ORDER H. N. Seth, J. -An Insurance Company by name Hindustan General Insurance Society Ltd. occupied an accommodation No. 192, Mohalla Ganj Bazar, Lal Kothi, Meerut as a tenant. Subsequently, as a result of Nationalisation the said Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. was merged with the National Insurance Co. Ltd. (Petitioner). On 7-1-1975 the said accommodation was under the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, notified to be vacant. On 14-1-1975, one of the owners of the accommodation moved an application before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer alleging that his tenant Hindustan General Insurance Co. had shifted its office elsewhere and that it had allowed Sri P. K. Jain to occupy the accommodation illegally. He, therefore, prayed that the premises be got vacated and its possession restored to the landlord. On the same date, the Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd., formal unit National Insurance Co. Ltd., Meerut through its Branch Manager, Sri P. K. Jain, moved an application before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Meerut stating that originally Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. was a tenant of the accommodation. Under a notification issued by the Central Government the said company stood amalgamated with the National Insurance Co. Ltd., Meerut. Accordingly, the tenant throughout remained the same person with mere change in nomenclature. The accommodation never fell vacant nor was it about to fall vacant and it throughout remained in occupation of the Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. It, therefore, prayed that the said accommodation may not be declared to be vacant and that it should also not be allotted to any one. 2. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer found that after its amalgamation with the National Insurance Co., the Office of Hindustan General Insurance Co. had been shifted to the office of National Insurance Co. situated in Khair Nagar Bazar, Meerut. Thereafter, Sri P. K. Jain had occupied the same for his residence. There was no material on the file to show that Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. had been using the accommodation for residential purposes. He did not accept the contention that as consequence of amalgamation of the two companies the tenancy rights of Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. devolved on the National Insurance Co. There was no material on the file to show that Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. had been using the accommodation for residential purposes. He did not accept the contention that as consequence of amalgamation of the two companies the tenancy rights of Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. devolved on the National Insurance Co. Ltd. He held that after the office of the Hindustan General Insurance Company was shifted from the disputed accommodation Sri P. K. Jain illegally occupied it for his residence. In the result, he by an order dated 19-3-1976 rejected the objection dated 14-1-1975 filed by Sri P. K. Jain on behalf of the Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. which by that time had become a unit of National Insurance Co. Ltd. and allotted the accommodation to Manjit Singh Chauhan (respondent No. 2). Being aggrieved the National Insurance Co. Ltd., went up in appeal before the District Judge, Meerut. However, because of change in law, the District Judge treated the said appeal as a revision under the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and disposed it of accordingly. 3. Before the District Judge, it was contended on behalf of the revisionist that as the disputed accommodation had been let out to a company which eventually merged in a public sector corporation, it was thus public building within the meaning of the expression as used in S. 2 (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of the 1972 and fell outside the purview of the Act. It was accordingly not open to the Rent Control & Eviction Officer to allot the same in favour of Sri Manjit Singh Chauhan. The District Judge, however, opined that the principal question for decision was as to whether the tenant company had vacated the accommodation and had thereby surrendered its tenancy rights therein. The question raised by the revisionist would not be relevant as in case it is held that the accommodation was vacated by the Hindustan General Insurance Co. It would be deemed that it had, in any case, again come within the purview of the Act with effect from the date it was vacated. He also held that the tenancy in the premises in question did not, in view of the provisions contained in (The) General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (No 57 of 1972), devolve upon the National Insurance Company. He also held that the tenancy in the premises in question did not, in view of the provisions contained in (The) General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (No 57 of 1972), devolve upon the National Insurance Company. There was nothing on the record to show if the National Insurance Co. had taken possession of the accommodation or had undertaken the responsibility to pay the rent to the landlord with effect from 1-1-1975. Sri P. K. Jain, who was the Branch Manager of the merged company occupied the accommodation in Jan., 1975 for his residential purposes, but there was nothing on the record to show that it was done under a licence or with the permission of the employer company. The documents filed by the petitioner company indicating that the transferred company had deducted rent from the salary of Sri P. K. Jain merely showed that the said deduction had been made subsequently in the year, 1976. He, therefore, concluded that Sri P. K. Jain had entered into the possession of the house on his own and subsequently got it regularised by his employer, namely, the transferee company. The fact that the original tenant the Hindustan General Insurance Co. became extinct implied that it had surrendered its tenancy right. Since the transferee company neither made itself liable for payment of rent nor did it take possession of the disputed accommodation, and as the landlord did not accept the transferee company as his tenant, the tenancy of the Hindustan General Insurance Company came to an end with effect from 1-1-1975 when it actually vacated the accommodation. In the circumstances, the vacancy had been rightly notified and the allotment order made in favour of Manjit Singh Chauhan was quite valid. In the result, the Additional District Judge vide his order dated 12-3-1979 dismissed the revision. 