JUDGEMENT Gujral, C. J. :- This Reference under Art.228 of the Constitution of India and Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. made by the learned Sessions Judge of Sikkim at Gangtok by his order dated 28th of Nov., 1979, brings to the forefront the question of the constitutional validity of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act. 1976 (hereinafter called the"Sikkim Act") in the light of the provisions of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution of India. The answer to this question would finally settle the procedure to be followed by the Courts in Sikkim in respect of the trials of criminal cases pending therein. The circumstances leading to this Reference may first briefly be stated. 2. The controversy involved has a close link with the judicial history of Sikkim during the last three decades. Though from the historical point of view the period does not relate to distant past yet the procedural atmosphere is surrounded with such mystery as if excavation of pre-historic culture is needed to unravel it. So far as the Penal law is concerned, the position as it prevailed before July, 1953 is somewhat hazy but by and large the provisions of the Indian Penal Code were broadly guiding the destinies of the criminals but after July, 1953 a Notification bearing No. 160/OS dated 10th of July, 1953 was promulgated and the I.P.C. 1860 was in terms made available to the Courts for basing their decisions regarding the criminality of the persons brought before them. The procedural aspect, however, still remained obscure as no legislative mandate is traceable till August, 1963 when a Notification bearing No. 73/H dated the 30th Aug., 1963 makes reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and carries the implication that sometime before the issuance of this Notification, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 had been bought into force to settle the procedural guidelines for the trial of criminal cases. There being no indication in this Notification of the date on which the Cr. P.C., 1898 was adopted in Sikkim or the date for which this Code was brought into force, the Notification, instead of offering any assistance in resolving the controversy, kept the uncertainty alive till Sikkim became part of India. To explain this a brief reference to the Cr. P.C. 1898 is necessary. P.C., 1898 was adopted in Sikkim or the date for which this Code was brought into force, the Notification, instead of offering any assistance in resolving the controversy, kept the uncertainty alive till Sikkim became part of India. To explain this a brief reference to the Cr. P.C. 1898 is necessary. This Code has been the subject-matter of numerous amendments till its repeal in 1974 but in the present strife the amendment brought about by the Amendment Act 26 of 1955 are mainly involved. By this Amendment Act, Section 251 was amended and new Section 152-A was introduced in the Cr. P.C., 1898. The departure in the procedure considerably curtailed the opportunity for cross-examination which was earlier available to the accused in a warrant case instituted on police report and the acceleration of the trial appears to be the motivating force behind this procedural innovation. 3. To have a clear, though a bird's eye view, of the problem, a brief reference to Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution is indicated. By this provision, the laws which were in force in Sikkim on the appointed day (26th Apr., 1975) were preserved and continued till their repeal or amendment by appropriate authority. If the Cr. P.C., 1898 was adopted in 1953, at the time the Indian Penal Code was extended to Sikkim, as is commonly the impression, and the subsequent amendments were not extended, the procedure in the trial of warrant cases instituted on police report would be as was provided in Chap. XXI before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 and this would be the law in force in Sikkim on the appointed day. In that case, S.251-A would not be attracted and the trial would be conducted without the procedural charge introduced by this provision. The Notification of 1963 though highly probabilities the existence of an earlier Notification whereby the Cr. P.C. 1898 may have been adopted in Sikkim but as it failed to indicate the date of the pronouncement by the competent authority it offers no assistance in resolving the procedural problem. The Notification of 1963 though highly probabilities the existence of an earlier Notification whereby the Cr. P.C. 1898 may have been adopted in Sikkim but as it failed to indicate the date of the pronouncement by the competent authority it offers no assistance in resolving the procedural problem. In this situation three alternatives can be visualised, i.e., (a) the procedure for the criminal trials may have been controlled by the Code as it stood before the 1955 Amendment, or (b) as it stood after the 1955 Amendment, or (c) that the Code in terms may not have been adopted and the Courts may have continued to follow the basic procedure provided in the Code of 1898. As to which of these possibilities represented the precise state of affairs, certainty alludes the final conclusion but it may be added that in case the third alternative was to provide the keynote, uniformity in procedure must have been the casualty. In any case, whatever may have been the position, because of the absence of a clear legislative mandate, this state of uncertainty continued till the appointed day and was somewhat heightened thereafter. Realising this unhappily situation, the State Legislature stepped in and enacted the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act,. 1976 and brought it into force with immediate effect, i.e. from 29th Mar., 1976. Though this enactment ought to have acted as a magic-wand to drive away the clouds of ambiguity but unfortunately the Courts in Sikkim failed to comprehend the full impact of this legislative measure, with the result that haziness still permeated the procedural atmosphere. So much so that even after three years of the enforcement of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976, the learned Sessions Judge felt compelled to make a Reference to this Court under Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. However in fairness to the learned Sessions Judge it may be mentioned that this confusion mainly stems from the persistent impression (for which there was probably some factual basis) that along with the Notification dated 10th of July 1953 whereby the I.P.C. was adopted as the law in Sikkim, another Notification ex tending the Cr. P.C. 1898 was also issued. P.C. 1898 was also issued. This impression is obvious from the Office Order of the Acting Chief Justice dated 25th of July, 1975 which indicated that the Code of 1898 as it stood before Amendment of 1955 was being followed in Sikkim and this position was reiterated in Passang Lama v. State of Sikkim (1975 Cr LJ 1350). 4. Though in the case of State v. Madan Mohan Rasaily (Criminal Revn. No. 3 of 1978) the High Court got an opportunity to put the matter beyond the pale of controversy but unfortunately the question was not considered in detail as it was neither argued at length nor was it found necessary to resolve this apparent conflict for the derision of that case. Probably, the Court was influenced by the view, for which there is ample authority, that constitutional questions may not be decided if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. In Madan Mohan Rasaily's case the Court was concerned with the duty of the prosecution to produce the original documents along with the charge-sheet. In considering the scope of the obligation of the prosecution to produce the original documents along with the charge-sheet. In considering the scope of the obligation of the prosecution to produce the original documents though a passing reference was made to the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976, and the prevailing impression that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood before the amendment of 1955 was the law in force on the appointed day but the constitutionality of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 was not examined in the light of Art.371-F(k) and the case was disposed of on the basis of the other contentions put forth by the parties. In fact, Bhattacharjee, J., while agreeing with the main conclusion, added that it was not necessary to decide whether the Cr. P.C. 1898 was applicable as it stood in 1953 or after amendment by the 1955 Act. 5. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the premises that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force on the"Appointed day" as defined in Art.371-F of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 being in conflict with the constitutional mandate contained in Article 371-F(k) was ultra vires and ought to be struck down. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force on the"Appointed day" as defined in Art.371-F of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 being in conflict with the constitutional mandate contained in Article 371-F(k) was ultra vires and ought to be struck down. He also sought support for this view from some observations in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case and on the basis of this reasoning he found himself compelled to make a reference under Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. And this is how the matter has come before this Court to finally determine what procedural paths the lower Courts should follow while trying warrant cases instituted on the basis of police reports. 