Judgment :- 1. In these petitions the challenges by the petitioners are to the proceedings taken by the various Taluk Land Boards against persons who had been found by prior orders of the Taluk Land Board to have excess lands which they were liable to surrender or who by prior orders have been found to have no excess land. In such cases invoking the provision in S.85(9) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (in short the Act) the respective Taluk Land Boards have initiated proceedings against the petitioners for setting aside the prior orders passed under S.85(5) or 85(7) of the Act so as to make fresh orders determining the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered. The petitioners in these cases challenge such action of the Taluk Land Boards on the ground that S.85(9) cannot be invoked in such circumstances. The grounds of challenge urged may be stated thus: 1. For invoking S.85(9) of the Act there should be some material other than what was already on record at the time the prior order under S.85(5) or 85(7) of the Act was passed. Without any such fresh material the Boards cannot initiate action under S.85(9) of the Act. In other words, merely because on the material that was before the Board when it passed the order under S.85(5) or 85(7) it chooses to take a different view it cannot take action under S.85(9). If so taken that will fall outside the scope of S.85(9). 2. S.101(4) of the Act provides for finality of the decision of the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be, on any question concerning exemption under S.81 of the Act which arises for determination by the Taluk Land Board. Determination under S.85(5) or (7) about the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered may involve the decision on the question of the lands which are to be exempted under S.81 of the Act. Such decision regarding exemption involved in the final determination would fall under S.101 (4) of the Act which provides for finality of such decision. Therefore even if the Taluk Land Board could reopen its order under S.85(9) it cannot reopen the decision under S.101 (4) of the Act. 3. Such decision regarding exemption involved in the final determination would fall under S.101 (4) of the Act which provides for finality of such decision. Therefore even if the Taluk Land Board could reopen its order under S.85(9) it cannot reopen the decision under S.101 (4) of the Act. 3. S.85(9) contemplates setting aside the Order under S.85 (5) or 85 (7) and not a decision under S.101 (4) and therefore" in exercise of the power under S.85(9) the question of exemption cannot be re-agitated. Even if a different view is held by the Board that will not enable the Board to reopen the order to the extent of the decision concerning exemption since it is only the decision under S.85 (5) or 85 (7) that could be reopened and not the decision under S.101 (4). 4. S.85 (5) or 85 (7) of the Act does hot contemplate an order finding that there is no excess land for surrender. If so the power under S.85 (9) cannot be invoked in a case where by the prior order the Taluk Land Board had determined that no land was liable to be surrendered. We will consider these questions in seriatim. It may be necessary to refer to the language of S.85 (9). That reads "85 (9) The Taluk Land Board may, at any time, set aside its order under subsection (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be, and proceed afresh under that subsection if it is satisfied that (a) the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act, or (b) the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person are not lawfully owned or held by him; or (c) in a case where a person is. according to such order, not liable to surrender any land, such person owns or holds lands in excess of the ceiling area: Provided that the Taluk Land Board shall not set aside any order under this subsection without giving the persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that the Taluk Land Board shall not initiate any proceedings under this sub-section after the expiry of three years from the date on which the .order sought to be set aside has become final. Explanation I. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the references in this sub-section to the Taluk Land Board shall, in cases in which the order under subsection ;5) or sub-section (7) has been passed by the Land Board, be construed as references to the Land Board. Explanation II For the purpose of this section and S.86, "hold" with reference to land shall include "possess" land under mortgage with possession Prior to its amendment by Act 13 of 1978, S.85(9) run thus: "9. The Taluk Land Board may, if it is satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under S.86 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act or that the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person were not lawfully owned or held by him, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), as the case may be, in respect of such lands and shall proceed afresh under that sub-section." Sub-section (9) does not contemplate coming into possession of any information or fresh material as the basis or prerequisite for invoking the power under that sub-section The Taluk Land Board has to be satisfied of one of the three matters mentioned in the sub-section. That such satisfaction is not to be formed on the same material as was before it on the previous occasion is not indicated in the sub-section Reference has been made by petitioners' counsel to S.147 of the Income-tax Act to indicate that where the income tax authority is to take action for assessing escaped income that has to be only on the possession of information or only when concealment of particulars is shown. That is the scheme of the Incometax Act. It is the specific provision in S.147 of requirement of possession of material to initiate action thereunder that obliges the incometax authority to be possessed of such material as a pre-requisite for such action. There are statutes where such requirement on the part of an authority reopening its order is not contemplated. We