S. B. Wad ( 1 ) SARDAR Niranjan Singh was an Assistant Post Master. On February 11, 1963, when he was going on a bicycle on Lady Harding Road at the crossing of Baird Road he was hit by D. T. U. bus No. DLP-906. He became unconscious and died in Willingdon Hospital on February 14, 1963. He was survived by his widow, a son, two minor daughters and one married daughter. They preferred a claim for compensation of Rs. 55,000. 00 under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to the Accident Claims Tribunal. ( 2 ) IN support of the claim the petitioners examined two eye-witnesses. Arjan Singh (AW-2) was a Constable on duty on the crossing of the Baird Road. Another eye witness was Inderjit Gupta (AW-6 ). The third important witness was Shri Darshan Singh the Police Officer who investigated in the accident and prepared a site plan. The respondent-Corporation denied any liability for the accident. It contended that the deceased was wholly responsible for the accident. The respondents examined Shri Om Pal Singh (R. W-1), a passenger travelling in the said bus. They also examined the bus driver Shri Man-phool Singh and Mehar Singh the conductor. They also examined Sarup Singh (RW-4) the Traffic Superintendent. ( 3 ) THE Accident Tribunal relied more upon the evidence of the respondents and came to the conclusion that the deceased was at fault and he was solely responsible for the accident. The Tribunal, however, worked out some figures of compensation but did not order any compensation to be paid due to its finding on the negligence of the deceased. The claim was, therefore, rejected by the Tribunal on October 1, 1965. ( 4 ) THE heirs of the deceased filed an appeal to this court under section 110-D of the Act. The learned Single Judge who heard the appeal preferred the evidence of the witnesses cited by the claimants. The evidence of Arjan Singh (AW-4), a constable who was on traffic duty at the relevant time showed that, the deceased, before turning to his right side for going towards Bhagat Singh Market, gave a signal. He had turned more than half on the road. The bus was coming at a very high speed. The cycle of the deceased was thrown away at a distance of five to six feet. He had turned more than half on the road. The bus was coming at a very high speed. The cycle of the deceased was thrown away at a distance of five to six feet. The bus stopped at a distance of 10 to 15 feet from the place of impact. There was absolutely no traffic on the road. This evidence is supported by another eye witness Inderjit Gupta (AW-6 ). According to the evidence of Sarup Singh (RW-4) Traffic Superintendent, the bus was standing in the middle of the road. The cyclist was on the right side of the bus. The skid marks on the road were 6 feet in length and the deceased was 9 feet from the place from where the skid marks started. The learned Judge, on this evidence came to the following conclusion : "if the driver had kept a controllable speed on the approach of the crossing and had kept to the left side of the road, the accident might have been avoided. But, the driver, without controlling the speed of the bus appreciably, appears to have moved a little towards the right side of the centre of the road in his attempt to quickly overtake the cycle, hoping that he would be able to move away, leaving the cyclist on his left. The driver, therefore, cannot be totally absolved of his responsibility. The deceased, because of his having taken a rash and reckless act of suddenly turning towards his right oblivious of approaching bus was clearly guilty of contributory negligence. Rather his responsibility for the accident was more than that of the respondent driver. There cannot be any hard and fast rule in apportioning the negligence of the parties. Looking to the circumstances of this case, I think, 2/3rd of the responsibility can be fastened to the deceased himself, while the responsibility of the respondent driver for the accident was to the extent of l/3rd only. "on these findings the learned Judge set aside the order of the Accident Tribunal and awarded a sum of Rs. 3,319. 00 as compensation. He also allowed the interest @ 4 per cent on the said amount from October 1, 1965. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for the parties have taken us through the evidence. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the evidence of the eye witnesses is to be preferred in this case. 3,319. 00 as compensation. He also allowed the interest @ 4 per cent on the said amount from October 1, 1965. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for the parties have taken us through the evidence. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the evidence of the eye witnesses is to be preferred in this case. We also agree with him that this is a case of contributory negligence. However, it is difficult to agree with the learned Judge on the apportionment of the responsibility of the deceased and the driver. We are of the opinion that the deceased and the driver were equally responsible. We do not take the view that the deceased was more negligent. The admitted facts are that the accident took place at the crossing of the road. The D. T. U. bus should have slowed down particularly at the crossing. The bus was in high speed. There was no traffic on the road at all. The deceased had given the signal for turning to right. The bus driver should have slowed down after seeing the cyclist infront of the bus, particularly when the signal for turning was given by the deceased. It was found that the bus was more on the right side of the middle of the road and the cyclist was thrown to further right due to the impact. The bus hit the cycle on its rear wheel which obviously shows that the cyclist had almost completed the turn towards Bhagat Singh Market. In these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the cyclist was more at blame than the bus driver. We held that both had equal shares in the causing of the accident. The compensation payable to the claimants would be worked out on this footing. ( 6 ) THE next question is the amount of compensation which the widow was entitled to. Although there are some principles evolved by judicial pronouncements in this regard, the question of compensation has to be decided on the basis of common-sense and the economic strata from which the deceased comes. A person from an affluent class might have income from property, good savings, investments as well as insurance to support the bereaved family. But a person at a very low income bracket, who is required to maintain a family with great difficulty, cannot have such provisions. A person from an affluent class might have income from property, good savings, investments as well as insurance to support the bereaved family. But a person at a very low income bracket, who is required to maintain a family with great difficulty, cannot have such provisions. The deceased here was drawing a total salary of Rs. 325. 