S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. is directed against the order dt. March 3. 1980 of the learned Munsif, Nathdwara the passed in Civil Suit No. 84 of 1977 holding that plaintiff-non-petitioners suit is maintainable in the absence of notice under sec 271 (2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act (XXXVIII of 1959), hereinafter referred to as «the Act*. 2. The plaintiff-non-petitioner instituted a suit for declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendant-petitioner in the Court of Munsif-Nathdwara on July 11, 1977. In para 4 of the plaint, it has been averred that the land described in paras 2 and 3 of the plaint measuring 1598 sq. ft. is of the plaintiffs ownership and possession and that the defendant wants to take possession of it. The word used in the plaint are- ^^oknh dh feyfd;r o dCts dh gS ftldks izfroknh gM+iuk pkgrs gSA^^ 3. The plaintiff submitted an application for erecting the boundary wall in respect of the land described in para 3 of the plaint to the defendant. But that application was dismissed by the defendant holding that the land is open one and from the plaintiffs evidence, it has not been proved to be its ownership. An appeal was lodged against the order dated December 31, 1976 of the dismissal of the application for grant of possession. That appeal was also dismissed by the Collector, Udaipur vide his judgment dated June 26, 1977. In these circumstances, it was prayed that it may be declared that the land in question belongs to it, as the plaintiff is in possession of it and further as the defendant wants to forcibly take its possession by erecting the bus stand on it, for which it has no authority to do so permanent prohibitory injunction may be issued. The plaintiff instituted the suit for the two reliefs of declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction as aforesaid. 4. The defendant filed the written statement on August 25, 1977 contesting the suit on various grounds. In the written statement no specific objection to the effect that the suit is not maintainable under S. 271(2) of the Act, was raised. The plaintiff instituted the suit for the two reliefs of declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction as aforesaid. 4. The defendant filed the written statement on August 25, 1977 contesting the suit on various grounds. In the written statement no specific objection to the effect that the suit is not maintainable under S. 271(2) of the Act, was raised. The learned Munsif framed the issues on July 27, 1978 Thereafter, on the same day, the court directed that as issue No. 4 relates to jurisdiction, it should be decided first and further that the parties should produce their evidence in respect thereof. It was first posted for the evidence of the defendant in respect of issue No 4. The evidence of the defendant was closed on February 16, 1979. However, an application was moved on behalf of the defendant on that very day that the evidence in respect of issue No 4 may also be recorded with the evidence of other issues. That application was however, dismissed by the learned Munsif by his order dated April 4. 1979 and the order producing the evidence of the defendant was kept intact and issue no. 4 was decided against the defendant. Thereafter, the case was posted for evidence of the plaintiff on the remaining issues on July 5. 1979. On July 5 1979, an application was moved on behalf of the defendant stating that the plaintiff has instituted the suit without giving two months notice against the Municipal Board and so, it should be dismissed. Arguments on the application were heard on February 21, 1980. The learned Munsif by the impugned order dated March 3, 1980 held that the suit as framed in view of the reliefs asked for by the plaintiff is maintainable in the absence of the notice under section 271(2) of the Act. Hence this revision by the defendant. 5. A show cause notice for admission was issued to the defendant on July 11, 1980 and the record was also ordered to be requisitioned. On November 12, 1980, both the learned counsel appearing for the parties agreed that this revision petition may finally be disposed of. On account of this agreement, the court ordered that this revision petition may be listed for admission and hearing on November 27, 1980. On November 12, 1980, both the learned counsel appearing for the parties agreed that this revision petition may finally be disposed of. On account of this agreement, the court ordered that this revision petition may be listed for admission and hearing on November 27, 1980. Record in this case has already been received and the learned counsel appearing for the parties also reiterated that this revision petition may finally be disposed of. 6. I have heard Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner and Mr. R.P. Dave, learned counsel for the plaintiff non-petitioner. 7. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that having regard to the averments made in the plaint and the reliefs asked for by the plaintiff, it is abundantly clear that the main relief in the suit is of declaration and the ancillary relief is injunction; that there are two reliefs (declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction) claimed by the plaintiff; and that in view of this, the learned Munsiff has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of the suit in the absence of notice under section 271(2) of the Act, for the suit is barred under section 271(2) of the Act and he should have rejected it under 0.7 r. 11 (d) C.P.C. On the other hand. Mr. R. P. Dave, learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner supported the impugned order and also pressed for my consideration that in the absence of a specific plea in the written statement regarding non-issuance and non-service of the notice under section 271 (2) of the Act, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the defendant will be deemed to have waived the objection. He also contended that the objection raised by the defendant-petitioner in the application dated July 5, 1979 should not be examined, for, there is no provision of law under which the defendant can be allowed to raise such an objection without incorporating it in the written statement. 8. I have bestowed my earnest consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. In the first instance, I consider it proper to deal with the argument raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner to the effect whether it is open to the defendant to take such an objection in the application though it was not taken in the written statement. 