Pathak, C.J. (Actg.)- This appeal is directed against the Judg­ment and decree dated 11.6.79 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Barpeta in Title Appeal No. 17 of 1973 affirming the Judgment and decree dated 2S.9.76 passed by the learned Munsiff, Barpeta in Title Suit No. 110 of 1976. 2. The brief facts leading to the present appeal may be stated as follows : The plaintiff was the "Aldharia" of late Dharmeswar Mahanta, 'Deka Satria' of Barpeta Satra and as such he is the sole heir of late Dharmeswar Mahanta as per customs and conve­ntion of the Satra. That on the death of Dharmeswar Mahanta on 1.7.74, the respondent-defendant in collusion with some people came and ousted the appellant-plaintiff from the 'Baha' of late Dharmeswar Mahanta. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a case against the defendant which was compromised at the intervention of some persons. The plaintiff-appellant's case is that the defendant without any right to inherit the properties of fete Dharmeswar tried to dispose of the same. Hence the suit was filed before the court of the learned Munsiff, Barpeta. The defendant's case as can be seen from the written statement is a complete denial of the averments made by the plaintiff in his plaint. According to the defendant he was the 'Aldharia' of late Dharmeswar and after the death of Dharmeswar, he was appointed 'Burha Bhakat' in the said 'Baha' of late Dharmes­war according to the convention of the Satra. He was further claimed that he is a lineal descendant of late Dharmeswar and therefore he has stated in his written statement that the plain­tiff in no way can become the heir of late Dharmeswar Mahanta. It is further stated in the written statement that the plaintiff left the 'Baha' of late Dharmeswar forever and as such he relin­quished the claim to inherit to the property left by late Dharmeswar Mahanta. The other averments made in the written statement are that the plaintiff does not have any cause of action, that the suit was not maintainable and that the Court did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction. 3. On the pleadings of the parties as many as seven iss­ues were formulated by the learned trial Court. Out of them the following two issues were taken as the preliminary issues. These issues are : Issue No. 4 : Whether the court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try this suit? 3. On the pleadings of the parties as many as seven iss­ues were formulated by the learned trial Court. Out of them the following two issues were taken as the preliminary issues. These issues are : Issue No. 4 : Whether the court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try this suit? Issue No. 5 : Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? On consideration of the above two issues by the learned Munsiff, the suit was dismissed on the ground of non-maintain­ability. The plaintiff being aggrieved preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court also affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court Hence the plaintiff has presented this second appeal before this Court. 4. Mr. T. C. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that when the trial Court recorded a finding that it had no jurisdiction to try the case because of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction, then according to the provision of Order 7, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, the proper course of the trial court was to order for returning the plaint to be filed in the proper court. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the finding on the point of the pecuniary jurisdiction having been recorded by the trill Court it could not have gone into the merit of the case, namely, whither any consequential relief was sought by the plaintiff or not as that matter would be in the realm of merit. Hence it is submitted by the learned counsel for the app­ellant, that once having found lack of pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the Courts below had committed an error to have gone to the question whether consequential relief has been claimed by the plaintiff. 5. In support of the submission of the first point,' the learned counsel refers to a decision by the Supreme Court in Raizada Topan Das and anr. vs. M/s. Gokal Chand, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 , which was also referred to in the judg­ment of the First Appellate Court. 5. In support of the submission of the first point,' the learned counsel refers to a decision by the Supreme Court in Raizada Topan Das and anr. vs. M/s. Gokal Chand, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 , which was also referred to in the judg­ment of the First Appellate Court. This decision has been referred by the learned counsel to substantiate the contention that once there is a finding that the Court lacks in pecuniary jurisdiction according to the general principle which governs the question of jurisdiction at the inception of the trial of the suit, the plaint is to be returned for presentation to the proper Court and cannot be dismissed. 6. In the above case setforth the Supreme Court was concer­ned with the question whether on a proper interpretation of Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Con­trol Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the Court of the Small Causes, Bombay have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the suit out of which the appeal before the Supreme Court arose. Leaving out unnecessary details the said section 28(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction, the Court of Small Causes in greater Bombay shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and & tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of Part II of the Act apply to decide any application made under the Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions and no other Court shall have jurisdiction to ent­ertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with any such claim or question. 