Judgment :- 1. The civil revision petition arises in execution of a decree for money. The decree holder sought to execute for the entire amount as per the decree alleging that the judgment debtors who were entitled to the benefits of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, Act 11 of 1970, committed default of three consecutive instalments and praying for the arrest and detention of the first judgment debtor in civil prison in the first instance. The judgment debtors filed an application E A. No. 568 (a) of 1974 in the matter under S.7 and 8 of Act 11 of 1970 for ascertaining the correct amount due. It was alleged in the application that by the payments already made, the entire debt has been wiped off and there has been excess payment. 2. The application was opposed on a preliminary point by the decree holder contending that in E. P. No. 31 of 1971 and subsequently, there has been an adjudication and ascertainment of the amount due as per the decree. In the said execution petition the decree holder had shown the total amount due from the judgment debtors as Rs. 3455.83 and claimed 1/8th of the amount with interest thereon as the first instalment after deducting a sum of Rs. 25/- paid on 15-1-1971. The court after hearing the judgment debtors's objection to this ordered that only 1/12th of the total amount was recoverable as the first instalment. In accordance with this direction, the decree holder's counsel filed a statement in court which reads: Table:1 The judgment debtors paid this amount and the E. P. was dismissed, on 18-1-1972. 3. The decree holder subsequently filed E. P. No. 67 of 1972 for realisation of instalments 2 and 3 Recoverable under Act 11 of 1970. The judgment debtors made certain part payments in the execution but finally arrest warrant was issued against judgment debtor No 1 There was an appeal filed in the matter A.S. No. 122 of 1973 before the District Court, Kottayam by the first judgment debtor. This appeal was however dismissed. But the execution petition was rejected for failure to take steps. During the pendency of the execution petition the second judgment debtor filed E. A. No. 1015 of 1972 on 14- 7- 72 paying a sum of Rs. 400 towards the fourth instalment due under the Act. This appeal was however dismissed. But the execution petition was rejected for failure to take steps. During the pendency of the execution petition the second judgment debtor filed E. A. No. 1015 of 1972 on 14- 7- 72 paying a sum of Rs. 400 towards the fourth instalment due under the Act. The decree holder was called upon to file a statement showing the correct amount. Accordingly a statement was filed by the decree holder as per which Rs. 87 69 was the balance amount due to the decree holder for the instalment. That amount was accepted as correct by the judgment debtors and this balance was paid on 27- 7 -72. The decree holder would therefore contend that there has been a conclusive determination by the executing court of the amount due from the judgment debtors as per the Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act. 4. In the above view, the executing court as well as the appellate court held that the execution application filed by the judgment debtors deserve no consideration and rejected the same. The executing court also pointed out that the means of the judgment debtors had already been proved in the previous execution petition. 5. I might at the outset point out that though a ground has been taken in the revision memo and faintly argued before me that the court below erred in ordering arrest of the judgment debtors allegedly without complying with the provisions of S.51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not much was stressed on this aspect quite rightly by Mr. Balasubramanyan the learned counsel for the petitioners in view of the tact that in the earlier proceedings there had been due enquiry and finding about the means of the judgment debtors. I might here point out that in Kadru Kunhu Abdul Karim v. Narayana Pillai Raghavan Pillai 1971 KLT. 448, this court had said that when it is once shown in execution that the judgment-debtor has means to pay and has refused or neglected to pay the same, it would debar an adjudication on a subsequent occasion whether the judgment-debtor has had means to pay the decree amount since the date of the decree and he has refused or neglected to pay the same. If on the earlier occasion the court finds that since the date of decree judgment-debtor has had means and has refused or neglected that again would be an adjudication which would debar a fresh adjudication on the question on a subsequent occasion. There Justice Poti followed the dictum of Justice Raman Nayar in Ulahannan Job v. Prudential Trust 1964 KLT. 1101 where the learned judge says: "That this argument forgets the clause 'or has had since the date of the decree' appearing in clause (b) of the proviso to S.51 of the Code. The prior order for arrest amounted to a finding that the judgment-debtor had or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay; and, that being so. the position remains, since the judgment-debtor is bound by that finding, that he has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay." This court differed from the view taken by Mr. Justice Panchapakesa Aiyar in Venkatasubba Rao v. Sreeramulu (AIR 1949 Madras 470) where it was said that every time a man is ordered to be arrested, and in every proceeding where he is ordered to be arrested, even if it is on the same day, reasons must be given, for cases differ and much depends on lapse of time also. In the circumstances no point could be made out on the basis of the alleged non-compliance with S.51 CPC. 6. What was pressed before me with considerable force and relying on various authorities by Mr. Balasubramanyan was that it is always open for a judgment debtor to show that the prior calculation of the decretal amount was in fact erroneous and there cannot be a bar of res judicata in such matters. It is never too late for judgment debtors to show that they have already satisfied the whole or so much part of a decree. They can at any stage show that the decree sought to be satisfied has become