6. The above narration having provided the factual backdrop the stage is now set for clearing the legalistic hurdles. To bar the reference at the threshold the learned counsel for the accused projected the incompetency of the reference as an obstacle, on the plea that neither S.432 of the Cr. P.C. nor Art.228 of the Constitution were attracted. When faced with this situation the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of Sikkim, did not make use of Art.228 of the Constitution as a shield to stave off the technical onslaught of incompetency and only projected S.432 of the Cr. P.C. as the statutory harbour to protect the reference. A close examination of Art.228 of the Constitution would reveal that to fall within the scope of this provision, a reference must involve a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution, the determination of which would be necessary for the disposal of this case. As will be shortly discussed, the interpretation of Art.371-F(k) does not give rise to any substantial question of law as the extent and scope of similar provisions to inhibit the competent legislatures to legislate retrospectively has been the subject-matter of numerous decisions by the High Courts and the Supreme Court and no substantial question relating to the interpretation of the Constitution survives for decision by this Court. Moreover, it is the interpretation of Section 2 of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which is mainly involved and this does not fall within the scope of Article 228 of the Constitution. 7. Sub-Section (1) of S.432 of the Cr. Moreover, it is the interpretation of Section 2 of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which is mainly involved and this does not fall within the scope of Article 228 of the Constitution. 7. Sub-Section (1) of S.432 of the Cr. P.C. which is relevant at this stage is as follows :- "Where any Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation, or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which the Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the decision of the High Court." The above provision does not cover the same ground as Art.228 of the Constitution and in fact, in one sense, it is much wider in its sweep than Art.228. Sec. 432 relates to the validity of an Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc. and is not confined merely to an interpretation of the Constitution. In order to attract this provision the Court has to form an opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc., is invalid or inoperative but has not been so declared by the High Court or the Supreme Court. 8. Keeping in the forefront the requirements of Section 432 of the Cr. P.C., 1898, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the assumption that immediately before the appointed day, the procedural law in force was the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 and thereby drew the inference that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which retrospectively enforces the applicability of the Cr. P.C., 1898 as amended by Act 26 of 1955 would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality because of the mandate of Art.371-F(k) preserving the laws in the same form or shape as these stood before the appointed day. The observation in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case, Cri. Revn. No. 3 of 1978 (Sikkim), that the trial of warrant case on police report was governed by the procedure contained in Chap. The observation in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case, Cri. Revn. No. 3 of 1978 (Sikkim), that the trial of warrant case on police report was governed by the procedure contained in Chap. XXI of the Code before its amendment in 1955, were also pressed into service by the teamed Sessions Judge for drawing the conclusion that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 was unconstitutional and ought to be struck down. There is no gainsaying the fact that before the trial of the case, in which reference has been made, can proceed the procedural path, which is beset by the interpretational wrangle on the scope and effect of S.2 of the Sikkim Act, has to be cleared. Viewed in the light of the requirements of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reference covers all the necessary ingredients and suffers from no infirmity. The Court was clearly faced with the procedural difficulty which could not be resolved unless the constitutionality of the Sikkim Act was tested in the light of the provisions of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution. 9. In support of his challenge to the validity of the reference, Mr. J.C. Ghosh, learned counsel for the accused, relied on Emperor v. Ratan Singh. ((1948) 52 CWN 869) but this case has absolutely no bearing on the matter in dispute before us. In Ratan Singh's case the Reference was made because the Presidency Magistrate doubted the correctness of certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court relating to a case under the Indian Arms Act.) The High Court rightly pointed out that"S.482 does not give them power to refer points of law settled by decisions of this Court, where the Magistrate doubts the correctness of these decisions". Constitutional validity of any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc., was not involved in this at all and S.432, Cr. P.C. was, therefore, not attracted. Reference was then made to M. Rajarama Reddi's case (AIR 1952 Mad 578) : (1952 Cri LJ 1235) and reliance was placed on the following observations extracted from this judgement : "A subordinate Court should only make a reference to the High Court, when it is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a real or substantial question as to the validity of any Act or regulation. A mere plea that an Act is'ultra vires' will not suffice. A mere plea that an Act is'ultra vires' will not suffice. If it is not so satisfied it should go on with the trial, leaving it to the aggrieved accused to move the High Court under Article 228, and to continue the trial until such an application is admitted and the trial stayed." 10. In Rajarama Reddi's case, an order of the Taluk Supply Officer was challenged on the ground that his order was passed under S.3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and it should have been notified in the official gazette. The validity of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act was also challenged. The learned Judges rejected both these contentions and also came to the conclusion that these points had been earlier decided in AIR 1952 Mad 576 : (1002 Cri LJ 1235). Keeping in view the background in which the above observations were made, there is no scope for contending that even where a substantial question and not merely a specious plea as to the validity of an Act is involved, reference under S.432, Code of Cr. P.C. cannot be made. 11. The rejection of the preliminary objection as untenable has cleared the deck for an in-depth analysis of the Sikkim Act in the light of Art.371-F(k) and the legislative competence of the Sikkim Legislature to pierce the protective barrier of this constitutional provision by giving retrospective effect to S.2 of the Sikkim, Act. The relevant provisions are extracted below for facility of reference : Article 371-F(k) -"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." Section 2 of the Sikkim Act-"The provisions of the Cri. P.C. 1898 subject to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule below have been the law in force in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 and is and shall be in force as the law relating to criminal procedure in the State of Sikkim until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." 12. A bare reading of S.2 of the Sikkim Act will leave no manner of doubt that the Cr. A bare reading of S.2 of the Sikkim Act will leave no manner of doubt that the Cr. P.C. 1898 incorporating all the amendments that this Act has suffered up to 1974 when it was repealed including the amendments by Act of 1955, was projected as the procedural law in Sikkim subject only to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule, with which we are not concerned in the present reference. A further analysis will reveal that Section 2 of the Sikkim Act is in two parts, in the sense that the first part conferred retrospective operation to the Cr. P.C. 1898 as if stood before its repeal (subject to the Schedule of the Act) while the second part enforced the statute prospectively. The expression that"the provisions of the said Cr. P.C., 1898....have been the law in force in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment Act, 1975)" carries the implication that whatever, in actuality, may have been the law in force immediately before the appointed day in the State of Sikkim with regard to the procedure followed by the Criminal Courts for the trial of criminal cases, at least as a result of the Sikkim Act, the Cr. P.C., 1898 with all the amendments incorporated in it, but subject only to the exceptions and modifications shown in the Schedule, would be considered to be the law in force immediately before the appointed day. The further expression that the Cr. P.C., 1898"is and shall be in force as the law relating to criminal procedure in the State of Sikkim until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority" emphasises the prospective operation of the Cr. P.C. 1898. 13. The line of reasoning adopted by the learned Sessions Judge in brief is that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force immediately before the appointed day within the meaning of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Act which brought into operation the Cr. P.C. as it stood after the 1955 Amendment as the law before the appointed day was clearly violative of the above constitutional provision. P.C. as it stood after the 1955 Amendment as the law before the appointed day was clearly violative of the above constitutional provision. The further implication which this argument carries is that the Sikkim Legislature could not amend any law which was in force in Sikkim on or before the appointed day with retrospective effect from a date prior to the appointed day even though no objection could be raised with regard to the legislative competence of the Sikkim Legislature on the basis of the subject-matter of the legislation. 