ORDER N. D. Ojha, J. -The petitioners are the tenants of an accommodation of which respondents 2 to 7 are the landlords. A suit was instituted by respondents 2 to 7 for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioner. 19th May, 1977, was the date of first hearing according to the finding of the Judge, Small Cause Court. This finding has not been set aside by respondent No. 1. The Judge, Small Cause Court, dismissed the suit in so far as the relief for ejectment was concerned on the ground that the petitioners having deposited the entire amount contemplated by Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the first date of hearing, viz., 19th May, 1977, were entitled to be relieved against their liability for eviction. Aggrieved, by that order respondents 2 to 7 preferred a revision before the District Judge which has been allowed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Bareilly, respondent No. 1 on 12th August, 1978, on the ground that the deposit which was made by the petitioners on the first date of the hearing, viz. 19th May, 1977, did not represent the entire amount which ought to have been deposited in pursuance of Section 20 (4) of the Act. It is this order of respondent No. 1 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners' that the entire amount as contemplated by Section 20 (4) was deposited on 19th May, 1977, which was the first date of hearing and the view taken by respondent No. 1 suffers from a manifest error of law. 3. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at some length I find it difficult to accept the said submission. As is clear from paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, rent with effect from 1st April, 1975, at the rate of Rupees 18.75 p. in respect of the accommodation in question was due. A copy of the application which was made by petitioners in the court of the Judge, Small Causes, on 19th May, 1977, has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. Its perusal indicates that a sum of Rs. A copy of the application which was made by petitioners in the court of the Judge, Small Causes, on 19th May, 1977, has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. Its perusal indicates that a sum of Rs. 243.75 p. representing rent of 13 months in respect of the accommodation in question was claimed to have been deposited by them under Section 30 of the Act. It was thereafter asserted that the amount of rent still due calculated up to 31st May, 1977, came to Rs. 243.75 p. Adding to that the amount of costs of the suit and counsel fee etc. the total sum came to Rs. 400/-. Admittedly it was this sum of Rs. 400/- alone which was deposited on 19th May, 1977. If rent from 1st April, 1975, to 31st May, 1977, at the rate of Rs. 18.75 p. per month is calculated it comes to Rs. 487.50 p. the period being 26 months. When the sum of Rs. 400/- alone was deposited on 19th May, 1977, which admittedly included costs of the suit and counsel fee etc. it would obviously be not right to say that what was deposited on 19th May, 1977, represented the rent due from 1st April, 1975, to 31st May, 1977, together with the costs of the suit, counsel fee etc. Indeed there is no scope for doubt on this point in view of the specific assertions made in this behalf not only in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit but also in the application made by the petitioners themselves on 19th May, 1977, that the rent was due from 1st April, 1975. For claiming the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act the petitioners obviously wanted an adjustment of the rent of 13th months deposited by them under Section 30 of the Act. In this behalf after a perusal of the material placed before him by the parties, respondent No. 1 has recorded a finding that the amount of rent which had been deposited by the petitioners under Section 30 of the Act had been deposited not under sub-section (1) but under sub-section (2) thereof. This finding being based on appraisal of evidence is unassailable and has indeed not been challenged before me. 4. This finding being based on appraisal of evidence is unassailable and has indeed not been challenged before me. 4. What has been urged by counsel for the petitioners is that notwithstanding the fact that the deposit was made under sub-section (2) of Section 30 the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act was still available to the petitioners. Having given my anxious consideration to the submission made by counsel for the petitioners I find it difficult to accept it. The language of Section 20 (4) is in unambiguous terms. It permits deduction only of such rent as has been deposited under Section 30 (1) and not of any such rent which may have been deposited under sub-section (2) thereof. In this connection the words "after deducting therefrom any 1 amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30" lire relevant. If the intention of the legislature was to permit deduction of liny amount deposited under Section 30 respective of the fact whether it has been made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) thereof the words "sub-section (1) of" would not have been used. In accepting the argument of counsel for the petitioners these words are rendered superfluous. It is an accepted principle of interpretation of Statutes that if the language of a section is clear its plain meaning has to be given to it and it is not to be Interpreted in such a way which renders some words specifically and purposely used therein superfluous. View-led in this light it is apparent that the sum of Rs. 400/- which was deposited by the petitioners on 19th May, 1977, did not represent the entire amount on the deposit of which alone the petitioners could claim the benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act. It is again an established principle of law that if a particular act is required by statute to be done in a particular manner it has to be done in that manner or not at all. In this view of the matter the view taken by respondent No. 1 does not suffer either from any manifest error of law or error of jurisdiction so as to justify interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 5. In the result the writ petition fails aid is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.