JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava, J. 1. This revision application under Section 25 of Small Cause Courts Act is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the II Additional District Judge and Judge Small Cause Court, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendants. 2. The plaintiff came forward with the case that he was the sole owner and landlord of the premises in dispute and defendant Himayatul Hasan (now dead) was tenant at the rate of Rs. 35/- per month, but he could not pay rent since the year 1958 except a sum of Rs. 500/- inspite of repeated demand and representations. It was also stated that the defendant had sub-let two rooms to two different persons. Notice of ejectment was served on the defendant, but he neither vacated the premises in dispute nor paid rent, hence the suit. The original defendant before filing of the written statement died and his heirs and legal representatives were brought on record. They filed separate written statements supporting case of each other. Their case was that their father Himayatul Hasan was a friend of the plaintiff and had some money transactions with him. It was pleaded that he was weak and mentally derailed. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff is not the sole owner and landlord of the house in dispute and the property belonged to his father and after his death it was inherited by the plaintiff, his sisters and mother. The plea of sub-letting was also denied. 3. The trial court framed certain issues in the case and the parties tendered evidence in support of their case. From the evidence on record it transpires that the house in dispute was purchased in the name of the mother of the plaintiff who died in the year 1932 leaving behind the plaintiff, two sisters and her husband and after her death the name of the plaintiff and his two sisters under the guardianship of their father was recorded in the Municipal records. It is also on the record that the plaintiff's father had two more wives and they were alive when his mother died and atleast one of them is still alive. It was also in evidence that after the death of the plaintiff's mother rent was realised by his father who also died in the year 1941. It is also on the record that the plaintiff's father had two more wives and they were alive when his mother died and atleast one of them is still alive. It was also in evidence that after the death of the plaintiff's mother rent was realised by his father who also died in the year 1941. After the death of his father, according to the defendant rent was sometime paid to the plaintiff and sometime to his mother and ultimately was deposited in Court under section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. But it is not clear during which period rent was paid to the plaintiff or his step mother. The trial court observed that after the death of the plaintiff 3/4th share will be inherited by her son and daughters and 1/4th share will go to the plaintiffs father, and after the death of his father, his share will devolve on the step mother of the plaintiff, his sisters and other daughters of his father and sisters gifted their share and thus each of them got smaller share. 4. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit by holding that he was not the sole owner of the Dermises in dispute and other co-owners were not impleaded as parties to the suit and he had no right to file the suit. The trial court further held that the plaintiff failed to prove the case of sub-tenancy and his claim was barred by time and was not cognizable and further the plaintiff alone was not the owner of the house in dispute and as such notice given by him was illegal and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the applicant, challenged the conclusions arrived at by the court below on number of grounds including its conclusion that the plaintiff had no right to file the suit as he had not impleaded other co-owners and co-landlords as parties to the suit. Sri S.S. Bhatnagar, learned counsel for the applicant, challenged the conclusions arrived at by the court below on number of grounds including its conclusion that the plaintiff had no right to file the suit as he had not impleaded other co-owners and co-landlords as parties to the suit. In this connection learned counsel contended that there may be co-owners, in the house in dispute who had very small share, but it was the plaintiff who was the landlord of the house in dispute and as such he could have alone maintained the suit and even as a co-owner he had a right to file the suit and the suit was wrongly dismissed on the ground of non-impleadment of other co-owners. In support of his contention learned counsel made reference to the Supreme Court decision in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagan Nath, AIR 1976 SC 2335 . The said case under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the suit was filed by one of the co-owners on the ground of default aswell as reasonable requirement of the premises for his own occupation aswell as members of Joint Hindu family consisting of his mother and married brother. The Court observed:- "Jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property. The question will change only when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purposes of section 13(1) (f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property being at the same time the acknowledged landlord of the defendants." In Sri Ram Pasricha case (supra) the finding was that the plaintiff was dealing with the property and it was he who was the landlord. 5. 5. Learned counsel also made reference to the Supreme Court case Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 which was a case under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in which the Court relying on Sri Ram Pasricha's case and taking into consideration the definition of the landlord and tenant observed :- "A fair understanding of the relationship between the parties leaves little room for doubt that the appellant was the tenant of the premises. The 1st respondent, together with the other respondents, constituted the body of landlords and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them representing them all, was collecting rent. In short he functioned for all practical purposes as the landlord, and was therefore, entitled to institute proceedings qua landlord." Learned counsel also made reference to the case Subhendu Prasad v. Kamla Bala, AIR 1978 SC 835 which was a case under Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act in which the Supreme Court placing reliance on Sri Ram Pasricha's case (supra) observed that "where the notice to quit under Sec. 4 mentions that the same is from and on behalf of all the co-owners including minors and the notice' is signed amongst others by the guardian of minor, the omission by the guardian to mention that he was signing on behalf of the minor would not invalidate the notice. Even assuming that notice was not given on behalf of one of the co-owner landlords, yet the notice would be good and valid." 6. Thus the position which emerges is that a suit by a co-owner who is sole landlord for ejectment of a tenant is maintainable and the suit cannot fail merely because other co-owners have not been impleaded as parties. But the question arises whether a co-owner is the sole landlord or he is only a co-landlord within the meaning of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Under the said Act a person may be owner, but he may not be landlord but a person may be a co-owner, but so far as tenant is concerned he may be the sole landlord. Thus the words 'owner' and 'landlord' are not synonimous with each other within the meaning of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Under the said Act a person may be owner, but he may not be landlord but a person may be a co-owner, but so far as tenant is concerned he may be the sole landlord. Thus the words 'owner' and 'landlord' are not synonimous with each other within the meaning of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The plaintiff thus having been found to be, co-owner had a right to file a suit for ejectment and the suit was maintainable if he was the sole landlord. The plaintiff came forward with the case that he was the sole landlord, but the court below held that he was not the sole landlord of the premises in dispute. The finding on this point has been assailed by the learned counsel on the ground that the relevant aspects of the case as well as material on record were ignored by the court below and if the same would have been taken into consideration the finding would have been otherwise. The father of the plaintiff died in the year 1941 according to the plaintiff after the death of his mother it was her father who was realising rent and thereafter he realised the rent. Thus the plaintiff's case is that it was he who was recognised landlord by the tenant and that the entire body of the landlords allowed him to deal with the property as landlord. According to the plaintiff rent was paid upto the year 1945 while according to the defendant it was always paid to some one and was ultimately deposited in court, but no finding as to when rent, if any, was paid after 1941 has been given. If rent was also paid to the plaintiff's step mother, the judgment is silent as to when it was first paid to her and if the same was paid to her then how credit of the same was given by the plaintiff or if the same was paid to the plaintiff, how was it accounted. The judgment of the court below does not touch the question if rent was paid to the step mother then it was done at the instance of the plaintiff or there has been constant tug of war for realising rent between the plaintiff and his step mother was had a very small share in the premises in dispute. The judgment of the court below does not touch the question if rent was paid to the step mother then it was done at the instance of the plaintiff or there has been constant tug of war for realising rent between the plaintiff and his step mother was had a very small share in the premises in dispute. The court below has made reference to the letter which was sent by the defendant to the father of the plaintiff in which the word 'instalments' was mentioned regarding which the finding appears to be that the same was towards rent. If the parties had money dealing, a clear finding on this question was necessary in order to find out that the same could be towards a particular action. Thus it is clear that the finding which has been recorded by the court below on the point that whether the plaintiff was not the sole landlord cannot be said to be in accordance with law inasmuch as relevant facts, evidence and circumstances have not been taken into account and relevant aspect of the case in this behalf have not been looked into. The finding may or may not be the same, yet it should have been arrived at in the manner required. In this view the civil revision deserves to be allowed. 7. The civil revision is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the court below is set aside and the case is remanded to the court below for recording a finding on the point whether the plaintiff was the sole landlord and was accepted as such at any point of time or the body of the landlords allowed him to deal with the property of the parlies as such. So far as other questions of fact are concerned they shall not be reopened as findings on such question are findings of fact based on appraisal of evidence and cannot be assailed in this revision application. In the circumstances of the case parties will bear their own costs. Revision allowed.