JUDGMENT V.K. Khaana, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession over plot nos. 109 and 116 and the Kolhara, cattle trough and pegs and the peepal tree therein. 2. The plaintiffs case was that they had been using plot nos. 104, 109 and 116 for keeping Kolhara, Gulaur, cattle troughs and pegs and they had planted peepal tree therein. About 12 years back there was a dispute between the parties and an agreement was entered into between the parties according to which it was agreed that Mukhi Chaube shall have the absolute right of user of plot no. 104 whereas the plaintiff were recognised to be the owners of plot nos. 109 and 116. In accordance with it the parties executed deed of agreement dated 5-12-1948. 3. Defendant no. 2 contested the suit with the allegations that he was he owner in possession of an area of 20 Karis in shikmi plot no. 116 and kept his cattle and cow dung cakes thereon. Defendant nos. 3 and 4 contested he suit on the ground that plot no. 109 was the properly owned and possessed by them and their predecessor Mahesh Chaube had planted the peepal tree. 4. The original deceased defendant Mukhi Chaube and his heirs had also filed written statements alleging that the land in suit was used by them is their Sehan and for the purposes of keeping cattle and straw fodder. 5. The trial court held that the plaintiffs had no concern with the plot nos. 109 and 116 and thus dismissed their suit. Feeling aggrieved, an appeal was filed which has also been dismissed. 6. In the present second appeal, learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the two courts below have wrongly held Exhibit 7, the agreement arrived at between the plaintiffs and Mukhi Chaube as inadmissible in evidence. It has been argued that the aforesaid agreement deed only recognised the existing rights and thus did not require registration. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is not correct inasmuch as the plaintiffs themselves described that Mukhi Chaube had executed 'Dastbardari' in favour of the plaintiffs. The courts below have rightly held that Dastbardari could only be executed in favour of the person having superior right. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is not correct inasmuch as the plaintiffs themselves described that Mukhi Chaube had executed 'Dastbardari' in favour of the plaintiffs. The courts below have rightly held that Dastbardari could only be executed in favour of the person having superior right. There being no proof on record that the plaintiffs were zamindars of the plots in suit, the agreement could not be termed as a Dastbardari. In case it was not a Dastbardari, the right exercised by Mukhi Chaube over plot nos. 109 and 116 could only be extinguished by a document which was duly registered. Reliance was also placed on a decision of this court reported in 1973 Allahabad page 382 (Shyam Sunder and others v. Siya Ram and another)............In that case it was held that if a document only recognised pre-existing rights when it was not necessary that it should have been registered. In the instant case the pre-existing rights were not being recognized. On the own case of the plaintiffs Mukhi Chaube was surrendering his rights in plot nos. 109 and 116. The case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is therefore, of 10 help. The view taken by the courts below is thus in accordance with law. The document Exhibit 7 was clearly not admissible in evidence for want of registration. 7. No other point has been pressed before me. 8. For the reasons stated above, the present second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.