Research › Browse › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

1980 DIGILAW 359 (KAR)

RADHAKUMARIAMMA D. v. RENT AND ACCOMMODATION CONTROLLER

1980-12-18

K.S.PUTTASWAMY

body1980
K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 8-9-80 of the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore district, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the D. C.) in Appeal No. H. R. C. (Civil) appeal No. 61 of 1980-81 (Annexure-E) affirming - the order dated 30-6-80 of the Rent land Accommodation Controller, Civil area, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) in Case No. H. R. C. 268|acc|80 (Annexure-D ). ( 2 ) AS owner of a residential building bearing No. 25, Annaiah Reddy Road, ulsoor, Bangalore-8, consisting of a ground floor and a first floor, the petitioner, occupying the first floor, had leased the ground floor of the same to one Sri George Philip, who is stated to have voluntarily vacated it on 2-6-80. On 5-6-80 the petitioner reported the vacancy of the ground floor of the building to the controller as required by S. 4 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act of 1961, (Kar. Act No. 22 (1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) in the prescribed form and sought his permission to occupy the same without letting it out to others, for the detailed reasons explained in her affidavit. ( 3 ) ON receipt of the aforesaid intimation of vacancy, the Controller on 6-6-80 notified the vacancy as required by the Act and the rule's framed thereunder, in response to which, respondent No. 3 and four others applied for allotment of the building. Before the Controller, the petitioner reiterated her case and urged for releasing the building for her own use and occupation. On the other hand, respondent No. 3 and other applicants urged for allotment of the building on various grounds. After hearing the parties, the Controller inspected the building on 27-6-80 and by his order dated 30-6-80 (Annexure-D) rejected the prayer of the petitioner for release of the building and allotted the same to respondent No. 3 accepting his case for allotment over the other applicants. Against the said order of the controller, the petitioner filed an appeal before the D. C. who by his order dated 8-9-80 (Annexure-E) has dismissed the same. Against the said order of the controller, the petitioner filed an appeal before the D. C. who by his order dated 8-9-80 (Annexure-E) has dismissed the same. ( 4 ) AS before the authorities, the petitioner has asserted that the first floor of the building was totally insufficient for her needs and the other members of her family and that she genuinely requires the ground floor for her own use and occupation. She claims that accepting her case the authorities were bound to release the building under the Act and by their failure to do so, they have committed an error of jurisdiction and illegality apparent on the face of the record. ( 5 ) AT the direction of the court, respondents 1 and 2 have entered appearance through the learned High court Government Pleader and have produced the records, ( 6 ) IN his return, respondent No. 3 has denied the assertion of the petitioner that she requires the building for her own use and occupation and has justified the impugned orders. He has set out in detail his imperative necessity to the building allotted by the controller. ( 7 ) SRI. S. G. . Sundaraswamy, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that when an owner 'of a building seeks for its release for his own use and occupation, the Controller is bound to release the - same without applying the requirements of s. 21 (1) (h) of the Act. In support of his contention Sri Sundaraswamy strongly relied on the ruling of Narayana Pai, J. (as he then was) in gopal Rao Shiddoji v, Kashappa chandrashekhar, (1) and a decision rendered by me in Nagammal V. K. v. Special Deputy Commissioner (2 ). ( 8 ) SRI M. H. Motigi, learned High court Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri G. R. L. Reddy, learned counsel for respondent no. 3 urged that an owner of a building does not have an absolute right to claim for the release of a building for his own use and occupation and can claim for its release only if he satisfies his genuine need for the same and not otherwise. ( 9 ) ON the claim of. the petitioner, the Controller held that the cause shown by her was not convincing and that her needs are not pressing to justify the release of the building in her favour. ( 9 ) ON the claim of. the petitioner, the Controller held that the cause shown by her was not convincing and that her needs are not pressing to justify the release of the building in her favour. In appeal, the D. C. without critically examining the contentions urged before him, agreeing with the conclusions of the controller, held that the existing accommodation available to the petitioner was itself suffiicient for her needs and that she does not require the additional accommodation. ( 10 ) AMONG various other principles, the intention of the Legislature in enacting the Act, the evil sought to be remedied, that the Legislature does not waste its words, that the act must be read as a whole, the meaning of the words in a provision must be ascertained in the context in, which they occur and that in the guise of interpretation it is not open to the courts to legislate, should always be kept in mind. ( 11 ) IN Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (3) the Supreme court interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging house Rates Control Act of 1947 explained the general objects of the rent Control Legislation in the country in these words: "the strain of last World War, industrial revolution, the large scale