HIMACHAL PRADESH ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. USHA KHARBANDA
1980-06-19
H.S.THAKUR, V.P.GUPTA
body1980
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT H. S. Thakur, J.—The Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 35 and 36 of 1973 were originally filed on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Commissioner Transport, Himachal Pradesh. During the pendency of these appeals, by virtue of Section 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, all suits or other legal proceedings instituted or which might but for the establishment of the Corporation have been instituted by or against the State Government in connection with the State undertaking may be instituted by or against the Corporation and in all such suits or other proceedings pending immediately before such establishment, the Corporation shall stand substituted in place of the State Government. A notification No. 4-3/74-Tpt (ii) dated 30th September 1974 has been issued to this effect. On 12th May 1980 when these two appeals were placed before us, the learned Advocate General made a statement to this effect and further stated that unless and until he was specially authorised on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation in this behalf, he could not argue these appeals. Shri S. S. Mittal, who is a standing counsel of the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, put in his appearance and stated that the liability involved in these appeals is the liability of the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. He also further stated that these appeals be continued in the name of the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation. The request of Shri S. S. Mittal was not opposed and it was ordered by us that in place of the State of Himachal Pradesh and the Commissioner Transport, Himachal Pradesh, the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation be substituted as the appellant in these appeals. These appeals have thus been argued by Shri Mittal. 2. At the very outset it was stated by Shri Mittal, the learned counsel for the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation for the sake of brevity) that an application under Order 41, Rule 27 numbered as C.M.P. No. 803 of 1973 be decided first. In this application the appellant has prayed that the additional evidence be allowed to be adduced and local inspection be made, in the interest of justice.
In this application the appellant has prayed that the additional evidence be allowed to be adduced and local inspection be made, in the interest of justice. Strangely enough, the then Advocate General submitted in paragraph 7 of the application as follows:— "That the Honble single Judge had even complimented the Advocate General at the close of arguments for the "fine job done" by him and he was quite sanguine about the success of his appeal/ 3. In the application it is stated, that the plan relating to the place of accident which was on the police file summoned by the claimants before the Claims Tribunal contained a report of Shri Wadhwa and the plan relating to the place of the accident and was thus an important evidence in the case. It was for this reason that Shri P. C. Wadhwa is intended to be produced as a witness. One Shri Leela Vilas is also prayed to be produced as a witness, 4. We have perused the judgment of the Honble Single Judge in which the plan in question has been discussed. Shri Wadhwa was not examined as a witness before the Claims Tribunal as he was stated to be not available being out of the country. The police file on which the said plan was put had been summoned and perused by the Claims Tribunal as also by the learned Single Judge. At this stage, otherwise also it is not proper to delay the disposal of the appeals which are pending for the last about seven years. In case there was any such necessity felt by the appellant, it was natural for it to have filed an application along with the grounds of appeal. No such application was moved and it was only while the Letters Patent Appeal was filed that the application has been submitted. As such, this application has no force and is dismissed. The learned counsel for the appellant was informed in the Court that the application was liable to be rejected. As such, Shri Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued these appeals on merits. The learned single Judge disposed of the appeals by a common judgment, as such both these Letters Patent Appeals can also be decided by one judgment. 5.
As such, Shri Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued these appeals on merits. The learned single Judge disposed of the appeals by a common judgment, as such both these Letters Patent Appeals can also be decided by one judgment. 5. At the outset it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that he does not challenge the quantum of compensation awarded to Smt. Bholi and others, but his contention is that the judgment can be maintained in favour of these respondents if it is proved that the death of the driver of the jeep (Shri Ladla Ram) «is proved to have been caused due to the negligence of the driver of the truck owned by the then appellants. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, challenged even the quantum of compensation as awarded to Mrs. Usha Kharbanda and others, even if it is proved that the death of Shri Kharbanda took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the truck. 6. Before we discuss the propriety and legality of the quantum of compensation awarded in favour of Mrs. Usha Kharbanda and others, it is proper to discuss whether the death of late Shri Kharbanda and the driver of the jeep took place due to the negligence of the driver of the truck or not. 7. Facts of the case may be stated in brief. On 18th January 1970 Shri Y. P. Kharbanda, an Executive Engineer in the Multi Purpose Projects and Power Department of the Himachal Pradesh Government, was proceeding on duty from Solan to Rajgarh accompanied by Shri M. S. D. Asnani, an Executive Engineer of the same Department, in Jeep No. HM-9692 driven by Shri Ladla Ram of the same Department. When the jeep was nearing Matnala, Tehsil Pachhad, the same was involved in an accident with a truck No. HIM 1979 belonging to the Himachal Pradesh Government and driven by Surjan Singh. The jeep rolled into the khad and both Shri Kharbanda and Ladla Ram died. 8. The respondents in both these appeals, filed separate petitions under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 claiming compensation in the sum of Rs. 3 lakh on account of the death of Shri Kharbanda and Rs. 75,000/-on account of the death of Shri Ladla Ram driver.