14. In reply, the learned Advocate-General has emphasised the utter futility of the above reasoning so far as the decision of the present case is concerned, on the simple, though effective, plea that the cases now pending in Sikkim could be validly governed by the procedure indicated in S.2 of the Sikkim Act as not even a remote challenge has been and could earnestly be posed to the prospective operation that has been given to the Cr. P.C., 1898 by the Sikkim Act. The subject-matter of this Act is appropriately covered by Item 2 to Entry 3 to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which is the Concurrent List and the power of the Sikkim Legislature to enact laws in respect of matters in this List are only subject to the limitation placed by Art.254 of the Constitution which renders any law made by the State Legislature on any matter in the Concurrent List invalid in case such law is repugnant to any law made by Parliament unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. The Sikkim Act is not in conflict with any Parliamentary law on the subject and in fact has the effect of extending the Parliamentary Act to Sikkim and in this situation the validity of the Sikkim Act is beyond questioning so far as its prospective operation is concerned. The subject matter of the Sikkim Act being within the legislative sphere of the Sikkim Legislature and no doubts having been expressed about the absence of inhibitions and limitations regarding its competence, at least, to legislate prospectively, the operational ambit of S.2 of the Sikkim Act in respect of the cases instituted after the enforcement of this Act cannot be the subject-matter of challenge any more. From this it would logically follow that the criminal case which has caused this reference to be made would be governed by the Sikkim Act and this conclusion is not only plausible, but wholly beyond the pale of controversy. This unimpeachable view would further generate the consequence that the Cr. P.C. 1898 as it stood in 1973, subject to exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule to"the Sikkim Act would guide the destinies of the accused in all cases instituted or to be instituted after the coming into force of the Sikkim Act. 15. The question of prospective operation of the Sikkim Act having been answered with satisfying'finality I proceed to deal with another contention raised by Mr. Ghosh. The learned counsel for the accused has sought the assistance of an argument which though somewhat interesting and ingenious is without much basis and is in fact an argument of frustration. The reasoning, in short, proceeds thus: By virtue of a Notification, which though not traceable, but was issued on 10th of July, 1953 or as a consequence of the practice followed by the Criminal Courts in Sikkim, the Cr. P.C., 1898 before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 was the law in force immediately before the appointed day and that reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in the Sikkim Act was intended by the Legislature to be a reference to the Code before its amendment in 1955. The basis for this argument is sought in the assumption that the Legislature had only declared the law by the Sikkim Act and had not intended to introduce any alteration or innovation in the procedural law. To say the least, the entire argument is based on fantasy saving no factual links. To start with, the assertion that a Notification was issued on 10th of July, 1953 extending the Cr. P.C., 1898 to Sikkim is wholly devoid of any material or evidentiary support. No doubt that at one time there was an impression in the Sikkim Courts that such a Notification had been issued but as existence of such a Notification could not be established the impression will have to be branded as conjectural. A reference in the Office Order dated 25th July, 1975 issued by the then Acting Chief Justice and the casual observation in the case of Madan Mohan Rasaily (Cri Revn No. 3 of 1978) that the Cr. A reference in the Office Order dated 25th July, 1975 issued by the then Acting Chief Justice and the casual observation in the case of Madan Mohan Rasaily (Cri Revn No. 3 of 1978) that the Cr. P.C., 1898 prior to its amendment in 1955 was operative in Sikkim before the appointed day are again the manifestations of the same impression and cannot furnish a factual basis for the existence of such a Notification. 16. To determine the existence or otherwise of the Notification supposed to have been issued on 10th of July, 1953, in respect of the procedure to be followed by the Sikkim Courts, or to highlight the factual position with regard to the state of the procedural law before the appointed day, a reference was invited by Mr. Ghosh and also by the learned Sessions Judge in the order of reference, to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Sikkim Act, but before we take the interpretative aid of this source it would be imperative to determine the extent to which and the purpose for which this source can be pressed into service. The matter has been considered in number of cases by the Supreme Court and from a review of these judgements, the position that emerges may be stated thus. Though reference to the statement of objects and reasons cannot be made as an aid to interpretation or for ascertaining the meanings of a particular word or words in a statute, nevertheless it is permissible to refer to the objects and reasons for the correct appreciation of : (i) what was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (iii) what remedy the Legislature had appointed; and (iv) the reasons for the remedy. 17. A reference to the objects and reasons is thus permissible to ascertain what procedural law was governing the criminal trials in Sikkim when the Bill was moved. In the objects and reasons there is a mention that"The I.P.C., 1860, with certain modifications, was adopted as the law in Sikkim by a notification bearing No. 160/O.S. dated 10th July, 1953", and it is added that,"though such a notification adopting the Cr. P.C., 1898, in Sikkim is not readily traceable, the provisions of the said Cr. In the objects and reasons there is a mention that"The I.P.C., 1860, with certain modifications, was adopted as the law in Sikkim by a notification bearing No. 160/O.S. dated 10th July, 1953", and it is added that,"though such a notification adopting the Cr. P.C., 1898, in Sikkim is not readily traceable, the provisions of the said Cr. P.C. have thereafter been applied and followed as the law of criminal procedure in Sikkim". It is further mentioned that"in fact the provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1898, have since been applied and followed in Sikkim with this modification that the provisions relating to commitment enquiry as contained in Chap. XVIII of the Code and the provisions relating to trials before Court of Session as contained in Chap. XXIII of the Code have not been applied and the trial of cases triable by the Court of Session has also been conducted according to the provisions contained in Chap. XXI of the Code dealing with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases by the Magistrates". Reference was then made to another notification dated 2nd of July, 1975 and from this an inference was drawn that"the provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1898 have been treated as the law in force immediately before the appointed day". Reference in the statement of objects and reasons is also made to the case of Passing Lama v. State of Sikkim (1975 Cr LJ 1350) and to the observation therein that the Cr. P.C., 1898"in terms is not applicable in the State of Sikkim." 18. The statement of objects and reasons is bereft of any material to support the assertion that the Cr. P.C., 1898 before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 was the law in force in Sikkim before the appointed day and in fact the only firm conclusion available is that the Code, subject to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule, was the law applicable to the criminal trials in Sikkim. The contention of Mr. Ghosh, therefore, is unable to find any factual basis in the statement of object and reasons and is liable to be brushed aside as a matter of no consequence. 19. Another limb of this argument may appropriately be considered at this stage. The contention of Mr. Ghosh, therefore, is unable to find any factual basis in the statement of object and reasons and is liable to be brushed aside as a matter of no consequence. 19. Another limb of this argument may appropriately be considered at this stage. It was urged that as two interpretations of the expression"Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" occurring in the Sikkim Act were possible, the one in favour of the accused, which gave him greater opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, should be adopted. This argument wholly loses sight of the fundamental rule of interpretation that where the words are clear and unambiguous no further aid to construction is needed and the words used in the statute should be allowed to have their full play. Rules of construction can only be pressed into service if either the words used in the context of their ordinary meanings would give rise to some ambiguity or the language used is capable of more than one meaning but not otherwise. In the present case, there is no ambiguity at all and the legislative mandate in S.2 of the Sikkim Act is couched in clear and lucid words capable of one and only one meaning and not inviting or even welcoming any other interpretative aid. There is no occasion for reading in the expression"Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" a reference to the Code as it stood before the 1955 Amendment. Consequently the only plausible conclusion available is that from the date the Sikkim Act came into force, the Cr. P.C. 1898, with the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the schedule provides the only procedural channel through which criminal trials must of necessity steer. 