JUDGMENT V. P. Gupta, J.—Smt. Paro plaintiff filed a suit on 1st October, 1974 against Tulsi defendant for possession of the land, as detailed in the plaint, on the allegations that she is the owner of the disputed land and that as she was ill, therefore, she allowed the defendant to cultivate the suit land as a licensee. It is alleged that the defendant had agreed to render sevices to her and that he had been rendering services to her and cultivating the land, but from the month of Jeth, Sambat 2031, the defendant stopped rendering any services and also turned the plaintiff out of her house, with the result that the defendant had refused to render services to the plaintiff and as such has no right to remain in possession of the suit land as a licensee. 2. The defendant contested the suit and pleaded that he is a tenant of the disputed land under the plaintiff and that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. It is further alleged by the defendant that so long as the plaintiffs husband was alive, the suit land was being cultivated by plaintiffs husband but after the death of plaintiffs husband, the suit land was being cultivated by the defendants father, and thereafter, for the last about 20 years, the defendant is in cultivating possession of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff. He further averred that he is not a licensee of the disputed land. The defendant further alleged that in fact the suit land had been gifted to him by the plaintiff in lieu of the services, but the revenue authorities vide order, dated 12th February, 1953, instead of making entries on the basis of the gift, entered the defendant as a tenant of the suit land, in lieu of services and maintenance. It was also alleged by tbe defendant that he never refused to render sevices to the plaintiff. On these allegations the defendant claimed that the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed. 3. After taking replication from the plaintiff, the trial court framed the following issues on 6th April, 1975: "1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exist between the parties and this court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? O. P. P. 2. Whether tbe plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land, as alleged? 3. After taking replication from the plaintiff, the trial court framed the following issues on 6th April, 1975: "1. Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exist between the parties and this court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit? O. P. P. 2. Whether tbe plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land, as alleged? O. P. P. 3. Relief." The Sub-Judge, vide his judgment and decree, dated 13th October, 1977, decreed the suit of the plaintiff for possession. 4. The defendant feeling aggrieved from this judgment and decree filed an appeal and the Additional District Judge accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Sub-Judge vide order, dated 15th March, 1978 with the directions that the Sub-Judge will frame an additional issue and then after recording the evidence of the parties dispose of the suit afresh on merits. After demand an additional issue was framed by the Sub-Judge on 20-4-1978 to the following effect: "Whether the defendant was licensee on the suit land and not a tenant, if so, to what effect ? O. P. P," The Sub-Judge, Dalhousie, vide his judgment and decree, dated 13th December, 1978, decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession of the land after holding that the defendant is not a tenant of the suit land and is only a licensee. 5. Feeling aggrieved from this judgment and decree the defendant preferred an appeal and the Additional District Judge vide his judgment and decree, dated 30th August, 1979, accepted the appeal of the defendant and dismissed the plaintiffs suit after holding that the defendant is a tenant of the suit land and is not a licensee of the same. 6. The plaintiff has now filed this second appeal in this Court assailing the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Kangra, Camp at Chamba, dated 30th August; 1979. 7. Mrs. Pratima Malhotra appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the respondent is not a tenant of the suit land and that his possession is that of a licensee. 7. Mrs. Pratima Malhotra appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the respondent is not a tenant of the suit land and that his possession is that of a licensee. To substantiate her contentions she has relied upon the documentary evidence consisting of copies of jamabandis, Exhibits P. D. (1951-52), P. B, (1956-57), P. E. (1959-60), P. F. (1963-64), P. C. (1966-67) and P. A. (1971-72) and copy of the Intakhab Tanqih, Exhibit P. G. She also referred to the oral evidence adduced by the parties, and on the basis of the evidence, she contended that for deciding the question as to whether the defendant is a tenant or a licensee, the entries of columns of cultivation have to be lead along with the entries of columns of rent. She also placed reliance on Maman Singh v. The Resident Magistrate, Gohana and others, [1965 PLR 161], Telu Ram v. Hari Kumar and another, [1975 ILR (Himachal Series) 464], /. B M. Lall v. M/s. Dunlop Rubber Co. {India) Ltd. and another, [AIR J 968 SC 175], and Mrs. M.N. Clubwala and another v. Fida Hussain Saheb and others, IAIR 1965 SC 610]. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the approach of the appellate court is altogether wrong and that the pleadings of the parties have been misconstrued. 