Sajanendra Nath Tagore v. Competent Authority — 1980 DIGILAW 401 (CAL)

ORDER The petitioner who is the owner of several buildings and also owner of ponds, jhils and vacant lands within the urban agglomeration in mouzas Panihati and Kasba in the district of 24 Parganas as well as owner of building with vacant land appurtenant to it in the city of Calcutta have filed this writ petition assailing the validity of the orders dated October 28, 1978 made by the Deputy Secretary, Government of West Bengal as well as the order dated December 13, 1978 issued under memo No. 2893/ULC/BKP by the Competent Authority, Barrackpore under S. 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1970. 2. The petitioner filed on September 28, 1976 a statement under S. 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 before the Competent Authority specifying therein all vacant lands in his possession including lands whereon there are buildings and dwelling houses. The petitioner also mentioned in the said statement the location and valuation of the land and the building. On the same day, that is, on 28th September, 1976 the petitioner made an application before the competent authority claiming exemption under S. 20 of the said Act on the grounds, inter alia, that the lands appertaining to premises No. 6, Mandevill Gardens were necessary for the beneficial use and enjoyment of the building standing thereon and that the building, shed, structures comprising in the lands situated in mouza Panihati were also required to be exempted under the provisions of the Act. It has also been stated therein that the lands in mouza Kasba are marshy lands covered with water and used for cultivation as well as for culturing and rearing fishes. As such those are not vacant lands within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act. Exemptions were also claimed in respect of some lands recorded as agricultural lands. 3. On January 10, 1977, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, the respondent No. 2, issued a letter under Memo No. 343/UL/IL 706/76 intimating the petitioner that his application for exemption of excess vacant land could not be considered unless certain particulars mentioned therein were furnished. The petitioner was accordingly requested to furnish the requisite particulars as mentioned in the said letter. The petitioner was accordingly requested to furnish the requisite particulars as mentioned in the said letter. On March 29, 1978, the petitioner sent a letter to the respondent No. 2 stating inter alia that he submitted all the papers for considering his application regarding exemption of excess vacant land made under S. 20 of the said Act but he did not receive any intimation from the respondent No. 1 in this respect. He, however, submitted the particulars required for considering the application for exemption of the excess vacant land. This has been marked as annexure 'C' to the writ petition. Thereafter on May 29, 1978, a notice dated May 27, 1978 under S. 8(3) of the said Act enclosing a draft statement was received by the petitioner from the competent authority and the sub-divisional officer, Barrackpore, the respondent No. 1, whereby the petitioner was directed to file his objection, if any, against the said draft statement within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of this notice before the competent authority. This notice has been annexed as annexure 'B' to the petition. 4. The petitioner on June 26, 1978, made an application to the respondent No. 2 stating inter alia that the applied for exemption of excess land under S. 20 of the said Act on September 28, 1976 and prayed for allowing his prayer as made in the said application. On June 30, 1968 the petitioner applied before the respondent No. 1 for a month's time from the time already granted to file objection against the draft statement on the ground that due to his illness and old age he could not file the objection within the time specified with a medical certificate attached thereto. On July, 15, 1978, the respondent No. 1 issued a notice under S. 9 of the said Act enclosing a final statement. This is annexed as annexure 'X' to the writ petition. On August 1, 1978, the petitioner sent a letter to the respondent No. 1 stating inter alia that he already applied for exemption of excess vacant land under S. 20 of the said Act before the Land Utilisation & Reforms and Land & Land Revenue Department. This is annexed as annexure 'X' to the writ petition. On August 1, 1978, the petitioner sent a letter to the respondent No. 1 stating inter alia that he already applied for exemption of excess vacant land under S. 20 of the said Act before the Land Utilisation & Reforms and Land & Land Revenue Department. The said application has not yet been disposed of and as such he prayed for consideration of the said application and till decision is made on the said application the question of acquisition of excess vacant land may be kept in abeyance. On 28th October, 1978, the respondent No. 2 by letter No. 2769-U.L/IL........706/76 intimated the petitioner that after careful consideration by the Government it was satisfied that in public interest it was not necessary nor expedient to exempt the excess vacant lands from the provisions of the Chapter III of the Act or that the application of the said provisions to the excess vacant land held by the petitioner would cause under hardship to him. This has been annexed as annexure 'I' to the petition, Thereafter on December 13, 1978 a notice was issued by the competent authority, the respondent No. 1 under S. 10(5) of the said Act stating inter alia that the lands mentioned in the said notice had vested in the State Government with effect from 28th November 1978 and directed the petitioner to deliver possession of the said vested vacant lands described in the schedule appended to the said notice to Sri Aparesh Neogi, K.G.O.I, who has been authorised to take possession of the same within 30 days from the date of service of the said notice. This has been annexed as annexure 'J' to the petition. 5. It is this order as well as the order dated 28th October, 1978 issued by the respondent No. 2 that have been assailed in this writ petition. 6. This has been annexed as annexure 'J' to the petition. 5. It is this order as well as the order dated 28th October, 1978 issued by the respondent No. 2 that have been assailed in this writ petition. 6. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the purported order dated S. September 28, 1976 passed by the respondent No. 2 under S. 20 of the said Act, and the said notice dated 15th July, 1978 issued under S. 9 enclosing the final statement without affording any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to place his objection against draft statement and without considering objections filed out of time is in breach of the principles of natural justice and as such those orders are bad. It has also been submitted that the authorities concerned acted illegally and in excess of jurisdiction in not disposing of the application for exemption of excess vacant land as claimed by the petitioner under S. 20 of the said Act before the issuance of the draft statement. The issuance of the draft statement is, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder and as such the same is per se without jurisdiction and so the final statement prepared on this basis is liable to be quashed and set aside. It has also been submitted that land, which are recorded as agricultural lands in the record of rights have been illegally treated as vacant lands in utter contravention of the provisions of the Act and the same has been vested by the impugned order arbitrarily and illegally. It has also been submitted that exemptions with regard to lands appertaining to building as required to be given under the Act has not been given. It has also been submitted that tanks, jhils and marshy lands covered with water used for pisciculture and recorded as such in the record of rights have