00 at the time of his death. He had five members in the family. Two daughters were of marriageable age. There is no evidence to show that he had any savings or investments or insurance. Law cannot compensate love, affection, protection and well being which the head of the family provides to the family. It tries to compensate in monetary terms the loss suffered by the family. Naturally, the compensation should be more liberal for that class of person who have very meagre income as compared to the classes which are more affluent. Reason and broad humanism dictate it. ( 7 ) THE deceased was getting a salary of Rs. 325. 00 at the time of his premature death. Even in 1963 this was a very small amount for the family of five people staying in Delhi. The deceased would have retired in August 1968 if he had lived. The pinch of retirement is felt by every Government servant because his income is suddenly reduced to 1/3. It is a matter of common knowledge that most of them are required to take up some private jobs or to do business to support their income after retirement. Particularly a person coming from very low economic strata (from which the deceased comes) would certainly find out a private job so as to make up the deficiency. Spiralling prices and social compulsions of high spending on marriages, would have forced the deceased to earn more money for his family. But since the two lower courts have concurrently held that the deceased would not have earned Rs. 325. 00 per month after his retirement we will not like to take a different view. We, therefore, proceed on the basis that the income of the family would have been Rs 325. 00 from 15. 2. 1963 to 31. 8. 1968 and Rs. 138. 00 from 31. 8. 1968 onwards. The deceased would have retired on 3. 8. 1968 and he was entitled to the pension of Rs. 138. 00 thereafter. We, therefore, proceed on the basis that the income of the family would have been Rs 325. 00 from 15. 2. 1963 to 31. 8. 1968 and Rs. 138. 00 from 31. 8. 1968 onwards. The deceased would have retired on 3. 8. 1968 and he was entitled to the pension of Rs. 138. 00 thereafter. ( 8 ) WE, however, differ from the learned single Judge in some other respects. The learned Judge has held that after his retirement the deceased would have contributed only Rs. 50. 00 to his family out o his pension of Rs. 138. 00. Considering the family responsibilities of the deceased, we think that be would have reduced his personal expenses and should have contributed at least Rs. 100. 00 for his family support. We also do not agree with the learned Judge that an amount 30% of the total income should be deducted on account of the benefit of the lump sum payment or what is described as the accelerated payment. Some decisions were brought to our notice which take this view of deduction on account of lump sum payment. However, there "is another set of decisions which take the view that the rise in prices, the normal increments which person would have earned or chances of his further promotion cannot be ignored. We agree with the second view. A Division Bench of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others v. Shanti Devi Dutt and another1 has affirmed that the advantage of lump sum payment is neutralised by the rise in prices of the necessities of life. We agree and follow the Division Bench judgment. The deceased here would have earned at least five increments before his retirement. This rise would have also been reflected in the pension. We were told at the bar that there was a general revision of pay scales after the death of the deceased. There is a phenomenal rise in prices since 1963. We, therefore, hold that no deduction should be made from the lump sum due to the widow. Thirdly, we cannot agree with the learned Judge in allowing the rate,of interest at 4 per cent. Normal rate (which itself is very meagre as compared to the market rate) allowed in law is 6 per cent. We hold that the widow will be entitled to 6 per cent of interest on the amount due. Thirdly, we cannot agree with the learned Judge in allowing the rate,of interest at 4 per cent. Normal rate (which itself is very meagre as compared to the market rate) allowed in law is 6 per cent. We hold that the widow will be entitled to 6 per cent of interest on the amount due. ( 9 ) WE agree with the learned Judge that the life expectancy for deceased can be safely taken at seventy years. We further agree with the calculations made by the learned Judge regarding the income upto that age on the basis of Rs. 325. 00 per month upto August 3, 1968 and @ Rs. 138. 00 thereafter. We also agree with the learned Judge that the personal expenses of the deceased at the time of his death were Rs. 140. 00 per month since the same are based on the evidence of the son of the deceased. After the deduction of the personal expenses the petitioner s family would have received Rs. 12. 210. 00 upto August 3, 1968 Thereafter till his age of seventy the deceased would have contributed Rs. 12,600. 00 @ Rs. 100 per month. Thus the total income would have been Rs. 24,810. 00. The widow of the deceased was paid Rs. 3,000. 00 by the respondents towards pension upto 3. 8. 1968 @ Rs. 46. 15 per month If it was held that the deceased was not at fault at all his widow would hive got the full amount, she would have got Rs. 21,818. 00. Since we have held that this is a case of contributory negligence where both the deceased and the driver of the DTU had equal share of negligence, half that sum, namely Rs. 10. 905. 00 would be the amount of compensation which the family of the deceased would have been entitled to. The family would be entitled to interest on the said amount at 6 per cent, The widow of the deceased has received Rs. 4838. 14 as compensation awarded by the learned single Judge on 1. 7. 1973. This amount includes Rs. 3,691. 00 as compensation and Rs. 1147. 14 as interest @ Rs. 4 per cent. Deducting the principal amount, the family is entitled to get Rs. 7,214 as compensation. ( 10 ) THE widow would be entitled to the interest on this amount from 15. 4. 7. 1973. This amount includes Rs. 3,691. 00 as compensation and Rs. 1147. 14 as interest @ Rs. 4 per cent. Deducting the principal amount, the family is entitled to get Rs. 7,214 as compensation. ( 10 ) THE widow would be entitled to the interest on this amount from 15. 4. 1963, when the claim was preferred. The final amount entitled as interest would be as follows : (1) 6% interest on Rs. 7,214 from 15. 4. 1963 till the actual realisation of the amount. (2) Rs. 1147. 14, the amount of interest received by the widow persuant to the order of the single Judge, is to be deducted from the total interest payable. ( 11 ) THE L. P. A. is allowed with costs. The respondents are directed to work out the final figures of interest early. A cheque for the total amount inclusive of the principal amount of Rs. 7,214. 00, interest and costs shall be presented to the widow before the Registrar within three months from the date of the judgment.