satisfied and they are not liable to be arrested as no further amounts are due. These arguments require careful examination in the light of the various authorities cited at the bar by counsel on both sides I will directly go into the Case Law in the matter. In Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad (1915) 32 All. These arguments require careful examination in the light of the various authorities cited at the bar by counsel on both sides I will directly go into the Case Law in the matter. In Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad (1915) 32 All. 589 which was followed in Sheo Mongol v. Hulsa AIR 1922 All 413 and approved by the Patna High Court in Prithin Mohton v. Jamshed Khan AIR 1922 Pat. 289 it was held that where a property is liable for attachment and sale and is sold an objection can be raised in subsequent execution proceedings that the amount of the decree debt for which the attachment and sale was held was not correct As per some earlier Madras decisions in Periakaruppan Chetty v. Chidambara Thambiran (1916) 2 M.W.N. 64 corresponding to 33 I. C. 443, Subbiah Naiker v. Ramanathan Chettiar 26 MLJ.189, Govinda Menon v. Krishna Mannadiar AIR. 1923 Mad. 649 and Lakshmanan Chetty v. Palaniyappa Chetty AIR 1928 Mad. 1052 it would appear that the Madras High Court had taken the view that the earlier execution order will operate as res judicata in subsequent stages when it bad held-(1) that the petitioner has a right to execute the decree, 12) that it is an executable decree, (3) that it is not barred by limitation and (4) that the judgment debtor is liable to satisfy the decree. In Ulaganatha v. Alagappa AIR. 1929 Mad. 903 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court said that the principle laid down in Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad (1915) 32 All. 589 does not conflict with the Madras decisions referred to above and further observed that the same fact that a judgment debtor did not in a previous execution proceeding object that the amount for which execution was taken out was in excess of the decree itself does not bar the judgment debtor from raising that objection in a subsequent execution proceeding Justice Walsh speaking for himself and Justice Kumaraswami Sastri said that to hold otherwise would imply that the decree is itself superseded by orders in execution which allow more than what the decree granted. 7. The law on the point was further explained by Justice Horwill in Alluri Bapanna v. Inuganti Vengayya & others AIR. 1937 Mad. 511 in the following manner. (It might be noted here that S.11 CPC. 7. The law on the point was further explained by Justice Horwill in Alluri Bapanna v. Inuganti Vengayya & others AIR. 1937 Mad. 511 in the following manner. (It might be noted here that S.11 CPC. before the 1976 Amendment did not in terms directly apply to execution proceedings) "It has often been pointed out by this Court that S.11 does not apply to execution proceedings; but for the same reasons that S.11 became necessary for controlling the trial of suits it has been necessary to apply the same or similar principles to execution proceedings. Caution has however to be exercised in applying the principle of constructive res judicata to execution proceedings. It can only apply to cases where the Court could not have acted as it did if the judgment-debtor had successfully raised the points which are sought to be held by this principle against him. In general, a Court cannot order execution unless it is satisfied: (i) that the petitioner has a right to execute; (ii) that the judgment-debtor is liable to satisfy the decree; (iii) that the decree is executable; and (iv) that it is not barred by limitation. If therefore an executing Court orders execution to proceed it must be presumed to have held that all these conditions are satisfied. If a judgment-debtor with due notice of the proceedings fails to raise any objection on any of these grounds it must be held by the principle of constructive res judicata that his failure to do so has the same legal effect as if it had been raised and decided against him. The mere fact that the sum for which the decree is sought to be executed is not the correct amount due by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder would not prevent execution from proceedings; and so the failure of a judgment-debtor to dispute at the first opportunity the correctness of the figure would not bar him by the principle of constructive res judicata from raising that point in subsequent proceedings or at some later stage of the same proceedings." In Jagannath Prasad v. Krishna Mahadeo AIR. 1933 Nagpur 182 it was held that the omission to raise objection as to correctness of amount to be recovered does not estop judgment debtor from raising dispute as to correctness of amount. 1933 Nagpur 182 it was held that the omission to raise objection as to correctness of amount to be recovered does not estop judgment debtor from raising dispute as to correctness of amount. The Court remarked that a distinction must be made between an objection to the actual execution of the decree and one relating to merely the amount for which the decree is to be executed. As regards the former question the judgment-debtor may well be held to be bound to raise an objection as soon as the execution of a decree is sought for and on his omission to do so he might reasonably be held estopped from raising the same objection by the principle of res judicata. 8. AIR. 1929 Mad. 903 and AIR. 1937 Mad. 511 are relied on and followed in T. N. V. Kailasa Thevar v. V. Ramaswami Ayyangar and others AIR. 1949 Mad. 238, Geddam Subba Rao and others v. Balantrapu Satyanarayanamurthy AIR. 1953 Mad. 948 and also approved of in Roja Babu Kothari and others v Syed Mohammad AIR 1961 Rajasthan 227. As pointed out earlier S.11 CPC. did not directly refer to execution proceedings before 1976 amendment. Therefore it had been once doubted by the courts whether the rule of res judicata applied to execution proceedings. The Privy Council corrected this erroneous view in Ram Kiroal v. Rup Kuari ILR. 6 Allahabad 269 (P.C ). There it was held that though the provisions in the Civil Procedure Code did not in terms apply to execution proceedings the principle of res judicata applied to such proceedings The Privy Council held there that the binding force of such decision depends not on the wording of S.13 of Act 10 of 1877 (Indian Act) corresponding to S. H of the 1908 Civil Procedure Code-but upon the general principles of law. "If it were not binding there would be no end to litigation." This view was again reiterated by the Council in Mungul Pershad Dichit and another v. Girija Kand Lahiri 8 ILR. Calcutta 51 (P.C.). 