also been illegally treated as vacant lands and they have not been exempted from vesting as provided under the said Act. It has also been submitted that buildings include not only the residential houses but also the Darwan's quarters as well as the servants quarters and as such land appertaining to each of these buildings are required to be given exemptions in accordance with the ceiling provided under the Act. It has also been submitted that buildings include not only the residential houses but also the Darwan's quarters as well as the servants quarters and as such land appertaining to each of these buildings are required to be given exemptions in accordance with the ceiling provided under the Act. The competent authority, however, it has been submitted, has not given exemptions of lands as provided under the Act and as such the notice of vesting issued under S 10(5) of the said Act is bad being opposed to the provisions of the Act. It has also been submitted that covered pathway appurtenant to the building standing on lands in premises No. 6, Mandeville Gardens should also be included within building and should not be taken into account while computing the total area of vacant land in possession of the petitioner. The impugned order and/or notice of the final statement made by the competent authority, the respondent No. 1, is not in accordance with law as it did not allow all the above exemptions while calculating urban vacant lands in possession of the petitioner. It has also been submitted that though disputed questions of fact cannot be agitated in a writ petition yet where jurisdictional facts involving rights of the parties have been decided wrongly a writ petition is maintainable. It has been submitted that jurisdictional facts such as agricultural lands, jhils, tanks etc. which were wrongly considered and also soown in the draft statement made under S. 8 of the Act as such mere wrongly held to be vacant lands and they were made to vest in the State have been challenged in this writ petition and this writ petition is, therefore, maintainable. 7. On 18th December, 1978, a Rule was issued and an interim order of injunction till 15th of January, 1979 was made whereby the respondents were restrained from giving effect to the orders dated 28th October, 1978 and 13th December, 1978 which were annexed as annexures 'I' and 'J' respectively to the petition with liberty to apply for extension of the interim order upon notice to the respondents on the same application. On the 18th of January, 1979, the interim order was extended till the disposal of the Rule. 8. An affidavit-in-opposition sworn by Sri Jahar Sircar, Sub Divisional Officer, Barrackpore, the respondent No. 1 has been filed. On the 18th of January, 1979, the interim order was extended till the disposal of the Rule. 8. An affidavit-in-opposition sworn by Sri Jahar Sircar, Sub Divisional Officer, Barrackpore, the respondent No. 1 has been filed. It has been stated in paragraph 6(a) of the affidavit-in-opposition that all the lands owned and possessed by the petitioner within the Urban Agglomeration has not been disclosed in the statement filed by the petitioner under S. 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 filed before the Competent Authority. It has also been stated that the petitioner is the owner of 36,708.12 square meters of land is total. It has also been stated that apart from three premises mentioned namely, is mouza Panihati, Kasba and at premises No. 6, Mandeville Gardens, Calcutta, the petitioner also holds more land at mouza Panibati. It has been stated further that the areas of land covered by buildings appurtenant to such buildings as required under the existing building rules is 1493.33 square metres. In paragraph 11 of the affidavit-in-opposition it has been stated that the petitioner applied for extension of the time on June 30, 1978, i.e., after a lapse of 30 days from the date of service of the notice and thereafter made another prayer for time on July 19, 1978 beyond the appropriate period and as such the said prayer could not be considered by the deponent. It has also been stated that the petitioner was not entitled to plead his inability in filing his objection against the notice under S. 8 of the said Alt within the statutory period and after allowing the period to be expired he cannot raise such objection he fore this Hon'ble Court in the present proceedings. In paragraph 13 it has been stated that action had been taken under S. 9 of the said Act after the petitioner has failed to make any objection as required under S. 8 of the said Act within the prescribed period and the petitioner was served with a notice on 17.7.78 along with a copy of the final statement. It has also been stated that there was a prayer under S. 20 of the said Act made by the petitioner but because the petitioner filed such objection there is no bar under the said Act to serve notice under S. 9 of the said Act. It has also been stated that there was a prayer under S. 20 of the said Act made by the petitioner but because the petitioner filed such objection there is no bar under the said Act to serve notice under S. 9 of the said Act. It has also been stated that the above referred objection dated 1.8.78 and 10.8.78 was filed by the petitioner, he was guilty of not taking any action in accordance with law. It has been stated that all the points raised by the petitioner was considered in accordance with law. It has been further stated in paragraph 13(a) of the affidavit that the petitioner filed his objection after the lapse of the period of 30 days and in paragraph 13(d) it has been averred that the petitioner filed his objection to the draft statement after the lapse of the statutory period of 30 days and the Competent Authority was not bound legally to consider his such objection. It has also been stated that in spite of the Competent Authority took into consideration the question raised by the petitioner in his aforesaid objection and thereafter issued the final statement as under the notification as stated therein. 9. An affidavit-in-opposition has also been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 5, the Union of India. The said affidavit was sworn by Sri Mahadeva Ayyar, Deputy Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing. In paragraph 6 of the said affidavit it has been stated that it is for the Competent Authority under the said Act to see as to whether the petitioner is entitled to retain the said lands in terms of the said Act. In paragraph 6 of the said affidavit it has been stated that it is for the Competent Authority under the said Act to see as to whether the petitioner is entitled to retain the said lands in terms of the said Act. In paragraph 10 it has been stated that the said Act was passed after two or more State Legislatures’ resolution to the effect that the matter relating to the provisions for the imposition of ceiling on vacant lands in urban agglomeration, for the acquisition of such lands in excess of the ceiling limit and to regulate the construction of building on such lands and for matters connected therewith with a view to preventing concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bring about an equitable distribution of lands in urban agglomeration to sub-serve common good should be regulated in those States by enactment made by Parliament and the said Act was passed accordingly. As such the said Act having been duly passed after the resolution passed by the legislatures of several States including the State of West Bengal in accordance with the provisions of Art. 252(1) of the Constitution of India the enactment made by the Parliament is within its competence and the same cannot be challenged on that ground. 10. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the petitioner denying all these statements and allegations made in the affidavit-in-opposition and reiterating the statements and allegations made in the petition. 