9. In the first instance, I consider it proper to deal with the argument raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner to the effect whether it is open to the defendant to take such an objection in the application though it was not taken in the written statement. This argument necessiates the examination of the provisions contained in O. VII r. 11. C.P.C. 10. It will be useful here to read the relevant portion of O. 7 r. 11, C.P.C. "O. 7 r. 11. Rejection of plaint:—The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) .................. (b).................. (c) .................. (d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to barred by any law." It is clear from the provisions contained in O. VII r. 11 C.P.C. that the Court has been empowered to reject the suit on the four grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). Here, as stated above, I am only concerned with Cl. (d) of O .VII r. 11 C.P.C. The words used in O. VII r. 11 C.P.C. are "the plaint shall be rejected." From these words, it can be said without any hesitation that the provisions contained in O. VII r. 11 C.P.C. are imperative. From this, it follows that the provisions of O. VII r. 11 C.P.C. for the purpose of rejecting the plaint can be invoked at any stage of the suit; and that a duty has been cast on the court if the plaint falls in the four grounds mentioned in clause(a) to (d) particularly when the suit appears from the statement made in the plaint to be barred by any law. 11. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gangappa vs. Rachawwa(l) as follows: "If for instance the plaintiffs cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming relief was served in terms of the said section it would be the duty of the Court to reject the plaint recording an order to that effect with reasons for the order. In such a case the Court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. In such a case the Court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. But, where the plaint on the face of it does not show that any relief envisaged by Sec. 80 of the Code is being claimed, it would be the duty of the Court to go into all the issues which may arise on the pleadings including the question as to whether notice under Sec 80 was necessary. If the Court decides the various issues raised on the pleadings, it is difficult to see why the adjudication of the rights of the parties, apart from the question as to the applicability of Sec. 80 of the Code and absence of notice thereunder should not operate an res judicata in a subsequent suit where the identical questions arise for determination between the same parties " In Ebrahimbhai vs. State(2) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the question relating to the notice realy is whether the suit can be instituted on the day it has been so instituted by the plaintiff. It was observed as follows: "Therefore, filing of a suit before the expiration of two months next after the notice has been delivered is prohibited by the mandatory provisions of Sec. 80 of the Code. There does not seem to be any power or jurisdiction in the Court to entertain such a suit. To that extent, the matter clearly relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the suit and in such a case the question of waiver either by the State Government or by the public officer cannot arise Under Order 7, Rule 11(d) it is obligatory on the Court to reject the plaint where the suit appears from the statement of the plaint to be barred by any law. Thus, in a case where the suit is filed before the expiration of the period of notice contemplated by section 80 there is no alternative for the Court to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 12. Thus, in a case where the suit is filed before the expiration of the period of notice contemplated by section 80 there is no alternative for the Court to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure." 12. From the aforesaid two authorities, it is clear that from the statement made in the plaint, if the suit appears to be barred by any law, there is no power or jurisdiction in the court to entertain and proceed with the trial of the suit. In these circumstances, the contention that the learned Munsif could not have given effect to the objection relating to the absence of notice u/s 271(2) of the Act without raising it in the written statement cannot be accepted. 13. This brings me to the other argument of the learned counsel for the non-petitioner, namely, that as the defendant-petitioner has not taken this objection in the written statement, it will be deemed to have waived it, for, it could be waived. Learned counsel for the non-petitioner was unable to show from the impugned order that the objection regarding waiver was taken by him before the learned Munsif when the arguments were heard on the application filed by the defendant-petitioner. It is well settled that so far as the question of waiver is concerned, it is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The fact that the objection was not taken in the written statement and the trial of the suit proceeded for some time, in my opinion, are not sufficient to infer that the objection regarding non-maintainability of the suit on account of non-issuance and non-service of notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act was waived particularly when the suit was posted for the evidence of the plaintiffs, an application was filed by the defendant that notice has not been issued by plaintiff. The circumstances that the objection was not raised in the written statement and that the trial of the suit proceeded (though no evidence of the plaintiff was recorded so far), are hardly sufficient to draw on inference of either express or implied waiver. As observed by me above the fact whether the suit is barred by any law pertains to domain of power of jurisdiction of the court to entertain and proceed with the trial of the suit. As observed by me above the fact whether the suit is barred by any law pertains to domain of power of jurisdiction of the court to entertain and proceed with the trial of the suit. For both these reasons, I regret my inability to agree with the learned counsel for the non-petitioner that the defendant-petitioner having failed to raise the point regarding non-maintainability of the suit on account of the absence of notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act has waived it. 14. The last argument raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner which is required to be examined is whether the order of the learned Munsif holding that the main relief asked for in the suit is permanent injunction and not declaration and as such in view of the provisions contained in S. 271 (3) of the Act, notice was not necessary. Here, it will be pertinent to read S. 271 of the Act— "271. Suits against board or its officers-(l) No suit shall be instituted against a board or against the chairman, vice-chairman, member, officer or servant of a board or against any person acting under the direction of any of them in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice thereof in writing has been, in the case of a board, left at its office and, in the case of the chairman, vice-chairman, member, officer, servant or persons delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the relief caught the amount of compensation claimed and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) No action such as is described in sub-section (1) shall unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. (2) No action such as is described in sub-section (1) shall unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property for a declaration of title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injuction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding." Learned counsel for the non-petitioner submitted that as relief of injuction was claimed, according to the protective provisions of section 271 (3) of the Act, notice envisaged by S. 271 (2) of the Act is not necessary. As stated by me above, in the suit, the plaintiff has claimed to reliefs viz. declaration in regard to title of the land and permanent prohibitory injunction. The expression "wherein the only relief" claimed as an injunction cannot be last sight of. The word only is not without significance, In order to claim protection under S. 271 (3) of the Act that issuance of notice is not necessary as required by S. 271 (2) of the Act, the plaintiff has to satisfy the court that the only relief claimed in the suit is of injunction. In the para relating to reliefs sub paras (a) and(b) deal with the reliefs of declaration and injunction. On this court alone, it cannot be said that notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act was not necessary. The matter does not rest at that. Section 271 (3) is also conditioned to the affect that the relief of injunction which the plaintiff seeks in a particular case would be defeated by giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding. Having read the plaint as a whole and the relevant averments made therein, I have no hesitation to say that the issuance of notice would have defeated the object of the suit. Learned Munsif relying on Goverdhandass vs. Corporation of Calcutta (3), reached the conclusion that the main relief in the suit which was instituted by the plaintiff was to injunction and not declaration and, therefore, no notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act was necessary. In Goverdhandass vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra) learned Judges after considering the provisions of Ss. Learned Munsif relying on Goverdhandass vs. Corporation of Calcutta (3), reached the conclusion that the main relief in the suit which was instituted by the plaintiff was to injunction and not declaration and, therefore, no notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act was necessary. In Goverdhandass vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra) learned Judges after considering the provisions of Ss. 53 and 54 of the Specific Relief Act. 1877 which correspond to secs. 38 & 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 held that every suit for perpetual injunction must involve a determination or a declaration to the above effect, or, in other words, such a declaration would be necessarily involved or implied in the case of every decree for perpetual injunction. On the basis of this reasoning, it was observed as follows : "In the instant case, the invasion of the plaintiffs right or the commission of the act contemplated above would, presumably be the passing of the impugned order, which is challenged in the plaint as invalid, illegal and mala fide, and a finding, determination or declaration to that effect would whether, expressly or impliedly, be necessary for the grant of perpetual injunction to the plaintiff. Indeed, in the instant case, there is an express prayer for such a declaration. That however, in our opinion, would not alter the substantive position. That prayer may well be regarded as ancillary to the main relief of perpetual or permanent injunction, if not unnecessary as a prayer in the prayer portion of the plaint. The necessary allegation in the body of the plaint to enable the Court to come to a determination of the above basic question would be enough for the purpose of supporting the ultimate decree of perpetual injunction. In law, a declaration by implication or in express terms would not make any difference in substance and, regarded from that point of view, it will not affect or alter the nature of the suit and, accordingly the instant suit may well be regarded, as, in substance, it is, as a suit for perpetual or permanent injunction. In this view, we would hold that the instant suit would satisfy the test of a suit, instituted under section 54 of the old Specific Relief Act, corresponding to section 38 of the new Act. In this view, we would hold that the instant suit would satisfy the test of a suit, instituted under section 54 of the old Specific Relief Act, corresponding to section 38 of the new Act. In that view, the instant case would be covered by the protective provision of subsection (4) of section 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and, accordingly, would be outside the mischief of sub-section (1) of the said section. The absence or want of a notice under the said statutory provisions cannot, therefore, be fatal to the instant suit and the learned trial Judges view to the contrary is not correct and must be set aside." 15. The reasoning given in this decision in the first place is not applicable to the case in hand, for, the language of sub-section (4) of S. 586 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 has not been shown to be identical with the language used in S. 271 (3) of the Act. It appears that Sub-section (4) of section 586 lays down that nothing in the foregoing Sub sec. of S. 586 apply to any suit instituted under S. 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. Secondly, the decision in that case turned on the averments made in the plaint, in that suit out of which the appeal arose before the learned Judges. That suit was a suit in substance for a permanent injunction against the defendants from giving effect to an illegal order dated May 12, 1960 and/or in anyway interfering with the plaintiffs right of property in respect of the disputed structures. The order dated May 12, 1960 was an order of the disputed structures and that was challenged in the plaint as illegal, invalid and an abuse of the statutory powers vested in the Commissioner and as such, unenforceable in law. I have briefly summarised the averments made in the plaint filed in the suit out of which the present revision has arisen and in view of those averments and the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff, I am unable to hold that the relief of perpetual prohibitory injunction is the main relief and the relief relating to declaration of title in respect of the land in question is an ancillary relief. I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the reasoning given by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court. I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the reasoning given by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court. For these reasons, the decision reported in Govardhan Dass vs. Corporation of Calcutta (supra) is of no avail to the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner. As the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff are declaration and injunction and further for the fact that the injunction is not the only relief claimed by the plaintiff, the learned Munsiff committed an error in exercise of his jurisdiction when he hold that no notice u/s 271 (2) of the Act was required. 16. For the reasons aforesaid, I am constrained to allow the revision petition and set aside the order of learned Munsif dated March 3, 1980. There will be no order as to costs.