( 1 ) THIS is defendants' appeal against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court reversing the finding of the trial Court, by which the trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Parties to this appeal will be referred to by the rank and position assigned to them in the trial Court. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS filed original Suit No. 52 of 1976 in the Court of the Munsiff, Hungund, praying for perpetual injunction against the defendants (appellants) from interfering with or disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs (respondents) of the suit property. The suit property was a portion of the premises bearing CTS No. 700 in Ilkal town. ( 3 ) THE facts may be briefly stated as follows: Plaintiffs, who are brothers carrying on the business of watch repairing, asserted in the plaint that they were tenants of the lst defendant in respect of, a portion of the shop premises. The shop premises was itself on lease to the 1st defendant by the Mahant Swamiji of Ilkal, the owner of the building. But no relationship of landlord and tenant was claimed between the owner of the building and the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs stated that they were paying a sum of Rs. 102 per annum as rent for the portion occupied by them. It was also the case that after 3 or, 4 years the rent was raised to Rs. 200 per annum. Plaintiffs stated that there were occasions on which the defendants looted their shop between 5-4-1976 and 6-4-1916 and unauthorisedly obstructed the possession and enjoyment of the suit premises by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the' suit for perpetual injunction. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS resisted the suit stating that plaintiffs were not their tenants, but only permissive occupants as licensees and they had allowed plaintiffs to occupy a portion of the premises and to make use of their cupboards etc. , as there was slackness in their business in Ayurvedic medicines and explosives. Plaintiffs began to store spirit and petrol and, therefore, the defendants were compelled to revoke their licence and directed the plaintiffs to carry on their business elsewhere. Plaintiffs had not carried on any business in the suit building since March 1976 and, therefore, they had no legal right to seek perpetual injunction. They prayed for the dismissal of the suit in the circumstances. Plaintiffs had not carried on any business in the suit building since March 1976 and, therefore, they had no legal right to seek perpetual injunction. They prayed for the dismissal of the suit in the circumstances. ( 5 ) ON the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following five issues: (1) Do plaintiffs prove that they are in possession of suit shop as sub-tenants? (2) Whether defendants prove that plaintiffs are in possession of suit shop building on leave and license? (3) Whether defendants prove that they have cancelled the leave and license? (4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunction? (5) What decree or order? ( 6 ) THE trial Court came to the conclusion on appreciating the evidence produced before it that the plaintiffs had not proved that they were lessees of the efendants and that they were in possession of the suit portion of the premises as licencees of defendants. In the result, the suit was dismissed without- answering other issues. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, plaintiff s filed regular appeal No. 77 of 1977 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bagalkot. The learned Civil Judge after hearing the parties and reappreciating the evidence on record came to the conclusion that in the absence of any written document evidencing lease, it was still open to establish the lease by other evidence and having regard to the totality of the circumstances and the evidence on record, the plaintiffs had proved that they were lessees in respect of the portion claimed by them under the defendants. Aggrieved by the same the defendants have preferred the present second appeal to this Court. ( 8 ) THE short question which falls for consideration in this second appeal is 'whether the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants is one of lessor and lessee or one of licensor and licensee?' it is admitted by the plaintiffs that the lease was not reduced to writing, that, by oral agreement and by delivery of possession, lease in their favour came into existence. They also adduced evidence to show that the building was assessed to Municipal tax as two separate units (Exhibits p-1 and P-21. Some witnesses were examined in support of their claim that they were lessees paying annual rent as asserted by them. They also adduced evidence to show that the building was assessed to Municipal tax as two separate units (Exhibits p-1 and P-21. Some witnesses were examined in support of their claim that they were lessees paying annual rent as asserted by them. As against evidence, defendant 3 alone was citied in support of the stand taken by the defendants, As can be seen from the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the reason why he did not agree with the conclusion reached by the trial Court was that in the absence of any written document, the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs in support of their stand was the worthier to establish the lease as Exs. P-1 and P-2 clearly supported or probabilised the two units being separate. The lower appellate Court also took into consideration the admission made for defendant when 3rd defendant was cross-examined. He stated that the defendants -did not object for levying house tax separately. From that fact the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants, if they were mere licensors, would have naturally objected to the levy of house tax for the portion occupied by the plaintiffs as a separate unit. It is this reasoning which has been found fault with by the learned counsel for the appellants. It has been his contention that solely relying on Exs. P-1 and P-2, the lower appellate Court ignored the other evidence in the case. But this has not been demonstrated with reference to any specific material evidence on record. However, an attempt has been made to place reliance on the Commissioner's report in the case which was to the effect that the partition wall put up between the premises in the occupation of the defendants and the portion-in the occupation of the plaintiffs was one put up after the plaintiffs obtained temporary injunction from the Court. But this argument overlooks the- fact that it was already in evidence of the witnesses for the plaintiffs that the two portions occupied by the plaintiffs and defendants separately were separated by almirahs belonging to the plaintiffs and defendants until those almirahs were burglarized and the plaintiffs had to me the suit for injunction. It is also in evidence, of the 3rd defendant, D. W. 1. It is also in evidence, of the 3rd defendant, D. W. 1. that there is a separate entrance to the Portion occupied by the plaintiffs which they were compelled to break open after obtaining temporary injunction from the Court. I, therefore, see neither perversity in the reasoning of the learned first appellate Judge nor any legal injunction in reappreciating the evidence that was already on record. ( 9 ) IT is now well settled rule, of, construction that in order to determine whether the relationship is one of licensee or lessee, neither documentary evidence, if any, nor even the recitals in the document of lease oil licence would be as, relevant as the real intention of the parties in entering into that relationship. If this is borne in mind, the reappreciation of the evidence by the lower appellate Court to come to the conclusion which it did cannot be said to suffer from any error of law so long as nothing is taken into consideration which was not in evidence before the Court. For the above reasons, I do not think there is merit in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.