11. Mr. Bajoria, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the instant writ petition is maintainable inasmuch as the constitutional validity of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was challenged on the ground that the said Act is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament and that it has affected the petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. According to Mr. According to Mr. Bajoria the question about the vires of the said Act as it contravened Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution is pending before the Supreme Court for decision in writ petition No. 350 of 1977 Maharao Saheb Bhimsinghji v. Union of India, writ petition No. 753 of 1977 Rajender Garg v. Union of India, writ petition No. 755 of 1977 Jodhan Reel Estate Company v. Union of India and writ petition No. 441 of 1977 Anand Laxmi v. Union of India. He has therefore submitted that the writ petition is maintainable. It has also been submitted by Mr. Bajoria that jurisdictional facts have been wrongly decided, that is, lands which are recorded as agricultural lands and tanks in the finally published record of rights and are used as such have been wrongly treated as vacant lands and the same have been made to vest under the State. This wrong determination of jurisdictional facts cannot confer jurisdiction on the competent authority and as such the writ application is maintainable. It has also been submitted that the draft statement prepared under S. 8 of the said Act is in utter breach of the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the draft statement was prepared even though the application flied by the petitioner claiming exemption of certain agricultural lands, tanks as well as lands appurtenant to buildings under S. 20 of the Act has not been considered and disposed of by the State Government as required under the said Act. The draft statement made under S. 8 of the said Act, it has been contended, is arbitrary, illegal and unwarranted being in contravention of the provisions of Rule 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976. The draft statement is required to be made in accordance with the manner specified in form No. III and as this has not been done it is not a draft statement as required to be made under this Act. It has been further urged that in interpreting provisions of S. 8 not only the provisions of the Act but also the relevant Rule as well as the form prescribed by the Rule are to be taken into consideration. It has been further urged that in interpreting provisions of S. 8 not only the provisions of the Act but also the relevant Rule as well as the form prescribed by the Rule are to be taken into consideration. Some decisions have been cited at the bar to impress upon the court that even if there is any ambiguity, the forms prescribed by the Rules would throw light on the provisions of the Act. It has been next submitted that no order was made on the application for exemption made under S. 20 by the State Government nor any recommendation was made by the Board to the State Government in this regard as provided in the guidelines issued under the said Act by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing. As such the draft statement is not a draft statement made in accordance with the provisions of the Act as admittedly columns 6, 7 and 8 of Part 'A' of Form No. III had not been filled up by the Competent Authority. It has also been submitted that the purported final statement which is nothing but a true copy of the draft 8tatement is also without jurisdiction as the same was made in contravention of the provisions of S. 8(4) of the said Act besides being not made in the manner specified in Form No. III because no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner (objector) before passing the order. It has also been submitted that the petitioner due to his failure to file the written objection against the draft statement which was served on him on 29th May, 1978 within 30 days from the date of service made an application on 30th of June, 1978 for extension of time to enable the petitioner to file his objection against the same. This application was rejected on the ground that the same was made after the expiry of the prescribed period provided in S. 8(4) of the Act. It has been submitted that the competent authority acted illegally in refusing to grant extension of time as sufficient cause was made out for his inability to file it within the specified time and in rejecting the same without assigning any reason therefor. Mr. It has been submitted that the competent authority acted illegally in refusing to grant extension of time as sufficient cause was made out for his inability to file it within the specified time and in rejecting the same without assigning any reason therefor. Mr. Bajoria has further submitted that even if any objection was filed within time before the competent authority under S 8(4) of the Act the question of exemption under S. 20 of the Act could not be agitated as the same had to be decided by the Board appointed by the State Government before the draft statement is prepared as evident from item No. 7 of Part 'A' of form No. III. It has also been submitted that after draft statement is finalised there is no room for consideration of the application for exemption under S. 20 of the said Act. Mr Bajoria has further contended that though recorded as agricultural lands in the record of rights and used as such and exemption was claimed on its basis yet the application has been rejected even though in the draft as well as in the final statement prepared by the Competent Authority such lands were shown as agricultural lands. Similarly tanks recorded as such and mentioned as such in the draft as well as in the final statement was wrongly treated as vacant land and the same had been vested in the State in breach of the provisions of the said Act. It has also been submitted that land appurtenant to buildings, that is, dwelling unit and Durwan's quarters have not been exempted as required under S. 2(g)(i) and (ii). It has been therefore submitted that the notice annexure 'I' dated 20th October, 1978 intimating that the application under S. 20 has been rejected as well as the notice annexure 'J' issued under S. 10(5) of the said Act mentioning certain lands to have vested in the State and directing delivery of possession on the date to be intimated are liable to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Bajoria has also submitted that he is not presently making his submissions on the question of the vires of the impugned Act which he will make later on if he does not succeed on the questions on merits raised about the order being made in utter contravention of the provisions of the Act. 12. Mr. Mr. Bajoria has also submitted that he is not presently making his submissions on the question of the vires of the impugned Act which he will make later on if he does not succeed on the questions on merits raised about the order being made in utter contravention of the provisions of the Act. 12. Mr. Noni Coomar Chakravartti, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipality respondent has contended that after final statement was prepared under S. 9 after disposal of objections against the draft statement the application under S. 20 claiming exemptions can be heard as under S. 9 the total vacant land in possession of the claimant is determined as provided in S. 20(1)(a) of the Act. Non-disposal of the objection under S. 20 before the preparation of the final statement does not invalidate the final statement prepared under S. 9 of the Act. It has been next submitted that the draft statement was prepared by the competent authority under S. 8(1) of the Act after holding enquiry as required. Mere non-filing up of item No 15 of Part 'B' of form No. III prescribed by Rule 5 in draft statement does not render it bad and invalid as there has been substantial compliance within the meaning of the provisions of S. 8(1) and Rule 5 read with form No. III as prescribed by the