JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner Koonaram had filed a complaint under sections 420, 406, 467 and 468 Indian Penal Code in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Bilara on 7-5-1977 contending therein that Kishanlal non-petitioner had purchased some land from Babhootram son of Bhanaram Sirvi at Sindwa and on 17-5-1977 entered into a transaction with the complainant and one Bhabhootram son of Udaram Jat and it was decided that Kishanlal will sell that land to them for a consideration of Rs. 68,000/-. Out of that amount Rs. 40,000/- were paid that very day and the remaining amount of Rs. 28,000/- was decided to be paid after one year. On 15-7-1974 Kishanlal demanded the remaining amount but the petitioner and Bhabhootram were not in a position to pay that amount and therefore promised to pay the same within ten or fifteen days and the purchasers executed a deed in favour of Kishanlal to the effect that the remaining amount along with interest at the rate of Rs. 2/- p.m, would be paid within ten or fifteen days and in case of default, Kishanlal would be entitled to keep the earnest money of Rs. 40,000/- with him and the purchasers will not have any right to claim the money or the land. On 30th July, 1974 Koonaram and Bhabhootram gave an amount of Rs. 36,120 - to Kishanlal. Rs. 28,000/- being the principal amount and Rs. 8120/- as interest. On the reverse of the document executed by Koonaram on 15-7-1977 Kishanlal acknowledged the receipt of the amount and appended his signatures thereon with the date 30-7-1977. Koonaram took the document with him. Kishanlal did not handover the possession of the land nor executed the sale deed and get it registered in favour of the purchasers for a sufficient long period and therefore, a notice asking the non-petitioner Kishanlal to fulfill the conditions of the agreement was sent on 4-1-1977 which reached him on 10-1-1977. In the notice it was also mentioned that the complainant had come to know that Kishanlal was intending to give that land to Municipality, Bilara for construction of a Hospital which is a clear cut matter of cheating. On 12-1-1977 reply of the notice was sent by the non-petitioner denying any transaction or agreement between the parties and alleging that in case there is any document it is false and forged. On 12-1-1977 reply of the notice was sent by the non-petitioner denying any transaction or agreement between the parties and alleging that in case there is any document it is false and forged. It was prayed by the complainant that the complaint may be sent for investigation under section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter to be referred as the Code) and the accused Kishanlal may be punished for the offences mentioned in the complaint. 2. The learned Magistrate sent the complaint for investigation under section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code to the Police Station, Bilara. After completion of investigation, a final report was submitted in the Court by the Station House Officer, Police Station, Bilara to the effect that no criminal case was made out against Kishanlal and even if there is any dispute, it is of civil nature and therefore, request was made for accepting the final report. 3. On 6-4-1978 a protest petition was filed by Koonaram with the prayer that the final report may not be accepted and cognizance be taken against the accused and in the alternative statements of the complainant and his witnesses may be recorded under section 200 and 202 Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate examined the complainant under section 200 and his two witnesses Kasimkhan and Gafoor Khan under section 202 Cr. P.C. By his order dated 6-1-1979, the learned Magistrate took cognizance for the offence under section 420 Indian Penal Code and ordered that process may he issued against Kishanlal. Being aggrieved by that order Kishanlal preferred a revision petition in the Court of Sessions Judge, Jodhpur which on transfer reached the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, No. 2 Jodhpur. 4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by his order dated 28-6-1980 held that the conclusion drawn by the learned magistrate on the basis of the record was not proper and legal and no prima facie case was made oui. He, therefore, accepted the revision petition and quashed the order dated 6-1-1979 passed by the learned Magistrate. 5. Being dissatisfied by this order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge petitioner Koonaram has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 6. The first ground of attack by Mr. He, therefore, accepted the revision petition and quashed the order dated 6-1-1979 passed by the learned Magistrate. 5. Being dissatisfied by this order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge petitioner Koonaram has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 6. The first ground of attack by Mr. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner is regarding the maintainability of the revision petition in view of the bar under Sec. 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which imposes a restriction for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. 7. To substantiate his contention, the learned counsel for the petition r placed reliance on a number of authorities and especially on the decision in the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. 1980 Cr. L.J. 690. 8. Mr. J.R. Tatia, learned counsel for the non-petitioner contested this proposition and submitted that an order for issuing the process cannot be said to be interlocutory order in every case rather it will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case as to whether the revisional court should entertain the petition or not. Along with other citations, he, especially emphasised on the principle enunciated in the case of Amarnath and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1977 SC 2185 . and submitted that when there were inherent improbabilities and patent absurdities,the learned Additional Sessions Judge was well within its jurisdiction to set aside that order which would have resulted into unnecessary harassment to the non-petitioner Kishanlal. 