20. This brings us to the challenge posed to the retrospective operation of the Sikkim Act which it would be necessary to meet in case we proceed on the assumption that the Criminal Courts in Sikkim were being guided by the Cr. P.C., 1898, before its Amendment in 1955 and this was the law in force immediately before he appointed day. This brings us to the challenge posed to the retrospective operation of the Sikkim Act which it would be necessary to meet in case we proceed on the assumption that the Criminal Courts in Sikkim were being guided by the Cr. P.C., 1898, before its Amendment in 1955 and this was the law in force immediately before he appointed day. Though for an answer to the reference an examination of this aspect of the matter may not strictly be necessary, but it would be fruitful to view the Sikkim Act from all aspects so as to obviate the necessity of any further interpretative probe and to ensure that no part of the controversy survives to plague the future criminal trials. 21. The power of Parliament and the State Legislatures within their respective spheres is plenary in quality and no inhibitions and limitations waylay their wide legislative powers in their respective fields highlighted by the relevant lists in the Seventh Sch. to the Constitution. The ambit of their powers not only covers prospective legislation but even retrospective legislation falls within their pale and this interpretation of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution is not res integra. In Jamnadas v. Commr. of Income-tax (AIR 1951 Bom 438), while considering the legislative competence of Parliament, Chagla, C.J., who spoke for the Bench, observed that the legislative competence conferred upon Parliament by Art.245 was in the widest possible terms and further noticed that"if the subject-matter is within the legislative competence of the Indian Parliament, then there is no restriction placed upon its power to legislate in the whole field with regard to the subject under Art.245(1)". In Jadao Bahuji v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa (AIR 1961 SC 1486), the Supreme Court ruled that retrospective legislation was open to the Provincial Legislatures. Again, the following observations made by the Supreme Court in J.K. Jute Mills Co. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1961 SC 1534) would apply proprio vigore :- "As the power of a Legislature to enact a law with reference to a topic entrusted to it being thus unqualified, subject only to any limitation imposed by the Constitution, in the exercise of such a power, it will be competent for the Legislature to enact a law, which is either prospective or retrospective." 22. In State of Mysore v. Achiah Chetty (AIR 1969 SC 477), Hidayatullah, C.J., while speaking for the Court, reiterated"the supremacy of the Legislatures in India within the Constitutional limits of their jurisdiction", and added that this supremacy was as complete as that of British Parliament. 23. No challenge is in fact posed to the above interpretation of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India and the real controversy is to the effect of Art.371F(k) of the Constitution. 24. In view of the above authoritative exposition of the relevant law though no controversy about the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate retrospectively survives yet to fight the last-ditch battle the weaponry of Art.371F has been brought forth to thwart or at least to contain the authority of the State Legislature and even Parliament in the field of retrospective legislation. To defuse the argumentative missiles of this weapon, it would be necessary to appreciate the content and strength of the reasoning deployed. To encircle the legislative competence a two pronged assault has been made and the two limbs of the argument, though have a common base in Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, have deployed different thought processes to provide the instruments for throttling the legislative power so far as retrospective legislation is concerned. 25. The effect of Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, according to Mr. J.C. Ghose, is not only to continue the laws in force in the State of Sikkim before the appointed day but to keep them alive in the same form and shape in which they existed during the relevant time. In a way, he emphasised, the pre-merger legislative atmosphere was frozen, as the power of the Indian Parliament to legislate did not extend to the territories of Sikkim immediately before the appointed day and the present State Legislature was not even in existence. These legislative bodies could possibly not deal with the existing laws in a manner so as to alter their effect at a time earlier to the appointed day, contends the learned counsel. The second limb of the argument lays emphasis on the expression"shall continue in force until amended or repealed" occurring in Article 371F(k) and it is sought to be inferred that the amendment or repeal could not be made with retrospective effect. In a sense the above arguments raise two questions. The second limb of the argument lays emphasis on the expression"shall continue in force until amended or repealed" occurring in Article 371F(k) and it is sought to be inferred that the amendment or repeal could not be made with retrospective effect. In a sense the above arguments raise two questions. Does Art.371F(k) provide a protective shield to the laws in force in Sikkim immediately before the appointed day so as to render the competent legislature's amendatory powers ineffective to tough the laws in force immediately before the appointed day in respect of any period prior to the appointed day ? Does the expression"until amended or repealed" occurring in the above provision forces the conclusion that the amendments can only be prospective and not retrospective ? 26. Both the above questions have earlier been considered by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court and reference in this connection may first be made to the case of United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (AIR 1941 FC 16). In this case, somewhat similar arguments were deployed to inveigle the legislative competence of the State Legislatures to legislate retrospectively under the Government of India Act, 1935 and S.292 of the Act was projected as a bulwark against the inroad by the Legislature into any period of time prior to the date of amendment. As the material part of S.292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 is similar to Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, with which we are concerned, the view finally taken would afford valuable assistance in meeting the challenge posed by the above arguments. While construing the above provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Federal Court referred to the corresponding provision of the Union of South Africa Act, 1909 and the British North America Act, 1867, and came to the conclusion that there was no reason for Parliament to place any fetter upon the power of the Indian Legislature. Gwyer, C.J., while dealing with the above provision made the following observation :- "It must always be remembered that within their own sphere the powers of the Indian Legislature are as large and ample as those of Parliament itself, and the burden of proving that they are subject to a strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legislation must certainly lie upon those who assert it. I can see nothing in the language of S.292 which suggests any intention on the part of Parliament to make them subject to that prohibition, nor, so far as that may be relevant, any explanation why Parliament should have desired to do so." 27. In Atiqa Begum's case, the High Court had laid great emphasis on the use of the expression"shall continue in force .....until altered or repealed or amended" and it was thought that this Section was more than a mere saving or a preserving Section and that it implied that the alteration, repeal or amendment of any previously existing law could not be made with retrospective effect at all. It was suggested before the Federal Court that the word'until' puts a time limit on the powers of the Legislature. The answer to this argument was provided by Sulaiman, J., in the following words :- "There is no doubt that the word'until' does ordinarily connote a point of time.'Until altered, repealed or amended' is equivalent to saying'until the alteration, repealment or amendment'. This can have two possible meanings-first, until the date from which the alteration, repealment or amendment takes place, and second, the date on which the Act altering or repealing or amending the previous law is actually passed, or rather when it comes into force. If the Act is retrospective, it would obviously operate from a date earlier than that on which it comes into force. If the view taken in the High Court were to prevail, then no legislation altering, repealing or amending the law which was in force when the Government of India Act was passed, no matter how long afterwards it comes to be passed, can have any retrospective provision so as to affect any transactions prior in time to the date when such Act is actually passed. It would follow that not only the Provincial Legislature but also the Central Legislature would be debarred from giving any retrospective effect whatsoever to any Act by which not only a previous Act but any other law is altered, repealed or amended. This is a drastic consequence which, it is difficult to believe, could have been contemplated". JUDGEMENT Gujral, C. J. :- This Reference under Art.228 of the Constitution of India and Section 432 of the Cr. This is a drastic consequence which, it is difficult to believe, could have been contemplated". JUDGEMENT Gujral, C. J. :- This Reference under Art.228 of the Constitution of India and Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. made by the learned Sessions Judge of Sikkim at Gangtok by his order dated 28th of Nov., 1979, brings to the forefront the question of the constitutional validity of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act. 1976 (hereinafter called the"Sikkim Act") in the light of the provisions of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution of India. The answer to this question would finally settle the procedure to be followed by the Courts in Sikkim in respect of the trials of criminal cases pending therein. The circumstances leading to this Reference may first briefly be stated. 2. The controversy involved has a close link with the judicial history of Sikkim during the last three decades. Though from the historical point of view the period does not relate to distant past yet the procedural atmosphere is surrounded with such mystery as if excavation of pre-historic culture is needed to unravel it. So far as the Penal law is concerned, the position as it prevailed before July, 1953 is somewhat hazy but by and large the provisions of the Indian Penal Code were broadly guiding the destinies of the criminals but after July, 1953 a Notification bearing No. 160/OS dated 10th of July, 1953 was promulgated and the I.P.C. 1860 was in terms made available to the Courts for basing their decisions regarding the criminality of the persons brought before them. The procedural aspect, however, still remained obscure as no legislative mandate is traceable till August, 1963 when a Notification bearing No. 73/H dated the 30th Aug., 1963 makes reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and carries the implication that sometime before the issuance of this Notification, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 had been bought into force to settle the procedural guidelines for the trial of criminal cases. There being no indication in this Notification of the date on which the Cr. P.C., 1898 was adopted in Sikkim or the date for which this Code was brought into force, the Notification, instead of offering any assistance in resolving the controversy, kept the uncertainty alive till Sikkim became part of India. To explain this a brief reference to the Cr. P.C. 1898 is necessary. P.C., 1898 was adopted in Sikkim or the date for which this Code was brought into force, the Notification, instead of offering any assistance in resolving the controversy, kept the uncertainty alive till Sikkim became part of India. To explain this a brief reference to the Cr. P.C. 1898 is necessary. This Code has been the subject-matter of numerous amendments till its repeal in 1974 but in the present strife the amendment brought about by the Amendment Act 26 of 1955 are mainly involved. By this Amendment Act, Section 251 was amended and new Section 152-A was introduced in the Cr. P.C., 1898. The departure in the procedure considerably curtailed the opportunity for cross-examination which was earlier available to the accused in a warrant case instituted on police report and the acceleration of the trial appears to be the motivating force behind this procedural innovation. 3. To have a clear, though a bird's eye view, of the problem, a brief reference to Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution is indicated. By this provision, the laws which were in force in Sikkim on the appointed day (26th Apr., 1975) were preserved and continued till their repeal or amendment by appropriate authority. If the Cr. P.C., 1898 was adopted in 1953, at the time the Indian Penal Code was extended to Sikkim, as is commonly the impression, and the subsequent amendments were not extended, the procedure in the trial of warrant cases instituted on police report would be as was provided in Chap. XXI before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 and this would be the law in force in Sikkim on the appointed day. In that case, S.251-A would not be attracted and the trial would be conducted without the procedural charge introduced by this provision. The Notification of 1963 though highly probabilities the existence of an earlier Notification whereby the Cr. P.C. 1898 may have been adopted in Sikkim but as it failed to indicate the date of the pronouncement by the competent authority it offers no assistance in resolving the procedural problem. The Notification of 1963 though highly probabilities the existence of an earlier Notification whereby the Cr. P.C. 1898 may have been adopted in Sikkim but as it failed to indicate the date of the pronouncement by the competent authority it offers no assistance in resolving the procedural problem. In this situation three alternatives can be visualised, i.e., (a) the procedure for the criminal trials may have been controlled by the Code as it stood before the 1955 Amendment, or (b) as it stood after the 1955 Amendment, or (c) that the Code in terms may not have been adopted and the Courts may have continued to follow the basic procedure provided in the Code of 1898. As to which of these possibilities represented the precise state of affairs, certainty alludes the final conclusion but it may be added that in case the third alternative was to provide the keynote, uniformity in procedure must have been the casualty. In any case, whatever may have been the position, because of the absence of a clear legislative mandate, this state of uncertainty continued till the appointed day and was somewhat heightened thereafter. Realising this unhappily situation, the State Legislature stepped in and enacted the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act,. 1976 and brought it into force with immediate effect, i.e. from 29th Mar., 1976. Though this enactment ought to have acted as a magic-wand to drive away the clouds of ambiguity but unfortunately the Courts in Sikkim failed to comprehend the full impact of this legislative measure, with the result that haziness still permeated the procedural atmosphere. So much so that even after three years of the enforcement of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976, the learned Sessions Judge felt compelled to make a Reference to this Court under Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. However in fairness to the learned Sessions Judge it may be mentioned that this confusion mainly stems from the persistent impression (for which there was probably some factual basis) that along with the Notification dated 10th of July 1953 whereby the I.P.C. was adopted as the law in Sikkim, another Notification ex tending the Cr. P.C. 1898 was also issued. P.C. 1898 was also issued. This impression is obvious from the Office Order of the Acting Chief Justice dated 25th of July, 1975 which indicated that the Code of 1898 as it stood before Amendment of 1955 was being followed in Sikkim and this position was reiterated in Passang Lama v. State of Sikkim (1975 Cr LJ 1350). 4. Though in the case of State v. Madan Mohan Rasaily (Criminal Revn. No. 3 of 1978) the High Court got an opportunity to put the matter beyond the pale of controversy but unfortunately the question was not considered in detail as it was neither argued at length nor was it found necessary to resolve this apparent conflict for the derision of that case. Probably, the Court was influenced by the view, for which there is ample authority, that constitutional questions may not be decided if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. In Madan Mohan Rasaily's case the Court was concerned with the duty of the prosecution to produce the original documents along with the charge-sheet. In considering the scope of the obligation of the prosecution to produce the original documents along with the charge-sheet. In considering the scope of the obligation of the prosecution to produce the original documents though a passing reference was made to the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976, and the prevailing impression that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood before the amendment of 1955 was the law in force on the appointed day but the constitutionality of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 was not examined in the light of Art.371-F(k) and the case was disposed of on the basis of the other contentions put forth by the parties. In fact, Bhattacharjee, J., while agreeing with the main conclusion, added that it was not necessary to decide whether the Cr. P.C. 1898 was applicable as it stood in 1953 or after amendment by the 1955 Act. 5. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the premises that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force on the"Appointed day" as defined in Art.371-F of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 being in conflict with the constitutional mandate contained in Article 371-F(k) was ultra vires and ought to be struck down. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force on the"Appointed day" as defined in Art.371-F of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 being in conflict with the constitutional mandate contained in Article 371-F(k) was ultra vires and ought to be struck down. He also sought support for this view from some observations in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case and on the basis of this reasoning he found himself compelled to make a reference under Section 432 of the Cr. P.C. And this is how the matter has come before this Court to finally determine what procedural paths the lower Courts should follow while trying warrant cases instituted on the basis of police reports. 