Rules. Non-filling up of column No. 15 of Part 'B' or of item No. 7 in part A of form No. III is, at best, an omission under S. 45 of the Act which is a mere irregularity not affecting the merits of the case. It has also been contended by Mr. Chakravarti that the application for extension of time to file objection was made on 30th of June, though notice annexure 'D' along with the draft statement was served on 29.5.78 that is, beyond 30 days of service of notice as specified in the notice. A medical certificate of 1977 was attached with the application. No sufficient came had been made out for extension of time and order was made by the Competent Authority rejecting the application regarding extension of time. As such the application for extension of time was rightly rejected. It has been also submitted by Mr. A medical certificate of 1977 was attached with the application. No sufficient came had been made out for extension of time and order was made by the Competent Authority rejecting the application regarding extension of time. As such the application for extension of time was rightly rejected. It has been also submitted by Mr. Chakravarti that no appeal was preferred under S. 33 of the Act against the order rejecting the application under S. 20 and the time to file such appeal having been allowed to be barred the petitioner is not competent to challenge the same in this writ petition. 13. It has also been contended that all orders are appealable under S. 33 of the Act and as no appeal was filed, this writ petition moved after the lapse of time to file appeal cannot be considered and the petitioner is not entitled to any remedy. It has also been submitted that the alternative statutory remedy provided in S. 33 of the Act not being availed of, the discretionary jurisdiction will not be exercised by this Court and the application should be rejected. It has also been submitted by Mr. Chakravarti that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976 is not ultra vires the Constitution the writ petition is not maintainable. 14. As regards the first contention about the maintainability of the writ petition admittedly a challenge was thrown in the writ petition on the ground that the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the rules framed thereunder are ultra vires the Constitution and as such the same could not be given effect to as it is not within the legislative competence of the Parliament to make laws with regard to land which is in the State List on the basis of the provisions of Art. 252(1) of the Constitution of India. At the time when the rule was issued admittedly this question was not decided and so there is no dispute that this writ application is maintainable. At the time when the rule was issued admittedly this question was not decided and so there is no dispute that this writ application is maintainable. Of course, this point has been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. V. Basaviah Chowdhury reported in AIR 1979 SC 1415 : (1979) 3 SCC 324 where it has been held that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has been made validly pursuant to the resolutions adopted by the State Assemblies authorising the Parliament to make the enactment under Art. 252(1) of the Constitution and hence the Act is not ultra vires but intra vires the Constitution. The validity of the Act has also been challenged on the ground that it purports to contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Though Article 31 was omitted from the Constitution by S. 5 of the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1976, yet at the time when the application was moved this Article was in the Constitution. Moreover, it has been stated by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the very questions are before the Supreme Court for consideration in connection with writ petitions against the said Act as mentioned hereinbefore and the said writ petitions are pending before the Supreme Court fur decision. An argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondents that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 that is, Act 33 of 1976 was included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India and as such the same is immune from attack on the ground that the same has taken away or abridged the fundamental rights conferred by part III of the Constitution. This argument is of no substance in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India & ors (1980) 2 SCC 591 where it bas been held following the earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court in (1973) 4 SCC 225 Keshabananda Bharati's case that mere inclusion of an Act in 9th Schedule does not confer immunity on the Act from the attack of its validity on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution if the provisions of Act purports to damage or destroy the basic structure or essential features of the Constitution. This view has been reiterated also in the case of Sasanka Sekhar Maity v. The State of West Bengal decided by the Supreme Court on 9.5.80 as reported in (1980) 2 SCC page 2. Therefore the instant application in writ jurisdiction is maintainable. 15 It is now well settled that if jurisdictional facts have been wrongly decided the same can be challenged in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the writ court comes to the conclusion that jurisdictional facts have been wrongly decided by the authorities it can set aside and quash the wrong decision of the concerned authority by making appropriate orders and undoubtedly a writ petition cbal1enging the erroneous determination of the authority is amenable to challenge before the writ court. In the instant petition it has been submitted that agricultural lands and tanks recorded as such in the record of rights and mentioned as such both in the draft statement as well as in the final statement prepared by the Competent Authority have been erroneously treated as urban lands by the Competent Authority, the respondent No. 1 who vested the same in breach of the provisions of S. 2(o) explanations (A) and (B) and 2(q) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As such this writ petition is also maintainable on this ground. It will be appropriate to refer in this connection to the decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 1186 at 1190 para 7, State of M.P. v. D.K. Jadav it has been observed by the Supreme Court that it is well established that where the jurisdiction of an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary finding of fact the High Court is entitled in a proceeding for a writ, to determine upon its own independent judgment whether or not that finding is correct. In 87 ITR 539 AIR 1973 SC 1362 at 1963, para 3, Reja Textiles Ltd. v Income Tax Officer, Rampur it has been held that Income Tax authorities cannot assume jurisdiction by wrongly deciding the jurisdictional facts, that is whether a person was non-residing or not within the meaning of Income Tax Act, 1961. The question whether a jurisdictional fact has been wrongly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by High Court in an application for writ of certiorari. The question whether a jurisdictional fact has been wrongly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by High Court in an application for writ of certiorari. If the High Court decides that the Income Tax Officer wrongly decided that jurisdictional fact the assessee was entitled to a writ of certiorari. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court(?) in the case reported in 76 CWN 343 Baldev Singh v. Indian Explosives Ltd and others and it was held there that the jurisdiction of the tribunal depended upon the existence of certain facts, the writ court is entitled to weigh and appraise the evidence to find out if the facts existed to enable the tribunal to assume jurisdiction in the matter. In this case the question arose was whether the appellant was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held that the appellant was not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held that the appellant was not a workman within the Industrial Disputes Act and as such he was not entitled to raise an industrial dispute and the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon the case. The same view bas been reiterated in AIR 1963 SC 569 at page 574, para 15, Express News Papers (P) Ltd v. Their Workmen. It has been observed by Gajendragadkar, J. who spoke for the Supreme Court :- "Normally, the questions of fact, though they may be jurisdictional facts the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence, should be left to be tried by Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. If and after the Special Tribunals try the preliminary case in respect of such jurisdictional facts, it would be open to the aggrieved party to take the matter before the High Court by a writ petition and ask for an appropriate writ." 16. It appears that the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the draft and final statements as well as the impugned notifications mentioned in annexures 'I' and 'J' on the ground that the draft statement as welt as the final statement was not prepared in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the notice issued under S. 10 of the said Act is also illegal and bad. Admittedly a writ of certiorari can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts. Judicial acts include the exercise of quasi-judicial function by the administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exercise such functions as distinguished from those which are purely ministerial acts. This jurisdiction exercised by a writ of certiorari is, of course, not appellate but supervisory jurisdiction and as such if the determination of the inferior tribunal is palpably erroneous or without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction the court can quash the determination. In other words, this writ of certiorari will be exercised only to keep the tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction and compel the tribunal while making its determination to observe the provisions of law. In a case where no particular procedure has been provided for if the tribunal violates the principles of natural justice writ of certiorari will also be available in such cases. This has been held in the case of T.C. Basappa v. T Nagappa reported in AIR 1954 SC 440 at 444 paragraph 9. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. D.K. Jadav (supra) S. Mukharji, J. held in the case of Krishna Narayan Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal (1979) CLJ 427 (: 1979 (I) CHN 484 ) at 435-440 para 12 that the Competent Authority under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has jurisdiction only over urban land. If such authority usurps or purports to exercise jurisdiction over other land by applying wrong principle or wrong test about the concept of urban land not envisaged in the said Act then in the case of appropriate challenge, this Court (Writ Court) is competent to decide whether the determination of the said jurisdictional facts by the Competent Authority is correct or not. It has been further observed that an authority of limited jurisdiction cannot by making a wrong decision of fact upon which his jurisdiction depends, deprive jurisdiction to determine the question at all depriving the court to adjudicate the question finally. The writ application is maintainable on this ground also. 17. It has been further observed that an authority of limited jurisdiction cannot by making a wrong decision of fact upon which his jurisdiction depends, deprive jurisdiction to determine the question at all depriving the court to adjudicate the question finally. The writ application is maintainable on this ground also. 17. An argument was sought to be advanced on behalf of the respondent that as there is an alternative statutory remedy by way of appeal in S. 33 of the said Act the instant application in writ jurisdiction is not maintainable after the petitioner has allowed that remedy to be barred by lapse of time. The Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Srivastava v. Bhupendra Kr. Jain, AIR 1977 SC 1703 has observed that where there is an appropriate and equally efficacious remedy the court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so when there is a statutory remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms. Election to the Bar Council of M.P. held under Indian Advocates Act was challenged by a writ petition Rule 31 of the Election Rules framed under Bar Council of M.P. provides for election petitions before Election Tribunal within 15 days of election. I was held that writ was not available in such a case. In the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries (1974) 4 SCC page 22 it has been held that where there is an alternative statutory remedy the High Court should not interfere by exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the alternative remedy is too dilatory or difficult to grant relief. In exceptional cases the extraordinary power may be exercised. So it is right that the High Courts will be careful to be extremely circumspect in granting there reliefs especially during the pendency of the criminal investigation as it was the effect of slowing down or hampering investigation. 18. On a conspectus of these decisions it is clear that the writ application is maintainable if the alternative statutory remedy is too dilatory or difficult to grant quick relief. It also appears that in exceptional cases the extra-ordinary power of interference by way of writ is not ruled out. 19. 18. On a conspectus of these decisions it is clear that the writ application is maintainable if the alternative statutory remedy is too dilatory or difficult to grant quick relief. It also appears that in exceptional cases the extra-ordinary power of interference by way of writ is not ruled out. 19. In this case admittedly the petitioner made an application for extension of time to file his objections against the draft statement served on him under S 8(3) of the Act. This application was rejected on the ground that the same was made beyond 30 days of the date of service of the notice as provided in the said Act and the objection as to the illegal and wrong inclusion of tanks and agricultural lands in the category of vacant land and lands which the petitioner is entitled to get being appurtenant to buildings or dwelling unit was not at all considered and was not adjudicated upon on the mere plea that such objection was filed out of time. In such circumstances the alternative remedy provided in S. 33 is, in my opinion, totally inappropriate and inefficacious remedy as it cannot afford adequate and proper relief to the petitioner. Moreover, this is an exceptional circumstance and the court is justified in exercising its extraordinary power by way of issuance of writs of Mandamus and Certiorari to remedy the wrong done or purported to be done to the petitioner by the impugned order and notification issued under S. 10 of the said Act. Hence, in my opinion, this writ application is maintainable. The attack made by the petitioner as to the illegality committed by the Competent Authority in preparing the draft statement as well as the final statement respectively in violation of the provisions of Ss. 8 and 9 of the Act read with Rule 5 of the Rules requires consideration in order to determine whether this submission is tenable or not. Before proceeding to consider this submission it is appropriate to state the legal position in this respect. 