have been referred to the provisions of the General Sales-tax Act in force in this State and particularly to the provision in S.19 of the Act. There are statutes where such requirement on the part of an authority reopening its order is not contemplated. We have been referred to the provisions of the General Sales-tax Act in force in this State and particularly to the provision in S.19 of the Act. This corresponds to R.33 of the General Sales-tax Rules framed under the Travancore-Cochin Act of 1125 and in force earlier That provision enables reopening of an assessment for any reason provided there was satisfaction on certain matters. Two things may be required to justify reopening a prior order of an authority. One of them may by satisfaction on one or other of the matters to be found as a pre-requisite for reopening. The other may be the existence of material on the basis of which such satisfaction is to be reached. Such satisfaction may be reached, if the statute so provides, on the same material. If the statute provides that it should be on fresh material then on the same material reopening cannot be resorted to the fact that the authority is to be satisfied on certain matters does not indicate that such satisfaction should be on fresh material. The authority could be satisfied that there was a case for reopening on the basis of its satisfaction on the specified matters by going into the records of the case and material on the file which were in existence when the previous decision was reached. In other words if the authority is satisfied that the view taken when the authority passed the order on the earlier occasion calls for reconsideration it would be possible for the authority to reopen it provided the statute envisages this We are prefacing our construction of sub-section (9) of S.85 of the the Act with these remarks only as a background to understand the scope of S.85(9) and particularly because learned counsel relied on S.147 of the Income-tax-Act. Sub-section (9) as it stands only requires the Taluk Land Board to be satisfied that the extent of lands surrendered by a person is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender or that the lands surrendered are not lawfully owned or held by the declarant or a person is found to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area but the prior order holds that he is not liable to surrender excess land. Once such satisfaction is reached the provision under sub-section (9) could be invoked by the Board at any time to set aside such order Once such order is set aside it can proceed to determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered afresh. In view of this provision we find no warrant for the contention that on the same materials a different view cannot be reached by the authority The decisions in State of Kerala v. M. Appukutty 14 STC. 242, Dy.. Commr, of Agrl. Income-tax v. Dhasalakshmi Cshew Co., 1969 KLT. 238 (SC) , State of Kerala v. Ninan, 1969 KLT. 719 (SC) brought to our notice by learned counsel Sri Govinda Warrier does not in any way help him. In the decision in Dy. Commr of Agrl. Incometax v. Dhanalakshmi Cashew Co. 1969 KLT. 238 which had followed the earlier decision in State of Kerala v. M. Appakutty, 14 STC. 242 the scope of the word "escaped assessment" in R 33 of the General Sales-tax Rules was examined by the Supreme Court. The word "escaped" indicates that it should not have been noticed, either by inadvertence of the officer or act or omission of the party. If noticed but wrongly exempted it would be a case of wrong or improper decision and would not be a case of escapement. It is evident that the question -considered was the construction of the term 'escaping assessment'. There is no concept of 'escaping assessment' under S: 85(9) of the Land Reforms Act. Though in the decision in State of Kerala v. Ninan, 1969 KLT. 719 there is a a reference to the earlier decision in 1969 KLT. 238, there is no consideration therein of any question which is of application to this case. 5. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State in these cases brought to our notice the decision in Maharaj Kumar v. I. T. Commr. AIR. 1959 SC. 257. The scope of S.34 (1) (b) of the Income-tax Act 1922 arose for consideration in that case. The term 'information' in S.34 (I) (b) of the Income Tax Act was read as referring not only to information as to facts but also information as to the state of law. AIR. 1959 SC. 257. The scope of S.34 (1) (b) of the Income-tax Act 1922 arose for consideration in that case. The term 'information' in S.34 (I) (b) of the Income Tax Act was read as referring not only to information as to facts but also information as to the state of law. Consequently if the, Incometax Officer obtained information about any relevant judicial decision subsequent to the assessment, that according to the Supreme Court would be information within the meaning of S.34 (1)(b). The attempt of the learned Additional Advocate General was to point out that even under the scheme of the Incometax Act which called for fresh material to reopen an assessment information as to the true state of law or information as to the correct law furnished by a subsequent judicial decision would be sufficient to reopen the decision. If so in a case where the authority is free to reopen an order even without any such material it should certainly be open to it to correct its own order if it finds that it is by way of a mistake that the earlier view was taken. We do not think that it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Incometax Act which are different from the provision in S.85(9) of the Land Reforms Act. 6. We do not have any hesitation in holding that it is not necessary that the Taluk Land Board should have any further material in its possession in order to reopen the order it had passed under S.85 (5) or 85 (7) of the Act. It is sufficient if it is satisfied of one or other of the matters specified in S.85(9). Such satisfaction may be on the materials on record. 