9. Mr. Choudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the cases of Santlal Bagrath Tis Hazari Delhi v. Krishanlal Suri and Ors., 1976 Cr. L.J. 215. Bhikhuram Jain and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. 1977 Cr. L.J. 1995. and Smt. Swam Anand and ors. v. Chief Judicial Magistrate and Anr., 1977 Cr. L.J. 355. wherein an order under section 204 was considered to be an Interlocutory Order against which no revision lies. 10. These cases decided by the various High Courts need not be discussed set because the question as to what an Interlocutory Order is emerged for decision in a number of cases before the highest Court of the country and I would therefore, refer to those decisions in order to such guidance. 11. 10. These cases decided by the various High Courts need not be discussed set because the question as to what an Interlocutory Order is emerged for decision in a number of cases before the highest Court of the country and I would therefore, refer to those decisions in order to such guidance. 11. In the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. The State and Another, AIR 1977 SC 403 . an order under section 94 of the old Criminal Procedure Code was issued to any to produce certain document, in response of which she expressed her ability to produce the document. The Magistrate, after the new Code coming in force ordered her to attend the Court. Against that order a revision petition was filed. Their Lordships discussed the bar under section 397 (1) and held that the purpose of sec. 397 of the new code is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of the revision, so that the inquiry trial may proceed without delay. It was further observed that an Interlocutory. Order though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive to the subordinate matter with which it deals. The lady was not a party to the inquiry or trial and in view of this fact it was observed that in a revision filed by her the bar of section 397(2) of the new Code could not be raised. 12. Then comes to the case of Amarnath and Others v. State of Haryana and Others (supra) in which their Lordships were pleased to discuss in detail the embargo under section 397(2) and the scope of that section as well as section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. Their Lordships opined that the term "Interlocutory Order in section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes an order of a purely interim or temporary nature which does not decide to touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Their Lordships were of the opinion that any order which subsequently affects the right of the accused, or decides certain right of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in sec. 397. 397. Their Lordships cited certain examples interlocutory orders and at the same time observed that the orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The question which was involved in that special leave was particularly regarding the interpretation and scope of the word interlocutory order appearing in section 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. After an elaborate discussion on the point, their Lordships were pleased to observe that the order of the Magistrate summoning the appellant was one which was a matter of moment. It was further held that if the appellants were not summoned, they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants without proper application of mind could not be held to be an interlocutory natter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. 13. The law propounded in that case thus set the matter at rest that in peculiar circumstances a revision can be entertained against an order for issuing process. 14. The next important case relating to the bar under section 397(2) is Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 47. While throwing light on the intention of the legislature for inserting this sub-section 2 or sub-section 3 of the new code, their Lordships observed that the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditions disposal of the cases finally, because more often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders, delaying the final disposal of the proceedings and therefore, legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in sec. 397. Their Lordships further observed that ordinarily and generally the expression Interlocutory Order has been understood and taken to mean as converse of the term final Order, but as interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must bean interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. 15. 397. Their Lordships further observed that ordinarily and generally the expression Interlocutory Order has been understood and taken to mean as converse of the term final Order, but as interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must bean interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. 15. By the two cases referred to above, it has been made clear that an order not being final need not always be interlocutory because there may be orders which may be called intermediary on the order relating to the matters of moment. 16. Mr. Choudhary contended that the view expressed in these cases is no more a good law because of the decision of the case of V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (supra) wherein the order passed by the Special Judge under Special Courts Act No. 1979 was held to be an interlocutory order and as such an appeal against the same was held to be incompetent. 17. In that judgment there is a detailed discussion about the expression interlocutory order appearing in Sec. 11(1) of the Special Courts Act (1979) and Sec. 397(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appeal in that case was filed under section 11(1) of the Special Courts Act and a preliminary question about the entertain ability of the appeal, in view of the term interlocutory order appearing in that section was under consideration. The preliminary objection was upheld and the appeal filed was held to be not maintainable. It is on this proposition that Mr. Choudhary has built up the argument that the view taken in Amarnaths case (2) (Supra) was modified and therefore, the principle enunciated in this subsequent authority so far as the interpretation of the term interlocutory order is concerned should be the guide line for this Court. 18. The argument is not appealing for the reason that in this case their Lordships were dealing with the expression interlocutory order appearing in Sec 11 of the Special Courts Act which is a Special Law. The distinction drawn by their Lordships was that so far as the expression of interlocutory appearing in Sec. 11(1) Special Courts Act is concerned.it has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Court in section 397(2) of the Code. The distinction drawn by their Lordships was that so far as the expression of interlocutory appearing in Sec. 11(1) Special Courts Act is concerned.it has been used in the natural sense and not in a special or a wider sense as used by the Court in section 397(2) of the Code. The law laid down in Amarnaths case (2) (supra) was not attempted lo be set aside by this case. The observations in Amarnaths case regarding the orders, which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court were reproduced in this judgment and their Lordships were pleaded to observe as under:- "It is no doubt true that this Court held that an order summoning the accused was not an interlocutory order but being the matter of moments it decided an important aspect of the trial and was, therefore, in a sense a final order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge or the High Court under sec. 397 of the Code. The observations made by this Court however have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts of the said case". 19. After stating the facts of Amarnaths case it was observed as under:- "It was in the back ground of these circumstances that this Court held that such an order being a matter of moment affecting the important rights of the parties could not be said to be purely an interlocutory orders. We have no doubt that the decision of this Court referred to above was absolutely correct. In fact this part of the decision was endorsed by the latter decision of this Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) " (emphasis is mine). 20. The sentence underlined by me in the above citation clearly indicates that even while deciding V.C. Shuklas case, the principle enunciated in Amarnaihs case was held to be correct and therefore, the argument of Mr. Choudhary that the situation has changed after V.C. Shuklas case does not hold good. 21. 20. The sentence underlined by me in the above citation clearly indicates that even while deciding V.C. Shuklas case, the principle enunciated in Amarnaihs case was held to be correct and therefore, the argument of Mr. Choudhary that the situation has changed after V.C. Shuklas case does not hold good. 21. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the order issuing process against the accused is not in every case the type of interlocutory order so as to attract the embargo of sec. 397(2) of the Code. What the courts are expected to take into consideration is that the purpose of this provision may not be frustrated by entertaining revision petition against every such order so as to allow the delaying tactics. Revisional power can be exercised in the peculiar facts of the case require probing into the matter by the revisional court in order to see that there is no miscarriage of justice and the accused are not put on a trial without there being a prima facie case against them and the Magistrate has properly applied his mind to the record available while exercising the discretion. 22. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no absolute bar for entertaining such a revision petition and the maintainability of the revision petition would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. 23. Assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on merits, Mr. Choudhary stressed that there was sufficient matter to establish the ingredients of sec. 420 Indian Penal Code so as to make a prima facie case against the non-petitioner and the revisional court should not have gone into the depth of the matter. It has next been argued that the: scope under section 204 is limited and the Magistrate is not expected to look into the matter from the point of view as to whether on the facts existing in the record at the time there can be a conviction or not, rather he is only to see whether there is substance to hold that a prima facie case is made out. 24. Mr. Choudhary referred to the case of Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, AIR 1976 SC 1947 . 24. Mr. Choudhary referred to the case of Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, AIR 1976 SC 1947 . wherein their Lordships have been pi eased to observe as under : "At the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one". 25. Observations were made regarding the discretion to be judicially exercised by the Magistrate and it was held that in the following cases an order of Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed : (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused. (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible, and (4) Where the complaint suffer fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 26. In that case the order of the Magistrate issuing a process against the accused persons was considered to be a very reasoned one which took into consideration the allegations in the complaint as also the evidence adduced in support of it and therefore, the interference of the High Court by quashing that order was considered to be an entirely wrong approach. 