8 and 9 of the Act read with Rule 5 of the Rules requires consideration in order to determine whether this submission is tenable or not. Before proceeding to consider this submission it is appropriate to state the legal position in this respect. Section 6(1) of the said Act provides that every person who holds vacant land in excess of ceiling limit in urban agglomeration at the commencement of the Act shall within the prescribed period file a statement before the Competent Authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and other particulars as prescribed for all vacant lands and also other lands on which there is building whether or not a dwelling unit therein held by him and also specifying the vacant lands within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain. Rule 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 provides that the statement under S 6 has to be filed within 122 days from the commencement of the Act and the statement shall contain the particulars specified in form No. I. Item No. 5 of the above form No. 1 provides the particu1ars which are to be given in respect of the vacant lands and item No. 8 of the said form requires details of exception from the ceiling limit claimed by the petitioner in respect of any vacant land held by him under S. 19 or S. 20 is to be stated. 20. Section 8 of the said Act enjoins that the Competent Authority on the basis of the statement filed under S 6 shall prepare a draft statement in respect of the person who has filed the statement under S. 6. This statement shall contain the particulars mentioned in sub. s 2 of that section. Clause V of sub-s. 2 of that section enjoins, that the particulars are to be stated in the manner prescribed by Rule 5 read with form No. III Form No. III which is appended to the rules consists of several parts, i.e., part 'A' comprising of several items including the item No. 4 & 7. Item No. 4 relates the total extent of vacant land owned or held as a tenant or possessed under a mortgage. Item No. 7 relates to extent of vacant land exempted under S. 20. Item No. 4 relates the total extent of vacant land owned or held as a tenant or possessed under a mortgage. Item No. 7 relates to extent of vacant land exempted under S. 20. Part B’ of form No. III comprises of 16 columns and it refers to the manner in which the particulars of vacant lands, land with building and agricultural land owned or held as tenant etc. by the person concerned are to be given. Column No. 7 of part 'B' specifies that the class of lands, that is, vacant land/land with building/agricultural land is to be specified, Column No. 10 of the said part specifies that the manner of approved land use is to be stated. Column No 15 requires view of the Competent Authority after his enquiry to be stated Part 'V' requires the details of vacant lands which the persons concerned desires to retain to be specified. The petitioner admittedly filed the draft statement before the Competent Authority on 28th of September, 1976. A copy of the draft statement has been annexed as annexure 'B' to the writ petition. On the same day an application was made under S. 20 of the said Act claiming exemption in respect of certain agricultural lands, tanks as well as in respect of lands appertaining to buildings. This has been annexed as annexure 'B' to the petition. In paragraph 4 of the petition it has been specifically averren that the land mentioned in the return comprises of jheel, tank, buildings including dwelling house, Darwans’ quarters, Mali's house, buildings for refugee market as well as for residence cinema house etc. It has been stated that jheels and tanks are not vacant land as no construction can be made thereon and as such they cannot be taken into account in determining the total area of land owned and/or possessed by the petitioner. It has also been stated that excluding the agricultural lands as well as the tanks and jheels and after giving due allowances in respect of lands appurtenant to buildings and structures in accordance with the provisions of the Act there will be no vacant land exceeding the ceiling limit which can be made to vest in the State. It has also been stated that excluding the agricultural lands as well as the tanks and jheels and after giving due allowances in respect of lands appurtenant to buildings and structures in accordance with the provisions of the Act there will be no vacant land exceeding the ceiling limit which can be made to vest in the State. The Competent Authority served a notice on May 29, 1978 on the petitioner with a copy of the draft statement prepared under S. 8(1) of the said Act and the petitioner was directed to file his objection within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. 21. It appears that the item No. 7 of part 'A' of the draft statement which requires extent of vacant land exempted under S 20 to be specified has been left blank whereas item No. 9, i.e., extent of vacant land to be surrendered has been filed up by mentioning the area of vacant land. It also appears from column No. 7 of part 'B' of the draft statement that certain lands have been described as building, tank, jheel etc. Column No. 15 of part 'B' which requires the view of the Competent Authority after his enquiry to be stated has been left blank. The final statement prepared under S 9 is also a mere copy of the draft statement prepared under S. 8(1) and served on the petitioner under S 8(3) of the Act. Admittedly item no. 7 of part 'A' and columns 7, 10 and 15 of part 'B' of the draft statement were left blank though sub-s. 2 of S. 8 read with rule 5 and form No. III clearly enjoins that the draft statement is to be prepared and it must contain the particulars as provided in S 8(2) read with Rule 5 and form III appended to the Rules. There is no doubt that the requirements specified in S. 8 read with Rule 5 are mandatory requirements and non-compliance with these mandatory requirements in preparation of the draft statement by the Competent Authority renders the draft statement wholly illegal and so ineffective in law and hence invalid. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision reported in AIR 1950 SC 265 at page 271 paragraphs 22 and 23, Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mondal. Reference may be made in this connection to the decision reported in AIR 1950 SC 265 at page 271 paragraphs 22 and 23, Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, West Bengal v. Keshab Chandra Mondal. Clause A of foot-note to form No. 5 of the Bengal Agricultural Income Tax Act specifically requires that the declaration in the return under S. 24 of the said Act shall be signed "in the case of an individual by the individual himself", i.e., personally and not by an agent. It was held that the declaration in the form of return signed by the illiterate assessee by the pen his son when there is no physical contact between the assessee and the return, cannot be treated as a properly signed and valid return. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Meghna Mills v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. reported in AIR 1971 SC 166 at page 169 para 7. It has been observed by the Supreme Court that Bye-law (b) Chapter V made under Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act 1952 read with Bye-laws 15 and 16 requires that the contracts are to be made in the prescribed form. This Bye-law is mandatory and the contract being not in accordance with the requirements of Bye-law 1(b) of Chapter 'V' it would not be held legal and valid. The Supreme Court in the case of S.P.S. Stores, Delhi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi reported in AIR 1973 SC 2401 held that from the provisions of S. 26A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 read with Rules 2, 8, 6 and the forms it is clear that before a valid application for renewal of registration is made, it is incumbent on the part of the assessee to have divided the previous year's profits. Consequently, application not fulfilling this mandatory requirement is liable to be rejected. Therefore the draft statement prepared being not made in accordance with S 8(2) read with Rule 5 and Form No. III the said draft s1atement is not a draft statement at all under the law and the same is invalid and bad. As such no proper objection as provided in sub-s 3 of S. 8 can be filed against the said draft statement. 