9. I might point out here that the Cochin Court had also followed the decision in Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad ILR. 32 All. 589. In Thoma v. Kunhan Kartha 19 Cochin 492 T M., Krishna Menon, J. said as follows: "This case is on all fours with the one reported in Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad. Calcutta 51 (P.C.). 9. I might point out here that the Cochin Court had also followed the decision in Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad ILR. 32 All. 589. In Thoma v. Kunhan Kartha 19 Cochin 492 T M., Krishna Menon, J. said as follows: "This case is on all fours with the one reported in Kalyan Singh v. Jagan Prasad. It was held there that if a judgment debtor does not take exception to the amount erroneously set forth in an application for the execution of a decree as being the sum due, he is not prevented by the principle of res judicata from doing so on a subsequent application for the execution of the same decree." (See also Chidambaram Pusari v. Nagammal 18 Cochin 127 and Albhuthasami v. Albhuthasami Maniharan 37 Cochin 438.)" The principle behind these decisions has been well stated by Chief Justice Ananthakrishna Ayyar in Varied v. Antony 40 Cochin 255. Though the principles of res judicata might apply to execution proceedings if the court did not either expressly or by necessary implications bring the judicial mind to bear upon the exact amount due for which execution should be issued, then there would be no bar, and the judgment-debtor would be entitled to raise the question of the exact amount due in a later execution petition. A mere notice calling upon the judgment debtor to show cause why execution should not issue, would be a proper notice for purposes of execution. But if any question of res judicata is to be based upon a decision passed after notice, then the notice to the judgment-debtor should insert the specific prayers in the application. "Of course, after applying the judicial mind, if the court should find expressly or by necessary implication that a particular amount was due on a particular date, then such order would be res judicata, and the judgment-debtor, when he did not object after notice to him, would be barred from raising objection about the correctness of the amount in any subsequent proceeding." (Emphasis is mine). If this case is examined on the above principle, there cannot be any doubt that there has been a finding by necessary implication in the earlier proceedings in the case as to what was the amount due from the judgment-debtors on the particular dates. If this case is examined on the above principle, there cannot be any doubt that there has been a finding by necessary implication in the earlier proceedings in the case as to what was the amount due from the judgment-debtors on the particular dates. The dismissal of E. P. No. 31 of 1971 after the judgment debtors had paid the amount specified in the statement of the decree holder is indicative of the fact that the judicial mind was brought to bear on the question of the exact amount due then. So also the decision in E. P. No. 67 of 1972 in regard to the realisation of instalments 2 and 3 recoverable under Act 11 of 1970. 10. It might be noted that the appeal in the matter before the District Court, Kottayam was A. S. No. 122 of 1973 and that appeal was also dismissed. It might also be noted that when the second judgment debtor filed E.A. No 1015 of 1972 on 14-7-72 paying a sum of Rs. 400/- towards the fourth instalment due under the Act, the decree holder was called upon to file a statement showing the correct amount. Accordingly the decree bolder filed a statement showing that Rs. 87.69 was the balance amount. The judgment debtors had accepted that as the correct amount and this balance was paid on 27-7-72. It is therefore too much to say that there has not been a judicial determination of the amount due from the judgment debtors. In this view, I find no error, much less an error of jurisdiction committed by the court below. I might before finally disposing of the CRP. advert to another contention raised by the decree holder's counsel. According to him, the present execution application is barred. The application is one under S.7 and 8 of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act. No doubt though no specific time is fixed for making such application according to the learned counsel, Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would then be applicable and the petitioners should have filed the application within three years when the right to apply accrued, that is three years from the date of the commencement of the Act. No doubt though no specific time is fixed for making such application according to the learned counsel, Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would then be applicable and the petitioners should have filed the application within three years when the right to apply accrued, that is three years from the date of the commencement of the Act. Though there is much force in this contention, I do not think I should make a decision on the same in view of the fact that on the question of res judicata I have found in favour of the decree holder and against the petitioners. While dismissing the CRP. I think interests of justice would be served in this case, if I grant the petitioners time till 2-6-1980 for payment of the balance decree amount. On failure to pay the amount the decree holder will be entitled to execute the decree by arrests and detention of the first judgment debtor in civil prison in the first instance. This CRP. is disposed of as above. I make no order as to costs.