27. Mr. 27. Mr. Tatia, learned counsel for the non-petitioner does not dispute the position that the discretion exercised by the Magistrate on sound reasoning should not be lightly interfered with by the revisional court but his submission is that in the present case when no case is made out against the non-petitioner, the revisional court committed no error in quashing the order of the magistrate issuing, the process. 28. I am alive of the principle that the order passed under section 204 of the Code must be based on the material on record before the Magistrate ami it should be his own independent opinion. It is also well settled that the discretion exercised by him, if it leaves no room for thinking that the discretion has not been properly used, should not be lightly interfered with by the revisional court. 29. With this principle in view, I now turn to the facts of the case on hand to find out whether the discretion exercised by the learned magistrate could b said to have been based on substantial material and there was no justification in the interference by the revisional court. 30. At the very out set I may observe that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has elaborately discussed the material on record and has given sound reasonings for his conclusion that no prima facie case is made out against the non-petitioner. He has emphasised upon the unnatural conduct of the petitioner as well as the inherent improbabilities and patent absurdity of the complainants case. In order to make out whether the approach of the revisional court was correct, I have carefully examined the record of the case and I am in perfect agreement with the learned Additional Sessions Judge that there re inherent improbabilities and patent absurdities in the case and it cannot be said that a prima facie of cheating is made out against the non-petitioner. 31. First of all, I will take the slackness of the petitioner in the alleged transaction. Initial talk about the transaction is said to have transpired on 17-5-1973 and it is surprising that the purchasers Kooparam and Bhabhootram would have parted with a huge sum of Rs. 40,000/- without there being any line drawn in that respect or without obtaining any receipt from the non-petitioner. Initial talk about the transaction is said to have transpired on 17-5-1973 and it is surprising that the purchasers Kooparam and Bhabhootram would have parted with a huge sum of Rs. 40,000/- without there being any line drawn in that respect or without obtaining any receipt from the non-petitioner. Still more surprising is the fact that on 15-7-1974 on the alleged demand by non-petitioner for the remaining amount of Rs. 28,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs. 68,000/- the purchasers themselves executed an agreement, Koonaram being the scribe of the same and even the signatures of even Kishanlal were not taken. It is to be noted that on that date Bhanwarlal and Gafoor Khan while attesting the document had written that they have done s at the instance and in the presence of the purchasers and Kishanlal, Despite that, signatures of Kishanlal do not appear there. The only implicating alleged fact against the non-petitioner is an endorsement on the reverse of that document acknowledging the receipt of the amount and the interest written in the agreement and his signatures and date 30-7-1974 beneath them. 32. It is not palatable that a person parting with Rs. 40,000/- without getting a line drawn from the receiver would agree to pay the interest on the remaining amount from the date of the initial talk about the transaction. Assuming for the sake of argument the contention that it was so decided amongst the parties at the initial stage and out of implicit faith in Kishanlal. Koonaram and Bhabooram did not obtain the receipt or get any document executed by Kishanlal, still when on 15-7-1974 Kishanlal is said to have insisted on the payment of the remaining amount along with the amount of interest thereupon from the initial date of transaction the petitioner should have become conscious and should have got some thing in writing or must have at least taken his signatures on the document written by Koonaram petitioner. 33. Mr. Choudhary submitted that even in this state of affairs there is one strong factor against the non-petitioner. 33. Mr. Choudhary submitted that even in this state of affairs there is one strong factor against the non-petitioner. According to him the signatures of Kishalal appearing on the acknowledgement receipt of the notice sent to him by Koonaram and on the reply sent by him to Koonaram were got compared with the signatures on the reverse of the above referred document through an export who had opined that the three signatures are or the same person, and therefore, there was substance in the complaint that non-petitioner has cheated the petitioner and therefore, the order of issuing of summons stands justified. 34. This point has not missed the attention of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Relevant it is to mention that the matter was sent for investigation to the Police under section 156(3) of the Code. After taking the necessary evidence, specimen writing and signatures of the non-petitioners were taken before the Magistrate i.e. he was asked to write the same line which appears on the reverse side of the said document and to sign and date it and that specimen writing was sent for expert opinion in connection with the writing on the concerned document. Mr. G.P. Sharma, Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory. sent the report that writing of the specimen series and writing on the disputed document, cannot be connected. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has to took into consideration these inconsistent opinions along with other infirmities in the complaint referred to above. 