Judgment :- 1. The 4th respondent in each of these cases is the same. He is an operator of a stage carriage on the route Areekode to Karulai under a pucca permit. He sought to change the halting place of his stage carriage from Areekode to Karulai. He filed an application in that behalf before the Regional Transport Authority, Malappuram, who is the second respondent in each of these writ petitions. This was objected to by the first petitioner in 0 P. No. 1469 of 1979 and some others. By Ext. P4 proceedings the second respondent rejected the application as aforesaid for the reason that the change of halting place will curtail the existing facilities of the students of Mampad College. Ext. P4 proceedings were on 27-9-1978. Thereafter the 4th respondent submitted Ext. P5 application dated 26-10-1978 stating that the change of halting place would not in any manner affect the time of arrival of the bus in the Mampad College area either in the morning or in the evening In Ext. P5 the 4th respondent further stated that the time the bus arrives in that area both in the morning and in the evening would be the same as obtained at present. By Ext. P6 proceedings dated 19-12-1978 the second respondent sanctioned the request to change the halting place. This was after overruling the objection preferred by the petitioner in O. P. No. 1453 of 1979 and some others but, according to the petitioner in O. P. No. 1469 of 1979, without hearing the first petitioner therein. Whatever that may be, the petitioner in O. P. No. 1453 of 1979 and the first petitioner in the other 0 P. preferred revision petitions against Ext. P6 order referred to above. The revisions preferred by these persons were dismissed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the third respondent in these writ petitions as per Ext P8 order in both these writ petitions. It is contended before me that Ext P6 order of the second respondent and Ext P8 order of the third respondent are without jurisdiction in so far as the second respondent has no power to review its earlier order marked in both the writ petitions as Ext. P4 and also for the reason that the power exercised is one which falls under S.57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. P4 and also for the reason that the power exercised is one which falls under S.57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. In answer to the first contention it is submitted on behalf of the 4th respondent that the power exercised by the second respondent is not one of reviewing its earlier order It is submitted that though Ext. P5 request refers to the earlier application and prays that the decision on the earlier application maybe reconsidered, the power exercised in allowing Ext. P5 request is one which, according to the learned counsel for the 4th respondent, falls under R.242 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules. It is also submitted that the same may, as argued on behalf of the petitioners in these cases, fall under R.238 of the said Rules. According to the learned counsel for the 4th respondent, in so far as there is power conferred on the second respondent under R.238 or the Rules to specify in the permit the exact place and point from which the daily service shall start and the exact place and point at which the daily service shall terminate, the second respondent authority could exercise that power from time to time notwithstanding any decision taken in that behalf on any earlier occasion. Shortly put the submission is that no finality is to be attached to an order passed as regards the decision that the halting place shall be at one or the other of the two termini and that the second respondent has, notwithstanding its earlier decision power to change the halting place, on being satisfied that circumstances exist and warrant the same. 3. It is also submitted in this connection that the power exercised by the second respondent authority, the Regional Transport Authority, under R.242 of the Rules to change of halting place would necessarily involve exercise of the power to change the schedule of timings, a power that could be exercised from time to time and the only restriction whereon is that other interested permit-holders should be afforded an opportunity to be heard as regards the proposed change of timings, as pointed out by this court in C T. Service v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority. Palghat. 1973 KLT. 266 and R. K. V. Motors & Timbers Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum, 1968 KLT. 73. 4. Palghat. 1973 KLT. 266 and R. K. V. Motors & Timbers Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Trivandrum, 1968 KLT. 73. 4. It appears to me that there is no merit in the contention that the second respondent, the Regional Transport Authority has no power to pass Ext. P6 order for the reason that some time earlier it passed Ext. P4 order. If power exists in the second respondent to change the halting place then I do not think that the exercise of that power once would preclude it from exercising that power again for the reason that earlier it was exercised one way. I am not prepared to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners in these cases that the request made by Ext P5 letter was one seeking the second respondent to exercise its power of review. In that view it is not necessary to consider the further question argued on behalf of the petitioners in these cases relying on the decision of the Punjab High Court in The Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Ltd., v. State Government and others, AIR. 1963 Punjab 92. 5. The only question therefore that arises for consideration is whether the second respondent has power to allow a request for the change of halting place. On this part of the case the submission made on behalf of the petitioners is that the route Areekode Karulai is different from the route in the opposite direction namely Karulai-Areekode and that therefore S.57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 is attracted. Under S 57 (8) referred to above an application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route covered by it or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. The provision aforesaid was relied on to contend for the position that the halting place could be changed only in accordance with the provisions governing the grant of a new permit. 6. The provision aforesaid was relied on to contend for the position that the halting place could be changed only in accordance with the provisions governing the grant of a new permit. 6. The question, therefore, is whether it can be said that as per Ext P5 request the 4th respondent sought any variation of condition of permit by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, by increasing the number of trips above that specified as maximum or by alteration of the route covered by it. The answer thereto depends upon mainly on the definition of the word 'route' in S.2 (28A) of the Motor Vehicles Act. This is so because the only argument advanced before me is that the route Areekode-Karulai is a route different from the route Karulai-Areekode. 7. S.2(28A) defines the word 'route' as meaning "a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another". The definition only says that such portion of a highway between two termini thereon which may be traversed by a motor vehicle is 'route', irrespective of whether that distance is traversed in one direction or in the opposite direction. Mark, the explanation to S.46 explains the expression "trip" for the purpose of S.48 and 57 as meaning "a single journey from one point to another" and goes on to explain that "every return journey shall be deemed to be a separate trip". This would indicate that the journey from point A to B is a trip and the return journey from point B to A would be a seperate trip on the same route. To construe otherwise would result in the confusion suggested by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the plying back of the bus from point B would be on a route for which no permit has been granted, the route being mentioned in the permit as from A to B. In that view it cannot be said that S.57(8) of the Act is attracted so far as Ext. P5 request is concerned. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention adverted to in trie preceding paragraph relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in H. V. Srinivasa Murthy v. The Regional Transport Authority and others, AIR. 1975 Karnataka 126. P5 request is concerned. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention adverted to in trie preceding paragraph relied on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in H. V. Srinivasa Murthy v. The Regional Transport Authority and others, AIR. 1975 Karnataka 126. No doubt that decision supports the learned counsel. The Karnataka High Court in that decision takes the view that the line of travel between point M to S and that between S to M are different and further says that "these two lines of travel are quite different though the distance covered thereunder may be the same". Taking that view the Karnataka High Court said: "To state that the route travelled by a passanger from Masur to Shimoga is nothing but the same route travelled by another passenger from Shimoga to Masur, would be contradictory in terms". With respect it appears to me that the route is the same as defined in S.2(28A) namely that that portion of the highway specified as lying between two termini which may be traversed by a motor vehicle, be it that that motor vehicle plies in one direction or in the opposite direction. 9. The second respondent, the Regional Transport Authority as also, the Revisional Authority has directed that the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, the first respondent in these writ petitions will fix the timings to suit the convenience of the operators concerned. Therefore, I am sure that the petitioners also will be afforded an opportunity to be heard as regards the fixing of the schedule of timings so far as the 4th respondent's motor vehicle is concerned. In that view 1 do not think that any interference is called for so far as Exts. P6 and P8 orders are concerned. In the result I dismiss these writ petitions but without any order as regards costs. Dismissed.