4. Being aggrieved the petitioner has approached this Court for relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 5. Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner company submitted that the tenancy which stood in the name of the Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. devolved by operation of law on National Insurance Co. Ltd. Whether or not landlord accepted the National Insurance Co. as a tenant, the National Insurance Co. 5. Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner company submitted that the tenancy which stood in the name of the Hindustan General Insurance Co. Ltd. devolved by operation of law on National Insurance Co. Ltd. Whether or not landlord accepted the National Insurance Co. as a tenant, the National Insurance Co. did by operation of law become the tenant and there was no such vacancy which could entitle the Rent Control & Eviction Officer to allot it to Sri Chauhan. He also urged that the National Insurance Co. being a company in the Public Sector the building in its tenancy was a public building contemplated by S. 2 (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and as provided there the provisions contained in that Act did not apply thereto. This being so, the Rent Control & Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to allot the same to Sri Chauhan. 6. I am, in this case concerned with the validity of declaration of vacancy made by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on 14-1-1975 as also that of the allotment order made by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer in the year 1975. If the declaration of vacancy and the allotment of the premises made on 19-3-1976 were within the jurisdiction of the Rent Control & Eviction Officer, clearly the order passed by the Additional District Judge dismissing the revision will not be liable to be quashed. 7. S. 2 as originally enacted by U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 did not exempt the 'public buildings from operation of the Act. It merely exempted building belonging to or vested in the Government of India, or to any State or local authority and certain other categories of buildings from operation of the Act. The section did not exempt 'public buildings as such from the operation of the Act. Public buildings were exempted from operation of the Act by Section 2 of the Act as substituted by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976 which came into force with effect from 1-7-1976. Accordingly, on 19-3-1976 when the order of allotment, after declaration of vacancy, was made in favour of Manjit Singh Chauhan, the premises did not stand exempted from operation of U. P. Act No .13 of 1972. Accordingly, on 19-3-1976 when the order of allotment, after declaration of vacancy, was made in favour of Manjit Singh Chauhan, the premises did not stand exempted from operation of U. P. Act No .13 of 1972. Accordingly, the question whether the petitioner company is or is not a public company, is not at all relevant for our purposes. The only question, therefore, that survives for consideration is whether in the circumstances of the case it can be said that the accommodation in question fell vacant and became available for allotment on 19-3-1976. 8. I will for the purposes of further discussion assume that the tenancy which originally stood in the name of Hindustan General Insurance Co. devolved by operation of law on the petitioner, National Insurance Co. Ltd. It is not disputed that the Hindustan General Insurance Co. had taken the premises on rent and was using it for office purposes. After its merger with the petitioner company, its office was shifted to the office of the petitioner company. Thereafter, the building is being used and is in the occupation of Sri P. K. Jain an employee of the petitioner company. 9. So far as the nature of occupation by Sri P. K. Jain is concerned, annexure 3-A of the counter-affidavit which is the statement of the account of Sri P. K. Jains salary from petitioners own account book, shows that the total emoluments payable to Sri P. K. Jain amount to Rs. 2426.00 which included house allowance of Rs. 146.00. From out of this amount deductions amounting to Rupees 836.41 P. falling under various heads had been made. This deduction included a sum of Rs. 140 by way of rent for the house occupied by Sri P. K. Jain. The fact that Sri P. K. Jain was entitled to house allowance for Rs. 146.00 and the petitioner charged him rent amounting to Rs. 146 for occupation of the premises lias not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit. It thus appears that even if by virtue of statutory provision, the tenancy of the accommodation in dispute, devolved on the petitioner company, it undoubtedly permitted Sri P. K. Jain to occupy the same on payment of Rs. 140 p. m. as rent. 10. 146 for occupation of the premises lias not been controverted in the rejoinder affidavit. It thus appears that even if by virtue of statutory provision, the tenancy of the accommodation in dispute, devolved on the petitioner company, it undoubtedly permitted Sri P. K. Jain to occupy the same on payment of Rs. 140 p. m. as rent. 10. According to S. 12 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family. When the company permitted Sri P. K. Jain to occupy the accommodation on payment of rent, the: petitioner company ceased to occupy the accommodation and placed it in possession of Sri P. K. Jain who undoubtedly was not a member of petitioners family as defined in S. 3 (g) of the Act. Action of the petitioner in permitting Sri P. K. Jain to occupy the accommodation on payment of rent amounted to its being sub-let in contravention of S. 25 of the : U p. Act No. 13 of 1972. In either case the accommodation in question would be deemed to have fallen vacant within the meaning of S. 12 of the Act and so long as the Act continued to apply to it, it could be allotted to Sri Chauhan. As stated earlier, the Act in any case continued to apply to the accommodation in question right up to 30-6-1976 and the order of allotment having been made on 19-3-1976 was quite valid and within jurisdiction. The revisional court could interfere with that order only if the same had been made without jurisdiction. Accordingly, no case has been made for interfering with the revisional order either. 11. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.