6. The above narration having provided the factual backdrop the stage is now set for clearing the legalistic hurdles. To bar the reference at the threshold the learned counsel for the accused projected the incompetency of the reference as an obstacle, on the plea that neither S.432 of the Cr. P.C. nor Art.228 of the Constitution were attracted. When faced with this situation the learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of Sikkim, did not make use of Art.228 of the Constitution as a shield to stave off the technical onslaught of incompetency and only projected S.432 of the Cr. P.C. as the statutory harbour to protect the reference. A close examination of Art.228 of the Constitution would reveal that to fall within the scope of this provision, a reference must involve a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution, the determination of which would be necessary for the disposal of this case. As will be shortly discussed, the interpretation of Art.371-F(k) does not give rise to any substantial question of law as the extent and scope of similar provisions to inhibit the competent legislatures to legislate retrospectively has been the subject-matter of numerous decisions by the High Courts and the Supreme Court and no substantial question relating to the interpretation of the Constitution survives for decision by this Court. Moreover, it is the interpretation of Section 2 of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which is mainly involved and this does not fall within the scope of Article 228 of the Constitution. 7. Sub-Section (1) of S.432 of the Cr. Moreover, it is the interpretation of Section 2 of the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which is mainly involved and this does not fall within the scope of Article 228 of the Constitution. 7. Sub-Section (1) of S.432 of the Cr. P.C. which is relevant at this stage is as follows :- "Where any Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation, or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to which the Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons therefor, and refer the same for the decision of the High Court." The above provision does not cover the same ground as Art.228 of the Constitution and in fact, in one sense, it is much wider in its sweep than Art.228. Sec. 432 relates to the validity of an Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc. and is not confined merely to an interpretation of the Constitution. In order to attract this provision the Court has to form an opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc., is invalid or inoperative but has not been so declared by the High Court or the Supreme Court. 8. Keeping in the forefront the requirements of Section 432 of the Cr. P.C., 1898, the learned Sessions Judge proceeded on the assumption that immediately before the appointed day, the procedural law in force was the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 and thereby drew the inference that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 which retrospectively enforces the applicability of the Cr. P.C., 1898 as amended by Act 26 of 1955 would suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality because of the mandate of Art.371-F(k) preserving the laws in the same form or shape as these stood before the appointed day. The observation in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case, Cri. Revn. No. 3 of 1978 (Sikkim), that the trial of warrant case on police report was governed by the procedure contained in Chap. The observation in Madan Mohan Rasaily's case, Cri. Revn. No. 3 of 1978 (Sikkim), that the trial of warrant case on police report was governed by the procedure contained in Chap. XXI of the Code before its amendment in 1955, were also pressed into service by the teamed Sessions Judge for drawing the conclusion that the Sikkim Criminal Procedure Act, 1976 was unconstitutional and ought to be struck down. There is no gainsaying the fact that before the trial of the case, in which reference has been made, can proceed the procedural path, which is beset by the interpretational wrangle on the scope and effect of S.2 of the Sikkim Act, has to be cleared. Viewed in the light of the requirements of Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reference covers all the necessary ingredients and suffers from no infirmity. The Court was clearly faced with the procedural difficulty which could not be resolved unless the constitutionality of the Sikkim Act was tested in the light of the provisions of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution. 9. In support of his challenge to the validity of the reference, Mr. J.C. Ghosh, learned counsel for the accused, relied on Emperor v. Ratan Singh. ((1948) 52 CWN 869) but this case has absolutely no bearing on the matter in dispute before us. In Ratan Singh's case the Reference was made because the Presidency Magistrate doubted the correctness of certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court relating to a case under the Indian Arms Act.) The High Court rightly pointed out that"S.482 does not give them power to refer points of law settled by decisions of this Court, where the Magistrate doubts the correctness of these decisions". Constitutional validity of any Act, Ordinance, Regulation, etc., was not involved in this at all and S.432, Cr. P.C. was, therefore, not attracted. Reference was then made to M. Rajarama Reddi's case (AIR 1952 Mad 578) : (1952 Cri LJ 1235) and reliance was placed on the following observations extracted from this judgement : "A subordinate Court should only make a reference to the High Court, when it is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a real or substantial question as to the validity of any Act or regulation. A mere plea that an Act is'ultra vires' will not suffice. A mere plea that an Act is'ultra vires' will not suffice. If it is not so satisfied it should go on with the trial, leaving it to the aggrieved accused to move the High Court under Article 228, and to continue the trial until such an application is admitted and the trial stayed." 10. In Rajarama Reddi's case, an order of the Taluk Supply Officer was challenged on the ground that his order was passed under S.3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and it should have been notified in the official gazette. The validity of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act was also challenged. The learned Judges rejected both these contentions and also came to the conclusion that these points had been earlier decided in AIR 1952 Mad 576 : (1002 Cri LJ 1235). Keeping in view the background in which the above observations were made, there is no scope for contending that even where a substantial question and not merely a specious plea as to the validity of an Act is involved, reference under S.432, Code of Cr. P.C. cannot be made. 11. The rejection of the preliminary objection as untenable has cleared the deck for an in-depth analysis of the Sikkim Act in the light of Art.371-F(k) and the legislative competence of the Sikkim Legislature to pierce the protective barrier of this constitutional provision by giving retrospective effect to S.2 of the Sikkim, Act. The relevant provisions are extracted below for facility of reference : Article 371-F(k) -"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, all laws in force immediately before the appointed day in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim or any part thereof shall continue to be in force therein until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." Section 2 of the Sikkim Act-"The provisions of the Cri. P.C. 1898 subject to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule below have been the law in force in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 and is and shall be in force as the law relating to criminal procedure in the State of Sikkim until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority." 12. A bare reading of S.2 of the Sikkim Act will leave no manner of doubt that the Cr. A bare reading of S.2 of the Sikkim Act will leave no manner of doubt that the Cr. P.C. 1898 incorporating all the amendments that this Act has suffered up to 1974 when it was repealed including the amendments by Act of 1955, was projected as the procedural law in Sikkim subject only to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule, with which we are not concerned in the present reference. A further analysis will reveal that Section 2 of the Sikkim Act is in two parts, in the sense that the first part conferred retrospective operation to the Cr. P.C. 1898 as if stood before its repeal (subject to the Schedule of the Act) while the second part enforced the statute prospectively. The expression that"the provisions of the said Cr. P.C., 1898....have been the law in force in the territories comprised in the State of Sikkim immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment Act, 1975)" carries the implication that whatever, in actuality, may have been the law in force immediately before the appointed day in the State of Sikkim with regard to the procedure followed by the Criminal Courts for the trial of criminal cases, at least as a result of the Sikkim Act, the Cr. P.C., 1898 with all the amendments incorporated in it, but subject only to the exceptions and modifications shown in the Schedule, would be considered to be the law in force immediately before the appointed day. The further expression that the Cr. P.C., 1898"is and shall be in force as the law relating to criminal procedure in the State of Sikkim until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority" emphasises the prospective operation of the Cr. P.C. 1898. 13. The line of reasoning adopted by the learned Sessions Judge in brief is that the Cr. P.C., 1898 as it stood on 10th of July, 1953 was the law in force immediately before the appointed day within the meaning of Art.371-F(k) of the Constitution and that the Sikkim Act which brought into operation the Cr. P.C. as it stood after the 1955 Amendment as the law before the appointed day was clearly violative of the above constitutional provision. P.C. as it stood after the 1955 Amendment as the law before the appointed day was clearly violative of the above constitutional provision. The further implication which this argument carries is that the Sikkim Legislature could not amend any law which was in force in Sikkim on or before the appointed day with retrospective effect from a date prior to the appointed day even though no objection could be raised with regard to the legislative competence of the Sikkim Legislature on the basis of the subject-matter of the legislation. 