M. P. CHANDRAKANTARAJ, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal against the concurrent findings of the courts below. Parties to this appeal will be referred to by the rank and title they had in the trial Court. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant for declaration that he was the owner of the suit property and to declare that the defendant was in permissive possession of the hut and also possession and mesne profits both past and future. It was his case that he purchased from P. W. 1, 24 guntas of dry agricultural land situated in Lakkavalli village of tarikere Taluk; that the land purchased by him was in Survey No. 120/2; that it was bounded on the east and West by road while on north and South by adjoining Survey Numbers 1. 21 and 120/2 respectively; that his vendor had retained 11 guntas of land out of the share that had fallen to him at a partition and therefore, those 11 guntas was actually the boundary on the eastern side of the plaintiff's land. It was his further averment in the plaint that he had permitted the defendant and her husband to construct a temporary structure and reside on the land. However, the defendant was refusing to vacate his land inspite of a legal notice which was refused. Hence the suit. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit by stating that she built the house some 18 years prior to the filing of the suit and that she had spent Rs. 5,000-00 for construction of the same. It is not a temporary hut but a permanent hut with brick walls and mangalore tile roofing. She further asserted that the plaintiff did not purchase the suit property much less was he in possession, that she did not know who the owner of the property was; that she had been living in that hut being in possession adverse to the interest of the owner since 20 years and therefore she had title in herself having perfected it by adverse possession and in that circumstance the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the suit may be dismissed. ( 4 ) ON the above pleadings, the trial court framed as many as five issues for determination. ( 4 ) ON the above pleadings, the trial court framed as many as five issues for determination. They are as follows: (1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule property? (2) Whether the defendant is in permissive possession of the hut situated in the suit land or whether the defendant is in adverse possession of the hut? (3) Whether plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of the hut? (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled to past mesne profits, if so at what rate? (5) To what other relief if any is plaintiff entitled? ( 5 ) THE plaintiff examined himself and his vendor and got marked some documents which were documents of title to the property purchased by him as well as the documents of title of his vendor in respect of the suit property and some other properties. The defendant got herself examined in support of her case and another independent witness who appears to belong to an adjoining village. ( 6 ) ON appreciating the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff while having proved his ownership to 24 guntas of land in sy. No. 120/2 of Lakkavalli, he had failed to prove, however, that he was the owner of the portion of the property where the defendant had put up the house in question. It also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not proved his allegation in the plaint that it was with his permission that the suit hut was built. It further came to the conclusion, accepting the oral evidence of the defendant and her witness that the suit hut was built more than 12 years prior to the filing of the suit and therefore the defendant had perfected her title to the hut by adverse posssession. On appeal, the lower appellate Court more or less adopted the reasoning of the trial court and rejected the appeal of the plaintiff. ( 7 ) BEFORE me, learned Counsel Sri rudraradhya has canvassed only two aspects which, according to him, are legal infirmities in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below that would give the plaintiff a decree as prayed for in place of the judgments and decrees dismissing his suit. ( 7 ) BEFORE me, learned Counsel Sri rudraradhya has canvassed only two aspects which, according to him, are legal infirmities in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below that would give the plaintiff a decree as prayed for in place of the judgments and decrees dismissing his suit. ( 8 ) HE has urged that the Courts below, particularly the lower appellate Court, erred in entirely going by the self-serving evidence of the defendant when there was no definite point of time fixed by any documentary or other evidence to reckon the period of adverse possession. In other words, it has been argued that witho,ut any evidence such as tax receipt in respect of the house or a licence for building the hut from the concerned authorities in the village, it was not proper for the lower appellate Court, to come to the conclusion that any definite period much less the period of 12 years could be reckoned. It is difficult to accept this argument. Adverse possession is a fact which is required to be proved before the law in that behalf is applied to the facts of the case. It is not necesssary that all facts must be proved by documentary evidece. Oral evidence is just as good evidence as documentary evidence. It is true that Courts will prefer documentary evidence as more reliable in a given context. But, every case must be decided by courts on the evidence parties adduce before it. The Court cannot direct the parties to produce this or that evidence whether documentary or oral. If the Courts below chose to believe the version of the defendant which according to them was supported by the testimony of an independent witness, a neighbouring villager, it cannot be said that the Courts below erred in accepting that oral evidence. The defendant and her witness, both had spoken to the fact that the hut was built more