J . F. F. Crosslay v. Sushila Bala Dasi — 1980 DIGILAW 375 (CAL)

JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The present appeal arises out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 9th Court, Alipore, in Title Appeal No. 840 of 1970 reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, Alipore, in Title Suit No.222 of 1966. The defendant is the appellant in the instant appeal and the said Title Suit was instituted by the plaintiff for eviction of the defendant from the disputed premises under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for the purpose of building and rebuilding. 2. The plaintiff's case is that the plaintiff is the owner of premises No.5, Belvedere Road, Alipore comprising an area of 1 bigha 14 cottahs of land. On the said plot of land, there is a two-storied residential masonry building and the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the ground floor of the said premises. The plaintiff contended that the said premises No.5. Belvedere Road was an old and dilapidated building and the first floor of the said building had become absolutely unhabitable since after the tenant of the first floor left some time in November, 1960. It has also been contended by the plaintiff that the ground floor of the said premises which was in occupation of the defendant was also highly dilapidated and had become unhabitable. It is contended by the plaintiff that in view of the condition of the said building no new storey could be usefully and profitably raised on the ground floor in place of existing upper flat and the plaintiff proposed to demolish the existing building and to construct new a mansion. It is also contended that the construction of such a mansion will increase the accommodation and will also yield a good return to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the tenancy of the defendant has been determined by valid notice to quit. The defendant not having vacated the suit premises, the aforesaid suit for eviction had to be instituted. 3. The defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement and the defendant denied that the building was in a dilapidated condition and the same did not require to be demolished. The defendant not having vacated the suit premises, the aforesaid suit for eviction had to be instituted. 3. The defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement and the defendant denied that the building was in a dilapidated condition and the same did not require to be demolished. The defendant had also denied that the plaintiff would construct a masonry building in place of existing building. The legality and validity of the notice to quit was also challenged by the defendant. 4. The learned Munsif on considering the evidences adduced by the parties and the materials on record came to the finding that the building was not in a dilapidated condition but the same was quite secured. The learned Munsif also came to the finding that the plaintiff did not reasonably require the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding. The notice to quit was, however, found by the learned Munsif to be quite legal and valid. Accordingly the said suit was dismissed by the learned Munsif and the plaintiff preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, but the Additional District Judge did not agree with the finding of the learned Munsif that the building was a secured one and it was not in a dilapidated condition. According to the learned Additional District Judge, the building was in a dilapidated condition and it was necessary to demolish the same. The learned Additional District Judge also held that from the scheme of the plaintiff it transpired that the plaintiff proposed to construct a multistoried building. The legality and validity of the notice was also found in favour of the plaintiff by the learned Additional District Judge. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was reversed and the appeal was allowed and the suit for eviction was decreed. It appears that against the said judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge the defendant preferred an appeal to this Court, being S. A. No. 729 of 1971. The said appeal was ultimately disposed of by this Court on 2nd May, 1973 and the Hon'ble Judge in disposing of the said appeal took into consideration the scope and import of Ext. 1, being a report of the Engineer Commissioner who inspected the disputed building. The said appeal was ultimately disposed of by this Court on 2nd May, 1973 and the Hon'ble Judge in disposing of the said appeal took into consideration the scope and import of Ext. 1, being a report of the Engineer Commissioner who inspected the disputed building. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge had relied on the said report, Ext. 1, and had observed that the said report indicated of a stern reality about the present condition of the building in question. The Hon'ble Judge after considering the said report, Ext. 1, came to the finding that nowhere in the report it was stated by the learned Engineer Commissioner that the building was in a dilapidated condition. The Engineer Commissioner had only considered whether additional structure could be constructed on the existing building and the said Commissioner was of the view that in view of the extent of the plinth, the existing building would not be able to bear additional load. It was also observed by this Court that the learned Additional District Judge had misread the report and his observation that the report had spoken of the stern reality of the precarious state of the building in question was not borne out by the said report. This Court further observed that the Engineer Commissioner either had misread the plan which was shown to him or that some other plan was shown to him by the plaintiff at the time he had inspected the building in question. This Court further observed that there was no doubt that the question as to whether the building was in a dilapidated condition or not was an important one for the purpose of considering the reasonableness of the requirement of the plaintiff for the purpose of building