14. In reply, the learned Advocate-General has emphasised the utter futility of the above reasoning so far as the decision of the present case is concerned, on the simple, though effective, plea that the cases now pending in Sikkim could be validly governed by the procedure indicated in S.2 of the Sikkim Act as not even a remote challenge has been and could earnestly be posed to the prospective operation that has been given to the Cr. P.C., 1898 by the Sikkim Act. The subject-matter of this Act is appropriately covered by Item 2 to Entry 3 to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution which is the Concurrent List and the power of the Sikkim Legislature to enact laws in respect of matters in this List are only subject to the limitation placed by Art.254 of the Constitution which renders any law made by the State Legislature on any matter in the Concurrent List invalid in case such law is repugnant to any law made by Parliament unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. The Sikkim Act is not in conflict with any Parliamentary law on the subject and in fact has the effect of extending the Parliamentary Act to Sikkim and in this situation the validity of the Sikkim Act is beyond questioning so far as its prospective operation is concerned. The subject matter of the Sikkim Act being within the legislative sphere of the Sikkim Legislature and no doubts having been expressed about the absence of inhibitions and limitations regarding its competence, at least, to legislate prospectively, the operational ambit of S.2 of the Sikkim Act in respect of the cases instituted after the enforcement of this Act cannot be the subject-matter of challenge any more. From this it would logically follow that the criminal case which has caused this reference to be made would be governed by the Sikkim Act and this conclusion is not only plausible, but wholly beyond the pale of controversy. This unimpeachable view would further generate the consequence that the Cr. P.C. 1898 as it stood in 1973, subject to exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule to"the Sikkim Act would guide the destinies of the accused in all cases instituted or to be instituted after the coming into force of the Sikkim Act. 15. The question of prospective operation of the Sikkim Act having been answered with satisfying'finality I proceed to deal with another contention raised by Mr. Ghosh. The learned counsel for the accused has sought the assistance of an argument which though somewhat interesting and ingenious is without much basis and is in fact an argument of frustration. The reasoning, in short, proceeds thus: By virtue of a Notification, which though not traceable, but was issued on 10th of July, 1953 or as a consequence of the practice followed by the Criminal Courts in Sikkim, the Cr. P.C., 1898 before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 was the law in force immediately before the appointed day and that reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in the Sikkim Act was intended by the Legislature to be a reference to the Code before its amendment in 1955. The basis for this argument is sought in the assumption that the Legislature had only declared the law by the Sikkim Act and had not intended to introduce any alteration or innovation in the procedural law. To say the least, the entire argument is based on fantasy saving no factual links. To start with, the assertion that a Notification was issued on 10th of July, 1953 extending the Cr. P.C., 1898 to Sikkim is wholly devoid of any material or evidentiary support. No doubt that at one time there was an impression in the Sikkim Courts that such a Notification had been issued but as existence of such a Notification could not be established the impression will have to be branded as conjectural. A reference in the Office Order dated 25th July, 1975 issued by the then Acting Chief Justice and the casual observation in the case of Madan Mohan Rasaily (Cri Revn No. 3 of 1978) that the Cr. A reference in the Office Order dated 25th July, 1975 issued by the then Acting Chief Justice and the casual observation in the case of Madan Mohan Rasaily (Cri Revn No. 3 of 1978) that the Cr. P.C., 1898 prior to its amendment in 1955 was operative in Sikkim before the appointed day are again the manifestations of the same impression and cannot furnish a factual basis for the existence of such a Notification. 16. To determine the existence or otherwise of the Notification supposed to have been issued on 10th of July, 1953, in respect of the procedure to be followed by the Sikkim Courts, or to highlight the factual position with regard to the state of the procedural law before the appointed day, a reference was invited by Mr. Ghosh and also by the learned Sessions Judge in the order of reference, to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Sikkim Act, but before we take the interpretative aid of this source it would be imperative to determine the extent to which and the purpose for which this source can be pressed into service. The matter has been considered in number of cases by the Supreme Court and from a review of these judgements, the position that emerges may be stated thus. Though reference to the statement of objects and reasons cannot be made as an aid to interpretation or for ascertaining the meanings of a particular word or words in a statute, nevertheless it is permissible to refer to the objects and reasons for the correct appreciation of : (i) what was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (iii) what remedy the Legislature had appointed; and (iv) the reasons for the remedy. 17. A reference to the objects and reasons is thus permissible to ascertain what procedural law was governing the criminal trials in Sikkim when the Bill was moved. In the objects and reasons there is a mention that"The I.P.C., 1860, with certain modifications, was adopted as the law in Sikkim by a notification bearing No. 160/O.S. dated 10th July, 1953", and it is added that,"though such a notification adopting the Cr. P.C., 1898, in Sikkim is not readily traceable, the provisions of the said Cr. In the objects and reasons there is a mention that"The I.P.C., 1860, with certain modifications, was adopted as the law in Sikkim by a notification bearing No. 160/O.S. dated 10th July, 1953", and it is added that,"though such a notification adopting the Cr. P.C., 1898, in Sikkim is not readily traceable, the provisions of the said Cr. P.C. have thereafter been applied and followed as the law of criminal procedure in Sikkim". It is further mentioned that"in fact the provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1898, have since been applied and followed in Sikkim with this modification that the provisions relating to commitment enquiry as contained in Chap. XVIII of the Code and the provisions relating to trials before Court of Session as contained in Chap. XXIII of the Code have not been applied and the trial of cases triable by the Court of Session has also been conducted according to the provisions contained in Chap. XXI of the Code dealing with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases by the Magistrates". Reference was then made to another notification dated 2nd of July, 1975 and from this an inference was drawn that"the provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1898 have been treated as the law in force immediately before the appointed day". Reference in the statement of objects and reasons is also made to the case of Passing Lama v. State of Sikkim (1975 Cr LJ 1350) and to the observation therein that the Cr. P.C., 1898"in terms is not applicable in the State of Sikkim." 18. The statement of objects and reasons is bereft of any material to support the assertion that the Cr. P.C., 1898 before its amendment by Act 26 of 1955 was the law in force in Sikkim before the appointed day and in fact the only firm conclusion available is that the Code, subject to the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the Schedule, was the law applicable to the criminal trials in Sikkim. The contention of Mr. Ghosh, therefore, is unable to find any factual basis in the statement of object and reasons and is liable to be brushed aside as a matter of no consequence. 19. Another limb of this argument may appropriately be considered at this stage. The contention of Mr. Ghosh, therefore, is unable to find any factual basis in the statement of object and reasons and is liable to be brushed aside as a matter of no consequence. 19. Another limb of this argument may appropriately be considered at this stage. It was urged that as two interpretations of the expression"Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" occurring in the Sikkim Act were possible, the one in favour of the accused, which gave him greater opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, should be adopted. This argument wholly loses sight of the fundamental rule of interpretation that where the words are clear and unambiguous no further aid to construction is needed and the words used in the statute should be allowed to have their full play. Rules of construction can only be pressed into service if either the words used in the context of their ordinary meanings would give rise to some ambiguity or the language used is capable of more than one meaning but not otherwise. In the present case, there is no ambiguity at all and the legislative mandate in S.2 of the Sikkim Act is couched in clear and lucid words capable of one and only one meaning and not inviting or even welcoming any other interpretative aid. There is no occasion for reading in the expression"Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898" a reference to the Code as it stood before the 1955 Amendment. Consequently the only plausible conclusion available is that from the date the Sikkim Act came into force, the Cr. P.C. 1898, with the exceptions and modifications mentioned in the schedule provides the only procedural channel through which criminal trials must of necessity steer. 