Judgment : In this Rule, which was obtained with the corresponding interim order on 5th November, 1976, the petitioners have impeached the action as purported to be taken under the provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, through the notice in Annexure-A and as issued by the Bhagchas officer who is also the Junior Land Reforms Officer, Hasnabad. 2. The land involved in this proceedings would be 1.07 acre, more or less. The other particulars of the lands are mentioned in paragraph 2 of the petition. It is the case of the petitioners that they purchased the lands in question from Sarbo-Shri Probodh Chandra Pal and Moni Mohan Pal, who are Proforma Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, on 2nd June, 1976. It has been alleged that one Thakur Charan Biswas, Respondent No. 2 in this Rule, without any authority or justification wanted to get hold of the lands in question, by claiming himself as a bargadar. The petitioners have claimed that the laid Respondent No.2, was not a Bargadar in respect of the lands in question and the claim as purported to be made by him, for recording his name as a Bargadar, through the application under section 18(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), was not only illegal, Irregular and improper, but u mentioned above, the same was whithout any justification, Such Application was filed by the said Respondent no. 2, before the Bhagchas Officer being the Junior Land Reform Officer, Hasnabad as mentioned above, and since the same was filed before the Bhagchas Officer, it has been claimed that the said officer had no authority either for entertaining the said application or for recording the name of Respondent No. 2 as Bargadar. 3. The application in question bas been disclosed in Annexure-B to the petition. From a reference to the said application it would appear that the applicant who is Respondent No.2 in this Rule, has referred that upto 1332 B.S. the lands in question were cultivated by one Jogendra Nath Kumakar as bargadar and he of his own having left the lands in question amicably, the said Respondent No.2, was setted as a bargadar in respect of 2.15 acre of land and thereafter, when the owners being the petitioners in this Rule gave out their intention to dispose of the said 2.15 acre of land. The applicant, with great difficulties purchased 1,08 acre and promised to purchase the balance subsequently. It has also been claimed that the owner petitioners having tried or given out to dispossess the applicant by force and they having given out that they would not allow him to cultivate the lands in question, it was prayed that an enquiry be initiated by the authority concerned and after such enquiry and evidence, the name of the applicant be recorded as bargadar in accordance with law or not to allow the petitioners to interfere with his right as a bargadar. 4. Although this Rule was made ready as regards service on 3rd January, 1978, apart from the Respondent No.2 who is appearing there has been an appearance entered on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 viz. the State authorities, but when the matter was taken up for hearing, only Respondent No. 2 appeared and contested and not the other Respondents. 5. Mr. Gopal Chandra Mukherjee, appearing in support of the Rule, after placing the pleadings as in the application in Annexure-B, referred to the notice as impeached and contended that the proceedings as sought to be initiated, was without jurisdiction and authority, as the officer concerned, viz. the Bhagchas Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the application in question. He claimed that when the said officer has bean authorised to take proper steps for maintaining village Record of Right under section 50 of the said Act and not under section 51 of the said Act, the action as sought to be taken, was illegal and improper apart from being without jurisdiction. He has also contented that the officer concerned further acted illegally and without jurisdiction, by issuing the notice in question under section 18(2) of the said Act for recording the name of Respondent No.2 as bargadar. It was his specific contention that the officer concerned, if at all, could have proceded under section 51 of the said Act and in not doing so or in purporting to take steps under section 18(2) of the said Act, has acted illegally and without any power or authority. Mr. Mukherjee also claimed that since the case was one for recording the name of a Bargadar, the officer concerned, in the instant case, had also acted without any authority or power in purporting to initiate proceeding for the recording of the Respondent No.2, as Bargadar. Mr. Mukherjee also claimed that since the case was one for recording the name of a Bargadar, the officer concerned, in the instant case, had also acted without any authority or power in purporting to initiate proceeding for the recording of the Respondent No.2, as Bargadar. 6. It was also submitted by him that actions taken under section 18 and under section 51 of the said Act, would be on different premises and as such, there could not be any combined notice or a combined order under those sections and the appellate forum, on the basis of the determinations under the said sections being different, such combined order or combined action, if at all, made or taken, cannot be allowed to stand in law. Mr. Paul, appearing for the Respondents, denied and disputed the submissions of Mr. Mukherjee not only in law but also on facts. It was stated by him that 2'81 acres of lands were covered by two plots and his client was a Bargadar in respect of the entire lands and on 28th April, 1976, he purchased 1'08 acres from the Proforma Respondent Nos. 2 and 5 as mentioned above. It was his case that before that, the said Proforma Respondents transferred 66 decimal of lands and after such transfer, the Respondent No.2 continued to be a Bargadar in respect of the remaining land. It was contended by Mr. Paul that since after their purchase, the petitioners have taken or are taking stops to terminate his client's Barga cultivation, so the application in Annexure-B, which was one under section 18(2) and filed before the officer concerned for protection of the Barga right, would be maintainable. 