and rebuilding and as the learned Additional District Judge had not properly considered the report, Ext. 1, his finding that the building was in a dilapidated condition could not be accepted. This Court also held that there was no doubt that in the instant case the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Neta Ram v. Jiban Lal, reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court, page 499 would apply and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in proceeding on the erroneous view. This Court also held that there was no doubt that in the instant case the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Neta Ram v. Jiban Lal, reported in AIR 1963 Supreme Court, page 499 would apply and the learned Additional District Judge was wrong in proceeding on the erroneous view. In that view of the matter, the Hon'ble Judge allowed the said Second Appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Court of Appeal below and sent the case back on remand before the learned Additional District Judge for rehearing. It was observed by the Hon'ble Judge in passing the said order of remand to the following effect:–– "In my opinion the case should go back to the learned Additional District Judge for the purpose of considering whether the building is in a dilapidated condition or not on the materials already on record particularly with reference to the report of the Engineer Commissioner, Ext. 1 in considering the question of eviction of the defendant on the ground of building and rebuilding. The learned Additional District Judge will take into consideration the surrounding circumstances particularly the condition of the building as laid down by the Supreme Court in Neta Ram's case." 5. After remand, the Court of Appeal below again considered the said report of the Engineer Commissioner, Ext. 1 and it was observed by the learned Additional District Judge that from the said report it transpired that there was a candid opinion that the foundation of the existing building would hardly bear the load of the existing structure and the very recital had gone to speak that the building was in a dilapidated condition and there was the further opinion that the existing structure might collapse at any moment. The learned Additional District Judge also considered the evidence given by the another Consulting Engineer, Sri Santosh Kumar Dey (P.W.4). The said Consulting Engineer had also stated on oath that he had personally surveyed 5, Belvedere Road premises and had prepared the plan. The said plan was for a second-storied building having eight suites. The said P.W.4 had also stated that the building in question was very much insecured and dilapidated and no improvement and addition were possible on the old structures and he had opined for demolition of the said existing structure. The said plan was for a second-storied building having eight suites. The said P.W.4 had also stated that the building in question was very much insecured and dilapidated and no improvement and addition were possible on the old structures and he had opined for demolition of the said existing structure. The said Engineer had also stated that the age of the present structure was of 100 years and he himself had examined and inspected the mortars and the bricks and according to him, the structure was not only in a dilapidated condition but it might fall down at any time. The other oral evidences were also taken into consideration by learned Additional District Judge and it was held by the learned Judge that on taking into consideration of the condition of the structure as pictured by the said documents he was of the opinion that it would be imprudent and uneconomic for any sensible landlord to invest good money on such structure. The learned Additional District Judge thereafter allowed the said appeal after remand and had decreed the said suit. The present appeal thereafter was preferred by the defendant tenant. 6. It was contended by Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant that in the suit for eviction of the disputed premises on the ground of building and rebuilding under section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the requirement of law was that the landlord would prove that the proposed building or rebuilding could not be made in a more reasonable or suitable way than that shown in the plan and the work under the plan could not be carried out unless a tenant would vacate the suit premises. He also contended that under the amended provision of section 13(1)(f) not only the bona fides of the requirement but also the propriety and reasonableness of the plan for the proposed building could be challenged by the tenant as a matter of right. For this contention Mr. Mukherjee referred to the Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (2) Smt. Snehalata Mukherjee v. Ajit Behari Mukherjee, reported in 81 CWN page 960. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that apart from the aforesaid requirement of law, the judgment under appeal being a judgment passed after remand must also be the judgment in accordance with the order of remand passed by this Court. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that apart from the aforesaid requirement of law, the judgment under appeal being a judgment passed after remand must also be the judgment in accordance with the order of remand passed by this Court. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the order of remand required to Additional District Judge to dispose of the appeal afresh which obviously implied that he was to consider the judgment which was under appeal before him viz. the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the learned Munsif came to the finding that the building proposed would cover more or less 3 cottahs out of 1 bigha 11 cottahs which was the total area of the premises. Therefore 1 bigha 11 cottahs of land would lie vacant and the plaintiff could very well build on the vacant portion, if she was so inclined. Mr. Mukherjee contended that after the remand the report of the Engineer Commissioner, Ext. 1, was again taken into consideration by the learned Additional District Judge and as aforesaid the learned. Additional District Judge came to the finding that there was a candid opinion that the foundation of the existing structure could hardly bear the load of the existing structure and the very recital had gone to speak that building was in a dilapidated condition and there was a further opinion that the existing structure might collapse at any moment. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the aforesaid observation by the learned Additional District Judge is contrary to the finding made by this Court on the said report, Ext. 1, and the learned Additional District Judge was bound by the finding made by this Court on the said report, Ext 1. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the learned Additional District Judge in disposing of the appeal was required to proceed particularly with reference to Ext. 1, but the learned Additional District Judge had not only done so, but he had refused to consider the case with reference to Ext. 1, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that after the order of remand the Court of Appeal below was bound by the observations made by this Court and he was required to dispose of the appeal in terms of the observations made by this Court. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the learned Additional District Judge had referred to other evidences in support of his judgment. Mukherjee submitted that after the order of remand the Court of Appeal below was bound by the observations made by this Court and he was required to dispose of the appeal in terms of the observations made by this Court. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the learned Additional District Judge had referred to other evidences in support of his judgment. He submitted that even assuming that the other evidences had been properly relied on it was not open to the learned Additional District Judge to disregard Ext. 1 and/or to misread the said exhibit when he was specifically required to proceed particularly with reference to Ext. 1, by the order of this Court. Mr. Mukherjee also contended that learned Additional District Judge had relied on the evidence of the Plan Maker, P.W. 4 and had refused to consider the evidence of the Inspection Commissioner appointed by the Court. The report of the Inspection Commissioner is Ext. 1 and the said report was accepted without any objection. He submitted that the question whether the building was in a dilapidated condition and whether the joist was hanging and the staircase was about to fall down could be seen by the pair of eyes and an impartial officer appointed by this Court had seen and submitted this report but such report was rejected on the ground of lack of qualification without any reference to the fact that he at least saw the condition of the building. He submitted that the rejection of the said report on the score of lack of qualification was wholly unjustified. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that this Court by the aforesaid order of remand directed the learned Additional District Judge to consider the materials already on record and this Court had not permitted the learned Judge to throw out of consideration anything on the ground that such evidence and/or materials were not worth consideration. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Court of Appeal below relied much on the letters of the defendant but did not consider the evidence on the side of the defendant viz. the inspection report, Ext. D and the evidence of the defendant. He submitted that the Court of Appeal below had overlooked the fact that the defendant had made some minor repairs to prevent the leakings of the roof and there was no necessity of further repairs far less demolition. Mr. the inspection report, Ext. D and the evidence of the defendant. He submitted that the Court of Appeal below had overlooked the fact that the defendant had made some minor repairs to prevent the leakings of the roof and there was no necessity of further repairs far less demolition. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the law in respect of eviction on the ground of building and rebuilding had undergone a fundamental change not only by the amendment of section 13(1)(f) but because of the introduction of section 18A in the Premises Tenancy Act. According to Mr. Mukherjee it is no longer permissible for the Court to be merely satisfied with the genuineness and/or reasonableness of the landlord but it is also necessary to specify in the decree itself the period within which the work of construction should be completed. The said provision is mandatory but the Court of Appeal below had already ignored it. Mr. Mukherjee had submitted that section 13(1)(f) did no longer stand in isolation but it must necessarily be read along with section 18A. When the Court was required to specify the period within which the work was to be completed, it necessarily implied that the plaintiff was in a position to commence the work immediately or within a reasonable time. He submitted that in the instant case it was not possible for the plaintiff to start any construction work because the proposed plan of the building had not yet been sanctioned and there was no ready money and an application for loan before the LIC was pending. He submitted that when the objection of section 18A was to provide a procedure to enable the defendant to have restoration, the same could not be ignored to the detriment of the tenant and the old decisions regarding the absence of a sanctioned plan and the credit worthiness of the landlord could no longer be relevant in view of the provision of section 18A. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that the suit was also not maintainable. The necessary averment under section 13(1)(f) had not been made and as such it must be held that the suit was not properly framed on the basis of the amended provisions of section 13(1)(f). For this contention, Mr. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that the suit was also not maintainable. The necessary averment under section 13(1)(f) had not been made and as such it must be held that the suit was not properly framed on the basis of the amended provisions of section 13(1)(f). For this contention, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (3) B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, reported in AIR 1975 SC page 1146 and a decision of this Court made in the case of (4) Shew Narayan Agarwala v. Mundhra Brothers, reported 1978(2) Calcutta Law Journal, page 10. In support of the contention that the order of remand has got to be carried out and the judgment passed in violation of the direction contained in the order of remand is to be set aside. Mr. Mukherjee referred to a decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of (5) K. Veerabasappa v. Court of the District Judge, Chitradurga, reported in AIR 1979 Karnataka, page 40. 7. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, however, submitted that the direction given by this Court in the aforesaid order of remand had been followed by the Court of Appeal below and the contention made by the appellant that the adjudication by the Court of Appeal below was contrary to the order of remand was wholly misconceived. It was submitted by the respondent that this Court was pleased to send back the case on remand for determination of the question as to whether the building in question was in a dilapidated condition or not on the materials on record; particularly with reference to Ext. 1 viz. the Engineer Commissioner's report in the light of the surrounding circumstances having bearing on the question. It was submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that what was the surrounding circumstances had been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision made in the case of (6) Metal Wire & Co. v. Bansilal Sharma, reported in AIR 1979 SC page 1559. It was submitted that the real import of the order of remand passed by this Court was that barely on the Commissioner's report the conclusion made by the learned Judge was not proper and it was directed by this Court to re-consider the question in the light of other evidences on record. It was submitted that the real import of the order of remand passed by this Court was that barely on the Commissioner's report the conclusion made by the learned Judge was not proper and it was directed by this Court to re-consider the question in the light of other evidences on record. The Court of Appeal below had in fact considered the report as directed and also considered the other evidences already on record and in doing so, it had already taken into consideration the surrounding circumstances in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court made in Neta Ram's case (supra). It was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the law was well settled that the question whether the building was dilapidated and required demolition was essentially a question of fact and such finding of fact, however erroneous it might be, if based on evidence could not be disturbed on second appeal. It was submitted by the learned Counsel that Ext. 1, viz. the report of the Engineer was not condemned by this Court but the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge on consideration of the said report was found to be incorrect by this Court and this Court had specifically directed the Court of Appeal below to reconsider the said Ex. 1. It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that out of the plurality of circumstances as laid down in Neta Ram's case, only a particular fact namely the condition of the house had been picked up for determination by the learned Court of Appeal. It was further submitted that the entire fabric of the suit for eviction on the ground of building and rebuilding under section 13(1)(f) had been circumscribed into the periphery of one dimensional ambit from the multi-dimensional aspects as laid down by the nomenclature of 'surrounding circumstances' in Neta Ram's case wherein for the said expression a catalogue of illustrative connotations were given and the same was also not exhaustive. This Court by the aforesaid order of remand had only meant the surrounding circumstances which had their bearing on Ext. 1 viz. the report. The learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that in view of the limited nature of order of remand the moot point of controversy in the pending appeal was as to whether the house was a dilapidated one or not. 1 viz. the report. The learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that in view of the limited nature of order of remand the moot point of controversy in the pending appeal was as to whether the house was a dilapidated one or not. In arriving at the said finding the learned Court of Appeal below apart from reading Ext. 1 had also considered the question in the light of surrounding circumstances, namely, Ext. 16 series which contain amongst others a letter written by the defendant tenant to the plaintiff about the unsafe condition of the building, Ext. 2 (c) viz. a letter written by the City Architect of Calcutta Corporation about the present condition of the building and also the evidences of the Engineers viz. the evidences of P.W.1, P.W.4 and also of D.W.3. The learned Counsel submitted that the question of reasonable requirement being a finding of fact the question of condition of the house was ex facie a finding of fact. The learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that the contention that reasonable requirement could be satisfied out of the vacant place and the appellant had failed to explain as to why instead of constructing on the vacant place the proposed construction was chosen on the existing structure and that such consideration was not made by the Court of Appeal below was misconceived. He submitted that the judgment passed by the Court of Appeal below was in accordance with the order of remand passed by this Court and in view of express direction contained in the judgment and order of remand of this Court the scope of the controversy on the issue of reasonable requirement had been limited into one dimension, namely, the condition of the house from the plurality of dimensions as envisaged in Neta Ram's case. He submitted that out of the plurality of the facts, only one aspect, namely, the condition of the house had been picked by this Hon'ble Court for being determined by the Court of Appeal below. Therefore the learned Court below had no occasion to go into other circumstances save and expect the condition of the house and it was not open to the defendant-appellant to raise the said issue at this belated stage. Therefore the learned Court below had no occasion to go into other circumstances save and expect the condition of the house and it was not open to the defendant-appellant to raise the said issue at this belated stage. The learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that there was no provision in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act that the landlord could build only in open land, if there was such open land. He submitted that the discretion was left with the landlord and the tenant could not prescribe how the landlord would proceed if it was found that the building itself was in a dilapidated condition. He also submitted that the reasonableness as contained in section 13(1)(f) was distinct from the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff for his own use and occupation under section 13(1)(ff). While in section 13(1)(ff) non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is a must, in section 13(1)(f), the condition of the building is the principal criterion and it had been proved that the condition of the building required demolition and reconstruction. Accordingly the reasonableness as contemplated in section 13(1)(f) had been satisfied. The learned Counsel for the respondent however submitted that there was a lacuna in the judgment passed by the Court of Appeal below in not specifying the period within which the proposed construction was to be made as required under section 18A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. But such lacuna had not vitiated the judgment but non-mention of such period was a defect in the nature of technicality which could be cured by this Court at the time of disposing of the appeal. The learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that the contention of the appellant that want of specific finding of reasonable requirement on the ground of building and rebuilding in accordance with the amended provisions of section 13(1)(f) of the Premises Tenancy Act was a vital defect and such defect could only be cured by amendment of the plaint and consequential order of retrial by trial court, was also misconceived. He submitted that for the said contention the learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan but if the said judgment was considered in its proper perspective it would appear that it was specifically pointed out in the said judgment that reasonable interpretation which could avoid invalidation was surely preferable. He submitted that the pleading was to be read in its entirely in order to appreciate a particular pleading and the pith and substance of the pleading was to be looked into in preference to form. The learned Counsel of the respondent referred to a decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (7) Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamrai Maniram, reported in AIR 1976 SC page 461 wherein it was held that the court should not scrutinize pleadings with such meticulous care as to result in the genuine case being defeated on trivial grounds. Another decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (8) Smt. Manjushri Raha v. B. L. Gupta, reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court page 1158 was also referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It was held in the said decision that the pleadings are to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of the poor people. The learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that even in paragraph 26 of the decision of the Supreme Court made in B. Banerjee's case it was held that clause (ff) of Section 13 (1) imposed more severe restrictions than clause (f) of section 13(1). The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the suit for eviction under section 13(1)(f) was governed by plurality of circumstances as laid down in Neta Ram's case but the ejectment under section 13(1)(ff) inhered in it a 'must have' element namely own use and occupation and ejectment under section 13(1)(ff) would have the pernicious implication of complete uprooting of the tenant but in an ejectment under section 13(1)(f), the tenant would be removed for a limited period of time and he had to adjust himself with temporary difficulties after which he would be provided with a better and suitable accommodation in the newly constructed house. In this connection, an unreported Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (9) Musamat Maimuna Khatun v. Mansurezzam & Ors., made in F.A. No. 129 of 1977 was also referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It was held in the said Bench decision of this Court that though specifically it had not been pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiffs were not in possession of suitable alternative accommodation but considering the nature of evidences the Court was of opinion that the plaintiffs were not in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation and such judgment was quite valid. 8. After considering the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties it appears to me that by the order of remand this Court directed the Court of Appeal below to consider the question of reasonable requirement of the landlord of the said premises for building and rebuilding on the ground that the existing structure was dilapidated and not suitable for making further construction on the same. This Court in the order of remand considered the report of the Engineer Commissioner, Ext. 1 and held that the said report did not indicate that the building was in a dilapidated condition but it had indicated that the load of the proposed building could not be taken by the existing structure. This Court, however, in the order of remand, directed the Court of Appeal below to consider the case of the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff on the ground of building and rebuilding in the light of observations made in Neta Ram's case and with special reference to Ext. 1, and after taking into consideration the evidences already on record. In my view, the Court of Appeal below misconceived Ext. 1 after remand and it was wrong on the part of the Court of Appeal below to hold that in essence the said Ext. 1 indicated that the building was in a dilapidated condition. In my view, Mr. Mukherjee is quite justified in contending that the said finding of the Court of Appeal below was contrary to the finding made by this Court. 