8. The respondents in both these appeals, filed separate petitions under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 claiming compensation in the sum of Rs. 3 lakh on account of the death of Shri Kharbanda and Rs. 75,000/-on account of the death of Shri Ladla Ram driver. According to the claimants the jeep in which Shri Kharbanda was travelling and was driven by Shri Ladla Ram driver, was proceeding from Solan on the Solan-Rajgarh road and near Matnala the truck HIM 1979 which was coming from the opposite direction collided with it and in consequence the jeep was pushed down into the khad and this brought about the death of Shri Kharbanda and Ladla Ram. The other occupant of the jeep, Shri Asnani, escaped with minor injuries. It was alleged that the accident took place due to the negligence of the truck driver. In the alternative, it was contended that even if the accident occurred on account of the negligence of the jeep driver, the claimants were still entitled to compensation. On the contrary it was stated on behalf of the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the jeep driver. The plea of the Chief Engineer, M.P.P. and Power Department was that the accident took place on account of the negligence of the truck driver. The driver of the truck also placed the responsibility for the accident on the driver of the jeep. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held that the accident took place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the truck driver and there was no negligence on the part of the jeep driver. In a common award the Tribunal awarded a total amount of Rs. l,53,C00/- to Smt. Kharbanda and her children, and a total amount of Rs. 41,250/- to Smt. Bholi and her children, The amounts were payable by the Himachal Pradesh Government and Surjan Singh, driver of the truck. 9. The Himachal Pradesh Government and the Commissioner Transport, Himachal Pradesh, filed appeal against the award, but no appeal was filed by Surjan Singh driver. The then Honble Single Judge (Chief Justice Pathak) heard both the appeals together and by a common judgment dismissed the same. The appellants feeling aggrieved have filed these two separate Letters Patent Appeals. 10.
9. The Himachal Pradesh Government and the Commissioner Transport, Himachal Pradesh, filed appeal against the award, but no appeal was filed by Surjan Singh driver. The then Honble Single Judge (Chief Justice Pathak) heard both the appeals together and by a common judgment dismissed the same. The appellants feeling aggrieved have filed these two separate Letters Patent Appeals. 10. We have perused the judgment of the Honble Single Judge and have also gone through the evidence on record. The learned Single Judge has come to a positive finding that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck driver and has thus up-held the finding of the Tribunal. We feel that the learned Single Judge has given cogent and plausible reasons to come to this finding after considering the entire evidence on record. In fact, the question as to who was responsible for the accident is the central question involved in these appeals. We have perused the statement of Shri Asnani, who was also in the jeep when the accident took place. It is in his testimony that as the jeep was proceeding up the ascending road, the truck hurtled down into it and the collision was so serious that the jeep was thrown off the road into the khad. It is also stated that the collision took place when the truck had crossed the boulder. It is further stated that shortly after the collision, the truck was driven from the place of impact, back, along the road, and parked along the hill side. The learned Single Judge has treated AW 5 Shri Mohan Sunder Dass Asnani, Executive Engineer, and RW 6, Shri Karamveer Singh, Section Officer, M. P. P. and Power, for the respondents and for the appellant respectively as material witnesses. RW 1 Shri V. K. Ahluwalia, the then Superintendent of Police District Sirmur and RW 2 Shri M. Partap Singh, Executive Engineer, are also material witnesses in regard to the accident. We have read the statements of these witnesses and also the other witnesses, and feel that the view taken by the Hon’ble Single Judge is perfectly proper. AW 5, as pointed out early above, was a passenger in the jeep when it was hit by the truck and he has deposed that the truck had crossed the boulder about 5 or 6 feet when the accident took place.