7. In order to appreciate the question raised before the Court, it is necessary to have a brief resume of the facts leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court. 7. In order to appreciate the question raised before the Court, it is necessary to have a brief resume of the facts leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court. There the plain­tiffs instituted a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay, asking for a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to enter into of remain in possession of a certain shop in Greater Bombay and for a permanent injunction restraining them from entering the shop on the allegation that the defendants had been granted a licence to use the shop of which the plaintiffs were the tenants under the owner and that defendants were wrongfully continuing there in spite of the termination of the licence and were thereby preventing the plaintiffs from carrying on their business in the shop. The defence to the suit was that the relationship between the parties was not that of licensor and licensee but that the shop had in fact been sub- let to them and that the agreement between the parties had been given the form of a licence only as a cloak to protect the plaintiffs from ejectment under the Act by the landlord on the ground of unlawful sub-letting. The defendants contended that as they were really tanants, their landlords plaintiffs were not entitled to remove them from posse­ssion in view of the provisions of the Act. The contention of the defendants prevailed with the City Civil Court and it held that in view of the Section 28 of the Act, at had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit which the plaintiffs had filed against the defendants in that Court and directed the plaint to be returned to the plaintiffs for being filed in the proper Court indicated by that Section, namely, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay. This question was tried as a preliminary issue in the suit by the City Civil Court. Against the aforesaid decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Bombay which took a contrary view holding that the City Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit had not been taken away by Section 28 of the Act. Against the aforesaid decision of the High Court, the defendants preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. 8. Against the aforesaid decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Bombay which took a contrary view holding that the City Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit had not been taken away by Section 28 of the Act. Against the aforesaid decision of the High Court, the defendants preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. 8. On a perusal of the operative part of sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act it is found that it refers to two metters i.e. (a) any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of Part II of the Act apply ; and (b) any application made under the Act or any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court addressed itself as to what is the true effect of sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act with regard to the aforesaid two matters. Does it mean that if the defendant raises a claim or question as to the exis­tence of a relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court is ousted even though the plaintiff pleads that there is no such relation­ship and the only court which has exclusive jurisdiction to try the suit is the Court of Small Causes, Bombay? In answering the above question their Lordships referred to the general principle which governs the question of jurisdiction at the inception of suits. In this regard their Lordships have referred with approval the general principle explained by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Ananti vs. Channu (AIR 1930 Allahabad 193) the material portion of which reads as follows : "The plaintiff chooses his forum and files his suit. If he establishes the correctness of his facts he will get his relief from the forum chosen. If...... he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts, and goes for his relief to a court which cannot grant him relief on the true facts, he will have his suit dismissed. If he establishes the correctness of his facts he will get his relief from the forum chosen. If...... he frames his suit in a manner not warranted by the facts, and goes for his relief to a court which cannot grant him relief on the true facts, he will have his suit dismissed. Then there will be no question of returning the plaint for pre­sentation to the proper court, for the plaint, as framed, would not justify the other kind of court to grant him the relief.........If it is found, on a trial on the merits so far as this issue of jurisdiction goes, that the facts alleged by the plaintiff are not true and the facts alleged by the defendants are true, and that the case is not cogni­sable by the court, there will be two kinds of orders to be passed. If the jurisdiction is only one relating to territorial limits or pecuniary limit, the plaint will be ordered to be resumed for presentation to the proper court If, on the other hand, it is found that having regard to the nature of the suit, it is not cognizable by the class of court to which the court belongs, the plaintiff's suit will have to be dismissed in its entirety." (emphasis supplied). After having stated the general principle, the Court observed that Section 28 no doubt gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Small Causes to entertain and try a suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of rent or posse­ssion of any premises to which any of the provisions of Part II apply ; it also gives exclusive jurisdiction to decide any