8. Shri Yoginder Paul learned counsel for the respondent contended that presumption of correctness attaches to the entries in the jamabandis and that the respondent is entered as a Gair Morusi-tenant in the record for the last more than 20 years. It was also contended by him that the oral evidence on the record also proves the defendant-respondent to be a tenant of the suit land and that the appellate court has correctly appreciated the evidence and the pleadings of the parties. It was also contended that the appellant has laid a false claim in the plaint which she has not been able to substantiate by documentary or oral evidence. 9. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 10. In order to arrive at a correct finding, the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by them in support of their respective claims have to be scrutinised carefully. 9. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case. 10. In order to arrive at a correct finding, the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by them in support of their respective claims have to be scrutinised carefully. Issue No. I framed on 9th March, 1975 and the additional issue framed on 20th April, 1978, are in fact the important issues in the case and one issue is the rebuttal of the other. The plaintiff-appellants case is that the defendant-respondent is not a tenant of the disputed land but is a licensee, i. e., a person in permissive possession of the land without having an interest in the land. The contention of the defendant is that he is a tenant on the suit land from the time of his father. To find out as to when the defendant came in possession of the disputed land the most important evidence on the record is of revenue entries. The plaintiff has proved on record the copies of Jamabandi from the year 1951-5 to 1971-72 (n all these documents the possession of the defendant is shown as a Gair Morusi and in the column of rent it is shown that this possession of the defendant is on account of his rendering services to the plaintiff and for Parvarish of the plaintiff. Tulsi (DW1) and Chhinju (DW2) have stated that the possession of the defendants father on the suit land was prior to the defendants possession, and this fact is also stated in para 2 of the written statement, as also in the statement of the defendant himself as DW3. If defendants father was in possession of the suit land prior to 20 years as has been narrated m para 2 of the written statement and also deposed to by defendant and his witnesses, then the possession of the defendants father would have been shown in the Jamabandi for the year 1951-52. The entries prior to 1951-52 are not on record and it is nowhere shown that the father of the defendant was ever in possession of the suit land as a tenant. The entries prior to 1951-52 are not on record and it is nowhere shown that the father of the defendant was ever in possession of the suit land as a tenant. Hence this story of the defendant and his witnesses that the defendants father was in possession of the suit land as a tenant prior to about 20 years is falsified by the entries in the revenue records. Even if some latitude is allowed with respect to the calculation of years stated by the defendant or his witnesses then too the defendant has not at all produced on record entries prior to 1951-52 to show that the defendants father was in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff. Therefore, in view of this it has to be held that there is no proof of the fact that defendants father was in possession of the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff. 11. The defendant in his written statement has accepted that the plaintiffs husband was in possession of the suit land originally and after the death of her husband, the defendants father came in possession of the same. As already stated, this proof is altogether lacking The defendants possession on the suit land is thus proved on record for the first time from 1951-52 and that cm be taken to be a starting point of defendants possession. It is pertinent to note that in revenue entries some change in the ownership was sought to be made in the year 1952 53 when a copy of Tanqih’ was prepared by the revenue authorities. This document, copy of which is Exhibit PG, shows that in 1952, Bhoiya father of the defendant made a statement before the Naib Tehsildar (Settlement) that the plaintiff has gifted the disputed land to his son, Tulsi, and that Tulsi will be serving the plaintiff*. It appears that a mutation regarding change of ownership on the basis of the alleged gift was to be attested or change in ownership was to be incorporated in the revenue records on the basis of this statement As a consequence the statement of Smt. Paro plaintiff was also recorded by the Naib Tehsildar (Settlement) in 1953 where she accepted the factum of oral gift to the defendant. After the recording of the statements by Naib Tehsildar (Settlement) these records were placed before the Settlement Officer for further enquiry/order. Before the Settlement Officer Smt. Paro gave a statement that she did not want to transfer the property during her life-time and that the defendant will only be entitled to get the property after her death. She also stated that the defendants father renders services to her. On the basis of this statement the Settlement Officer, Chamba, vide his order, dated 13th February, 19^3, ordered that the change in ownership cannot be effected because, in fact, the plaintiff does not accept the factum of oral gift and the plaintiffs intention was only to will away the property and in such circumstances the Settlement Officer further ordered that the property shall remain in the ownership of Smt. Paro. From the sequence of events it appears that the defendant, as also his father were serving Smt. Paro and in lieu of these services, the understanding between the parties was that Smt. Paro will be transferring the ownership of the suit land in favour of the defendant. Smt. Paro, as admitted by the defendant, is an old lady, requiring services and naturally it appears that the property was