JUDGMENT Bajpai, J - 1. By this second appeal, the defendant-tenants seek interference with the judgment and decree directing their eviction from the tenanted premises made by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court found the ground of bonafide need of the suit accommodation by the respondent-landlord for the purposes of his own business as proved and, accordingly, decreed the claim for eviction on the aforesaid ground as specified in clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The lower appellate Court however, further held that in addition to the ground under clause (f) the ground under clause (a) of section 12 (1) of the Act, i.e. default in payment of arrears of rent, was also available and the decree could be based on the same too because, according to the lower appellate Court since the appellant-tenants withdrew the amount of previous deposits after the dismissal of the suit in default, there was no deposits in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Act despite the fact that prior to the restoration of the suit, the Said amount which had been withdrawn was again deposited. 2. On behalf of the defendant tenants, it was contended that so far as the availability of the ground under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, as held by the lower appellate Court is concerned the same is not liable to be sustained because, undisputedly the initial deposits were within the prescribed time and even if the amount so deposited by mistake happened to be withdrawn the same was again re-deposited long before the restoration of the suit which had been earlier dismissed in default. Under there circumstances it was contended that even if there was a technical defect of the amount not remaining in deposit during the period when the suit stood dismissed the delay could always be condoned because the Courts always have the power to condone the delay in respect of the initial deposit. It was further contended that under the peculiar circumstances of the case that the suit happened to be dismissed and the amount were -deposited long before its restoration, a case was made out for condoning the delay. 3. It was further contended that under the peculiar circumstances of the case that the suit happened to be dismissed and the amount were -deposited long before its restoration, a case was made out for condoning the delay. 3. As regards default in the matter of subsequent deposits month to month during the pendency of the suit it was contended that the defendant-tenants had been regular in making the payment and that more than sufficient amount of rent towards arrears of rent had been in deposit. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-landlord could not point out any such defect in the monthly deposits. He simply made a general allegation that certain amount deposited by that tenants was towards electricity charges. He however failed to demonstrate any such shortage in payment. In view of the aforesaid circumstances this Court is of the opinion that the defendant-tenants were entitled to the benefit of sub section (3) of section 12 of the Act and no decree for eviction could be passed on the ground under clause (a) of section 12(1) of the Act. Even if the date on which the amount was re-deposited is to be treated as the date of first deposit the circumstances, justify condonation of the delay in the initial deposit. 4. While assailing the finding concurrently recorded by both the Court’s below about the bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs-landlord for his own business, the learned counsel for the appellants mad an effort first to show that the finding about the existence of need was vitiated inasmuch as the courts below had over-looked certain material pieces of evidence. It was pointed out that the Courts below did not take into consideration the circumstances that even after vacating the tenanted premises the plaintiff, landlord could find a place for keeping his shop in a portion of the hall wherein he had put his shop in a portion of the hall wherein he had put his machines of cutting. stitching and rolling paper. The argument was that once the plaintiffs could keep his shop in a portion of the said hall the Courts below should have held that the need, If any was satisfied. stitching and rolling paper. The argument was that once the plaintiffs could keep his shop in a portion of the said hall the Courts below should have held that the need, If any was satisfied. As regards sufficiency of space for storage it was pointed out that the plaintiffs had sufficient accommodation in the basement floor and that even during the pendency of the appeal two or three rooms belonging to the plaintiff had fallen vacant and they could constitute an alternatives suitable accommodation. In this respect statement for incorporating the plea of alternative accommodation having become available subsequently counsel for both the sides and on going through the evidence on record this Court is of the opinion that the finding about the bonafide requirement of the suit accommodation by the landlord for his own business is a pure question of fact, concurrently recorded by both the Courts below and does not call for any interference at this stage in second appeal. 5. It was not disputed that the hall referred above had been in the occupation of the plaintiff landlord right from 1967 onwards. In the said hall he was keeping his machines of rolling stitching and cutting paper. The plaintiff deals in the business of manufacturing exercise books in addition to the business for the state of paper It was also not disputed the plaintiff was having a shop in rented premises upto the year 1968 There were some room, also attached to the rented shop which were being used for storagas of paper. It was also not disputed that when in 1963 the plaintiffs had to vacate and hand over possession of the aforesaid rented shop to his landlord, he had already instituted the present suit asking eviction of the defendants from the suit shop When the plaintiff was compelled to surrender possession of the rented shop, he had to make some ad-hoc arrangement. Accordingly, he started utilising a portion of the said hall as shop. This does not mean that his need for a separate shop was satisfied. Similar is the position about the subsequent even of certain rooms behind the suit shop falling vacant, Those room cannot be said to be reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for a shop. The suit shop is situate on the main road. This does not mean that his need for a separate shop was satisfied. Similar is the position about the subsequent even of certain rooms behind the suit shop falling vacant, Those room cannot be said to be reasonably suitable alternative accommodation for a shop. The suit shop is situate on the main road. The rooms said to have been fallen vacant are inside the building and by no stretch of imagination could he an alternative for a shop. The rooms in the basement floor were such that one could not even land straight in them. During the course of evidence, the plaintiffs had already offered those rooms to the tenant by saying that if he felt that the same were alternative accommodation, he may occupy the same The tenant however, flatly refused the offer, by saying that the same would not serve the purposes of a shop. Under these circumstances simply for the reason that the plaintiffs -landlord had made some ad-hoc arrangement by using a portion of the said ball as a shop, it could not be said that his need for the suit shop held come to an end it is really unfortunate that the landlord who comes to the Civil court for seeking eviction of the tenant on the around of bonafide need has to wait for more than 12 to 15 years for getting the actual vacant possession, The same has been the fact of the present landlord. It could not be expected of him that for such a long period he should have kept his shop closed. Naturally he had to make some alternative ad-hoc arrangement as soon as be had to hand over vacant possession of the tenanted premises to his landlord. He did make adhoc arrangement by temporarily using a portion of the hall where machines had been installed. 6. Lastly. It was contended that since the business of paper and manufacturing of exercise hooks were being done in the names of Hukumchand, the present landlord, his mother Smt. Kesharbai, the respondent No.2 and the son, who were partners it was not the business of the landlord himself and, therefore, the ground under clause (f) of section 12(1) of the Act was not attracted. The stress was on the words 'his business’ Reliance was placed on the observations made by their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of D.N. Sanghvi v. A.T. Das AIR 1974 SC 1026 , I have gone through the aforesaid decision and find that the present case is clearly distinguishable Even according to the observations made in D.N. Sanghavi's case (supra) the business as disclosed in the present case can be said to be the business of the landlord even when he was to do it as a partner of the firm comprising of the members of the joint family, i.e. his mother and son. There is evidence not only from the side of the plaintiffs but also of the defendants and their witnesses that Hukumchand, the present landlord is actually working and looking after the business. He could not be shown to be a sleeping partner, From the decision of the Supreme Court in D.N. Sanghavi's case (Supra) it is apparent that if a partner is not shown to be a sleeping partner and needs certain premises for doing the buisness which he is required to do even in the capacity of a partner or a firm, the said business can be held to be his business. The aforesaid case has been referred and distinguished by a subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Gouribai v. Ranidan 1979 JLJ 245 =1977 MPLJ 456, wherein has been held that the mere fact that the member of a joint family have constituted a firm will not take away the right of the landlord to claim eviction on the ground under clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act so long as it is shown that the business was actually of the members of the family, despite the fact that they had formed a partnership. It is not the case that there was any other partner who was a stranger to the family. Undisputedly Hukumchand is the landlord. He is doing his business with his mother and son in partnership. He and his son are actually looking after the business and doing all the work. They could always claim eviction of the tenants on the ground of their need for much a business. 7. Undisputedly Hukumchand is the landlord. He is doing his business with his mother and son in partnership. He and his son are actually looking after the business and doing all the work. They could always claim eviction of the tenants on the ground of their need for much a business. 7. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondent had filed an affidavit & stating that the defendant-tenants had already obtained possession of a shop in the neibourhood of the suit premises, that they are doing their business in the said newly acquired premises and that they are unnecessarily keeping the suit premises booked. However, acquisition of another non-residential it accommodation does not make out a ground under clause (i) of section 12 of the Act which is confide to residential accommodation only under these circumstances, this aspect even If true, will not be material and relevant. 8. In view of the discussion made above, the finding about the bonafide need of the suit accommodation by the landlord for his own business as specified under Cl. (f) of section 12 (i) of the Act, concurrently arrived by both the Courts below is liable to be sustained, his appeal is, therefore partly allowed the judgment and decree impugned for eviction on the ground under Cl. (a) of section 12(1) are set aside. However, the judgment and decree for eviction an the ground under Cl. (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act are sustained. Parties will bear their own costs of this appeal. 9. Since the decree for eviction is not being sustained on the ground under Cl. (a) of section 12 (1) and is based only on the ground under clause (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act, the defendant-tenants would be entitled to payment of compensation in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (6) of S.12, before actual eviction, If there is any dispute about the quantum of compensation the same may be determined by the executing Court. 10. However, the appellant tenants are granted time till 31st March 1980 to vacate the suit premises and surrender possession of the same to the plaintiff-landlord. On their failure to do so, the plaintiff landlord will be free to put the decree for eviction in execution after 31st March 1980. The other part of the decree shall, however, always remain available for execution. On their failure to do so, the plaintiff landlord will be free to put the decree for eviction in execution after 31st March 1980. The other part of the decree shall, however, always remain available for execution. It is further clarified that the executing Court will be free to take proceedings and determine the amount of compensation in the meanwhile, if there is any dispute about the quantum of compensation payable to the appellant-tenants by the plaintiff-landlord.