AW 5, as pointed out early above, was a passenger in the jeep when it was hit by the truck and he has deposed that the truck had crossed the boulder about 5 or 6 feet when the accident took place. This testimony of AW 5 is also corroborated by RW 4, who was admittedly travelling in the truck. It is stated by this witness that when the accident took place there was a stone lying at the back of the truck. Though this witness tried to correct himself later on in his statement, but that was not believed by the Tribunal or by the learned Single Judge. Shri V. K. Ahluwalia, RW 1, who was the Chairman of the Enquiry Committee appointed to investigate the incident has, according to the learned Single Judge, besides the other witnesses of the appellant, made every attempt to present a version of the accident inconsistent with the truth. The testimony of Shri Ahluwalia has not been believed for the reasons indicated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. We fully agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in this behalf. Shri Ahluwalia also deposed that he found the truck standing on the extreme left side of the road with its left side bumper against the boulder and that two buses or motor vehicles could pass each other at the side of the accident. Shri Ahluwalia, however, admittedly visited the scene of the occurrence 24 hours after the accident had taken place. 11. Upon an examination of the evidence on record it appears that the truck hit the jeep after it had crossed the boulder. It may be pointed out that according to the evidence on record there was a boulder projecting on to the road near the place of the accident. According to the oral evidence the brakes of the moving truck were applied atleast 20 to 30 feet before the collision occurred. There were found tyre marks visible on the road such as are produced when the brakes are sharply applied. This is clear from the testimony of Shri Ahluwalia and Shri M. Partap RW 2. The continuous length of the tyre marks of the truck amply prove that the truck was moving with a considerable speed.
There were found tyre marks visible on the road such as are produced when the brakes are sharply applied. This is clear from the testimony of Shri Ahluwalia and Shri M. Partap RW 2. The continuous length of the tyre marks of the truck amply prove that the truck was moving with a considerable speed. As regards the jeep it was moving up the slope of the road and it cannot be reasonably believed that it could have been speeding. 12. Once it is believed that the brakes of the truck were applied 20 to 30 feet before the accident occurred, demonstrates that the truck was speeding while it was negotiating the curve around the hills and while doing so, came upon the boulder projecting from the hill side. According to the evidence of Shri Asnani, AW 5, the boulder projected about 3 or 4 feet on the road from the hill side, while according to the testimony of Karamveer Singh, AW 6, the boulder was about 5 or 6 feet in width. At that point the road was stated to be about 18 feet wide. Under such a situation that would have brought the speeding truck moving on to the remaining part of the road leaving hardly any space for the oncoming jeep to pass. The learned Single Judge has observed that there was no photograph or other reliable evidence to show the exact position of the tyre marks as the truck hurtled along the road. The story of the appellant had been that the accident took place after the jeep hit the truck and the driver of the jeep reversed it and while doing so in a nervous state of mind he reversed the jeep into the khad. The contention of the appellant stands falsified whem regard is had to the fact that the jeep was thrown into the khad immediately after it was hit by the truck. Moreover, in case the driver of the jeep had time enough to put the vehicle into reverse gear, he had to bring the jeep to a stand still and in that position it was natural for the occupants of the jeep to get down from it. 13. For the reasons briefly stated above, it cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination that the accident took place due to the negligence of the jeep driver.
13. For the reasons briefly stated above, it cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination that the accident took place due to the negligence of the jeep driver. On the contrary from the material on record, the irresistible conclusion which can be drawn is that the truck was coming from Rajgarh side at a high speed and that after passing the curve it had to cross the boulder projecting on the road and in doing so it moved across the road and, therefore, left insufficient space for the on coming jeep to pass. Since the truck was being driven at a high speed inspite of the application of its brakes it hit the jeep with tremendous force which was sufficient to throw the Jeep into the khad at or very near the point of impact on the road. The other irresistible conclusion that can be drawn from the material on record is that the driver of the truck was driving rashly and negligently and the accident took place on that account as well. As such we affirm the view taken by the Tribunal and up-held by the learned Single Judge that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck driver. 14. After we have held that the death of Shri Kharbanda took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the truck, the only question which remains to be determined is whether the quantum of compensation awarded to Mrs. Kharbanda and her children is on the higher side or not. Shri Mittal, the learned counsel for the appellant, has drawn our attention to a judgment in Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Jai Ram and others, [AIR 1980 HP 16 ; 1979 TAC 297]. One of us was a member of the Division Bench which decided that matter. In that judgment "multiplier method" has been approved. It is not disputed that Shri Kharbanda at the time of his death was of about 39 years of age. He was at the time of his death posted as the Executive Engineer. Even if multiplier method is strictly applied to the facts of this case, the amount of compensation awarded may be a little higher.
It is not disputed that Shri Kharbanda at the time of his death was of about 39 years of age. He was at the time of his death posted as the Executive Engineer. Even if multiplier method is strictly applied to the facts of this case, the amount of compensation awarded may be a little higher. In this very judgment, however, it has been observed that no method is final and only that method is best which serves best the purpose of justness contemplated by Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is further observed that it may be noted that the possibility of the deceased earning more emoluments in future can be properly taken care of by selecting a suitable multiplier. If these observations are kept in view, we are of the opinion that the compensation awarded to Mrs. Kharbanda and her children is not on the higher side and we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion of the Tribunal as up-held by the learned Single Judge on this point. 15. In view of our above discussion there is no merit in these Letters Patent Appeals and both the appeals are dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.