The expanding area of present-day Administrative Law is, undoubtedly, in the field of social welfare. Yesterday's privilege is today's right. Government has assumed the responsibilities and taken care of its benefactory functions. Government is a gigantic fount which pours out largess on which depend a mul­titude of Indians in a large democratic country. Those dependant on "public largess" are merely clients, in a subordinate legal sense, yet it is precisely those dependants who are most in need of protection, as they have neither the resources nor the ability to protect themselves against "arbitrary administrative action" which the regulated business entities and the rich can afford. Government may withhold all benefits or privileges as it likes, but if it chooses to open largess to the public for social wel­fare, it cannot make them available in an arbitrary manner. To say that there is no "right" to something like Government con­tract should not mean that the agency of the Government may act arbitrarily (substantially or procedurally) against a person or that he is not entitled to challenge the "fairness" of the agency towards him in his particular case. "The privilege concept" so firmly ingrained has been discarded in the field of Government contracts, employment, largess, grant of licence by the Supreme Court of India. Procedural safeguards for persons affected by ''departmental decisions rendered after hearing" have been improvsd. Such tribunals have been closely blended with the general legal structures; even the process of departmental determination has fceen judicialised. The functional stance of our Supreme Court reveals that administrative decisions have been animated and made more ingeneous. Ramana vs. Indian Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCC 489 marks a watershed in the realm of Administrative Law, a sterling example of the resourcefulness and creative ability of our Supreme Court. Libe­ral attitude towards the protection of individual rights from governmental incursions is manifest. The members of the tribunals, who are ordinarily Government officials, are no longer rated as a part of the machinery of administration, but are considered as machinery provided by law for adjudication. Undoubtedly, all such machinery cannot be forced into a straight-jacket uni­formity yet their essential adjudicatory role has been underscored, their independent status established and their procedure tuned in the wave-length necessary for imparting administrative justice requiring them to give reasons. Undoubtedly, all such machinery cannot be forced into a straight-jacket uni­formity yet their essential adjudicatory role has been underscored, their independent status established and their procedure tuned in the wave-length necessary for imparting administrative justice requiring them to give reasons. The petitioner has projected this writ application against such an Appellate Authority constituted under Rule 9 of the Assam Settlement of Forest Coupes and Mahals by Tender System Rules, 1967, for short "the Rules", and complains that the authority has failed to perform its adjudicatory role. 2. To appreciate the question of law involved, it is nece­ssary to narrate the cognate and intrinsic facts which ars set out: The petitioner belongs to the Karbi Tribe, a recognised Scheduled Tribe and is a permanent resident of village-Rangsoli in the district of Karbi Anglong, an Autonomous District in Assam. The Divisional Forest Officer, Eastern Assam Wild-life at Bokakhat, for short, "the D.F.O.", invited tenders for settle­ment of Kakojan Stone Quarry for the period commencing from August 1, 1979 to October 31, 1982, fixing the last date of submi­ssion of tenders on 19.6.79. The petitioner had late knowledge of the Notice and could submit his tender hurriedly on the last date. He offered Rs. 35,111/- and expressed in his tender that hs could not submit some of the requisite certificates for the reasons alluded, but undertook to produce them before the execution of the agreement. However, he produced his caste certificate to show that he 'belongs to the Karbi Tribe' and submitted his Sales Tax Clearance Certificate as well. Others, including Respon­dent No. 5, Badulal, submitted their tenders. Rsspondent No. 5 could not file his Income-tax Clearance Certificate along with his tender but produced it at a later stage. It shows, that he had no assessable income. His Sales Tax Clearance Certificate shows that he had no occupation. Respondent No. 5, however, produced a "certificate of his financial soundness". The certificate is an expression of opinion of the Sub-Deputy Collector that "the finan­cial position of Respondent No. 5 is sound". The D.F.O., as required under the rules, prepared a comparative statement of tenders and recommended the case of the petitioner for settle­ment. The recommendation runs thus: "Recommended for settlement of Kakojan Stone Quarry for the period from 1st of Aug. 79 to 31st Oct. 82 with Shri Khoi Singnar at his highest offer at Rs. The D.F.O., as required under the rules, prepared a comparative statement of tenders and recommended the case of the petitioner for settle­ment. The