A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) BY these two petitions the petitioners challenge the amendment made in Entries 19a and 19b in Schedule A of Rule 14 of the Octroi Rules framed in exercise of powers conferred on the Municipal Corporation by virtue of sec. 457 (7) read with sec. 149 (1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 Before the amendment cotton yarn was liable to octroi duty on weight basis under Entry 19 (a ). All other yarns (other than cotton yarn) were also similarly liable to octroi allout on the basis of weight albeit the rate of octroi duty under the aforesaid two entries varied. By amending the said two entries the basis for calculating the duty has been changed from weight basis to ad valorem basis. Under the amended Entry 19a octroi duty on cotton yarn is imposed at Re. 1/- p. c. Adv. while under Entry 19b the rate of duty is Rs. 2-00 p. c. Adv. The grievance of the petitioners is that the change from weightbasis to ad valorem basis by the amendment of the two entries is unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution in that it has thrown a heavy and unbearable additional. monetary burden on the petitioners. We do not see any merit in this submission. ( 2 ) IT seems well settled that a taxing statute cannot be challenged can the were ground that the tax imposed by the law is heavy. In JAGANNATH V. UNION OF INDIA A I. R. 1962 S. C. 148 the Supreme Court has in clear and unmistakable language laid down that a challenge to tax law on the mere ground that the tariff imposed by the tax law is heavy cannot be entertained. Again in S. NARAYAN V. UNION OF INDIA A I. R. 1976 S. C. 1986 Ray C. J. speaking for the Court observed that the A Courts had no jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to go into the reasonableness of Telephone Tariff Rates. It was pointed out that the rates are fixed as a matter of special planning and policy which cannot be subjected to judicial determination. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court that the challenge on the mere ground that the impost is unreasonably heavy cannot succeed. It was pointed out that the rates are fixed as a matter of special planning and policy which cannot be subjected to judicial determination. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court that the challenge on the mere ground that the impost is unreasonably heavy cannot succeed. ( 3 ) THE next question is whether the petitioners can challenge the levy on the ground that subsequent of the amendment of the two entries octroi duty is levied on the basis of the value of the an and not on the basis of weight as was the case before the amendment of the two entries. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision of law which prohibits such a change in the manner of levy of octroi duty. In fact as held by the Supreme Court in ANDHRA SUGARS LTD. V. STATE OF I ANDHRA PRADESH A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 599 the argument that percales tax could not be levied with reference to tonnage was repelled by observing than the purchase tax is levied with reference to the price of the goods but it is competent to the Legislature to levy the tax with reference to the weight of the goods purchased. On the same line of reasoning in the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary there can be little doubt that octroi duty can be levied on the basis of the value of the goods. Merely because in the past under the old entries octroi duty was levied on year on weightbasis it cannot be argued that the authorities were not competent to make a change by providing that from the date of the amendment octroi duty on yarn shall be recovered on the basis of the value of the yarn imports. We are therefore of the opinion that there is no merit in this submission urged on behalf of the petitioners. ( 4 ) OUR alternation was drawn by counsel for the petitioners to certain observations found in the judgment of Subba Rao J. in AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT (RAJASTHAN) LTD. V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN A. I. R 1962 S. C. 1406. In column 2 on page 1431 of the report it has been observed as under: It is said that a law of taxation is always in public interest. V. STATE OF RAJASTHAN A. I. R 1962 S. C. 1406. In column 2 on page 1431 of the report it has been observed as under: It is said that a law of taxation is always in public interest. Ordinarily it may be so but it cannot be posited that there cannot be any exceptions to it. A taxing law may be in public interest in the sense that the income realised may be used for public good but the may be accessions when the rate or the mode of taxation may be so abhorrent to the principles of natural justice or even to well settled principles of taxation that it may cause irremediable harm to the public rather then promote public good that the Court may have to hold that it is not in public interest. Nor can I agree with the contention that it is impossible for a Court to hold in any case that a rate of taxation is reasonable or not. As aproposition it is unsound. THESE observations do not form the basis of the majority decision. It is therefore not possible to accede to the submission that the shift in the newly added entries from the weightbasis to the ad valorem basis is unreasonable in the absence of any other material on the record of the case. ( 5 ) IN JAGANNATH IS BAKSH SINGH V. STATE OF U. P. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1563 the Supreme Court made the following observations in this behalf : Mr. Goyal argues that the Act is confiscator in character and must be struck down as being a colourable piece of legislation and in support of this argument he sagacities that the rates prescribed by the Schedule are so heavy that the assesses would virtually have the part with their properties within a short time in order to bear the burden of the tax. This plea raises the question as to whether a taking statute can be challenged on the ground that the burden of tax imposed by it is unreasonably high or excessive. This plea raises the question as to whether a taking statute can be challenged on the ground that the burden of tax imposed by it is unreasonably high or excessive. We have already seen that the provisions of Art. 31 cannot be invoked in challenging the validity of a taxing statute on the ground that the tax levied is unreasonably high and we have also noticed that if the taxing statute does not contravene any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part 111 : it would normally be treated as a valid law by whose authority tax can be collected without in foresting Art. 31 (1 ). Though the validity of a taxing statute cannot be challenged merely on the ground that it imposes an unreasonably high burden it does not follow that a taxing statute cannot be challenged on the ground that it is a colourable piece of legislation and as such is a fraud on the legislative power conferred on the Legislature in question. If in fact it is shown that the Act which = purports to be a taxing Act is a colourable exercise of the legislative power of the Legislature then that would be an independent ground on which the Act can be struck down. . . IN the instant case also there is no such challenge. All that the petitioners have stated in the petition is that the shift from the weightbasis to the ad valorem basis is unreasonable as it imposes a heavy burden on the petitioners but that is no ground as observed by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to earlier to strike down the impost. ( 6 ) THE Challenge based on Art. 14 is equally without substance. All those who import cotton yarn or any other yarn are governed by Entries 19 or 19b as the case may be and are taxed uniformly on the basis of the value of the yard. There is no grievance that from amount the class of cotton yarn importers or importers of any other yarn a few are differently treated. The treatment meted out so far as the commodity as well as the class of importers are concerned is theism that is uniform. All those who import cotton yarn are taxed under Entry 19-A on a uniform basis. The treatment meted out so far as the commodity as well as the class of importers are concerned is theism that is uniform. All those who import cotton yarn are taxed under Entry 19-A on a uniform basis. Similarly all those who import any other yarn such as synthetic yarn are uniformly taxed under Entry 19b. In Jagannath Baksh Singhs case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that a taxing statute can be hold to contravene Art. 14 if it purports of to impose on the same class of property similarly situated an incidence of taxation which leads to obvious Inequality. The Legislature is competent to classify persons or properties into Different categories and tax them discerently and if the classification thus made is rational the laying statute cannot be challenged. put if in its operation any taxing statute is found to contravene Art. 14 it would be open to Courts to strike it down In the present two petitions as pointed out earlier we do not see any discrimination or unequal treatment and hence we see no merit in the challenge based on Art. 14 of the Constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) TO the result therefore both these petitions fail and are dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. .