exodus of the working people to an urban area and the social and political changes brought in their wake social problems of considerable magnitude and complexity and their connected evils. The country was faced with spiralling inflation soaring cost of living, increasing urban population and scarcity of accommodation. Racketting and large scale eviction of tenants under the guise of the ordinary law, exaggerated those conditions making the economic life of the community unstable and insecure. To tackle these problems and curb these evils, the Legislatures of the states in india enacted Rent Control Legislation. " ( 12 ) BEARING the above principles in mind, I propose to ascertain the scope and ambit of the provisions of the Act. ( 13 ) THE uniform consolidating and amending Act, repealing the earlier acts that were in force in the integrating areas of the new State of karnataka, has been enacted for the control of rents and evictions, for the leasing of buildings, to control rates of hotels and lodging houses and for certain other matters connected thereto. The Act is divided into seven parts. The Act is divided into seven parts. But, for our purpose the true scope and ambit of the provisions found in parts I and II of the Act is sufficient. ( 14 ) SEC. 1 of Part-I 'preliminary' deals with the title, extent, commencement and duration of the Act. S. 2 that deals with the application of the Act, shows that all parts of the Act are not uniformly made applicable to all parts of the State. Parts 1 and 7 of the Act are made applicable to the whole State. Parts 2 and 3 are made applicable to the areas specified in schedule-I of the Act and one of the areas in that schedule is the city of bangalore and an area within a radius of 2 miles from the Municipal limits of the city. The proviso to sub sec. (2) of S. 2 exempts buildings constructed after 1-8-57 for a period of five years from the date of construction of that building. The rest of the provisions of S. 2 dealing with the power of Government to apply ail or any of the provisions of the Ad:, withdraw, rescind those notifications, exemptions granted to buildings owned by Central and State Government, local authorities, religious and charitable institutions are not material for the case. ( 15 ) S. 3 of the Act defines certain terms that occur in the Act. S. 3 (a) defines the word 'building' as any building or hut or part of a building or hut other than a farm house, let or to be let, separately for residential or non-residential purposes. A part of a building let or to be let is also a building. S. 3 (n) defines the term 'premises' as meaning a building defined in clause (a) of S. 3 and any land not used for agricultural purposes. S. 3 (p) defines the word 'public authority' as the State Government, central Government or a local authority or a Corporation established by a central Act or a, Karnataka Act or a government company. The rest of the terms that have been defined in S. 3 are not material and are therefore not examined. ( 16 ) THE provisions of Part-II 'lease of Buildings' of the Act on the scope and ambit of which, the case turns require a close and detailed examination. The rest of the terms that have been defined in S. 3 are not material and are therefore not examined. ( 16 ) THE provisions of Part-II 'lease of Buildings' of the Act on the scope and ambit of which, the case turns require a close and detailed examination. ( 17 ) S. 4 (1) of the Act requires or directs a landlord to notify the vacancy of a building that occurs either by his ceasing to occupy the same or otherwise expressly including a previous tenant vacating the same also. Proviso of sub-section (2) of S. 4 exempts a landlord from intimating the vacancy only when he has secured possession on obtaining a decree for eviction against his tenant for his bonafide use and occupation under s. 21 (1) (h) of the Act. A land lord is under a compulsive obligation to report the vacancy to the controller in the prescribed form within 15 days the vacancy occurs by registered post, the fact that the landlord is required to give intimation of vacancy by registered post obviously made to avoid controversies as to whether an intimation of vacancy has infact been given or not, cannot be construed as excluding intimation to the Controller in person. Why and how the vacancy occurs is not important. But, what is important is when a vacancy occurs, the landlord is under a legal obligation to report the vacancy to the controller within a stipulated time. ( 18 ) THE procedure to be followed by the controller on receipt of intimation of vacancy, is exhaustively set out in Rule 3 of the Karnataka, Rent control Rules of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). Very rightly the said rule requires the controller to take immediate action on the intimation of vacancy received by him and initiate proceedings thereto in the manner contemplated therein without any loss of time and allowing the matter to drift. Immediately on receipt of intimation in triplicate, the Controller is required to fix a date of hearing, send a copy of intimation to the State Government or the authorised officer, notify the particulars of the same on the notice board of his office and keep a copy of the intimation for inspection,. Immediately on receipt of intimation in triplicate, the Controller is required to fix a date of hearing, send a copy of intimation to the State Government or the authorised officer, notify the particulars of the same on the notice board of his office and keep a copy of the intimation for inspection,. ( 19 ) SUB-SECTION (2) of S. 4 requires a landlord who has given intimation of vacancy under S. 4 (1) of the Act not to occupy the building or let out the same