22. As such no proper objection as provided in sub-s 3 of S. 8 can be filed against the said draft statement. 22. Admittedly the petitioner filed an application claiming the exemption under S. 20 of the said Act on the same day of filing the statement under S 6(1) of the said Act, that is, on September 28, 1976. This application under S. 20 for exemption is required to be decided before the Competent Authority prepares the draft statement under S. 8(1) of the said Act. This naturally follows from the particulars specified in part 'A' of form No. III prescribed by Rule 5 of the Rules where item No. 7 expressly provides that extent of vacant land exempted under S. 20 is to be mentioned. The words "exempted under S. 20" clearly signifies that the application under S. 20 has to be considered and disposed of by the State Government before the Competent Authority prepares the draft statement in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S 8 of the said Act. Section 20 read with the Compendium of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 states therein the guidelines to be followed under the said Act. One of the guidelines is as follows:- “The Board will make its recommendation to the State Government which will pass appropriate orders under S. 20(1)(a). Copies of these orders will be sent to the Competent Authority concerned so that he can note the exemptions and, process the statements filed by the person under S 6.” 23. In this case there is no dispute that the application for exemption under S. 20 of the said Act filed by the petitioner was not at all considered and disposed of not only before the preparation of the draft statement under S. 8 but also before the preparation of the final statement under S. 9 of the said Act. As such the draft statement being made in breach of the provisions of S. 20 of the said Act is also not a proper draft statement envisaged under the Act and on the ground the draft statement is liable to be quashed and set aside. As such the draft statement being made in breach of the provisions of S. 20 of the said Act is also not a proper draft statement envisaged under the Act and on the ground the draft statement is liable to be quashed and set aside. The argument that has been made on behalf of the respondent that the non-disposal of the claim for exemption made under S 20 of the said Act before the finalisation of the draft statement or even before the finalisation of the final statement under S. 9 of the said Act is a mere irregularity is wholly untenable and devoid of any merit. This non-compliance with the provisions of the Act cannot be termed as a mere irregularity but it is, in my opinion, an illegality which gees to the very root of the case and it renders the draft statement as well as the final statement invalid and ineffective in law. Similarly the contention sought to be advanced on behalf of the State respondent that the non-filling up of item No 7, 15 etc. as required under Rule 5 read with form No III is a mere omission under S 45 of the Act is also wholly unsustainable as I have already held that these items are to be filled up in the draft statement in order to enable the petitioner to know whether any exemption claimed by him has been allowed or not and if allowed to what extent. Secondly the non-mention of the views of the Competent Authority after his enquiry about the class of land in respect of which exemption is provided for in the said Act regarding agricultural lands, lands appurtenant to building, lands on which construction cannot be made etc. frustrates or baffles the entire purposes of serving the copy of the draft statement to be prepared after enquiry by the Competent Authority in order to enable the petitioner to file effective objections against the same. So such a draft statement prepared is anything else than a draft statement as required to be made under the said Act and the same as such is invalid and void. It is not disputed that the notice annexure 'D' dated 27th May, 1978 was served on the petitioner on 29th May, 1978. So such a draft statement prepared is anything else than a draft statement as required to be made under the said Act and the same as such is invalid and void. It is not disputed that the notice annexure 'D' dated 27th May, 1978 was served on the petitioner on 29th May, 1978. On June 30, 1978, an application wa5 made before the Competent Authority, the respondent No. 1 stating inter alia that the petitioner was and old man and he was suffering from chronic heart disease and so he prayed for further one month's time from date to enable him to file objection against the draft statement. This application was rejected by the Competent Authority as evident from the averments made in paragraph 11 of the affidavit-in-counter sworn by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that it was made beyond the statutory period and as such the said prayer could not be considered by the respondent No. 1. It may be mentioned in this connection that the notice was served on the petitioner on 29th May, 1978 asking him to file his written objection under S. 8(3) against the said draft statement within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Thus there is undoubtedly a delay of two days in making this application for extension of time. The Competent Authority, however, has not considered the provisions of S. 8(4) of the said Act which expressly confers upon him the power to extend the period specified in the notice as appears to him proper for any good and sufficient reason. From the averments made in the said affidavit-in-counter it does not appear that the Competent Authority considered this provision. On the other hand, from the averments made it is clear that the Competent Authority rejected the application for extension of time merely on the ground that the same was filed after the expiry of the period specified in the notice. This, in my opinion, is not a proper order made by the Competent Authority. It has been submitted in support of this order that there was no good or sufficient reason for extending the time but no such reason appears from the order itself or from the averments made in the affidavit-in-counter as stated hereinbefore and no such reason for rejection was communicated to the petitioner at all. It has been submitted in support of this order that there was no good or sufficient reason for extending the time but no such reason appears from the order itself or from the averments made in the affidavit-in-counter as stated hereinbefore and no such reason for rejection was communicated to the petitioner at all. In my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case it is fit and proper that the Competent Authority should have extended the time for filing objections particularly when the delay in making this application is only for two days and the reasons assigned therefor cannot be called to be not sufficient reason, particularly when a man's statutory right to file objection against the draft statement is going to be prejudiced or jeopardized by refusal to grant extension of time. There has been no unusual delay nor any apparent lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner in not filing the objection to the draft statement within the specified time and in praying for extension of time only two days after expiry of the period specified. In my opinion, therefore, the Competent Authority was wrong in not extending time for filing the objection against the draft statement. 