recommendation runs thus: "Recommended for settlement of Kakojan Stone Quarry for the period from 1st of Aug. 79 to 31st Oct. 82 with Shri Khoi Singnar at his highest offer at Rs. 35,111.00 subject to production of I.T.C. and S.T.C. (submitted on 22.6.79) now enclosed with his tender." The recommendation was made to the Additional Chief Conservator of Forests (Respondent No. 3) as he is the settling Authority in respect of such settlements. Respondent No. 3 passed an order that Badulal (Respondent No. 5) was the regular highest tenderer and settled the quarry upon him. No reason was attri­buted why the recommendation of the D.F.O. was turned down nor is there any 'speaking order' showing reasons for rejection of the highest tender of the petitioner. Respondent No. 5, not­withstanding due receipt of the notice of the Rule, has not turned up before this Court to contest the proceedings, although he is the most interested person. The State, notwithstanding the direc­tions from the Court has failed to produce some relevant records, namely, the records which were at the disposal of respondent No. 3 while dealing with the tenders as well as the reports of the Divisional Forest Officer and the Additional Chief Conservator of Forests referred to in the appellate order. A number of adjourn­ments were granted to the Respondents for production of the documents but they have failed to produce them. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under Rule 8 of "the Rules," but he was not aware of the reasons for rejection of his highest offer. At this stage, it is pertinent to state that the notification calling tenders provides that the provisions of "the Rules" shall be foll­owed although the rules were superseded by "the Rules of 1977." The tender notice expressed that the members of the Scheduled Tribes would get preferential treatment in all spheres. The appeal was heard and disposed on 22.10.79, by a crypric order. The appellate authority impliedly conceded that the petitioner had offered the highest price and he was a member of the Scheduled Tribe. However, no weight was given to those facts by the Appellate Authority. The appeal was heard and disposed on 22.10.79, by a crypric order. The appellate authority impliedly conceded that the petitioner had offered the highest price and he was a member of the Scheduled Tribe. However, no weight was given to those facts by the Appellate Authority. I quote the relevant extracts from the appellate order : "Perused the report of the Divisional Forest Officer and the Additional Chief Conservator of Forests. It is certain that the appellant did not file all required document along with his tender form. The address given by the appellant in his tender paper was stated to be from Sibsagar but in his caste and Sales Tax Clearance Certi­ficate his district stated to be Karbi Anglong. It is diffi­cult to believe which one is true. Moreover, he has not submitted the financial soundness certificate. Hence, it is not known how is his financial soundness." 4. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the settle­ment proceedings and Dr. M. K. Sarma has attacked the appe­llate order of Respondent No. 4. As alluded, Badulal, Respon­dent No. 5, has not entered appearance to contest the petition. 5. The first contention of the petitioner has a strong force. Admittedly, the D. F. O. recommended the case of the petitioner for settlement as it was the bounden duty of the Settling Autho­rity to give reasons for not accepting the recommendation, more so, when the petitioner was admittedly a member of the Schedule Tribe entitled to get preferential treatments. Failure to consider and decide the contentions in appeal has rendered the order of the Appellate Authority invalid. The decision is liable to be struck down as "a purported decision". Further, the authority has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by "the Rules" and the order is liable to be quashed. 6. The second contention of the petitioner is that the impug­ned appellate order was grounded on non-existent reports of "the D.F.O." and Additional Chief Conservator of Forests. Their reports referred to in the impugned appellate order have not been produced before this Court. As such, they were non-existent. Therefore the impugned order, based on non-existent material, must be quashed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the main reason for not considering the case of the petitioner was "non-submi­ssion of his financial soundness Certificate". The other grounds on which the appeal has been rejected bears no scrutiny. Dr. As such, they were non-existent. Therefore the impugned order, based on non-existent material, must be quashed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the main reason for not considering the case of the petitioner was "non-submi­ssion of his financial soundness Certificate". The other grounds on which the appeal has been rejected bears no scrutiny. Dr. Sarma submits that the appellate decision is 'a purported decision' subject to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Dr. Sarma contends that the appeal was rejected on two erron­eous grounds : First, the authority wrongly held that the pro­vision of Rule 6 (4) (v) of "the Rules" was mandatory. Secon­dly, the authority committed error apparent on the face of the record in concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to settlement as he could not produce "a certificate of financial soundness". 