7. It was further claimed by Mr. Paul that in the concerned Bhagchas case, the petitioners in the Rule, hive appeared find filed their written statement and therein, they have admitted that the Respondent No.2 was in possession and cultivation of the lands in question and in order to establish their illegal action, the petitioners herein made out a false case that the Respondent No. 2 surrendered the disputed lands in favour of the owners, at the time when he purchased a portion of the lands in question. Mr. Mr. Paul has of course stated that his client did not give up the possession of the lands in question to the owners but he continued to be in possession and has cultivated the lands in issue. It has also been stated by Mr. Paul that his client has been cultivating the entire lands for a long time. It should be remembered here that Mr. Mukherjee, on a reference to the application in question, submitted that the Respondent No.2 had admitted that Jogen was a Bargadar. But, Mr. Paul on scrutiny and after scanning the pleadings in the application in question contended that such submissions of Mr. Mukherjee would be incorrect. Apart from the fact that the petitioners have submitted to the jurisdiction of the officer concerned, Mr. Paul further contended that because of the delay in moving this Court, this Court should not also interfere. 8. Thus, the whole question to be answered in this case would be whether the application as filed and on its pleadings would come within the provisions of section 18(2) of the said Act. Section 18(2) lays down that if in deciding any dispute referred to in sub-section (1) or otherwise, any question arises as to whether a person is a Bargadar or not and to whom the share of produce is deliverable, such question shall be determined by the officer or authority mentioned in sub-section (1) which is to the following effect: Every dispute between a bargadar and the person whose lend he cultivates in respect of any of the following matters, namely :- (a) division or delivery of the produce, (aa) recovery of produce under section 16A, (b)Termination of cultivation by the bargadar, shall be decided by such officer or authority as the State Government may appoint : Provided that no application for decision of any dispute in respect of delivery of the produce referred to in clause (a) shall be entertained unless such application is presented to the officer or authority within two years from the date on which the delivery of the produce falls due. 9. The words, ''or otherwise", as mentioned in sub-section (2) of sec. 18 were added by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974. Mr. 9. The words, ''or otherwise", as mentioned in sub-section (2) of sec. 18 were added by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974. Mr. Paul claimed that on the pleading as appearing through the application in Annexure-B, the case of the Respondent No. 2 would not only come under sub-section (2) of section 18 prior to the addition of the words "or otherwise" and even if it is found to be not covered by the said sub-section before the amendment, after the amendment, which introduced the words "or otherwise" as mentioned above, the case of the Respondent No, 2 would certainly come within the purview of sub-section (2) of section 18. This submissions of Mr. Paul were advanced as Mr. Mukherjee, appearing in support of the Rule claimed and contended that the case as sought to be made out, would not come under the sub-section as referred to hereinbefore and as such, the exercise of power was improper and unauthorized, apart from being without jurisdiction. 10. So we shall have to find out whether the words "or otherwise" as inserted in the sub-section in 1974 would authorise the authorities concerned to take steps under section 18(2) and to record the name of the Respondent No.2 as Bargadar. 11. The meaning of the word 'otherwise' according to Webster's, would be in another manner, in a different way or manner, differently, in different circumstances and in other respects. The said word according to Chamber's Dictionary, would be in another way or manner, by other causes in other respects and under ether conditions. According to Oxford Dictionary such word 'otherwise', would mean in a different way. According to the determinations in the case of (1) B. Monck v. Hilton, 45 LJMC 167, the word 'otherwise', when following an enumeration should receive an ejusdem generis interpretation. The words 'or otherwise' have also been used in section 10 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and the Supreme Court in the case of (2) George Dacost v. Controller of State Duty, A1R 1957 SC 849 has observed that the same should be considered ejusdem generis, and it must be interpretated to mean, some kind of legal obligation or some transaction, enforceable at law or in equity which though not in the form of a contract may confer a benefit to a donor. Vernon', case, as appears from Stroud's, Judicial Dictionary is the leading authority on the word 'otherwise' and there, it was decided that the proviso, contained in Statute of Uses enabling a wife to take or reject hereditaments given to her for term of her life or otherwise in jointure," extended to an estate in fee simple; but the judgment says, "for nota, this word 'otherwise' is not indefinite, but otherwise in jointure. The word, any land which forms part of any park, garden or pleasure ground or is otherwise required for the amenity or the convenience of any house as use in housing Act, 1936 has been observed in the case of (3) White and Collins v. Minister of Health, (1939) 2 KB 838, to be read as "any land which is part of a park, garden or pleasure ground or any land which is otherwise required for the amenity or convenience or any house." Those word, "or otherwise" as used in National Arbitration order, 1940, have been interpretated in the case of (4) National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation, (1943) A.C. 166, to mean "or in another way". Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, makes "pretending or professing to tell fortunes, or using in subtle craft means or device by palmistry or otherwise to deceive, an offence and reading said terms as an offence a whole it has been observed in B, Monck v. Hilton (supra), that the word 'otherwise' should not be taken as limiting the earlier words but as enlarging word "palmistry", and providing against the professing to tell fortunes or using craft means or devices to deceive whether by palmistry or by contrivance to deceive, other than palmistry, provided they are of the same general character as is indicated by the earlier words of the section. 12. In the instant case, on the pleadings as mentioned hereinbefore, it was argued by Mr. Paul and that too with substance that sections 50 and 51 of the Act were not attracted. 12. In the instant case, on the pleadings as mentioned hereinbefore, it was argued by Mr. Paul and that too with substance that sections 50 and 51 of the Act were not attracted. The word 'otherwise' as used in section 15(2) has also been construed in the case of (5) Chapala Bala Adhikary v. Monoreanjan Das & Ors, 1975 (2) CLJ 447 and it has been observed by the learned Judge that this word 'otherwise' has been inserted in section 18 to confer jurisdiction upon the officers of authorities to decide the question whether a person is a Bargadar or not and to whom the share of produce is deliverable even in the absence of any dispute referred to in sub-section (1). After the said amendment in sub-section (2) even if such a question arises in any other different way the officers or authorities under sub-section (1) of section 18 can assume jurisdiction under sub-section (2) and determine the question. But the amplitude or the extent of their jurisdiction is still limited to decisions on the question whether a person is a Bargadar. 13. In answer to the said submissions of Mr. Paul as referred to and mentioned hereinbefore, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the determinations of this Court in the case of (6) Tarak Chandra Dholey v. Satyanarain Singh & Anr., 1975 (2) CLJ 246 , (7) Gobinda Prasad Samanta & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., 1979 (2) CLJ 319 and to the determinations in the case of (8) Garikapati Veerapati v. N. Subbiah Choudhry and Others, AIR 1957 SC 540 . The Supreme Court case as mentioned above, lays down that in construing the Article of the Constitution Courts must bear in mind, a cardial rule of construction that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right and the golden rule of construction is that in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed. It has also been observed in the next place that Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances that existed at the time when the Constitution makers framed the Constitution and for which provision had to be made by them. It has also been observed in the next place that Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances that existed at the time when the Constitution makers framed the Constitution and for which provision had to be made by them. It ill also the observation of the Supreme Court that in construing the Articles relating to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is well to remember that several categories of persons who were at the date of the Constitution, interested in the right of appeal from judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court to a Superior Court in one way or another. 14. After construing the determinations as mentioned above, I find, the two judgments of our High Court as referred to by Mr. Mukherjee, are of no avail or assistance in the facts of this case. The golden rule of construction as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court, will have certainly been kept in mind, in the matter of construing sub-section (2) of section 18. 15. After considering the pleadings an the intrinsic evidence as available and so also on due application of the golden rule of construction as enunciated by the Supreme Court, I find that the incorporation of the words 'or otherwise' have made wider provisions or given wider powers to the authorities concerned and since the case before us is one for recording of a bargadar, the action as sought to be initiated, was neither improper nor irregular and without jurisdiction, as claimed. In fact, I am of the view that such words 'or otherwise' have enhanced the power and jurisdiction of the officers concerned to deal with all other or such matters which were or are neither covered by section 18(1) or other sections of the said Act. Such words "or otherwise" in section 18(2), would mean any contingencies, in addition to those as indicated in section 18(1). For the views as above, the Rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs.