JUDGMENT 1. 1. In all these appeals a common question of law is involved, and, therefore, these appeals can be conveniently disposed of by one judgment. 2. The respondents in all the 8 appeals were work-charged employees on the various projects in the irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan. 3. In Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3/72 the respondent Gopal Lai was appointed as a Mistri in the Irrigation Department of the State of Rajasthan on 21-9-49, and after completing 10 years service he was confirmed with effect from 29-9-59 as a Mistri. At the time, when the suit was filed by respondent Gopal Lal, he is said to have been working as a work-charged Supervisor on the main division of Rawat Bhata. 4. Laduram and Bhanwar Singh, the two respondents, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4/72 are said to have been working on the post of Turners in the Chambal Project of the Irrigation Department, and at the time of filing of the suit, both of them were working in Workshop at Kota. 5. The respondents in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4/72 were also work-charged employees of the Irrigation Department, Government of Rajasthan, and were attached at the relevant time of the Chambal Project. Out of the respondents Kisban Singh died during the pendency of the appeal, and his legal representatives were brought on record. 6. The respondents Govind Singh and Satish Kumar in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 6/72 at the time of filing of the suit are said to have been working as work-charged Supervisors in the Irrigation Department, Government of Rajasthan, Chambal Project. 7. The 8 respondents in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 7/72 at the time of filing of the suit are said to have been working as Chenwalias in the Irrigation Department, Government of Rajasthan, Chambal Project, Kota. 8. The 14 respondents in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 8/72 at the time of filing of the suit are said to have been working as Mistries in the Irrigation Department, Government of Rajasthan, Chambal Project, Kota. 9. Durga Shanker respondent in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9/72 at the time of filing of the suit was a Mistri in the Chambal Project of the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan, and was declared as semi permanent. 10. 9. Durga Shanker respondent in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 9/72 at the time of filing of the suit was a Mistri in the Chambal Project of the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan, and was declared as semi permanent. 10. The 9 respondents in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 10/72 at the time of filing of the suit are said to have been working as Mistries. It may be mentioned here that the suit of respondents 4, 7 and 9, Shemsher Ali, Madho Prasad, and Manmohan, was dismissed by the trial Court on 4-10-75. 11. All the respondents in these appeals are governed by the Rajasthan P. W. D. (B & R) including Gardens, Irrigation, Water Works and Ayurvedic Department Work charged Employees Rules, 1954 (hereinafter to be referred as the Rules). The services of the respondents were terminated under various orders on the ground that they were no longer required, because of the completion of the projects. Suits were filed in the trial Court that in pursuance to the order of retrenchment, the appellant should not terminate the services and should not relieve the respondents. 12. In each of the suits, a preliminary objection was raised that the disputes raised by the employees were industrial disputes and as such the jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred. The learned trial Court holding that its jurisdiction was impliedly barred dismissed the suits. Appeals were filed before the learned District Judge, 'which were transferred for disposal in accordance with law to the learned Civil Judge, Kota, who vide his judgment and decree dated 20-7-71 disposed of all the Civil Regular Appeals and holding that the jurisdiction of Civil Court was not impliedly barred allowed all the appeals and remanded all the cases to the trial Court for disposal of other issues in accordance with law. In the appeals before this Court, the aforesaid order of remand is challenged. 13. The only point which needs consideration by the Court is, as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil, Court to take cognizance of the nature of the suits filed by the respondents is impliedly barred. Under section 9, C. P. C., the civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Under section 9, C. P. C., the civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants is that all the respondents were workmen within the meaning of section 2 (S) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Disputes Act), and the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan was an industry within the meaning of section 2 (J) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Because the nature of the suits was such in which the order of termination was challenged, it was an industrial dispute, and,, therefore, it could only be dealt with under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was impliedly barred. It can no longer be disputed that if the dispute raised in a suit is of such a nature which can be raised under the Industrial Disputes Act, then the Act being a special statute providing a complete machinery for dealing with such disputes, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred and the Civil Court will not entertain such a suit. This court in Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Ra asthan, 1974 W L N 564 after reviewing the case law on. the point held that the Irrigation Department of the State of Rajasthan engaged in construction of dams etc. is an industry. It will be relevant to quote the following words of the learned Judge: "Thus, an enterprise, which is an undertaking analogous to trade or business, resulting in rendering material services to the community, would certainly be an 'industry' within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Act. The Irrigation Department of the State Government which is engaged in constructing dams, carsals, tanks etc. and distributing and supplying water for irrigation purposes, is rendering material services to the community at large or a part thereof with the help of its employees and is, therefore, an 'undertaking' which comes within the definition of 'industry' under the Act. The State Government may not be providing irrigation facilities to the community with profit motive but that would not make any difference as the undertaking is analogous to trade or business, because the irrigation facilities are provided on payment of certain charges. The State Government may not be providing irrigation facilities to the community with profit motive but that would not make any difference as the undertaking is analogous to trade or business, because the irrigation facilities are provided on payment of certain charges. It is essentially a business activity, though the motive might be general welfare of the people." The learned Judge in making the above observations also placed reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, 1970 Raj L W 137 wherein this court had also taken a view that the Irrigation Department of the State Government is an industry. It can, therefore, be taken to be settled that the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan, which is engaged in constructing dams etc. is an industry within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 14. Prior to the framing of the rules, there were no rules governing the service conditions of the workers of the various departments including the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan. The rules lay down the service conditions of the work charged employees, and they also govern recruitment, promotion, seniority. retirement and retrenchment. Part VI of the Rules deals with procedure for retrenchment and closure etc. The retrenchment orders of the respondents were passed by the competent authority on the ground that their services were no longer required. Whether or not the retrenchments are in accordance with the rules is not the question to be decided at present, and as already said earlier the only question is that whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is impliedly barred. 15. In Krishnan v. East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd., Nellikuppan, AIR 1964 Mad 81 it was held that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by certain workmen for declaration that an agreement entered into between the management and the labour union was invalid and not binding on them and for an injunction restraining the management for implementing the terms of the agreement. This authority was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram (1976) 1 S C C 496 : (1975 Lab I C 1651) and was approved in para 26 of the said judgment. This authority was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram (1976) 1 S C C 496 : (1975 Lab I C 1651) and was approved in para 26 of the said judgment. After discussing the various authorities, their Lordships of the Supreme Court summed up the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to industrial disputes in para 23 as follows: "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the Civil Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." In para 24, it was observed as under:- "We may, however, in relation to principle No. 2 stated above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2 (K) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law only and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example, may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored workman which in view of the provision of law contained in section 2A of the Act will be an industrial dispute even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute. 'Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle No. 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle No. 3 stated above." 16. 'Civil Courts, therefore, will have hardly an occasion to deal with the type of cases falling under principle No. 2. Cases of industrial disputes by and large, almost invariably, are bound to be covered by principle No. 3 stated above." 16. This court had the occasion to deal with the aforesaid authority in Shankerlal Mali v. State of Rajasthan 1980 W L N 459 : (1980 Lab I C 964) . Placing reliance on the above extracted observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it was observed by this court that the proper remedy to the petitioner, it he desires to take an objection regarding the alleged infringement of the provision of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act is to raise an industrial dispute. A reference may also be made to Jaswant Singh v. Union of India (1979 Lab I C 1362)(SC) in which dealing with work-charged employees and their rights, it was observed (at p. 1372):- "But though the work-charged employees are denied these benefits, they are industrial workers and are entitled to the benefits of the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act. Their rights flow from that special enactment under which even contracts of employment are open to adjustment and modification. They, therefore, are in a better position then temporary servants like the other petitioners who are liable to be thrown out of employment without any kind of compensatory benefits." Therefore, if in the suit the nature of dispute is an industrial dispute, then it cannot be disputed that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the suit will be barred. 17. Even the appellate court, whose judgment is challenged in these appeals, has nowhere said that before it the respondent challenged that the dispute raised in the suit was an industrial dispute. The appellate court has observed in para 12 that the appellant did not contend before the lower court that the dispute is not an industrial dispute, and that it does not fall under schedule III of the Act. The appellate court has observed in para 12 that the appellant did not contend before the lower court that the dispute is not an industrial dispute, and that it does not fall under schedule III of the Act. The appellate court has also observed at the end of para 17 of the judgment at page I 1 that the weight of judicial authority is in favour of the defendant-respondent, and it means that even the appellate court does not dispute that in case the dispute is such which is covered under the Industrial Disputes Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court will be impliedly barred. But observing that as the rules do not lay down that the machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act will have to be resorted to, the learned appellate court observed that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not impliedly barred. It has also been observed that the Civil Court has to see that the rules which have got the force of law are to be complied with by the authorities who have to enforce these rules. It was held that the jurisdiction of the civil court to take cognizance of the suit was not impliedly barred. In this connection, the learned appellate court has placed reliance on Roshanlal Tendon v. Union of India AIR 1967 S C 1889 . The aforesaid ruling only lays down that the legal position of a Government servant is more of status than of contract. It has nowhere dealt with as to whether the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. The learned appellate court has fallen into an error when it held that because it is a question of enforcement of statutory rules, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred. A power is vested in the Governor to frame rules under Art. 309 of the Constitution of India to regulate recruitment and conditions of the service of the person recruited to public service in connection with the State. But, these rules are subject to the provisions of the Constitution and Acts of the appropriate legislature. Therefore even if the rules have been framed under article 309 of the Constitution of India, they are subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and if a workman wants to challenge his retrenchment, he has to take recourse to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore even if the rules have been framed under article 309 of the Constitution of India, they are subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and if a workman wants to challenge his retrenchment, he has to take recourse to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. A Division Bench of this court in State of Rajasthan v. Kailash Chandra Jain 1973 Lab I C 221 has held: "The proviso to Article 309 enables the Governor of a State to frame rules which become the conditions of service. These rules must be (a) subject to the provisions of the Constitution and (b) Acts of appropriate Legislature. Rule 20 undoubtedly enables the State of Rajasthan to transfer its employees but these rules are subject to the Acts of appropriate Legislature. Can it be said that the Industrial Disputes Act and other enactments affecting a "workman" are Acts of the appropriate Legislature subject to which rule 20 must operate? The answer to the question, in our opinion, must be in the affirmative. The Industrial Disputes Act is a legislative step intended to shape and give content to the concept of social justice so precious to our Constitution. It regulates the relationship between an employer and employees. Its multiple and frequent changes are evidence of the adjustment that are made from time to time by Legislature to attain the end of social justice in changing times. A workman as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, which Jain undoubtedly was, has numerous benefits in that capacity, such as, the advantage of the Payment of Wages Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Industrial Disputes Act, The Industrial (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, etc. To the extent the terms and conditions of a workman employed by the State of Rajasthan are regulated by the aforesaid Acts of Legislature the rules framed under Article 309 are subject to these legislative enactments." 18. It can, therefore, be no longer in dispute that the rules in the case governing service conditions of the respondents, work charged employees of the Irrigation Department are subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the view of the learned appellate court that whether or not the retrenchment is according to the rules is open for scrutiny before a civil court does not appear to be correct. Therefore, the view of the learned appellate court that whether or not the retrenchment is according to the rules is open for scrutiny before a civil court does not appear to be correct. A look at the nature of reliefs claimed in the plaint will make it clear that it was a retrenchment order, which had been served on the respondents, which was challenged and an injunction was sought that under that order they should not be dismissed and should not be relieved. Industrial dispute has been defined in section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workman and workman, who is connected with the employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. Under section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act even a dispute arising out of retrenchment of an individual workman is an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute. The matters within the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals are enumerated in IIIrd Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, and item 10 is retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment. Therefore, the matter of retrenchment of a workman is to be dealt with by the Industrial Tribunal. If a workman is wrongfully discharged or dismissed, then it is a matter which is within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the IInd schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act. It can, therefore, be said that the relief claimed in the suit for injunction is in substance a relief of reinstatement, and when in view of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act the relief of reinstatement or the question of retrenchment was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, the civil court could not have granted an injunction relating to the relief. Here a reference may again be made to Premier Automobiles' case (supra), wherein their Lordships have observed that where the civil court is not competent to grant main relief, even the suit for a decree for permanent injunction was not maintainable in a civil court. Their Lordships observed: "But a suit unlike the remedy in a civil court merely for the purpose of injunction would not lie to prevent an action which when completed cannot be challenged in a civil court. Their Lordships observed: "But a suit unlike the remedy in a civil court merely for the purpose of injunction would not lie to prevent an action which when completed cannot be challenged in a civil court. " To me, it appears that the suit relates to an enforcement of a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act, and by necessary implication the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. 19. In the result, all the appeals are allowed, the judgments of the appellate court Ore set aside and that of the trial Court are restored. There will be no order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******