrowed in the manner indicated in the proviso. If, in the instant case the application for the appointment of a Commissioner by the respondents 1 to 5 had been dismissed, that would not have certainly put an end to the suit as such, but kept it very much alive. And thherefore, the interdict under Cl. (a) to the proviso to S. 115. C.P.C.referred to above, would apply in the insatant case. The order for the appointment of a Commissioner, if allowed to stand, cannot by any means be stated to-result in a failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the petitioners as such. Therefore, even under 61. And thherefore, the interdict under Cl. (a) to the proviso to S. 115. C.P.C.referred to above, would apply in the insatant case. The order for the appointment of a Commissioner, if allowed to stand, cannot by any means be stated to-result in a failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the petitioners as such. Therefore, even under 61. (b) to the proviso to S. 115, C.P.C. the order of the Court below appointing a Commissioner cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. 8. The result is, the Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed with costs.