7. The Settlements of the nature are not merely conferment of privileges but are conferment of rights. When an offer is thrown to the public to get such settlements in terms of the Notification and "Rules", the Settling Authority, cannot act arbitrarily, substantially or procedurally. The practice of inviting tenders from the public is for the social welfare. Every qualified person has a right to get settlements and the order of settlement should not be arbitrary, unfair or violative of the norms set by the Government in the tender forms. In America, the landmark case of Goldberg vs. Kelly, 397 US 254 (1970) has extricated the courts from the restrictive web of the out-moded analytical concept that conferment of licences to the public is a privilege and not a right. Indeed, it is inexact to think of welfare bene­fits as only privileges. Such benefits when offered is a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them and they are more like 'property' than a 'gratuity'. The decision brought revolutionary changes and caused a great impact on the State privilege cases. Before Goldberg (supra) the liquor licence was the best example of a State privilege, not protected by due process as it operated in the field inimical to the "public welfare". The Supreme Court of America in Sugarman vs. Dougal, 413 US 634 (1973) reiterated", this Court has now rejected the concept that Constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern­mental benefit it characterised as a 'right' or as 'privilege". The Supreme Court of America in Sugarman vs. Dougal, 413 US 634 (1973) reiterated", this Court has now rejected the concept that Constitutional rights turn upon whether a govern­mental benefit it characterised as a 'right' or as 'privilege". Thus, the privilege right dichotomy is in the process of being com­pletely eroded in America. We have in Ramana (supra) a sterling decision of our own Supreme Court which is more forward-looking and marks a watershed in the realm of'administrative law'. In that decision, yesterday's privileges have been turned to today's right, by a magic touch. It has been ruled that the State is the repository of all rights in all forms of activities and it cannot like private individuals, dis pense such right to any person it pleases, without providing any norm and condition. Once it makes pro­visions as to the conditions of eligibility, qualifications, reserva­tions, preferences, it is bound by the Borms or conditions, or limitations imposed by it. The object of creating those non-discrimintory standards or norms is to compel the State agency not to depart from such standards or norms. If it docs, its action is bound to be stamped as arbitrary. It cannot obliterate a qualification while making a settlement upon a person who lacks the qualification. A settlement which does not satisfy the condition of eligibility expressed in the rules or notifications invariably results in "inequal treatment". Per­sons lacking any such qualifications can legitimately complain that they could but did not submit their tenders under the impre­ssion that the eligibility standard prohibited them to submit tenders. It is now a settle rule, a rule of Administrative Law judicially envolved by our Supreme Court. The enunciation of the norms-or conditions are brakes against exercise of arbitrary power by the executive authority. The State Policy is for the attainm3nt of socio-economic justice in every sphere of activities. An ordi­nary citizen comes into relationship or direct encounter with the state power-holders in every field of its activities. The Government, in our Welfare State is the regulator and dispenser of almost all services and dispenser of a large number of benefits like jobs, contracts, licences, quotas, minor mineral rights etc. The benefits dispensed by the Government are the nation's wealth. The Government is free, as a private individual, to select the recepients-of its largess but the Government is still the Government and must be subject to restraint. The benefits dispensed by the Government are the nation's wealth. The Government is free, as a private individual, to select the recepients-of its largess but the Government is still the Government and must be subject to restraint. Democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious norms or standard for choice of person. In the matter of granting licences or quotas or largess the Government cannot act arbitrarily as it pleases. It must act within certain bounds structured by rational and non-discrimi­natory standards. Any departure from such norms and standards would be liable to be struck down, unless shown to be non-arbitrary and based on valid principles. The above principles, have been drawn from Ramana (supra). It has been held therein that the challenge against such an order can be supported apart from Article 14 of the Constitution. I extract a part from the judgment : "It has an independent existence apart from Article 14. It is a rule of Administrative Law which has been judi­cially envolved as a check against exercise of arbitrary powers by the executive authorities". 