to others for a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of his intimation of vacancy by the Controller, within which period the proceedings under Part-II of the Act are normally expected to be completed. Any violation of sub-sections (1) and (2) by a landlord is an offence punishable under S. 4 (3) of the Act. Sub-section (4) , of S. 4 deals with exemptions to certain buildings referred to therein. ( 20 ) WHEN a report of vacancy is received from the controller, the state Government or its authorised officer can determine whether the building, which necessarily includes a part of a building is required by a public authority and if so required by such authority, issue a direction to the Controller under sub-rule (2) of rule 5 of the rules. If the Government or the authorised officer find that the building is not required by a public authority, but is required by others to whom priorities are prescribed by rule 4 of the rules, they can then issue necessary directions also in that behalf to the controller. A direction issued by the Government or the authorised officer under Rule 5 is binding on the Controller. With this it is now useful to consider the scope and ambit of Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act in the first instance and thereafter Ss. 5, 8, 9, and 10 together. ( 21 ) S. 6 regulates the allotment of building to a public authority. When a vacancy is reported by a landlord and a direction is issued under Rule 5 (2) of the Rules by the state Government or the authorised officer, the Controller is required to examine the same and the case of the landlord with reference to factors enumerated in S. 6 of the Act. When a vacancy is reported by a landlord and a direction is issued under Rule 5 (2) of the Rules by the state Government or the authorised officer, the Controller is required to examine the same and the case of the landlord with reference to factors enumerated in S. 6 of the Act. The controller should examine whether the landlord is already in possession of one or more buildings and whether he should be permitted to occupy the same, if he has sought for its occupation having regard to his calling, standard of living, nature and extent of business and other material facts. In a case, where a landlord has only' one building and he requires the same for his own use and occupation, then the Controller cannot allot the same to a public authority. S. 6 can be pressed into service only when a land lord is in possession of at least one building and is seeking for possession of another Duilding and not otherwise. But, the term 'one building' in the context of the Act, cannot be construed as a separate and independent building and has to Le construed as part of a building also as in the present case itself. When he seeks for possession of another building, the factors enumerated in S. 6 which may compendiously be called as the requirements of the landlord vis-a-yis the requirements of the public authority have to be examined and a decision taken with due regard to the factors enumerated therein. The reason for providing the above in S. 6 is not far to seek. When a landlord is already in possession of one building and a vacancy arises in respect of another building, the requirement of the public ' authority, that being the requirement of the general public, is given precedence but. even in doing that, the criteria or standard on which the need of the landlord should be considered is clearly set out in the section. While this is the position, so far as the requirements of a public Authority, the Legislature not without any significane, has not made a similar provision, when the same is required by a person other than a public authority. S. 6 is an important section that should be borne in mind in interpreting the other provisions of the Act. While this is the position, so far as the requirements of a public Authority, the Legislature not without any significane, has not made a similar provision, when the same is required by a person other than a public authority. S. 6 is an important section that should be borne in mind in interpreting the other provisions of the Act. When a building is required by a public authority and the controller with due regard to the factors enumerated in S. 6 of the Act, upholds the same, the question of allotting the same to others will not arise. In such an event, all that is required to be done by the Controller is to issue an order under S. . 6 of the act and enforce the same in which event the proceedings inititated under s. 4 of the Act would stand terminated. ( 22 ) S. 7 of the Act empowers the controller to direct the landlord to effect improvements and alterations to a building allotted to a public authority, and its true scope and ambit has no bearing on the question and, therefore, the same is not examined ( 23 ) IN the absence of a direction under R. 5 (2) of the rules, the manner and method of terminating the proceedings initiated under S. 4 of the act, is dealt in Ss. 5, 8, 9 and 10 of the act and it is, therefore, convenient to deal with those provisions Itogether. ( 24 ) S. 5 of the Act empowers the controller to permit the land lord to occupy the building for his own use and occupation or allow the same to a public authority or another person. When a landlord seeks the building for his own use and occupation, no criteria or guidelines is laid down in the section or in the other related provisions, to judge his need as in S. 6 of the Act. In the absence of a criteria stipulated in S. 5 or other provisions, is it open to the controller, the D. C. or the courts, to lay down a criteria and evaluate the needs of a landlord. In my opinion, the answer must be clearly in the negative for