7. Now we will consider the scope of S.101 (4) of the Act. This is not a question without some difficulty. There is no indication of the object with which the above-said provision could have been brought into the statute by the amending Act 35 of 1969 S.101 (4) reads thus: '101. 7. Now we will consider the scope of S.101 (4) of the Act. This is not a question without some difficulty. There is no indication of the object with which the above-said provision could have been brought into the statute by the amending Act 35 of 1969 S.101 (4) reads thus: '101. Powers of the Land Board and the Land Tribunal: (1) (2) (3) (4) If any question arises as to whether any land is exempted under S.81, the question shall be decided by the Land Board or the Talak Land Board as the case may be in such manner and having regard to such matters as may be prescribed, and the decision of the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board shall be final." We may in this context refer to sub-section (5) of S.85 of the Act. Surrender of excess lands: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) On receipt of the statement under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board as may be decided by the Land Board in accordance with such principles as may be prescribed and such Taluk Land Board shall (a) cause the particulars mentioned in the statement to be verified; (b) ascertain whether the person to whom the statement relates, owns or holds any other lands; and (c) by order, determine the extent and identity of the Land to be surrendered Sub-section (7) reads thus: (7) Where any person fails to file the statement specified under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) the Land Board shall, intimate that fact to the Taluk Land Board and thereupon the Taluk Land Board shall after necessary enquiries, by order, determine the extent and other particulars of the land, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered: Provided that before such determination the Taluk Land Board shall give an opportunity to the persons interested in the land, to be heard." The obligation of a person who owns or holds excess land is to file a statement under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) of S.85 of the Act. Once such statement under one or other of these sub-sections is received by the Board it has to transfer the statement to such Board as may be decided upon by it. Thereupon the Taluk Land Board proceeds to act in accordance with subsection (5). Once such statement under one or other of these sub-sections is received by the Board it has to transfer the statement to such Board as may be decided upon by it. Thereupon the Taluk Land Board proceeds to act in accordance with subsection (5). Clauses (a) and (b) of that sub-section relate to proceedings taken by the Board by way of verification of the matters relevant for the determination of the excess area. Besides causing the particulars in the statement to be verified the Board causes enquiry as to whether the person owns or holds other lands. Sub-clause (c) of sub-section (5) deals with the adjudication by the Board. It provides that the Board may, by order, determine the extent and identify of the land to be surrendered. Such determination would call for exercise of all powers incidental to such determination. When the Board has the duty to determine what extent of land is to be surrendered by a person that cannot be so determined without the Board determining the identity or extent of land owned or held by the person. The nature of the lands so owned or held by him also calls for determination That is because on the determination of the nature of the land depends the determination of the extent of standard acres which such person could hold. Then there is the question of determination of the lands which have to be exempted as not falling within the provisions of Chapter III Lands to be exempted under S.81 can be held by a person in addition to the lands measuring up to the ceiling area. That being the case when the statute empowers the Board to determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered there need be no separate provision enabling the Board to determine the total extent of land owned or held by a person the nature of the land held or owned by a person and the extent of land in respect of which exemption could be granted under S.81, All these are matters preliminary to the final determination of the extent of the land to be surrendered and when power to make the final determination is conferred by S.85(5) all powers incidental to it must necessarily be assumed. We cannot accept the plea of counsel for the petitioners that S.101(4) being the only provision conferring power by virtue of which the Board could determine the question of exemption once such a determination is made by the Board that decision becomes final under S.101(4) so that the Board cannot reopen it. The answer to this question will depend upon whether a decision by the Board determining the extent of land to be surrendered involves a decision exercise of power under S.101(4) or whether the power under S.101(4) is to be independently exercised proceedings falling within its purview. 8. S.101(4), we notice, contemplates prescription by rules of matters and the manner concerning its exercise under the sub-section. We have not been told of any such rules by any of the counsel appearing in these cases. It is true that we do not have a clear idea as to the circumstances under which the power under S.101(4) is to be exercised in case it is to be treated as as independent power. Perhaps the legislature contemplated question as to exemption particularly in the context of S.81(1), and 81(3) to be decided by the Land Board or Taluk Land Board. We do not want to speculate on this. Merely because We are unable to find a field of operation for S.101(4) we may not be justified in importing the idea that the power to be exercised under that sub-section is the power of determining which lands are to be exempted so as to reach the final decision under S.85(5) or 85(7) as to the extent of land to be surrendered. That would suggest that without such a provision that could not be so detrained In that event should there