than 12 years before the filing of the suit in the year 1969. The suit property itself was purchased by the plaintiff in the year 1967. If the point of time can be fixed with reference to the filing of the suit or documents of title in, evidence, accepting the oral evidence. I do not see any legal infirmity. ( 9 ) THERE is yet another reason why the argument of the learned Counsel should be rejected. If the point of time can be fixed with reference to the filing of the suit or documents of title in, evidence, accepting the oral evidence. I do not see any legal infirmity. ( 9 ) THERE is yet another reason why the argument of the learned Counsel should be rejected. Issues, as framed by the trial Court, put the burden fairly both on the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff was required to prove his title which he had done for the 24 guntas of land. But, he had failed to prove permission which he himself pleaded as having been granted to the defendant to put up the hut. Similarly, the defendant was rightly required to prove her claim of adverse possession which in the opinion of the trial Court, she had discharged by her own oral evidence supported by the evidence of an independent witness of the area familiar with the facts. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from leading evidence rebutting the assertions made by the defendant in her written statement particularly in regard to the plea of adverse possession or in regard to permissive possession. No witness appears to have been examined by the plaintiff in support of his plea of having given permission to the defendant. It is normal to believe that if a person grants permission to others to construct a hut or house on his property some body would know about it. This apparent laches on the part of the plaintiff and numerous admissions made by him before the trial Court on which the Courts below relied heavily to discredit his evidence, this Court in any event cannot accede to re-examine the evidence on record. ( 10 ) THE scope of S. . 100 CPC is severely restricted to examine the errors of law in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. It is useful to notice the recent decision of our Supreme Court in this behalf. Chandrachud C. J. in the case of madan Lal v. Gopi, AIR 1980 SC. 1754 . ( 10 ) THE scope of S. . 100 CPC is severely restricted to examine the errors of law in the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. It is useful to notice the recent decision of our Supreme Court in this behalf. Chandrachud C. J. in the case of madan Lal v. Gopi, AIR 1980 SC. 1754 . has this to observe on the facts of that case:"though whether a person was in a fit state of mind to execute the adoption is a question of fact, where both Courts below ignpred the weight of preponderating circumstances and allowed their judgments to be influenced by inconsequential matters, the High Court would be justified in reappreciating the evidence and in coming to its own independent conclusions. " ( 11 ) ON the facts of that case, though the Supreme Court sustained the reappreciation of evidence by the High Court in the last paragraph of the judgment, the learned Chief justice has stated as follows:"may we add that this judgment, properly understood, will not be a charter for interference, by the high Courts with findings of facts recorded by the final Court of facts. "it is, therefore, not open to this court to appreciate the evidence on record in a different manner than the final Court of facts. It is perhaps possible and perhaps the High, Court would, if the particular circumstances of the case warrant such re-appreciation of evidence. In this case, no such special circumstance exists. ( 12 ) IT has been urged before me that the lower appellate Court erred in not finding in favour of the plaintiff after coming to the conclusion that he has proved his title. I have already pointed out that the trial Court came to the conclusion that while the plaintiff had proved his title to 24 guntas of land in Survey No. 12012 of Lakkavalli village, he had failed to prove that the defendant's hut which could be referred to as the suit hut' or 'suit construction' was erected on the land of the plaintiff. If that is so the plaintiff cannot make a grievance of it in this Court. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from having his land measured in terms of the sale deted and the properties suitably identified as well as the suit construction or hut located with the aid of a sketch. If that is so the plaintiff cannot make a grievance of it in this Court. Nothing prevented the plaintiff from having his land measured in terms of the sale deted and the properties suitably identified as well as the suit construction or hut located with the aid of a sketch. This not having been done, it is almost impossible for this Court to reverse the findings of the courts below. All that the sale deed evidenced was the sale of 24 guntas of land as described in it. The sale deed is totally silent as to the existence of a hut which neither proves its existence nor its non-existence. ( 13 ) IN these circumstances, this appeal must necessarily fail and is liable to be dismissed. Before doing so, it must be made clear that the courts below have accepted the case of the defendant only in respect of the construction which is stated to be standing completed on the date of the suit. The defendant has not pleaded adverse possession in respect of the larger area than what has been occupied by the suit-hut in question. If the case of the plaintiff for title is accepted by the Courts below, then it necessarily follows that the defendant has established title by adverse possession to the suit construction only and not to any other area of the land purchased by the plaintiff under the suit sale deed. ( 14 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed and in the circumstances of the case, there will be no costs throughout. To this extent only, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is modified. --- *** --- .