ORDER This application has been taken out under Article 226 of the Constitution by the Good Year India Ltd. under the following circumstances. 2. The petitioner company prior to 1972 had its head office situate at 225C, Acharyya Jagadish Ch. Bose Road, Calcutta and the district Sales Office at No. 60, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta. In the Year 1972, the Head Office of the petitioner company was shifted to New Delhi and subsequently the registered office was shifted from Calcutta to Ballabgarh. Consequently the petitioner only has a small establishment at Calcutta at No. 60, Chowringhee Road. The respondent No. 2 A.N. Bhattacharyya was an employee of the petitioner Company working in the capacity of a Billing Clerk at the office at 60 Chowinghee Road, Calcutta. He was dismissed by the petitioner company on 21st of November, 1967 on the basis of the finding at a domestic enquiry in which he was found guilty of number of charges. Those charges were that the 2nd respondent along with another employee named B.N. Dutt instigated the warehouse subordinate staff attached to the 60 Chowringhee Road not to unload the truck loaded with large sized tyres and thereby instigated the subordinate staff to disobey the instructions of the warehouse supervisor. In spite of protests from the superiors the respondent No. 2 continued to instigate the sub ordinate staff. Then again on the next day i.e. the 2nd September, 1967 the 2nd respondent instigated the ex causal subordinate staff to cause wooden barricade to be placed across the main gate in order to obstruct the entry of the superior officers. The Good Year employees union intensified poster campaign by pasting poster and writing on the walls, windows and main gates of the office at 60, Chowringhee Road with defamatory, incriminatory and anti management slogans with caricatures and drawings. On protest the respondent No. 2 along with four ether employees T.L. Dutt, S.K. Chatterji, B.N. Dutt and T. Ramchandran supported the same as part of lawful trade union activity. The 2nd respondent also used abusive languages. Hence a charge-sheet was served on the 9th of September, 1967 upon the 2nd respondent by the District Operating Manager in the presence of other persons. Although the 2nd respondent received the charge-sheet but he refused to sign the office copy in acknowledgment of the receipt of the said charge-sheet. He snatched away the office copy from the officer. Hence a charge-sheet was served on the 9th of September, 1967 upon the 2nd respondent by the District Operating Manager in the presence of other persons. Although the 2nd respondent received the charge-sheet but he refused to sign the office copy in acknowledgment of the receipt of the said charge-sheet. He snatched away the office copy from the officer. Thereafter the typed copy of the charge-sheet dated 9th September, 1977 was sent by registered post with acknowledgment due to his address at 16A, Moore Avenue, Calcutta-40. The office of the Good Year India Ltd. employees union was also situated at 16, Moore Avenue. The 2nd respondent was the secretary of the said Union. After the issue of the said charge-sheet the 2nd respondent and his followers went on strike and resorted to such conduct which compelled the petitioner company to declare a lock out. The said charge sheet was sent with a forwarding letter. Thereafter another letter was written on 13th of September, 1967 which was also sent by registered post with acknowledgment due whereby he was asked to answer or give explanation to the charges within 24 hours from the receipt of the letter. A further charge-sheet was also issued on 9th of September, 1967 for forcibly snatching away and tearing up of the office copy of the charge sheet issued to him and also for going on a unjustified, uncalled for and unwarranted strike. The charge sheet was sent to him by registered post at the same address which was also forwarded by a letter asking him to submit his explanation to the charge-sheet within 24 hours from the receipt of the letter. All those registered communications were received back with the postal endorsement 'refused'. Thereafter a letter was sent on 5th October, 1967 by registered post with acknowledgment due placing on record the fact of refusal by him of all earlier registered communications enclosing copies of all the said registered communications and directing him to submit his written explanation to the charge-sheet within 24 hours of the receipt of the letter. He was also sent a letter on 24th October 1979 intimating that an enquiry would be held to enquire into the charges levelled against him. The chargesheet dated 9th September, 1977 was served on the petitioner at the head office and a telegram was also sent to him informing him about the forthcoming enquiry. He was also sent a letter on 24th October 1979 intimating that an enquiry would be held to enquire into the charges levelled against him. The chargesheet dated 9th September, 1977 was served on the petitioner at the head office and a telegram was also sent to him informing him about the forthcoming enquiry. From the registered cover it would appear that every attempt was made by the peons to serve the covers on him on earlier occasions when various endorsements like 'left' 'not found' were made on the registered cover. Ultimately the said cover was served and bears the endorsement 'refused'. The telegram also could not be served as he refused to accept the same. Thereafter an inquiry was held by Avtar Krishna the Assistant Secretary of the Company on 3rd of November, 1967. The 2nd respondent did not appear at the enquiry and it was held ex parte. Evidence was given at the aforesaid communications