not be a similar provision enabling the Board to determine the extent of land owned or held by a person for the purpose of S.85 (5)? If there is no such power conferred why is there such a power in regard to determination of the question of exemption? If there is no such power conferred why is there such a power in regard to determination of the question of exemption? When a decision under S.85(5) or 85(7) is not final but is subject to revision under S.103 of the Act to the High Court it seems to be irrational and illogical to assume that the decision of the Board under S.85(5) or 85(7) of the Act has within it an inbuilt decision under S.101(4) on the question of exemption under S.81 and that decision is a final decision despite the revisional powers of the High Court under S.103. That would mean that the order of the Board revisable by the High Court is still not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question of exemption of lands and on any question relating to S.81 the order of the Taluk Land Board is final. We may also indicate that this is not the way the section has ever been understood. In revisions to this court questions of propriety of grant of exemption or refusal of exemption under S.81 has been the subject of attack whenever such question amounted to a question of law and this court had considered such attack in revisions. It is in this batch of petitions that for the first time an argument is presented in this court that in a decision under S.85 (5) there is a preliminary decision reached on the question of exemption under S.101 (4) and that decision is final. We also feel that the decision of the Board under S.85 (5) or 85 (7) cannot be said to have within it another decision under S.101 (4). The decision of the Board could only be one and that under S.85 (5) or 85 (7). 9. We are therefore unable to accept the argument of counsel in these cases that though the order of the Board under S.85 (5) or 85 (7) is revisable by the High Court if in deciding the question of extent and identity of land to be surrendered the Board had considered the question of exemption of some land and the partly is aggrieved thereby the High Court in revision is not competent to consider that question as the decision on that question is final under S.101 (4) and cannot be agitated before the High Court. By the same reasoning we cannot accept the plea that the decision in regard to the question of exemption is not liable to be reopened under S.85(9) for the reason that it is a decision not under S.85 (5) or 85 (7), but a decision under S.101 (4) of the Act. 10. There is another aspect to the matter. Even assuming that the decision on the question of exemption under S.85 is a decision falling under S.101 (4) if it is preliminary to the determination of the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered when that determination is made the order is under S.85(5) or 85 (7) and therefore that order is liable to be reopened under the terms of S.85(9). 11. The plea of finality will hot be of any consequence for another reason. Finality is only with reference to other authorities reopening the order and not the very same authority reopening the order in order to rectify it or review it if the relevant statute provides for such power of review or rectification. If the same statute provides for reopening the order the term final has necessarily to be understood subject to that provision. In this view we find no impropriety in the proceedings taken by the Boards to reopen the orders under S.85(9) in cases where they have been satisfied of the matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of S.85(9) and such satisfaction concerns the matter of grant of exemption in the earlier order of the Board. We find that in most of these cases and in fact in all the cases except the last 3 the proceedings for reopening under S.85(9) have been taken because the Boards had earlier exempted certain lands under S.81 and it has subsequently been found that such lands are not liable to be exempted. As an instance we may refer to water ways and tanks which were considered as liable to be exempted under S.81 and possibly because of the change of view by the Taluk Land Board, the Board felt that it was satisfied that such lands were not liable to be exempted. If so the extent of land surrendered by or assumed from the owner would be less than the extent of land which were liable to be surrendered under the provisions of the Act. If so the extent of land surrendered by or assumed from the owner would be less than the extent of land which were liable to be surrendered under the provisions of the Act. If there was satisfaction of the specified matters that would be relevant satisfaction enabling the proceedings under S.85(9) to be taken. That evidently is the approach in all the cases except the last these. In the last 3 the question is whether without any fresh material the Board should have proceeded under S.85(9) of the Act, a matter to which we have already referred in this judgment. 12. Now we come to the last point. The plea that S.85(5) or 85(7) does not contemplate an order that there is no excess land to be surrendered, that if so in a case where no excess land has been directed to be surrendered there is no question of setting aside an order under S.85(5) or 85(7) and for that reason sub-section (9) of S.85 would not arise for application in such a case is answered by the provision in the Section itself. Sub-clause (c) of sub-section (9) contemplates a case where a person is. according to such order found not liable to surrender land. That sub-section indicates that such order, namely, the order under S.85(5) or 85(7) may be an order which holds that a person is not liable to surrender any land as excess. In view of what we have held above, all the Original Petitions have to be found to be of no merit. We are not adjudicating on any other question such as whether the proceedings are in time or otherwise. These are all questions to be raised and considered before final decisions are taken. They are left open. All the Original Petitions are dismissed. No costs.