Hardeo v. Govinder Kaur — 1980 DIGILAW 403 (RAJ)

JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application by the landlord decree-holds for contempt under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for having committed wilful breach the undertaking given by the non-applicant-tenant Smt. Govinder Kaur Rear on 13-3-1930 to hand over vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicants on or before the expiry of two months. 2. A few material facts giving rise to the present application may briefly be stated as under. 3. The applicant instituted a suit for ejectment against the no applicant in respect of shop No. 6 and some other premises. The said suit was decreed by the Munsif City, Jodhpur, on 5-2-1972. Thereafter an appeal was preferred. In appeal the plaintiff's suit regarding Shop No. 5 was dismissed and for the rest premises the decree of the trial court was maintained on 28-8-1973 by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur. The non-applicant preferred second appeal. In the second appeal preferred by the non-applicant decree for eviction in respect of shop No. 6 was maintained, whereas the decree in aspect of open land was set aside, on 13-3-1980. When the judgment was pronounced the learned counsel for the non-applicant prayed for time to vacate shop No. 6, on which prayer the non-applicant was allowed two months' time to vacate shop No. 6 and the non-applicant gave an undertaking to hand over vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant on or before the expiry of two months. The non-applicant, however, filed special leave petition before the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 7-5-1980 stayed the execution of the judgment and decree of this Court ex parte. The Special Leave Petition of the non-applicant was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 6.10.1990. However, in the meanwhile the non-applicant's adult son Shri Richhpal Singh filed a civil suit against the applicant and the non-applicant for Permanent injunction restraining the applicant from executing the decree. In that suit Shri Richhpal Singh submitted an application for grant of temporary injunction on S-10-1980, an undertaking was given by the applicant that he will not execute the decree against the plaintiff Richhpal Singh. The said application for temporary injunction was rejected on 27-10-1980. In that suit Shri Richhpal Singh submitted an application for grant of temporary injunction on S-10-1980, an undertaking was given by the applicant that he will not execute the decree against the plaintiff Richhpal Singh. The said application for temporary injunction was rejected on 27-10-1980. Richhpal Singh went in appeal against the rejection of his application for grant of temporary injunction, in which an interim order was passed against the applicant restraining him from executing the decree against Shri Richhpal Singh, till the next date, but after that date the order was not repeated. Thereupon, an application for continuance of the orders was moved by Richhpal Singh on 26-11-1980, on which the learned District Judge, Jodhpur, passed an order to continue the stay upto 1-12-1980. According to the applicant. this order was passed in his absence. However, on 1-12-1980 the stay was ordered to be continued till 22-12-1980. The applicant moved this application on 13-10-1980 stating that the non-applicant committed wilful breach of the undertaking given to this Court, so she is liable to be punished or contempt of Court. 4. Shri I. C. Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, urged the after rejection of the leave petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 6-10-1980, it was obligatory for the non-applicant to comply with the undertaking given by her to the Court to handover vacant possession of shop No.6 Originally, the non-applicant's husband was the tenant in the premises and a suit was instituted against the non-applicant's husband Sardar Attar Singh, but on account of his death that suit had abated. Thereafter a fresh tenancy was created solve in favour of the non-applicant and a second suit was filed against her. In that suit a plea was raised by the non-applicant that after the death of her husband Sardar Attar Singh, the tenancy devolved on the non-applicant as well as her three sons and one daughter, who were all minors. But that plea was negatived by all the three courts, and it was found by this Court concurrently with the courts below that a new tenancy by oral agreement had come into being with Smt. Govinder Kaur, non-applicant. The suit was instituted as for back as in 1968. Richhpal Singh at present is aged about 19-20 years. But that plea was negatived by all the three courts, and it was found by this Court concurrently with the courts below that a new tenancy by oral agreement had come into being with Smt. Govinder Kaur, non-applicant. The suit was instituted as for back as in 1968. Richhpal Singh at present is aged about 19-20 years. In reply to the notice of ejectment, the non-applicant stated that the concern run by her in the premises regarding motor repairs is absolutely owned by her and there is no one who has joined in her concern. So it was alleged by the applicant that Richhpal Singh filed the suit in collusion with the non-applicant and at her instance. The plea taken by the non-applicant and that she was ever ready and is still ready to deliver the possession of the disputed shop and it is her son, who in exercise of his own independent legal right, has instituted a suit and in which execution of the decree is stayed, so there has been no breach of undertaking on the part of the non applicant, is only a false one and is merely a pretext. The said plea is absolutely untenable in view of the undertaking given by the non-applicant as well as in view of the contents of the stay application submitted by the non-applicant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in which the non-applicant stated that she is in possession of the disputed shop No.6 and she is running the business of the Motor Vehicles and Motor parts in the said shop and if she is evicted therefrom, then she would be put to irreparable loss, its this business is the only source of livelihood of the non-applicant and her family. Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, pointed out that right from the very beginning, since the reply to the notice for ejectment, the non-applicant's case has been that she is the sole owner of the business run in the shop. He urged that under the garb of the suit filed by Richhpal Singh, the non-applicant cannot take shelter for non-compliance of the undertaking. She has wilfully committed the breach of undertaking, so she should be punished. 5. Shri N. M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, on the other hand, urged that in fact there is no undertaking given by the non-applicant to the Court. She has wilfully committed the breach of undertaking, so she should be punished. 5. Shri N. M. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, on the other hand, urged that in fact there is no undertaking given by the non-applicant to the Court. The non-applicant eras not givens any benefit. The applicant was not entitled to take possession of the shop No. 6 for two months under sub-section 9 of section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1950 (hereinafter-referred to as "the Rent Control Act"). In view that provision, the Court allowed two months' tine. In the absence having taken any benefit, the undertaking cannot be considered to be an undertaking to the Court. At the most it can be said to be an under taking given to the applicant. Breach of such an undertaking give to the applicant, cannot be held as commission of tempt of court. Shri Singhvi in support of his contention relied on case law, to which I shall presently advert. Shri Singhvi also contended that there was no cause of action with the applicant to move the application on 13-10-1980 in view of the fact that on that date the applicant had already given an undertaking not to execute the decree against Richhpal Singh. Besides that, the restraint order against the applicant still continues, so the question of contempt on the part of the applicant does not arise and it cannot be said that under the circumstances there has been any wilful breach of any undertaking by the applicant. He also maintained that Richhpal Singh has instituted suit in his own independent right. The applicant has moved this a cation with an ulterior motive to exert pressure on the non-applicant, that the suit may not be pursued and under the threatening of contempt the applicant may get possession. 6. He also maintained that Richhpal Singh has instituted suit in his own independent right. The applicant has moved this a cation with an ulterior motive to exert pressure on the non-applicant, that the suit may not be pursued and under the threatening of contempt the applicant may get possession. 6. In the rejoinder Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the application refuted the submissions of Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for the n applicant, and reiterated that it was the bounden duty of the non-applicant to comply with the undertaking and breach of undertaking is will full on her part of Richhpal Singh was already in possession of the reputed shop in his own right the non applicant should not have sought time and should not have given undertaking to the Court for handing over the vacant possession and further she should not have maintained before the Supreme Court that she is in possession of the disputed shop and running her business. 7. For the success of the present application, the applicant is required to establish that there has been wilful breach of undertaking given by the non-applicant to the court. Under section 2, clause (b) "civil contempt" has been defined "Civil contempt" means wilful dis- obedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. It has to be established that there is an undertaking given to a Court and the same has been breached, and simply breach of undertaking would not amount to a "civil contempt". The breach has to be "wilful" in order to amount "civil contempt". If these conditions are satisfied, then alone the non-applicant can be held guilty of "civil contempt" punishable under section 12 of the Act. 8. The first question, therefore, arises as to whether the non-applicant had given undertaking to the Court. Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for (or the non-applicant, disputes that the undertaking given on 13-3-1980 is an undertaking to the Court. It is simply an agreement between the parties and for giving rise to an undertaking. It is necessary that soma benefit should have been drawn by the non-applicant by making some sort of representation to the Court. He referred to sub-section (9) of section 13 the Rent Control Act. Section 13(9) of the Rent Control Act reads as under: "Section 13. It is necessary that soma benefit should have been drawn by the non-applicant by making some sort of representation to the Court. He referred to sub-section (9) of section 13 the Rent Control Act. Section 13(9) of the Rent Control Act reads as under: "Section 13. Eviction of tenants : xx xx xx xx (9) Where any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant is made on the ground specified in sub-section (1), the land- lord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of two months from the date of the decree or order." The above provision disentitles the landlord to obtain possession the premises before the expiration of two months from m the date of the decree or order for eviction of a tenant with effect from the date when the decree or order is made on the ground specified in sub-section (1) sub-section (1) of section J3 lays down the grounds on which eviction cannot be sought by the landlord. In the present case eviction was sought by the landlord on the ground of reasonable bona fide need. Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, urged that the decree was modified by this Court on 13-3.1980, so from 13-3-1980 for two months, the landlord was not entitled to possession. The order allowing two months' time by the Court was in conformity with this provision, so by giving an undertaking, no benefit was taken by the non-petitioner aid the undertaking given by her, should be read as an agreement between the parties and not an undertaking to the Court. It referred is Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and another AIR 1979 S. C. 1528 ), Chhaganhhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chanaubhal Gorahanbhoi and others (A.I.R. 1976 S. C 1909) , and he also placed reliance on Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhasy v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (A. I. R (35) 1948 Calcutta 294) , P. K. Kripaleni V. Mahabir Pam and another (A. I. R. 1952 Calcutta 452) , Sukumar Mitra v. Tara Shankar Ghosh (A I R. 1952 Calcutta 591 and Babulal Parekh v. M/s. Lachminarayan Swairam and others, A. I. R. 1964 Orissa 63 . He also referred to to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Dutt v. R. K. Sardana (A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 6) , and observations made in Babu Ram Gupta's case (supra), with regard to the principles and objects for resorting to proceedings for contempt. According to Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-petitioner, an undertaking is no undertaking, unless some benefit is drawn by the person giving the undertaking, for under taking. 9. In Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and another (supra) , para 10, it was observed : "In fact, the reason why a breach of clear undertaking given to the court amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making a false representation to the Court obtains benefit for himself and if he fails to honour the undertaking, he plays a serious fraud on the court itself and thereby obstructs the course of justice and brings into disrepute the judicial institution. The same can not, however, be of a consent order or a compromise decree where "the found if any, is practised by the person concerned not on the but on one of the parties. Thus, the offence committed the person concerned is qua the party and not qua them and, therefore, the very foundation for proceeding for contempt of court is completely absent in such cases. In this circumstances, we are satisfied that unless there is an express undertaking given in writing before the court by the contemner or incorporated by the court in its order there can be so question of wilful disobedience of such an undertaking. Its the instant case, we have already held that there is neither any written undertaking filed by the appellant nor was any and undertaking impliedly or expressly incorporated in IN order impugned. Thus, there being no undertaking at all the question of breach of such an undertaking does not arise" 10. In Chheganbhai Narsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai and others (supra) reliance was placed on the following observations in para 4: "We agree with the High Court that there is a case of perverse and deliberate flouting of undertakings given by a litigant, who, evidently, had no intention to abide by them. The undertakings seemed to have been taken very lightly by him as mere cloaks for obtaining an order which would not have beef passed but for the undertakings. The undertakings seemed to have been taken very lightly by him as mere cloaks for obtaining an order which would not have beef passed but for the undertakings. The High Court observed that it had no option except to convict the appellant and to sentence him to three months imprisonment in jail." The underlined observations were interpreted by Shri Singhvi that order should be passed by the Court in pursuance of the undertaking else the order would not have been passed. The present is not a where the Court would not have passed the order. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, but I find unable to agree with the submission. Sub-section (9) of section the Rent Control Act does not enjoin the Court to grant two time. It only places a restriction on the landlord to obtain Possession and the period of two months shall run from the date, the decree or order for eviction is made. It may be pointed out that the decree eviction was made by the trial court and it is not made by this Court. This, Court has simply affirmed the decree for eviction of shop No. 6 passed by the two courts below. Affirming of the decree or confirming the decree or maintaining of the decree, cannot he equated to making decrees. Had the suit been dismissed and the decree is passed the first time, then in that case it can be said that the decree for on has been made and from the date of making of such decree, the landlord is under an obligation not to seek eviction for two months. The object behind this sub-section appears to be that during the period of two months of making of the decree, the tenant may file an appeal and obtain or the tenant may search for new accommodation and vacate the premises in two months and the Legislative object may be that quick and forcible dispossession may be avoided in the interest of justice and public peace and status and prestige of the tenant may be maintained by avoiding forcible dispossession. But when once the decree for eviction is passed or made and first and second appeals are preferred and those Appeals are dismissed, then, in my opinion, the tenant is not entitled to vail the benefit under sub-section (9) of section 13 of the Act. It is my because of that, prayer is made to the appellate Court for allowing time to the tenant to vacate the premises. The allowing of time by the appellate court is nothing, but a grant of 'indulgence to the tenant to sate the premises, thereby giving him a benefit of avoidance of forcible dispossession in execution of the decree. In the present case, the following order was passed on 13-3-1980 : "Learned counsel for the appellant prayed for time to vacate shop No. 6. The appellant is allowed to vacate shop No. 6 within two months. The appellant undertakes to hand over vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the respondent Harden on or before the expiry of two months from today." 