more than one reason. ( 25 ) AFTER all the need of one person cannot be compared to the need of another person. In my opinion, the answer must be clearly in the negative for more than one reason. ( 25 ) AFTER all the need of one person cannot be compared to the need of another person. What may be sufficient to one having regard to his own educational, social, financial, mental and a variety of other factors, some of which may even be imponderable, cannot be compared to the need of another person who is less fortunate in all or in any of those matters. In the absence of a criteria or guidelines in the Act itself, it is not possible for any authority to stipulate its own criteria, which in the very nature of things is bound to vary from officer to officer and judge to judge. A provision in an Act, which interferes with the right of a landlord to enjoy his own property so long as the same does not interfere with the rights of others or any other law, cannot be construed as conferring an unguided, subjective evaluation and determination on an authority. On the other hand, the criteria that should guide in determining the need of a landlord, who is seeking to occupy his own building and not the' building of any other person should normally be the heed of that very landlord alone and the need of others or the standard of others cannot be the criteria. The possibility of abuse in a given case, which is never considered a ground for striking down an Act of Legislature, cannot also be a ground for placing an undue restriction on the scope and ambit of a provision or in interpreting a provision in a manner that the Legislature never intended. Assuming that in a given case, a landlord sets up a, false plea, obtains the building for his alleged need and later lets out the same to others at rack rent, the Act confers ample powers on the controller to evict such a person, notify the vacancy and allot the same to the needy person. ( 26 ) SS. 8 and 9 of the Act only regulate the procedure to be followed by the controller in completing the proceedings initialed before him under s. 4 of the Act and the requirements of an order to be made by him thereto. ( 26 ) SS. 8 and 9 of the Act only regulate the procedure to be followed by the controller in completing the proceedings initialed before him under s. 4 of the Act and the requirements of an order to be made by him thereto. S. 10 of the Act only deals with the powers to effectuate an order made by the controller under Chapter-II of the act. The other provisions of chapter- ii viz. , Ss. 10a, 11, 12 and 13 are only incidental provisions and only effectuate the substantive provisions made in Chapter-II of the Act. ( 27 ) AFTER a tenancy is created whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the grounds on which, a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant are set out in S. 21 of the Act. The grounds on which the eviction can be sought under s. 21 (1) of the Act cannot be taken into consideration in judging the need of a landlord, when he seeks a building that has become vacant, for his own use and occupation. The rigors or restrictions placed on the right of a landlord in evicting a person either for his bonafide use and occupation or other persons cannot guide the controller in evaluating the needs of a landlord when he seeks the building for his own use and occupation, under chapter II of the Act. ( 28 ) FROM the above analysis what emerges is that when a landlord reports the vacancy of a building which includes part of a building and the same is not required by a public authority, the controller is required to examine the need of the landlord for his own use and occupation from the standpoint of the requirement of that landlord and not from the requirements of the person that is seeking for its allotment or the acute scarcity in housing in, an overgrown and ever growing metropolitan city. ( 29 ) ON an independent examination of the provisions of the Act, I have reached the above conclusion. While the above is the position, it is useful to ascertain how the matters have been regulated in other States. ( 29 ) ON an independent examination of the provisions of the Act, I have reached the above conclusion. While the above is the position, it is useful to ascertain how the matters have been regulated in other States. In most of the Rent Control Laws of the country like Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and host of other places where the problem of housing is probably more acute than in the city of Bangalore or in other parts of our State, we do not find provisions similar to Chapter-II of the act. We find similar or analogous provisions in the Rent Control Laws of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Tripura and pondichery only. In all other Rent control' Laws' of other States, the legislatures have only sought to control the rents, evictions and other amenities enjoyed by tenants and, they do not control the right of the landlord either to occupy his own building or lease the same to others. I have alluded to this only as a matter of comparative study. ( 30 ) AN examination of the orders made by the D. C. and the Controller, reveal that they have hot examined the need of the landlord from the correct legal principles as required by the Act and have examined her case with reference to the scarcity of the buildings and the need of respondent no. 3, which are totally irrelevant and in so doing they have committed manifest illegalities apparent on the face of the record. ( 31 ) BEFORE the Controller, the petitioner had asserted that she has a family of 9 members and the condition of her mother and the need of others are such that she requires the ground floor for her own use