and of the incidents in which the respondent participated which led to the issuance of the said chargesheet. The Enquiring Officer found the respondent No. 2 guilty of the charges and after considering the finding of the Enquiring Officer the petitioner company came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 should be dismissed from services. Accordingly he was dismissed from service by the letter dated 21st of November, 1967 which was sent to him by registered post with acknowledgement due together with the Enquiring Officer's finding and report. At the time of the dismissal, proceedings were pending before the industrial tribunal in respect of a dispute referred to by another employee Manirul Haque. That reference was disputed by the company as invalid and the petitioner company applied under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash those proceedings. Hence an application was taken out under S. 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the industrial tribunal for the for the approval of the action of the petitioner company in dismissing the 2nd respondent. The said reference made by Manirul Haque was quashed. The industrial tribunal held that the petitioner's application dated 9th June, 1979 under S. (33)(2)(b) was not maintainable. 3. Since then the head office of the Good Year Company has been shifted from Calcutta and the petitioner has a few workers or employees at Calcutta and the Good Year employees union has ceased to exist. The industrial tribunal held that the petitioner's application dated 9th June, 1979 under S. (33)(2)(b) was not maintainable. 3. Since then the head office of the Good Year Company has been shifted from Calcutta and the petitioner has a few workers or employees at Calcutta and the Good Year employees union has ceased to exist. Hence nobody was interested either collectively or individually in the dismissal of the 2nd respondent. There was no apprehension or possibility of any industrial strike or interruption or production or stoppage of supplies or services to the public, arising out of the dismissal of the 2nd respondent. 4. By letter dated 1st February, 1975 the Labour Commissioner has intimated the petitioner company that the 2nd respondent has claimed that his dismissal was illegal. The Government of West Bengal has made a reference bearing No. 3862-R/IR/11L-266/78 dated 5th of August, 1976 to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of the issue "Is the dismissal of Sri A.N. Bhattacharyya with effect from the 21st November, 1967 justified. To what relief, if any, he is entitled to"? 5. Written statement has been filed before the Tribunal and in that written statement it has been contended by the petitioner company that the pretended reference of the Government of West Bengal was ultra vires, invalid and of no effect and the tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue. As according the petitioner company the dispute was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1967 as there was no dispute by and between the petitioner and the company as also the general body of its workmen on the day when the said pretended reference was made. The petitioner also challenged S. 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In any event it is the petitioner's case that the Government of West Bengal could not make a valid reference under S. 2A in as much as the said reference was made almost nine years after the dismissal of the 2nd respondent. At the time when there could not have been any apprehension of any strike lock, out, interruption of production or other breaches of industrial peace or threat of the maintenance of supplies or service to the public. At the time when there could not have been any apprehension of any strike lock, out, interruption of production or other breaches of industrial peace or threat of the maintenance of supplies or service to the public. The said contention was raised as a preliminary objection without going into the evidence but the said preliminary objection was rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated 3rd October, 1977. The petitioner participated in the said proceedings on protest and without prejudice to its rights and contentions challenging the validity of the said reference the matter was heard on various dates on the validity of the enquiry made by the domestic tribunal. The petitioners officers as also the respondent No. 2 give evidence and the proceedings of the domestic enquiry as also this various postal covers were tendered before the Tribunal and marked as exhibits. The 2nd respondent has challenged the finding of the domestic enquiry on the ground that neither the charge-sheet nor the notice of the enquiry was ever served on the 2nd respondent. Hence that point was heard and decided first by the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that the ex parte proceedings against the workman was not justified as there was no service of any charge sheet or the notice of the Enquiring Officer on the 2nd respondent. In making the said order on 3rd October, 1979 and on Ist June, 1978 it is the petitioner's case that the tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to laws. Hence the petitioner has come for this extraordinary remedy. The petitioner is apprehensive that if the petitioner is now called upon to prove the charges it could cause extreme hardship and difficulties as after so many years most of the employees who deposed before the domestic tribunal have retired and the others are scattered all over India in different branches of the petitioner company. Hence it will cause great hardship and also tremendous expenses to bring them before the Tribunal to prove the