applica­tion under the Act and any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions-all this notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. It was argued on behalf of the defendants that the section in effect states that notwithstanding any general principle, all claims or questions under the Act shall be tried exclusively by the Courts mentioned in the section, e.g., the Court of Small Causes in Greater Bombay, and it does not matter whether the claim or question is raised by the plain­tiff or the defendant. In repelling the aforesaid argument of the defendant, their Lordships have stated the law in the following term : "The argument is plausible, but appears to us to be untenable on a careful scrutiny. We do not think that the section says or intends to say that the plea of the defendant will determine or change the forum. It proceeds on the basis that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on cer­tain courts to decide all questions or claims under the Act as to parties, between whom there is or was a rela­tionship of landlord and tenant. It does not invest those courts with exclusive power to try questions of title, such as questions as between the rightful owner and a tres­passer or a licensee, for such questions do not arise under the Act. If, therefore, the plaintiff in his plaint does not admit a relation which would attract any of the provisions of the Act on which the exclusive jurisdiction given under S. 28 depends, we do not think that the defendant by his plea can force the plaintiff to go to a forum where on his averments he cannot go. The interpretation canvassed for by the appellants will give rise to anomalous results; for example, the defendant may in every case force the plain­tiff to go to the Court of Small Causes and secondly, if the Court of Small Causes finds against the defendant's plea, the plaint may have to be returned for presentation to the proper Court for a second time." (emphasis supplied) Ultimately their Lordships held that on consideration of the plea raised in the plaint it is found that the suit is not between the landlord and tenant in order to attract the provision of Sec­tion 28 of the Act. Therefore, the Small Causes Court, Bombay could not have jurisdiction to try the suit. The plaint shows that the plaintiffs had brought the suit against the defendants treating them as a licensees and not as tenant. Therefore, on such facts the City Civil Court was a proper forum for trying the suit. 9. From the facts giving rise to the present appeal, it is found that the nature of the suit is not such that it was not cognisable by the Court before which it was filed. Therefore, on such facts the City Civil Court was a proper forum for trying the suit. 9. From the facts giving rise to the present appeal, it is found that the nature of the suit is not such that it was not cognisable by the Court before which it was filed. When the trial Court came to a finding that it lacked the pecuniary juris­diction, the proper course for that Court was to return the plaint to the plaintiff for filling in the Court of competent pecuniary jurisdiction. It did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the suit. We have already noticed in the case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 (supra) the law enunciated by their Lordships regarding the general principle of jurisdiction. There the law has been succi­nctly stated to the effect that if a suit is filed in a Court and the nature of the suit is such that it is not cognisable by the Class of Court to which the Court belongs, then the plaintiff's suit is to be dismissed in its entirety. But the present suit is not a suit of the nature which is not cognizable by the Court before which it was filed. Such is cognizable by that Court but only preliminary decision given by Court was that it lacked pecu­niary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I am of firm opinion that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the suit. 10. Mr. Y. K. Phukan, the learned counsel appearing en behalf of the Respondent submits that the present appeal itself is liable to be dismissed as being non-maintainable. The contention of the learned counsel is that from the written statement, it is clear that the suit would itself involve more than Rs. 20.000/- as has been stated in the written statement. Therefore, if the suit was dismissed by the trial court, the pro­per forum for the appeal should have been this Court by way of First Appeal. But, I am of firm opinion that the plea taken by the defendant cannot change the character of the suit as it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 (supra) that the suit is to be proceeded of the basis it has been pleaded in the plaint. 11. But, I am of firm opinion that the plea taken by the defendant cannot change the character of the suit as it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1348 (supra) that the suit is to be proceeded of the basis it has been pleaded in the plaint. 11. On consideration of the entire matter lam inclined to hold that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are liable to be set aside which I accordingly do. 12. By virtue of the provision of Order 7, Rule 10 and Explanation appended thereto, I direct the return of the plaint to the appellant, who will be entitled to file the same in the proper Court. This is an old pending case and there is urgency in the disposal of the suit at an early date. If the plaintiff files the plaint in the proper Court, the trial Court should dispose of the suit with utmost dispatch. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I pass no order as to costs. The appellant prayed for injunction to this Court but by an order of this Court dated 1.7.80 no injunction was granted. So if there is any question of injunction comes before the trial Court that will be considered by that Court itself on its merit.