24. It has been urged on behalf of the State respondent that the Government of West Bengal duly considered the application under S. 20 of the said Ad filed by the petitioner and the same was rejected. This order of rejection was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 28th October, 1978 under Memo No. 6729-UL/IL-706-76. This letter does not disclose the reasons for rejecting the claim for exemption as made in the said application. It appears from the application under S. 20 that exemptions from the ceiling provided for retention of vacant lands under S 4 of the said Act have been claimed on the grounds, inter alia, that certain lands as mentioned therein are recorded as agricultural lands in the settlement record of rights and they are being used as such and so they are not urban lands within the meaning of S. 2(o) of the said Act. Similarly tanks and marshy lands covered with water recorded as such in the record of rights on which construction of building is not permissible under the building regulation in force in the locality where the land is situated are not vacant land under S. 2(q) of the said Act. Similarly lands appurtenant to buildings which are required to be kept open according to building rules or which are required to be kept as open space for the enjointment of the building to the extent of 500 square metres have not been excluded while calculating the total area of vacant lands in urban agglomeration held by the petitioner. It also appears that claim was made for exemption to the extent of 500 square metres not only in respect of the dwelling unit in No. 6, Mandeville Garden Road premises but also in respect of Durwans’ quarters to the extent of 1000 square metres; but exemption was allowed only in respect of the dwelling units to the extent of 500 square metres without giving any exemption with regard to lands appurtenant to Durwans’ quarters. In the Guidelines issued by the Government of India and termed as "Compendium of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976" it has been provided that under S. 2(g), any building constructed before the appointed day on it in the dwelling unit therein is entitled to an additional allowance of 500 square metres of land. Therefore any building constructed before the appointed day which contains a dwelling unit or several dwelling units whether it is in the nature of servant quarters or out-houses even if it is situated in the same plot of land as the main building is entitled to an additional allowance of 500 square metres of land. If there are more buildings constructed before the appointed day, each building containing a dwelling unit (or several dwelling units) every such building is entitled to an additional allowance of 500 square metres. If a single building contains more than one dwelling unit it is not entitled to another additional allowance of 500 square metres of contiguous land. It does not appear from the above order communicated by the Deputy Secretary, Government of West Bengal to the petitioner that the claim for exemption have been rejected on any grounds whatsoever. If a single building contains more than one dwelling unit it is not entitled to another additional allowance of 500 square metres of contiguous land. It does not appear from the above order communicated by the Deputy Secretary, Government of West Bengal to the petitioner that the claim for exemption have been rejected on any grounds whatsoever. This order is bad being made in violation of the principles of natural justice which required that the order must record reasons for rejection of claim in order to observe fair play in making administrative order affecting rights of the parties. I am fortified in my view by the pronouncement of Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . It has been observed that the recording of reasons is usually regarded as a necessary requirement of fair decision. The obligation to give reasons for decision when consequence of wrong judgment is forfeiture of life or personal liberty for long period needs no emphasis, especially when it is a first appeal following upon a heavy sentence imposed for the first time. It has been urged by the petitioner that the order of rejection is wholly bad being in contravention of the provisions of the Act particularly under S. 2(o) and (q) of the said Act. It has been also urged that tank which is not a vacant land has been illegally taken to be a vacant land and the claim for exemption was illegally rejected. There is merit in this contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. It appears from the draft statement prepared by the Competent Authority that there are agricultural lands, tanks and marshy lands covered with water and recorded as such in the settlement record of rights. These lands, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of S. 2 of the said Act cannot be treated either as urban land or as vacant land within the meaning of the provisions of S 2(o) and (q) of the said Act and as such the exemption claimed in respect of these lands should have been considered and proper order should have been made on the application filed under S 20 of the Act. In the case reported in (1979) 1 CLJ 427 at page 438 para 12 Krishna Narayan Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal it has been held that the land which was being used for the purpose of agriculture and was entered in the land and 1and revenue records before the appointed day, i.e. 28.1.76 as for the purpose of agriculture and the said land being not included in any of the Master Plan cannot be treated as urban land for the purpose of computation of ceiling in respect of land of a person in urban agglomeration. Such a land is exempted from the ceiling limit provided in the Act. In AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh N.O.C notes 9 it has been observed that to attract Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 it must be land which under S. 3(J) means land. So anything which is not land cannot be brought under the definition. A tank is not land since it is called tank and not land. It is pertinent to mention in this connection that the Competent Authority also showed this classification of lands in the draft statement prepared by him under S. 8(1) of the Act and the final statement prepared by him under S. 9 is nothing but a true copy of the said draft statement which also shows that these lands in respect of which exemptions have been claimed are shown as tanks, agricultural land, marshy land etc. The competent authority has not recorded any reason why these lands have been treated as vacant land in urban agglomeration I have already mentioned hereinbefore that the views of the competent authority after enquiry which is required to be stated in column No. 15 of Form III part 'B' was left blank. This being the position the lands as mentioned in column No. 7 of part 'B' form No. III where particulars of all vacant lands, buildings etc were given cannot be treated as vacant lands within the meaning of the Act in urban agglomeration and the same cannot be vested by the competent authority in utter contravention of the provisions of this Act. The computation of the excess vacant land is, therefore, erroneous and arbitrary and the notice issued under S 10(5) dated 13.12.78 issued by the respondent No. 1 as mentioned in annexure 'J' to the petition intimating the petitioner to deliver possession of the vested lands described in the schedule below on the date specified is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction being in utter violation of the provisions of the Act. Hence, this notice is invalid and so it is liable to be set aside. 25. For the reasons aforesaid the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner having succeeded the Rule is made absolute. Let a writ of certiorari be issued commanding respondents to quash and set aside the draft statement prepared under S. 8 and the final statement prepared under S. 9 and the notice dated 13th December, 1978 issued under S. 10(5) as mentioned under annexure 'J' to the petition as well as the order rejecting the claim for exemption under S. 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 as mentioned in annexure 'I' to the petition. As the Rule succeeds it is not necessary to enter into and decide the questions raised regarding the vires of the impugned Act and the same is kept open. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The respondents are, however, given liberty to proceed in accordance with law. Rule made absolute.