charges levelled against the respondent No. 2 One of the witness has died. 6. Mr. Ginwalla appearing on behalf of the company has challenged S 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 being unconstitutional invalid, void and of no effect. According to the petitioner it is discriminatory and violative of the rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. Mr. Ginwalla appearing on behalf of the company has challenged S 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 being unconstitutional invalid, void and of no effect. According to the petitioner it is discriminatory and violative of the rights under Article 14 of the Constitution. Secondly it is the petitioner's cafe that even if it is held by this Court that S. 2A is valid but the Government of West Bengal in exercising its power under the said Section has acted arbitrarily and capriciously by making the reference nearly 9 years after the dismissal of the 2nd respondent and at a time when there was none and nor could be any apprehension of industrial unrest or breach of industrial peace arising out of the said dismissal. More so in view of the fact that the head office of the Company has been shifted to New Delhi and there is no possibility of any industrial unrest as the persons who are working as workmen at the Calcutta Office are least interested in the cause. According to the petitioner the tribunal has committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record and also misdirected itself in law in failing to appreciate that a domestic enquiry can only be held to be invalid if the Enquiring Officer acted contrary to the principles of natural justice. Secondly when the finding by the domestic tribunal is based on no evidence or is perverse or such finding of fact do not warrant in law. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the Enquiring Officer did not commit any wrong prima facie in acting on the postal endorsement 'refused' at the same time the tribunal came to the conclusion that the ex parte proceedings were not justified. It was only upon to the tribunal to consider whether the Enquiring Officer had acted contrary to the principles of natural justice and having correctly come to the conclusion that the Enquiring Officer did not commit any wrong prima facie in acting on the postal endorsement 'refused,' the firs respondent committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that the ex parte proceedings were not justified. According to the petitioner the finding of the tribunal that the charge sheet and the notice of enquiry were not served on the 2nd respondent is perverse and contrary to all evidence on record and erroneous in law. Moreover the tribunal has committed an error in believing the uncorroborated, motivated evidence of the 2nd respondent when he deposed that he had no occasion to refuse the postal covers as he was in the company of the workmen demonstrating in front of the petitioner's office throughout the entire period of lock out. No such workmen were called to corroborate such statement of the respondent No. 2. There is no allegation or evidence that the petitioner company has either bribed the postman or won over the postmen to make such endorsements with motive to keep away the respondent No. 2 from such enquiry. Hence the entire finding of the respondent No. 1 is perverse. 7. So far Mr. Ginwalla’s first point that S. 2A is invalid and unconstitutional, that is unacceptable to this Court in view of that the finding by His Lordship the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra to the effect that S. 2A was ultra vires to the Constitution as it violated Article 19(1)(c) and Article 14, on appeal it was reversed and the learned judges of the appellate Court reversed that finding and came to the conclusion that the section is valid. The discretion exercised by the State Government under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is an administrative function of the State Government. In the exercise of such discretion the Court cannot see if the discretion has been properly exercised or if it had been exercised arbitrarily. From the order of the Tribunal it would appear that the company submitted before the Tribunal that in spite of various attempts being made the domestic tribunal had to proceed ex parte as the respondent No. 2 has refused to accept the registered covers including telegrams. The company's case that Mr. Bhattacharyya was handed over the charge-sheet whereupon he took the charge sheet but he refused to sign in acknowledgment. Thereafter he forcibly took away the company's copy of the chargesheet and tore it into pieces. Thereafter the notice and the time of holding the enquiry was served on him by registered post on more than one occasions. Bhattacharyya was handed over the charge-sheet whereupon he took the charge sheet but he refused to sign in acknowledgment. Thereafter he forcibly took away the company's copy of the chargesheet and tore it into pieces. Thereafter the notice and the time of holding the enquiry was served on him by registered post on more than one occasions. After several attempts being made by the postal peon when the postal peon was successful in tendering the document to him he refused to accept them thereupon all the postal covers came back with the endorsement 'refused' and secondly the Tribunal had to consider whether the domestic enquiry was otherwise valid. The Tribunal came to the positive finding that while the domestic tribunal acted upon the postal endorsement 'refused' it prima facie did not commit any wrong. The Tribunal has also come to the conclusion that there is a bunch of refused postal envelopes from exhibits 8 to 18 and exhibit 20. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the postman's endorsement on the covers could be evidence without examining the postman and that will give rise to a presumption of service as all the postal covers were properly prepared and correctly addressed. But this presumption could be rebutted if the Tribunal believed the evidence of denial of refusal by the addressee. The tribunal referred to cases reported in AIR 1953 Cal. page 251, AIR 1961 Cal. page 439 and AIR 1966 Cal. page 504. 8. Mr. Bhattacharya deposed before the Tribunal that the postal covers were never tendered to him and all the endorsements are false and he insinuated that all these endorsements were procured by the company from the obliging postman. Mr. Bhattacharyya deposed that he was with the workmen who were demonstrating in front of the company's office all throughout the day but the company strongly relied on exhibit 21(a) series which were written by A.N. Bhattacharyya as the Secretary from the office of the union which is situated at his residence when all the postal endorsements were tendered to him and he is said to have refused them. Hence it was the case of the company that Mr. A.N. Bhattacharyya was very much in the union office to write such letters. In answer Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted before the tribunal that those letters were typed on the street. Hence it was the case of the company that Mr. A.N. Bhattacharyya was very much in the union office to write such letters. In answer Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted before the tribunal that those letters were typed on the street. The tribunal came to the conclusion that it may be that some casual street typist was picked up to type them". The Tribunal also opined that even if the respondent No. 2 visited his house occasionally which is five miles away from the office of the Company it was unlikely that his visits would coincide with the visits of the postman. The Tribunal was satisfied with the evidence of the workman and held that the presumption of evidence has been properly rebutted and came to the conclusion that the ex parte proceeding, against the workman was not justified as there was no legal service of any chargesheet on the respondent No. 2. 9. The main issue before the Tribunal was whether the dismissal of A.N. Bhattacharyya was justified. There was a finding of the domestic tribunal. The domestic enquiry proceeded ex parte. It is the positive case of the company that in spite of various attempts the workmen deliberately avoided the receipt of the notice and ultimately the company was successful in effecting the service on the workmen as he refused to accept the registered cover. Hence the presumption of service was attracted and the domestic Enquiry Officer was justified in proceeding ex parte as in law if such registered cover is refused the enquiry officer is entitled to proceed ex parte. The preliminary point regarding service and/or validity of the domestic tribunal were raised before the tribunal and both the parties agreed that the point of service to be decided first by the tribunal. It is the definite finding of the Tribunal that the domestic proceedings was not bad on the ground that it was held ex parte because the enquiry officer did not commit any wrong by proceeding ex parte relying on the endorsement 'refused' made by the workmen on the registered covers. Prima facie he was entitled to proceed ex parte. The evidence given by the District Operating Manager to prove the service of the charge-sheet according to the tribunal was not corroborated by G. Balaram, Shri Nayar and Shri Bhandari as none of them have been examined. Prima facie he was entitled to proceed ex parte. The evidence given by the District Operating Manager to prove the service of the charge-sheet according to the tribunal was not corroborated by G. Balaram, Shri Nayar and Shri Bhandari as none of them have been examined. The tribunal also came to the conclusion that all the postal articles were prepaid and correctly addressed however the tribunal came to the conclusion that the presumption as to service would be rebutted if the tribunal believed the evidence of Arabinda Bhattacharyya the workman denying that those covers were tendered to him by the postman. The workmen also asked the tribunal to consider the surrounding circumstances and background of the case as according to him he had bitter relationship with the company. 10. Mr. Ginwalla submitted that this court should look into the entire surrounding circumstances and facts and come to the conclusion whether the workman is to be believed in the background of the facts as would appear from the affidavits. According to Mr. Ginwala the tribunal acted perversely and committed an error of law and the tribunal has gone against the trend of all decisions of the Calcutta High Court. The Enquiring Officer has not violated the principles of natural justice by proceeding ex parte relying on the basis of the endorsement of refusal made by various postmen. The charge of the workman that this endorsement had been obtained by the company is wrong, mala fide and motivated. 