1 indicated that the building was in a dilapidated condition. In my view, Mr. Mukherjee is quite justified in contending that the said finding of the Court of Appeal below was contrary to the finding made by this Court. But it appears to me that other evidences were also taken into consideration by the Court of Appeal below and on consideration of such evidences the Court of Appeal below came to the finding that the building was insecured and it was not fit to construct on the existing structure. It may be noted in this connection that in the order of remand this Court had noted that Ext. 1 indicated that the existing structure could not bear the load of the proposed structure. The said report along with other evidences discussed by the Court of Appeal below establish that the building is an in secured one and the proposed construction cannot be effected on the existing structure and for the purpose of effecting the proposed structure, the landlord reasonably requires the premises. I am also satisfied that the Court of Appeal below decided the case in terms of the direction passed by this Court in the said order of remand. In my view, the learned Counsel for the respondent is justified in his contention that the order of remand passed by this Court was to the effect that barely on the report of the Engineer Commissioner the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeal below was not justified and the Court of Appeal below should reconsider the question in the light of other evidences on record. The learned Counsel for the respondent is also justified in his submission that while in section 13(1)(ff), non-availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is a must for the success in a suit for eviction under section 13(1)(ff) for the success in an action for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for building and rebuilding, under section 13(1)(f) the condition of the building on which the proposed building and rebuilding is contemplated is a very relevant consideration. In the instant case it has been found by the Court of Appeal below on consideration of various evidences on record that the existing building is not suitable for the proposed construction and the condition of the building is also insecured. In the instant case it has been found by the Court of Appeal below on consideration of various evidences on record that the existing building is not suitable for the proposed construction and the condition of the building is also insecured. In my view, the learned Counsel for the respondent is also justified in his submission that the judgment passed by the Court of Appeal below was in accordance with the order of remand passed by this Court and in view of express direction contained in the judgment passed by this Court, the scope of the controversy on the issue of reasonable requirement had been limited into one dimension, namely, the condition of the house from the plurality of dimensions as envisaged in Neta Ram's case. If the suit could be defeated simply on the ground that there was no bona fide requirement to construct on the existing structure when there was ample vacant place in and around the existing structure then the defendant-appellant would have succeeded in the carrier appeal before this Court on that ground alone and there would have no occasion for this Court to direct for reconsideration of the case of reasonable requirement on the basis of evidences on record and the said Ext. 1 in the light of the observation of the Supreme Court case made in Neta Ram's case. In my view, such contention cannot be raised after the said order of remand. The learned Counsel for the respondent is also justified in his submission that the pleadings are to be interpreted not with formalistic rigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of the common people and the pleading is also to be read in its entirety in order to appreciate the pith and substance of the pleading. It is quite apparent and evident that the parties understood the case of the plaintiff of the reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for building and rebuilding and evidences were led for the said purpose. In the facts of the case, it cannot be held that the defendant has suffered any prejudice for not understanding the real case of the plaintiff. In the facts of the case, it cannot be held that the defendant has suffered any prejudice for not understanding the real case of the plaintiff. I am also inclined to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the lacuna in the judgment of the Court of Appeal below in not specifying the period within which the proposed construction was to be made as required under section 18A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act has not vitiated the judgment but non-mention of such defect can be cured by this Court at the time of disposing of the instant appeal. It is therefore, directed that the defendant should be offered a reasonably similar accommodation in the building proposed to be constructed within a period of 18 months from the date of the eviction of the defendant from the disputed premises in accordance with the provisions of section 18A of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The tenant is granted time till 31st December, 1980 to vacate the disputed premises. With the aforesaid modification the decree for eviction is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.