8. It follows, therefore, that whatever label may be given to the nature of settlement, namely, "privilege" or "licence" or "so-called right", but it is a proceeding for enforcement of certain rights to the qualified persons who are entitled to get it and the validity of the settlement, if arbitrary and capricious, can be questioned by any person. The discretion to grant of largess by the Government is subject to two restrictions. First, the award must pass the test of reasonableness and public interest. Ordi­narily all governmental actions, whether done under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making law, failing to satisfy the tests of reasonableness and public interest are liable to be struck down as invalid. Secondly, while selecting the recepients the Government is not at libsrty, like a private individual, to pick and choose, as it likes. The governmental action must be objective and impersonal, consistent and respon­sible. The validity of its action is liable to be tested on the touchstone of the principles of reasonableness, relevancy and the doctrine of equality judicially envolved as a rule of Administrative Law running parallel with the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14. As such, I hold that the petitioner can question the validity of the governmental action on any of the grounds alluded. As such, I hold that the petitioner can question the validity of the governmental action on any of the grounds alluded. The petitioner questions the validity of the order of the Appe­llate Authority as if, inter alia, on the ground that it has failed to discharge its duty, in ignoring the above principles. 9. The main reason for rejecting the appeal is non-produc­tion of certificate of financial soundness. The rule requiring production or "documents" evidencing financial soundness i. e., Rule 6(4) (v), was held to be mandatory by the Authorities. The said clause of the Rule reads as follows: "6. Tender and its enclosures :- (1) * * (2) * * (3) * * (4) The tender shall be accompanied with the following documents namely :- (i) * * (ii) * * (iii) * * (iv) * * (v) Documents evidencing financial soundness of the tenderers". (Emphasis supplied). 10. It is difficult to fathom how the appellate authority reached the conclusion that Respondent No. 5 had complied with the so-called mandatory provision of clause (v) of Rule 6(4). If the Rule is mandatory substantial compliance will not do. On perusal of Rule 6, it appears clear that a distinction has been made between "certificates" and ''documents". Respondent No. 5 produced a "certificate" but no "document", to bear up his financial stability. Clause (v) mandates production of "documents evidencing financial soundness of the tenderers" which implies that the tenderers are required to produce documents like patta, sale deed or some such documents evidencing their financial puis­sance. Other clauses in Rule 6(4), namely, clauses (ii), and (iv) speak about production of "certificates" whereas, Clause (v) man­dates production of "documented". Admittedly, Respondent No. 5 produced a "certifiicate" of a Sub-Deputy Collector. It is not "document" as envisaged under Clause (v), on strict construction of the so-called mandatory provision. Respondent No. 5 might have substantially complied with the provision of the law, but substantial compliance is no compliance if the Rule is held to be mandatory. Under these circumstances, it must be held as contended, that the petitioner as well as Respondent No. 5-sailed in the same boat as neither did produce "documents eviden­cing financial soundess". This vital aspect was completely over looked by the authorities below. Under these circumstances, it must be held as contended, that the petitioner as well as Respondent No. 5-sailed in the same boat as neither did produce "documents eviden­cing financial soundess". This vital aspect was completely over looked by the authorities below. However, this is of no conse­quence as I hold that the provision of Clause (v) is directory, for the following reasons : (a) The Clause provides the form or manner in which somethiEg is to be done and no legal conse­quence of failure to observe the prescription has been prescribed, (b) There is nothing to show that substantial compliance will invalidate a tender, (c) It is true that a compulsive word 'shall' is there in Rule 6, but the compulsive word must take its meaning in accord with the legislative intent. Considering the subject matter, its importance in relation to the general object intended to be secured, namely, to ascertain as to whether the tenderer is financially sound to prosecute the contract work, as well as the function of Rule 7, which provides that the authority calling tender may ask for other particulars to elicit information about the financial soundness, if it is in doubt, takes out the compul­sive force and renders it non-obligatory; (d) The necessary reqirements occupy the field, which may be characterised as minor and non-essential. One of the touch-stones to determine whether a requrement is essential or not is to consider the consequences of the failure to follow the provision and if the requirements are minor and not urgent in nature and character, the interpretation must be that the provision is directory. 11. I have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that Rule 6 (4) (v) is optional and not mandatory. By Rule 7, the authority calling for other particulars from intending tenderers may call for any other particulars "with a view to indentify the tenderer or to elicit information about his financial soundness". There is a binding decision of this Court in Muffasin Ali Barbhuiyan vs. State of Assam, AIR 1971 A & N 171 (DB) where it has been held that Rule 6 (4) (v) is directory. Under these circumstances, I hold that the authorities below have committed error of law in assuming that non-production of "certificate of finan­cial soundess" was fatal. There is a binding decision of this Court in Muffasin Ali Barbhuiyan vs. State of Assam, AIR 1971 A & N 171 (DB) where it has been held that Rule 6 (4) (v) is directory. Under these circumstances, I hold that the authorities below have committed error of law in assuming that non-production of "certificate of finan­cial soundess" was fatal. The impugned order of the appellate authority is bad as it rejected the appeal of the petitioner assum­ing Clause (v) to be mandatory. 12. The Appellate Authority has co-extensive power with that of the authorities below. If it had any difficulty to identify the tenderer as it had expressed in its order it could have proceeded in accordance with Rule 7 to pinpoint the identity of the petiti­oner as well as to call for other particulars for eliciting from the petitioner all about bis financial sondness, as well. If we look at the recommendation made by the authority calling for the tender, "the D.F.O.", we find that he recommended the petitioner and had no doubt about the identity of the petitioner or his financial soundness. In the instant case, the authorities below including the Appellate Authority has completely over-looked Rule which provides that in the event of any difficulty to identify the tenderer or to elicit information, it could have called upon the petitioner to satisfy the doubts it had in its mind at the time of hearing. In any view of the matter, the rejection of the appeal on account of non-production of the certificate was violative of Rule 6 (4) (v) read with Rule 7 and the autho­rities below acted illegally in assuming Rule 6 (4) (v) to be mandatory. Therefore, I hold that the authorities below have committed errors apparent on the face of the record in holding that the petitioner was not entitled to settlement as he did not or could not produce a "certificate" of financial soundness and over-looked the recommendation made by the D.F.O., who must have had satisfied himself under Rule 7, as to the identity of the petitioner and about his financial soundness. 13. The segement of the order where the appellate authority doubted the identity of the petitioner is a finding which on the admitted facts and circumstances of the case, a person properly instructed in law could not have arrived at. 13. The segement of the order where the appellate authority doubted the identity of the petitioner is a finding which on the admitted facts and circumstances of the case, a person properly instructed in law could not have arrived at. It has not been contested before this Court that the petitioner is a resident of village Rangsoli in the district of Karbi Anglong which falls right on the border of the Sibsagar district. The nearest Post Office is Nomaligor, which is in the district of Sibsagar. Accordingly, in his sales-tax certificate the Post Office was shown as Noma­ligor. On top of everything the authority calling for tender had no doubt as to the identity of the petitioner. The decision rendered by the Appellate Authority in so far as the identity of the petitioner was made without giving the petitioner any oppor­tunity to establish his identity. 14. Upon the whole I quash the impugned order or the appe­llate authority and remit the matter back to it. The appellate authority shall afford reasonable opportunities to the petitioner as well as Respondent No. 5 to place their cases and permit them to produce necessary certificates and documents, if so requ­ired by the authority and shall consider the effect of the provi­sions of "the Rules" as well as the norms or conditions of the tender notice about the preferential treatment to the members of the Scheduled Tribes and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law, within a month from the date of receipt of the records. 15. Before parting, I would obssrve that it is essential for the Authority to bear in mind the nature and character of the right of tenderers in such settlements as well as the duties and obligation of tribunals to dispense responsible administrative justice, as set forth in the judgment. 16. In the result, the application is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.