being cultivated by the defendant or his father with the consent of Smt. Paro. it is a matter of common knowledge that the revenue authorities record a person who is in possession of the land without any ostensible title thereto in the column of cultivation describing him as a Gair Morusi’, but to find out the real status of the person in possession of land one has to look to the entry of the rent column Here, in the present case, although the defendant is entered as a Gair Morusi, i. e., tenant-at-will, but in the rent column the entry is-"BILA LAGAN, BASHAKAL KHIDMAT PAR-VARISH MALIK". The case as put forth by the defendants father and the plaintiff in Exhibit PG, clearly leads to the conclusion that the defendant or his father were cultivating the land of the plaintiff with her permission and without having any interest in the land and that they were rendering services to the plaintiff with the hopes that the defendant or his father may acquire ownership to the land after the death of the plaintiff, as a legatee. The defendant in his written statement has also admitted that he is a relation of the plaintiff. The defendant has not at all proved any implied or express contract which could show that the defendant or his father were ever inducted as tenants on the suit land. The tenancy has to be inferred from the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the inception of the alleged tenancy, but as evidenced from the document, Exhibit PG, which has already been discussed in detail and from the relations between the parties it is established that the plaintiff had no intention to create any tenancy in favour of the defendant during her life-time. The defendant was, as a matter of fact, cultivating the land for the plaintiff due to relationship or due to the fact that the plaintiff had given a promise to the effect that she will be gifting this land to the defendant or that she will be bequeathing the same to him later on. The entry in Exhibit PD (Jamabandi for the year 1951-52) also lends support to the intention of the parties which is evident from Exhibit PG and it appears that the Jamabandi although is of the Year 1951-5- may have been attested a little later, i. e., after February 1953. In due course this Jamabandi depicts the position as prevailed in the year 1951-52, but sometimes the attestation of the Jamabandi is delayed by the revenue authorities and it is just possible that Exhibit P. D. (Jamabandi for the year 1951-52) may have been attested a little later than February 19%3 and as such the defendant was entered as a Gair Morusi because he was in possession of the land and in the rent column the entry "BAWAJA PARVARISH WA KHIDMAT MALIK" was made. The entries of 1951-52 are repeated subsequently upto the year 1971-72 when it appears that due to the coming into force of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act a dispute arose between the parties and the defendant tried to claim ownership rights and the relations between the parties became strained. The plaintiff as P. W. 3 and her witnesses, Singhu (PW1), and Chatro (PW2) have also stated that defendant was a licensee and not a tenant. The plaintiff as P. W. 3 and her witnesses, Singhu (PW1), and Chatro (PW2) have also stated that defendant was a licensee and not a tenant. The evidence of the parties and the circumstances of the case that (i) the defendant had been cultivating the land fox the plaintiff, (ii) working for the plaintiff, (iii) helping the plaintiff, (iv) the produce of the land being stored in the house of the plaintiff, (v) the members or the defendants family residing in the house of the plaintiff, and (vi) the statements and orders recorded in Exhibit PG also lead to the inference that the defendant was not a tenant of the disputed land and that it was due to the cordial relations between the parties that the defendant, as a member of the family, had been rendering help and service to the plaintiff, who was an old lady, and was also cultivating the land in suit for her. It the defendant had been a tenant of the suit land then he would not have stored the produce of the land in the house of the plaintiff and his family would not have stayed in the house of the plaintiff. The statement of the plaintiff to the effect that she used t j make payment in cash to the defendant may be wrong, but all the circumstances taken together clearly lead to the conclusion that there was no express or implied contract between the parties by which a tenancy had been created in favour of the defendant and further that the cultivation of the suit land by the defendant was only due to the good relations between the parties or due to the fact that the defendant expected that the plaintiff would be gifting or bequeathing her land to him later on. In view of the fact that the defendant is not held to be a tenant of the suit land, I need not enter into further discussion regarding the applicability of section 127 of Act No. 8 of 1974. In view of the fact that the defendant is not held to be a tenant of the suit land, I need not enter into further discussion regarding the applicability of section 127 of Act No. 8 of 1974. The possession of the defendant over the suit land is held to be permissive without any interest in the land, i.e., as a licensee, but not in the capacity of a tenant, and as such the decision of the Additional District Judge on all the issues has to be reversed and the plaintiff is to be held entitled to the possession of the suit land. 12. The result of the above discussion, therefore, is that the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge on 30th August, 1S79, is set aside, the appeal is accepted, and the judgment and decree of the trial court decreeing the suit of the plaintiff is restored. 13. The parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.