35. Yet another important factor weighing with the revisional court was that even after 30-7-1974 when the full amount along with interest was paid to the non-petitioner when he did not get the sale deed executed and registered nor did be handover the possession how could petitioner keep quiet till 1977 when the notice was sent. A person parting with an amount of Rs. 76120/- would not in the ordinary course of nature sit idle for a period of three year. Mr. Choudlarys argument is that it was only on investigation in the officer of Tehsildar that it was known that no land at Sindwa stood in the name of Kishanlal and then the petitioner became alert, has no force. The reason is that even in the notice this fact does not appear. Mr. Choudlarys argument is that it was only on investigation in the officer of Tehsildar that it was known that no land at Sindwa stood in the name of Kishanlal and then the petitioner became alert, has no force. The reason is that even in the notice this fact does not appear. Apart from it in the statement of Kishanlal recorded under section 200 Criminal Procedure Code, he has stated that on enquiry from Khatedar Bhaboot Ram, he told that he had sold some land to Kishanlal. Even after receipt of the reply of notice in the month of January, the petitioner did not take any step till 7-5-1979, the date of the filing of the complaint. All these factors were responsible for the filing of the final report on the ground that no criminal case was made out and the case even if any, was of Civil nature. 36. Mr. Choudhary referred to the case of Smaria v. Narayanan, 1962 (1) Cr.L.J. 649 wherein the availability of the civil remedies to the complainant was not held to be sufficient for exclusion of criminal trial. The argument is worth consideration and I am of the opinion that mere filing of the suit for specific performance and damages for an amount of Rs. 98,282,45/- filed by the petitioner and Bhaboot Ram against the non-petitioner Kishanlal in the Court of District Judge, Jodhpur would not come in the way of the criminal proceedings if the case under section 420 Indian Penal Code is made out. 37. Mr. Choudhary relied on the decisions of Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bangal, AIR 1954 SC 724 . and Shivanarayan Kabra v. The State of Madras, 1967 Cri.L.J. 946 to substantiate his argument that in a case of breach of contract or agreement offence under Section 420 Indian Penal Code is made out. The nature of allegations and facts and circumstances of those case being of an altogether different type the principles enunciated there in are of no help to the petitioner. 38. It has been pointed out by Mr. Choudhary that in this case without there being any land with the non-petitioner, he cheated Koonaram and Bhaboot Ram Jat and induced them to part with their money. 38. It has been pointed out by Mr. Choudhary that in this case without there being any land with the non-petitioner, he cheated Koonaram and Bhaboot Ram Jat and induced them to part with their money. I have already dealt with this argument and referred to the statement of Koonaram under section 200 Criminal Procedure Code deposing that Bhaboot Ram (Sirvi) on inquiry had told him that be had sold same land to Kishanlal. All these aspects of the case and especially the unnatural conduct of the petitioner in not getting anything in writing and his keeping quiet for a period of four years after parting with Rs. 40,000/- and three years after parting with the amount of Rs. 36,120/- has been rightly considered by the revisional court and there is no impropriety or incorrectness in the impugned order. 39. I may mention here that the revisional court need not always enter into an elaborate discussion of the material on record as I have done in this case, but when the impugned order of the revisional court has been assailed on the ground of illegality as well as incorrectness and impropriety it became necessary for me to go into depth of the matter to find out whether the order of the revisional court, which should be slow in interfering with the discretionary order of the magistrate passed under section 204 of the Code suffers from any such infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court. The reason is that if the discretionary order of the magistrate can be said to have been passed after proper application of mind to the facts on record, however short or inexpressive it might be, it should not have been interfered. 40. From the above discussion, as constrained to opine that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the findings of the learned magistrate that a prima facie case under section 420 Indian Penal Code was made out cannot be said to be justified and therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of the ease, the learned Additional Sessions Judge committed no illegality or impropriety in quashing that order. 41. Mr. 41. Mr. Choudhary at the end submitted that simply by issuing process even in cases where the revisional court holds that there is no prima facie case, no interference is warranted because mere passing an order under section on 201 would not land to the full trial and under the provisions of Section 245 (2) of the code the person alleged against can be discharged after the process, issued but before the evidence is recorded under sub-section (1) of Section 245 of the Code. To support his contention be referred to the case of Gopal Chauhan v. Smt. Satya and another, 1979 Cr. L.J. 446. The argument is quite attractive but what I am to see in this revision petition is whether in the circumstances of the case on hand, when the revisional court came to a conclusion, and in my opinion rightly so, that no prima facie case was made out against the non-petitioner, there was no illegality improprieties or incorrectness in quashing that order by the revisional court. This being the position, the impugned order cannot be set aside only on the ground that relief could still be sought by the non-petitioner under the provisions of Sec. 245(2) of the Code. 42. Consequently, the revision petition having no merits is rejected.Revision Dismissed. *******