11. Mr. Sengupta appeared on behalf of the workmen and submitted that under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act a discretion has been given to the Government whether a reference is to be made under the said Act such discretion whether applied rightly or wrongly cannot be looked into or challenged in a Court of law as the Government has after considering whether there exists an industrial dispute after considering the expediency of the case his made the reference. Even if there is no material before the Government to make the reference the Tribunal cannot decide that. In view of S. 2A even the cause of a single workman even if not supported by others can be referred to the tribunal if the Government is of such opinion. Even if there is no material before the Government to make the reference the Tribunal cannot decide that. In view of S. 2A even the cause of a single workman even if not supported by others can be referred to the tribunal if the Government is of such opinion. In the Case reported in 77 CWN page 809 it was not the issue before the Appeal Court whether the court can scrutinise the discretion used by the Government to make a reference under S 10 Any observation as contained in the said judgment according to Mr. Sengupta was by way of obiter. Whether there is an industrial dispute or not or whether there are such exigencies is a question and/or discretion with the Government or whether the dismissal of a person may cause industrial unrest or not is a question which is within the discretion of the Government under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Reference may be made to AIR 1979 SC page 70 paragraph 6, AIR SC page 1660 at 1662 has been held that under S. 2A threat of industrial dispute is not necessary as any labourer or union may not espouse the dismissed employee's cause if that is required under Section then the whole purpose of S. 2A of the Industrial Dispute Act would be nugatory industrial peace and other exigencies are only required to be considered under S. 2 sub-s (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is not for the Tribunal to see whether there was any material before the Government or factual existence of exigencies with the Government to make the reference under S. 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act. Hence Mr. Ginwalla's submission that in view of the shifting of the head office of the company elsewhere and also in view of the fact that there is only a small branch of the office in Calcutta where hardly any employees are there hence the dismissal of Mr. Arbinda Bhattacharyya would not cause any industrial unrest or threat of industrial peace is of no avail. Section 2A gives a substantive right to an individual worker. Hence the reference made by the Government in respect of the dismissal of Arabinda Bhattacharyya cannot be challenged in this proceeding. There is no charge of mala fides in making the reference. 12. Arbinda Bhattacharyya would not cause any industrial unrest or threat of industrial peace is of no avail. Section 2A gives a substantive right to an individual worker. Hence the reference made by the Government in respect of the dismissal of Arabinda Bhattacharyya cannot be challenged in this proceeding. There is no charge of mala fides in making the reference. 12. So far the service of notice by registered post is concerned Sri Arabinda Bhattacharya on oath had stated before the tribunal that these registered covers were not tendered to him and he had no occasion to meet the peon. On the ground that as the lock out was going on he was with the workmen all throughout the day and night in front of the factory premises and he was demonstrating with the other workers. He has further stated that although the union office is situated at his residence and during that period letters were written by the union but be had no occasion to visit the home. Save and except on rare occasions when he was at home he did not meet the postman. Although there is a presumption that the endorsement made by the postman to the effect that the registered covers have been refused is a good service but that presumption can be rebutted by independent evidence. Such evidence has been given by Arabinda Bhattacharya. It is with the court whether to believe a particular witness or not. If such evidence of not tendering of the registered covers is believed then the presumption of regular service is rebutted where such evidence is not believed the presumption of regularity of service is not rebutted. Finding of such fact by the tribunal cannot be interfered with or challenged in writ jurisdiction until and unless this court comes to the conclusion that such finding of fact in the light of the materials before the tribunal was perverse and amounted to an error apparent on the face of the records. Error of fact however great cannot be interfered with in any writ jurisdiction unless it amounts to an error of law. Improper letting in evidence, improper rejection of evidence or decision passed on evidence are not the grounds for interference by this Court under the writ jurisdiction. 13. As S. 33(2)(b) proceedings were pending no reference under S. 10 could be made till the said proceedings were disposed of. Improper letting in evidence, improper rejection of evidence or decision passed on evidence are not the grounds for interference by this Court under the writ jurisdiction. 13. As S. 33(2)(b) proceedings were pending no reference under S. 10 could be made till the said proceedings were disposed of. The Tribunal's finding that the Enquiring Officer was prima facie right is based on the records as the domestic Enquiring Officer was entitled to proceed ex parte relying on the endorsement made by the postman but when such endorsements are challenged before the Tribunal the tribunal is entitled to proceed and/or examine and/or rely on such evidence of rebuttal. 14. In the case reported in AIR 1979 SC page 170 Messrs, Avon Service Production v. Industrial Tribunal, Harayana it was held that S. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act confers a discretionary power and this discretionary power can be exercised on being satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There must be some material before the Government on the basis of which it forms an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the power conferred on the appropriate Government is an administrative power and the action of the Government in making the reference is the administrative act the adequacy or sufficiency of the materials on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny if the Government in making the reference is impugned by a party it would be open to such a party to show that what was referred was not an industrial dispute and the tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award but if the dispute was an industrial dispute it is the factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the facts and circumstances of a particular case which matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings merely because there was in its opinion no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on these matters. 15. 15. In the Case reported in AIR 1975 SC page 1660 it has been held : "Before the introduction of S. 2A an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated and whose case was not espoused by any labour union or by a substantial number of workmen had no remedy. It was to deal with that contingency that S. 2A was enacted. We would therefore be justified in concluding that in enacting S. 2A the intention of the legislature was that an individual workman who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose service were otherwise terminated should be given relief without it being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees being attracted to that dispute and the dispute becoming a generalised one between labour on the one hand and the employer on the other." “The whole of the machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act is available even in the case of a reference relating to an individual workman”. 16. In the case reported in 39 CWN page 934 a division bench of this High Court held that the presumption of service is a rebuttable presumption. 17. In the case reported in 19 CWN page 489 it was held that if a party on oath says that he did not receive it and if such evidence is accepted by the Court that will rebut the presumption of service. 18. In the case reported in AIR 1968 Bom 387 it was held that there the ex parte decree was passed relying on the endorsement of refusal on the registered post the said decree could be set aside when the defendant on oath stated that the summon, was not tendered by post which was believed by the Court. In that event it was the duty of the plaintiff to call the evidence of the postman who tendered the document and according to that decision if the plaintiff does not summon the postman the statement on oath of the defendant remained uncontroverted and it was held that was sufficient ground for setting aside the ex parte decree. Although under the Evidence Act and also General Clauses Act sending of a letter by registered post raised a presumption of delivery of such letter but that presumption is rebuttable. Although under the Evidence Act and also General Clauses Act sending of a letter by registered post raised a presumption of delivery of such letter but that presumption is rebuttable. This view was upheld and approved by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1976 SC page 869. 19. In the case reported in AIR 1953 SC page 53 (The State of Madras v. C.P. Sorathy & Anr) it was held :- “The Government must have sufficient knowledge of the nature of the dispute to be satisfied that it is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, as for instance that it relates to retrenchment or reinstatement. But, beyond this no obligation can be held to lie on the Government to ascertain particulars of the disputes before making a reference under S 10(1) or to specify them in the order. The reference under S. 10(1)(c) is not, therefore, incompetent merely because it is made in general terms and the disputes are not particularized. 20. Though it is desirable that the Government should, wherever possible indicate the nature of the dispute in the order of reference, it must be remembered that in making a reference under S. 10(1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. The Court cannot, therefore canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material be fore the Government to support conclusion, as of was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. No doubt, it will be open to a party seeking to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But, if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters." 21. The same view was reaffirmed in AIR 1979 SC page 170 (Messrs. Avon Production v. Industrial Tribunal, Harayana) where it was held : "That S. 10(1) confers a discretionary power and this discretionary power can be used on being satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There must be some material before the Government on the basis of which it forms the opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended the power conferred on the appropriate Government is an administrative power and the action of the Government in making the reference is an administrative act. The adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed is beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. If the action of the Government in making the reference is impugned by a party it would be open to such a party to show that was referred was not an industrial dispute and that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award but if the dispute was an industrial dispute its factual existence and the expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for Government to decide upon, and it will not be competent for a Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because there was, in its opinion, no materials before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion on those matters". 22. 22. So far the case reported in 77 CWN page 809 is concerned there was no issue before the learned Judges for determination as to whether the Court can scrutinise the discretion used by the Government in case of reference made under S 10. The validity of S. 2A of Industrial Disputes Act was agitated before the said bench where it has been held that an appropriate Government exercises the power arbitrarily or capriciously in a particular case the Court shall strike down such exercise of power and not the law which confers such powers on the appropriate Government. In view of the fact that the said point was not agitated before the Appeal Court with due respect I feel such observation was by way of obiter as it has been pointed out in AIR 1979 SC page 170 that if there is an industrial dispute the factual existence and the expediency to make a reference are matters entirely for Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceeding for want of jurisdiction merely because there was in its opinion no material before the Government on which it could have come to the affirmative conclusion on those matters. Hence Mr. Ginwalla's submission that there was no materials before the Government to make the reference hence this Court should interfere and strike down such reference cannot be accepted. 23. Mr. Ginwalia's submission that there was no possibility of any breach of peace, industrial unrest or inconvenience to the public as nobody else has come forward to expouse the cause of Mr. Bhattacharyya cannot accepted in view of the enactment of S. 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has been held in AIR 1975 SC page 1660 (Chemicals & Fibers of India Ltd. v. D.D. Bhoir & Drs,) that- "In enacting S 2A the intention of the legislature was that an individual worker who was discharged, dismissed or retrenched or whose services were otherwise terminated should be given relief without it is being necessary for the relationship between the employer and the whole body of employees being attracted to that dispute and the dispute became a generalised one between labour on the one hand and employer on the other." 24. Hence whether any other employees are interested in the dismissal of Mr. Hence whether any other employees are interested in the dismissal of Mr. Bhattacharyya or whether there is any possibility of industrial breach of peace is not relevant in view of the specific provision as contained in S 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2A gives a substantive right to an individual worker. 25. So far the question or service by registered post and the presumption of due service is concerned the case reported in AIR 1976 SC page 869 (Puwada Vekalaswara Rao v. Chidomana Venkata Ramana) considered the case reported in AIR 1968 Bom page 387. The presumption of service under registered post which is properly addressed and sent in the usual course is rebuttable, by evidence on oath of the defendant that the registered covers were not tendered to him. Although it has been held in that case that on a closer examination of evidence on record the Court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly and it is not always necessary in such case to produce the postman who tried to effect service as denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admission or conduct but as observed earlier a wrong finding of fact by the Tribunal cannot be interfered with in a writ jurisdiction hence I am unable to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that there has not been proper service on the workman Sri A.N. Bhattacharyya. 26. Applying the same principles to the facts of this case it would appear that the tribunal has believed the evidence of the workman although it is true that several registered covers were tendered to the workman and it is highly unlikely that each and every time the postmen have made wrong endorsement and also there is no charge of collusion and conspiracy between the company and the postmen. Be that as it may in view the finding of fact by the Tribunal even assuming it is a wrong finding the same cannot be corrected under the writ jurisdiction of this Court unless this Court comes to the conclusion that an error was apparent on the face of the record which amounted to an error of law. Be that as it may in view the finding of fact by the Tribunal even assuming it is a wrong finding the same cannot be corrected under the writ jurisdiction of this Court unless this Court comes to the conclusion that an error was apparent on the face of the record which amounted to an error of law. Error of fact however great cannot be interfered with under the writ jurisdiction unless it amounts to an error of law. 27. It is true that there has been inordinate delay in making the reference but Mr. Sengupta has submitted that as S. 33(2)(b) proceedings were pending and the High Court only passed an order on 9th January, 1975. Hence no reference could be made earlier to the disposal of the proceedings under S. 33(2)(b). Moreover under S. 10 reference can be made at any time. Hence delay in this particular case is of no consequence. Even the case of the company that the workman has been personally served has been disbelieved by the Tribunal. In view of what has been stated above this Court should not interfere with a finding of fact which does not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record hence amounting to an error of law. In view of that this Rule is discharged and all interim orders vacated. Rule discharged.