20. This brings us to the challenge posed to the retrospective operation of the Sikkim Act which it would be necessary to meet in case we proceed on the assumption that the Criminal Courts in Sikkim were being guided by the Cr. P.C., 1898, before its Amendment in 1955 and this was the law in force immediately before he appointed day. This brings us to the challenge posed to the retrospective operation of the Sikkim Act which it would be necessary to meet in case we proceed on the assumption that the Criminal Courts in Sikkim were being guided by the Cr. P.C., 1898, before its Amendment in 1955 and this was the law in force immediately before he appointed day. Though for an answer to the reference an examination of this aspect of the matter may not strictly be necessary, but it would be fruitful to view the Sikkim Act from all aspects so as to obviate the necessity of any further interpretative probe and to ensure that no part of the controversy survives to plague the future criminal trials. 21. The power of Parliament and the State Legislatures within their respective spheres is plenary in quality and no inhibitions and limitations waylay their wide legislative powers in their respective fields highlighted by the relevant lists in the Seventh Sch. to the Constitution. The ambit of their powers not only covers prospective legislation but even retrospective legislation falls within their pale and this interpretation of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution is not res integra. In Jamnadas v. Commr. of Income-tax (AIR 1951 Bom 438), while considering the legislative competence of Parliament, Chagla, C.J., who spoke for the Bench, observed that the legislative competence conferred upon Parliament by Art.245 was in the widest possible terms and further noticed that"if the subject-matter is within the legislative competence of the Indian Parliament, then there is no restriction placed upon its power to legislate in the whole field with regard to the subject under Art.245(1)". In Jadao Bahuji v. Municipal Committee, Khandwa (AIR 1961 SC 1486), the Supreme Court ruled that retrospective legislation was open to the Provincial Legislatures. Again, the following observations made by the Supreme Court in J.K. Jute Mills Co. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1961 SC 1534) would apply proprio vigore :- "As the power of a Legislature to enact a law with reference to a topic entrusted to it being thus unqualified, subject only to any limitation imposed by the Constitution, in the exercise of such a power, it will be competent for the Legislature to enact a law, which is either prospective or retrospective." 22. In State of Mysore v. Achiah Chetty (AIR 1969 SC 477), Hidayatullah, C.J., while speaking for the Court, reiterated"the supremacy of the Legislatures in India within the Constitutional limits of their jurisdiction", and added that this supremacy was as complete as that of British Parliament. 23. No challenge is in fact posed to the above interpretation of Arts. 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India and the real controversy is to the effect of Art.371F(k) of the Constitution. 24. In view of the above authoritative exposition of the relevant law though no controversy about the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate retrospectively survives yet to fight the last-ditch battle the weaponry of Art.371F has been brought forth to thwart or at least to contain the authority of the State Legislature and even Parliament in the field of retrospective legislation. To defuse the argumentative missiles of this weapon, it would be necessary to appreciate the content and strength of the reasoning deployed. To encircle the legislative competence a two pronged assault has been made and the two limbs of the argument, though have a common base in Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, have deployed different thought processes to provide the instruments for throttling the legislative power so far as retrospective legislation is concerned. 25. The effect of Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, according to Mr. J.C. Ghose, is not only to continue the laws in force in the State of Sikkim before the appointed day but to keep them alive in the same form and shape in which they existed during the relevant time. In a way, he emphasised, the pre-merger legislative atmosphere was frozen, as the power of the Indian Parliament to legislate did not extend to the territories of Sikkim immediately before the appointed day and the present State Legislature was not even in existence. These legislative bodies could possibly not deal with the existing laws in a manner so as to alter their effect at a time earlier to the appointed day, contends the learned counsel. The second limb of the argument lays emphasis on the expression"shall continue in force until amended or repealed" occurring in Article 371F(k) and it is sought to be inferred that the amendment or repeal could not be made with retrospective effect. In a sense the above arguments raise two questions. The second limb of the argument lays emphasis on the expression"shall continue in force until amended or repealed" occurring in Article 371F(k) and it is sought to be inferred that the amendment or repeal could not be made with retrospective effect. In a sense the above arguments raise two questions. Does Art.371F(k) provide a protective shield to the laws in force in Sikkim immediately before the appointed day so as to render the competent legislature's amendatory powers ineffective to tough the laws in force immediately before the appointed day in respect of any period prior to the appointed day ? Does the expression"until amended or repealed" occurring in the above provision forces the conclusion that the amendments can only be prospective and not retrospective ? 26. Both the above questions have earlier been considered by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court and reference in this connection may first be made to the case of United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (AIR 1941 FC 16). In this case, somewhat similar arguments were deployed to inveigle the legislative competence of the State Legislatures to legislate retrospectively under the Government of India Act, 1935 and S.292 of the Act was projected as a bulwark against the inroad by the Legislature into any period of time prior to the date of amendment. As the material part of S.292 of the Government of India Act, 1935 is similar to Art.371F(k) of the Constitution, with which we are concerned, the view finally taken would afford valuable assistance in meeting the challenge posed by the above arguments. While construing the above provision of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Federal Court referred to the corresponding provision of the Union of South Africa Act, 1909 and the British North America Act, 1867, and came to the conclusion that there was no reason for Parliament to place any fetter upon the power of the Indian Legislature. Gwyer, C.J., while dealing with the above provision made the following observation :- "It must always be remembered that within their own sphere the powers of the Indian Legislature are as large and ample as those of Parliament itself, and the burden of proving that they are subject to a strange and unusual prohibition against retrospective legislation must certainly lie upon those who assert it. I can see nothing in the language of S.292 which suggests any intention on the part of Parliament to make them subject to that prohibition, nor, so far as that may be relevant, any explanation why Parliament should have desired to do so." 27. In Atiqa Begum's case, the High Court had laid great emphasis on the use of the expression"shall continue in force .....until altered or repealed or amended" and it was thought that this Section was more than a mere saving or a preserving Section and that it implied that the alteration, repeal or amendment of any previously existing law could not be made with retrospective effect at all. It was suggested before the Federal Court that the word'until' puts a time limit on the powers of the Legislature. The answer to this argument was provided by Sulaiman, J., in the following words :- "There is no doubt that the word'until' does ordinarily connote a point of time.'Until altered, repealed or amended' is equivalent to saying'until the alteration, repealment or amendment'. This can have two possible meanings-first, until the date from which the alteration, repealment or amendment takes place, and second, the date on which the Act altering or repealing or amending the previous law is actually passed, or rather when it comes into force. If the Act is retrospective, it would obviously operate from a date earlier than that on which it comes into force. If the view taken in the High Court were to prevail, then no legislation altering, repealing or amending the law which was in force when the Government of India Act was passed, no matter how long afterwards it comes to be passed, can have any retrospective provision so as to affect any transactions prior in time to the date when such Act is actually passed. It would follow that not only the Provincial Legislature but also the Central Legislature would be debarred from giving any retrospective effect whatsoever to any Act by which not only a previous Act but any other law is altered, repealed or amended. This is a drastic consequence which, it is difficult to believe, could have been contemplated".