and occupation. n support of her claim, she had filed an affidavit and also produced a medical certificate as to the condition of her mother. In his report dated' 23-6-80, the Revenue Inspector attached to the office of the controller had stated that 'the facts stated by the petitioner in her affidavit are substantially correct. The affidavit filed by the petitioner had not been controverted by respondent No. 3 or any other applicant. But, still the controller inspected the building and reached the conclusion that the petitioner does not require the building on four grounds viz. The affidavit filed by the petitioner had not been controverted by respondent No. 3 or any other applicant. But, still the controller inspected the building and reached the conclusion that the petitioner does not require the building on four grounds viz. , (i) that all the members were not present when he inspected the building; (ii) that the brother, sister-in-law and nephews cannot be considered as members of the family; (iii) that the mother of the petitioner was quite healthy and, therefore, she can continue to live in the first floor; and (iv) that no ration card was produced at his inspection or at the hearing of the case. In appeal, the D. C. does not critically examine any of the contentions urged for the petitioner before him or the records and agrees with the above conclusion of the Controller. ( 32 ) LET me now examine whether all or any of the above reasons are sound for rejecting the claim of the petitioner. ( 33 ) THE first reason given by the controller that all the members for whose need the petitioner had sought the release of the building were not present at the time of his inspection cannot be a ground for refusing the request of the petitioner. The law does not require that every member should parade before the controller when he inspects the building. ( 34 ) THE case of the petitioner is that she is governed by Murmukatayam law, according to which, the brothers, sister-in-law and nephews would also be the members of her family. But, the controller holds that brother, sister- in-law and nephews are not members of the petitioner's family, within the meaning of that term occurring in S. 3 of the Act. As the opening part of S. 3 itself declares the meanings attached to the terms in that section, have to be applied only when the context does not require otherwise. The Act or any other law does not require that the brother, sister-in-law and nephews should not live with the petitioner. Who should live with " the petitioner and why they should live with- her, are not matters on which the authorities have any control. The Act or any other law does not require that the brother, sister-in-law and nephews should not live with the petitioner. Who should live with " the petitioner and why they should live with- her, are not matters on which the authorities have any control. So long as the petitioner says that she proposes to live with other relations, it is not for the authorities to say that they should not live with her and the building cannot be released for their need. ( 35 ) THE petitioner has asserted that her mother is aged about 78 years and that the aged mother finds it extremely difficult to live on the first floor. Whether the aged mother should be provided accommodation in the ground floor or in the first floor, is primarily or solely for the petitioner to decide. Even assuming that the mother is healthy, a,s found by the controller, it is not for him to say that she should continue to live on the first floor and that the ground floor cannot be released for the occupation of the old mother and should be allotted to another person. ( 36 ) THE last reason given by the controller that the petitioner had not produced the ration card either at his inspection or at the hearing of the case is equally untenable. At the highest a ration card may indicate the number of persons for whom rations are drawn and possibly living at a given point of time. But, it is not uncommon to find in the city of bangalore, where there is only informal and not statutory rationing, that there are persons who do not even possess ration cards. The failure of the petitioner to produce a ration card, if any, does not destroy her case. ( 37 ) FROM the above, it follows that all the reasons given by the controller concurred by the D. C. with an addition that the need of the petitioner was not bona fide and reasonable, are manifestly illegal. ( 38 ) ALL the circumstances and the material placed by the petitioner, in the light of the provisions examined by me earlier, justified her claim for release of the premises for her own use and occupation. While that is the position, the authorities have illegally refused to release the premises guided by illegal and irrelevant considerations. ( 38 ) ALL the circumstances and the material placed by the petitioner, in the light of the provisions examined by me earlier, justified her claim for release of the premises for her own use and occupation. While that is the position, the authorities have illegally refused to release the premises guided by illegal and irrelevant considerations. In this view, it is necessary to quash the orders of the authorities and order the release of the premises to the petitioner. ( 39 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I quash the impugned orders by issue of a writ of certiorari and issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Ren,t and Accommodation controller, Civil Area, Bangalore- respondent No. 1 to release the ground floor of the building No. 25 annaiah Reddy Road, Bangalore in favour of the petitioner. ( 40 ) RULE issued is made absolute. ( 41 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .