DWARKA PRASAD, J.~-This second appeal arises out of a suit for possession of a shop, situated in Dhan Mandi in the town of Phalodi. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that they were owners of the shop in dispute. As the tenant Chandan Mal denied the title of the plaintiffs and claimed that he was a tenant of Shrimati Dhanni, they filed a suit for ejectment against him which was dismissed on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not proved between the parties. An appeal filed by them met the same fate and in second appeal this Court observed that in the absence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the plaintiffs could seek a remedy by means of a separate suit to establish their title, if they thought that they had a title to the property in dispute. The present suit for possession was, therefore, filed by the plaintiffs on May 16, 1960 against Chandan Mal and Snot. Dhanni Bai. 3. The plaintiffs and Shrimati Dhanni Bai are descendants of a common ancestor, Girdharilal. The pedigree of the parties is as under : — Girdharilal Thakursi Bhawarsi Rajuji Igyaram Parwati (widow) Hazarimal Punji (Pannalal) Shivnarain Jaikishan Mishrilal Lunji Magji Punji (went in adoption) Shrikishan Sunder lal Devilal Gopilal Rampratap Premsukh Pltf. No.1 Moolchand Pltf. No.2 Jethmal Badrilal Pltf. No.3 Jamnalal Pltf. No.4 Dhanni (widow) (Def.No.2) Poonamchand Pltf. No.5 According to the plaintiffs, the shop in dispute belonged to Igyaram and Hazarimal, sons of Bhawarsi and grand-sons of Girdharilal by virtue of a patta of Samwat Year 1911 in their favour. Both Igyaram and Hazarimal died issueless and Parwati widow of Igyaram came into possession of the said shop on the death of both the aforesaid brothers. On Falgun Badi 2, Samwat 1966 Shrimati Parwati executed a so called gift deed in favour of Jaikishan, who was the grand-son of Rajuji, third son of Girdharilal. It is not in dispute that the so called gift deed is really a will executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan and is a registered document. Although the said document Ex. It is not in dispute that the so called gift deed is really a will executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan and is a registered document. Although the said document Ex. 2 speaks of making a gift of the entire property left by Igyaram, husband of Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan, yet it goes on to state that Shrimati Parwati would remain as the owner of the said property during her life time and on her death Jesiram (Jaikishan) would become the owner of the said property. Thus although styled as a gift deed, the document Ex. 2 is essentially a will made by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan, described therein as Jesiram. It is also not in dispute that Shrimati Parwati died in Samwat 1974 and Jaikishan came into possession of the suit shop on her death. The plaintiffs who are the sons of Jaikishan, executed a registered mortgaged deed on March 4, 1918 in respect of the suit shop in favour of Hastimal Askaran, in which they relied upon the gift deed executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan in Samwat 1966 in support of their title to the mortgaged property. On February 22, 1945 the plaintiffs repaid the mortgage money to the mortgagees and redeemed the suit shop. Uday Kishan, who was inducted into the suit shop as a tenant by the mortgagees Hastimal Askaran. and who executed a rent deed E 4 dated Chet Sudi 14, Samwat Year 1996 in favour of the mortgagees, later executed a fresh rent note in favour of the plaintiffs on February 22. 1945 when the mortgage was redeemed by the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, they had led out the shop in dispute again to Ramdayal Surajmal by means of a rent deed dated January 5, 1949, a copy of which has been produced on the record as Ex. 9. The plaintiffs further alleged that Chandan Mal, who was a relation of Surajmal Ramdayal was allowed to occupy the shop with the permission of the plaintiffs and he became a tenant of the suit shop with effect from Bhadwa Sudi 15, Samwat 2010 on a monthly rent of Rs. 15/-. They also alleged that as the plaintiffs usually resided at Akola, Smt. Dhanni Bai, who was their aunt and was residing at Phalodi, used to realise rent from Chandan Mal on behalf of the plaintiffs. 15/-. They also alleged that as the plaintiffs usually resided at Akola, Smt. Dhanni Bai, who was their aunt and was residing at Phalodi, used to realise rent from Chandan Mal on behalf of the plaintiffs. Bat as Chandan Mal subsequently failed to pay rent for the premises in dispute, a suit for ejectment was filed which was dismissed, as mentioned above, on account of the failure of the plaintiffs to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 4. Here it may be mentioned that Shrimati Dhanni Bai is the widow of Rampratap, grandson of Thakursi, who was another son of Girdharilal. 5. The plaintiffs based their claim in the present suit on their title derived from the gift deed executed in their favour in Samwat 1996 by Shrimati Parwati widow of Igyaram and also on the basis that Jaikishan was the nearest heir of Shrimati Parwati and her husband Igyaram. The plaintiffs claimed that they continued to be in possession of the suit shop since the possession thereof was handed over to them by Shrimati Parwati. The defendants resisted the plaintiffs claim and according to them Shrimati Dhanni Bai was always in possession of the suit shop and she claimed title on the basis of adverse possession. Shrimati Dhanni Bai claimed that she was the owner of the suit shop and Chandan Mal claimed to be a tenant of the suit shop on her behalf. The defendants took the plea that Mst. Parwati had no right to dispose of the property by gift or will and that the said gift deed did not bestow any right to Jaikishan or the plaintiffs. It was also denied that Jaikishan was the nearest reversioner of Smt. Parwatis husband. A plea was also taken by the defendants that the suit was barred by limitation. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit, holding that the title of the plaintiffs was proved. However, on appeal the learned District Judge. Jodhpur dismissed the plaintiffs suit on two grounds: viz. that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in respect of the suit shop and further that the suit was barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In the present appeal, the decision of the first appellate court in respect of both the aforesaid questions has been challenged. 6. Jodhpur dismissed the plaintiffs suit on two grounds: viz. that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in respect of the suit shop and further that the suit was barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In the present appeal, the decision of the first appellate court in respect of both the aforesaid questions has been challenged. 6. The plaintiffs claimed to be the owners of the suit shop on the ground that they came into possession on the basis of the gift or will executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of their father Jaikishan and secondly that Jaikishan was the nearest reversioner of the husband of Shrimati Parwati and thirdly that even if it be held that the so called gift deed or will executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan did not pass any title to him being a void document then the possession obtained by Jaikishan under such void document must be deemed to be adverse against the true owners, viz. the legal representatives of Igyaram and Hazarimal. So far as the first ground is concerned, it is not disputed before me that Parwati, being a Hindu widow, did not possess any disposing right in respect of the suit property in dispute to Jaikishan either by way of gift or by will. The so called gift deed of Samwat year 1966 executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan alias Jassu Ram, father of the plaintiffs, was thus without any doubt a void document. According to Hindu Law, a widow or other limited heir had no power to dispose of the corpus of immoveable property inherited by her from her husband or father, except for legal necessity. Hindu Law, as it prevailed at the relevant time, imposed restrictions on the rights of a Hindu widow in respect of alienation of immoveable property and even the learned counsel for the appellants could not support the plaintiffs case that the so called gift or will executed by Shrimati Parwati could give any right or pass any lawful title to Jaikishan or the plaintiffs in respect of the suit shop. As regards the question of heirship, a bare perusal of the pedigree shows that Jaikishan could not be held to be the nearest reversioner of Igyaram, who was one of the owners of the suit shop, by virtue of the patta of Samwat Year 1911. As regards the question of heirship, a bare perusal of the pedigree shows that Jaikishan could not be held to be the nearest reversioner of Igyaram, who was one of the owners of the suit shop, by virtue of the patta of Samwat Year 1911. Moreover, it is not on the record as to which of the descendants of Gir-dharilal were alive at the time of death of Igyaram, so that the question as to who was his nearest reversioner at that time could be properly determined. 7. However, learned counsel for the plaintiff - appellants relied before me upon the third plea raised by them, viz. the plaintiffs became the owners of the suit property by adverse possession. The aforesaid plea was taken before the first appellate court as well but the same was not allowed to be raised on the ground that no such plea was advanced by the plaintiffs in their plead-ings. According to the learned District Judge, allowing such a plea of adverse possession to be raised at the appellate stage would amount to entertaining a new case and if the plaintiffs were permitted to set up such new case, the same was likely to prejudice the defendants. It was also observed that adverse possession must be Droved by clear and unequivocal evidence and must be shown to be hostile, continuous and open. 8. I am unable to agree with the learned District Judge on this question because the plea of adverse possession is inherent in the plea of ownership raised by the plaintiffs in the present case. The plaintiffs claimed their title on the basis of the so called gift deed executed by Shrimati Parwati in favour of Jaikishan alias Jesiram on Falgun Badi 2, Samwat 1966. If the said document was void and was unable to pass any title to the plaintiffs, then the possession acquired by Jaikishan under the aforesaid document was necessarily adverse to the true owners. 9. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed in Vasudeva Padhi Khadanga Garu vs. Maguni Devan Bakshi Mahapatrulu Garu (1), as under :— "Then comes in section 28, by which his right to the property is extinguished at the determination of the period limited for bringing a suit for possession of it. The point does not require to be expressly pleaded as it is only evidence of the respondents title :" (Itelic added) 10. The point does not require to be expressly pleaded as it is only evidence of the respondents title :" (Itelic added) 10. Following the aforesaid decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council, a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Etawah vs. Mt. Ram Sri (2) held that the plea of adverse possession in such cases could not be specifically pleaded, as it is included in the plea of title. 11. The same view was also expressed by a division bench of the Patna High Court in Sribhagwan Singh vs. Rambasi Kuer (3). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners of the disputed property on the basis of a sale deed executed by one of the defendants and it was alleged that they were put into possession by the executant of the sale deed with the consent of the remaining defendants. It was found that the executant had no authority from the other defendants to execute the sale deed in respect of the land in dispute, and further that the sale deed was invalid being unregistered. On these facts, it was observed as under :— "The position is well established that a transferee having acquired title under an invalid transaction, and continuing in possession for more than twelve years, would be deemed to have acquired a perfectly good title to the property. In the present case, although the oral sale by defendant No 14 to the plaintiffs in 1927 for Rs. 300/- was an invalid sale, as it was not under registered document, and, therefore, it did not amount to a legal sale of the land to the plaintiffs, it could nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession of the plaintiffs thenceforth from 1927 right upto till at least the 26th June, 1947." 12. In Collector of Bombay vs. Bombay Corporation (4), the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay claimed title over the land and building on the basis of a resolution of the Government of Bombay dated December 19, 1865, in pursuance of possession of the site was delivered to the Municipal Corp. although no formal grant was executed as required by law. although no formal grant was executed as required by law. It was held that the Corporation of Bombay, having continued to remain in possession of the site for over70 years, under colour of invalid grant which was not referable to any legal right, it acquired title by adverse possession. The following observa-vation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court may be quoted in this context :- "What in the circumstances as the legal position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title in relation to the land in question ? They were in possession of the land to which they had no legal title at all. Therefore, the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title is as prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity, free from rent but only for the purposes of market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865. The immunity from the liability to pay rent is just as much an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title so required as is the obligation to hold the land for the purposes of a market and for no other purpose. There is no question of acquisition by adverse possession of the Governments prerogative right to levy assessment. What the respondent Corporation has acquired is the legal right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent for the specific purpose of erecting and maintaining a market upon the terms of the Government Resolution as if a legal grant had been made to it." (Itelic added) 13. What the respondent Corporation has acquired is the legal right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent for the specific purpose of erecting and maintaining a market upon the terms of the Government Resolution as if a legal grant had been made to it." (Itelic added) 13. It is thus settled law that possession exercised as of right and openly, uninterrupted for a period of over 20 years, under colour of an invalid grant is prima facie adverse to the title of the real owner from the very moment such possession is taken under the invalid grant. As such possession is not referable to any legal title, it must, therefore, be considered as adverse to the right of the real owner. It has already been observed above that the plaintiffs claimed in the plaint that their father Jaikishan came into possession of the suit shop by virtue of the so called gift deed dated Falgun Badi 2, Samwat Year 1966. Because the said gift deed was a void document, the possession of Jaikishan and his sons and grand-sons over the suit shop, obtained under colour of the said gift deed must be considered to be adverse to the title of the real owners. Thus Jaikishan and the plaintiffs have been prescribing for title no sooner they obtained possession of the disputed shop on the basis of the aforesaid invalid document. It is also in evidence that the plaintiffs executed a mortgage deed Ex. 3 on March 4, 1918 in favour of Hasti Mal Askaran, and were dealing with the property in question as their own, openly and without interruption continuously since Samwat Year 1974, when Shrimati Parwati is said to have expired. Where the plaintiffs based their title on a document and the defendants challenged the validity thereof if the document in question is held to be invalid and did not create any title, then in such cases, the plea of adverse possession is inherent in the plea of title, as the plaintiffs claimed to have come into possession by virtue of such document which was found by the court to be void. I would, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs in the present case have been able to successfully prove their adverse possession in respect of the suit shop since Samwat Year 1974 for a period of more than 20 years and as such the title of the plaintiffs is fully established. 14. Then the question arises as to when the plaintiffs could be considered to have been dispossessed from the suit shop, so as to find out as to whether the suit has been brought within 12 years of the alleged dispossession or discontinuance of possession. P.W.4 Uday Kishan has proved the rent deeds Ex 4 and Ex 5 executed by him in favour of the Mortgagee Hastimal Askaran and the plaintiffs respectively, in respect of the suit shop and it is amply proved from the aforesaid two documents as also the statement of Uday Kishan that he and prior to him, his father Jagannath, were in possession of the suit shop as tenants of the plaintiffs or their mortgagees, Hastimal Askaran The last mentioned document Ex. 5 was executed on February 22. 1945 by Uday Kishan, on the day when the suit shop was redeemed by the plaintiffs from Hastimal Askaran. On the rend deed Ex.5 there are entries regarding payment of rent for a period of seven months and it thus appears that Uday Kishan remained in possession of the suit shop from February 1945 for a period of seven months at least, upto November 21, 1945. Thereafter, Ramdayal, Surajmal executed rend deed in favour of the plaintiffs on April 5, 1949, a copy of which is Ex. 9 on record. The plaintiff Premsukh, appearing as P.W.7, stated that the said rent deed was executed in his presence and that he had handed over the possession of the suit shop to Ramdayal Surajmal. PW 1 Moolchand stated that the original of the rent deed Ex 9 is in possession of Shrimati Dhanni Bai, who being their aunt was authorised by them to collect the rent of the suit shop, as the plaintiffs normally resided at Akola (Madhya Pradesh) while Shrimati Dhanni Bai resided at Phalodi, where the suit shop was situated. PW 1 Moolchand stated that the original of the rent deed Ex 9 is in possession of Shrimati Dhanni Bai, who being their aunt was authorised by them to collect the rent of the suit shop, as the plaintiffs normally resided at Akola (Madhya Pradesh) while Shrimati Dhanni Bai resided at Phalodi, where the suit shop was situated. The learned District Judge has held that the document Ex, 9 has not been proved became permission was not obtained for giving secondary evidence in respect thereof and that the original rent deed should have been called from Smt. Dhanni Bai. Even if the original was not called for and a copy thereof was produced and no objection as to the mode of proof was taken by the defendants when the document Ex. 9 was tendered into evidence and was marked as an exhibit by the trial court, it is settled law that an objection about the mode of proof cannot be raised at the appellate stage. In the present case, evidence in respect of Ex. 9 was led without any objection, and it was too late in the day, when the question of absence of permission to lead secondary evidence was raised for the first time before the court of first appeal. Learned counsel for the defendants relied upon the statement of P.W. 1 Moolchand for the plea that after the shop was vacated by Uday Kishan, the possession thereof was delivered to Smt. Dhanni Bai and during the period the shop was lying vacant, the key of the lock remained with Smt. Dhanni Bai P.W. 1 Moolchand has explained that Smt. Dhanni Bai was the aunt of the plaintiffs and as she was a near relation, residing at the place where the shop was situated, she was handed over the key by the former tenant until the shop was again let out to some other person. Thereafter the rent deed was executed by Surajmal Ramdayal in favour of the plaintiffs. It may be observed that Smt. Dhanni Bai got only a rent deed Ex. A. 5 executed in her favour from Chandan Mal and again she got another rent deed Ex A.4 dated February 11, 1955 executed in her favour by the same tenant, Chandan Mal. Thereafter the rent deed was executed by Surajmal Ramdayal in favour of the plaintiffs. It may be observed that Smt. Dhanni Bai got only a rent deed Ex. A. 5 executed in her favour from Chandan Mal and again she got another rent deed Ex A.4 dated February 11, 1955 executed in her favour by the same tenant, Chandan Mal. There is nothing on the record to show that Smt. Dhanni Bai exercised any hostile title to that of the plaintiffs prior to the execution of the rent deed Ex A. 5 in her favour by Chadanmal in the year 1950. It has been pleaded in the plaint that Smt. Dhanni Bai used to realise the rent of the shop, on behalf of the plaintiffs, from Chandan Mal and the document Ex 10 pas produced in support of such a plea. Chandanmal has admitted the execution of the document Ex. 10 which is an extract of the account relating to the payment of rent in the account books of Chandan Mal. The document shows that rent was paid to Smt. Dhanni Bai as aunt of the plaintiffs and not in her own right as owner of the suit shop. It was argued by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents that Ex. 10 was not relied upon by the court in the suit for ejectment and it was held in that litigation that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not proved between Chandanmal and the plaintiffs. That may be so, yet there is nothing on the record to show that Smt. Dhanni Bai exercised any independent right or hostile title to that of the plaintiffs at any time prior to 1950, when she got the rent deed Ex.A. 5 executed from Chandan Mal. 15. In Nathu Lal vs. Durga Prasad (5), where it was found that the plaintiff was in possession during the earlier period and when the tenant kept by him vacated the house he did not lock it, yet the possession was presumed to continue until the plaintiff was dispossessed by someone else. Their Lordships drew the presumption of continuity of possession in such circumstances, in the following passage :— " It has been found by the courts below that the plaintiff was in possession of this house even during the lifetime of Laxmi and continued in possession thereafter. Their Lordships drew the presumption of continuity of possession in such circumstances, in the following passage :— " It has been found by the courts below that the plaintiff was in possession of this house even during the lifetime of Laxmi and continued in possession thereafter. Even if the tenant vacated the house on the 24th August 1933 and the plaintiff did not lock it, his possession would be presumed to continue till he was dispossessed by some one. The law presumes in favour of continuity of possession. The three courts below have unanimously held that on the evidence it was established that after the death of Laxmi plaintiff continued in possession of the house and the suit was within limitation." 16. Following the aforesaid principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, I hold that the adverse possession of the plaintiff, which began in Samwat Year 1947 (corresponding to the year 1918) after the death of Smt. Parwati, remained continuous and uninterrupted and was openly exercised by them for over 30 years until 1950, when they could be held to have been impliedly dispossessed because Smt. Dhanni Bai got the rent deed Ex. A. 5 executed from the tenant Chandan Mal. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the possession of the plaintiffs was proved only upto August 22, 1945 and not beyond that date, as the plaintiffs failed to prove the allegation made by them that they had let out the shop in dispute to Chandan Mal. When the possession of the plaintiffs was proved right from 1918 to 1945, the presumption of continuity of possession must be drawn their favour, as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nathoolals case (5) and the possession of the plaintiffs would be presumed to continue until they are alleged to have been dispossessed by someone. In Nathoolals case (5) the plaintiffs had alleged that he went to his native place after locking the house but no evidence was led by him about locking the house, and that allegation could not be proved, yet their Lordships of the Supreme Court by raising the presumption of continuation of possession, held the suit to be within time. The same situation arises in the present case. The same situation arises in the present case. From 1918 to 1945 there is positive evidence on the record to show that the plaintiffs and their father were in possession, either by themselves or through their mortgagees or tenants. There is no positive evidence that between 1945 and 1950 the shop was let out either by the plaintiffs or by Shri-mati Dhanni Bai. The case of the plaintiffs is that, during the interval when the shop was let out to a tenant Smt Dhanni Bai had the key of the lock of the shop on behalf of the plaintiffs, as they resided at a far distant place viz. Akola in Madhya Pradesh and Smt. Dhanni Bai was their near relation and was residing in Phalodi where the suit shop was situated, and was looking after the shop on the plaintiffs behalf. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondents was unable to point out any material evidence on the record to show that Smt. Dhanni Bai dealt with the suit property as her own during the period from 1945 to 1950 or that she let out the same to any tenant or realised rent in respect thereof. If the shop remained vacant during the aforesaid period of five years, then applying the presumption of continuity of possession, the possession of the shop must be held to be that of the plaintiffs and Smt. Dhanni Bai must be considered merely to be a care taker on behalf of the plaintiffs. It was only in 1950 that Smt. Dhanni Bai started asserting a hostile title by getting the rent note Ex.A. 5 executed from Chandan Mal in her favour. Thus the possession of the plaintiffs must be held to be continuous upto 1950 and, therefore, the suit filed on May 16, 1960 must be held to be within limitation. It may also be observed here that Smt. Dhanni Bai had claimed to be in adverse possession and an issue was framed in respect thereof but she was unable to prove her adverse possession over the suit shop for a sufficiently long time which could ripen into title by adverse possession. 18. No other point was argued before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. 18. No other point was argued before me by the learned counsel for the parties. 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the learned District Judge, Jodhpur is set aside and the decree for possession and mesne profits passed by the trial court is restored with costs in all the courts.