12. It may be stated that after dismissal of the non-applicant's appeal a respect of Shop-No. 6 and pronouncement of the judgment, a prayer as made by the learned counsel for the non-applicant for allowing time to scale the premises. The non-applicant was present in person. This Court allowed two months' time and it is clear that the non-applicant undertook to hand over vacant possession of the premises on or before the spiry of two months. The above order allowing two months' time is a composite order and it cannot be divided into two parts reading grant of so months time and giving of undertaking in a disjuncted manner as attended by Shri Singhvi The intention behind the order is quite manifest that the time has been allowed on giving an undertaking by the non-applicant. Thus, the non-applicant in fact availed the benefit by living an undertaking, that the decree will not be executed against her for period of two months and that she will peacefully hand over the possession of the premises under the undertaking within two months. 13. Even if it is found that the Court was required to give two months' time to the non-applicant to vacate the disputed shop, still the non- applicant gave an undertaking to the Court, so that the need for executing be decree may not arise. The undertaking is clear and unqualified. 13. Even if it is found that the Court was required to give two months' time to the non-applicant to vacate the disputed shop, still the non- applicant gave an undertaking to the Court, so that the need for executing be decree may not arise. The undertaking is clear and unqualified. By living such an undertaking the non-applicant represented to the Court she will hand over vacant possession to the applicant peacefully, of her own accord without initiation of any execution proceedings. The applicant does not come into picture at all. After pronouncement of the judgment, a prayer for time was made to the Court and it is the Court which allowed the time on non-applicant's undertaking and the non-applicant gave an undertaking to the Court. By no stretch of imagination, such an undertaking can be taken to be an undertaking as a result of any mutual agreement. Thus, I find that the above undertaking is an undertaking to the Court and further by giving in undertaking the non-applicant has availed the benefit. Even if it is found that no benefit has been availed by the non-applicant, still it is a solemn undertaking to the Court, which she is bound to respect and wilful breach thereof can be considered to he visited with punishment. 14. Shri Singhvi tried to support his contention by reference to Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Sec 17 the expression the Court' which passed a 'decree' has been defined and explained in relation to execution of decrees. That meaning has no relevance for purposes of sub-section (9) of Section 13 of the Rent Control Act. The provision contain ed in Section 37 is a deeming provision with a limited put pose and scope. 15. I may now refer to the cases Nishe Kanto Roy Chowdhary v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (supra), P. K. Kripalani v. Mahabir Ram and another (supra) and Sukumar Mitra v. Tarasankar Ghosh (supra) and Bahulal Parekh v. M/s. Lachhminarayan Swalram and others (supra), cited by Shri Singhvi. 16. In Nisha Kanto, Roy Chowdhary's case (supra) the suit was compromised and under compromise the lessee undertook to remove the image of Kali as also permanent brick built and other structures in and around the place where the image of Kali is situate. The decree was passed in terms of compromise. 16. In Nisha Kanto, Roy Chowdhary's case (supra) the suit was compromised and under compromise the lessee undertook to remove the image of Kali as also permanent brick built and other structures in and around the place where the image of Kali is situate. The decree was passed in terms of compromise. The lessee, however, subsequently declined to remove the image of Kali and the decree-holder applied to commit the lessee for contempt of court on the ground that he had broken the undertaking given to the Court. It was held that on the true construction of the compromise mere use of the word "undertaking" did not mean a promise to Court. It was simply a solemn promise by leasee to the lessor and the nature of that promise or undertaking could never changed by reason of the compromise being accepted by the Court and a decree passed in its terms. It was held that the lessee could not committed Tor contempt of Court. Thus, on facts the case is clearly distinguishable. 17. In Sukumar Mitra v. Tarasankar Ghosh's case (supra) under. taking was not an unqualified and unconditional one. In case the defendant gave an undertaking to vacate the premises or before a certain date and a default clause was embodied the undertaking itself and it was provided that in default, the defendant agree that the ejectment decree be executed or some other steps to be taken according to law and that he would raise no objection The High Court passed an order in the terms of the undertaking. In facts and circumstances of that case, it was held that failure in the of the defendant to keep to the terms of the undertaking cannot regarded as justifying the exercise of the discretionary powers of the Court to order committal for contempt. This fact was also taken no of, that while giving the undertaking the defendant had reasonable do that he had not given an unqualified undertaking and this practice also considered that the proceedings for contempt should be taken reluctance and that any benefit of doubt should be given to the party so it was held that the case was not fit for starting contempt proceedings. In the present case no such condition is attached to the undertaking. The present undertaking is an unqualified and unconditional one. 18. In the present case no such condition is attached to the undertaking. The present undertaking is an unqualified and unconditional one. 18. In P. K. Kripalanl v. Mahabir Ram and another (supra), the bailiff of the Court delivered possession of the premises to the landlord in motion of the decree, but the sub-tenant, however retook possession, who was not a party to the ejectment proceedings. On the question whether the opposite party committee contempt of Court or not, it was held that the opposite party 2, who was the tenant, did not commit any attempt, since there were no allegations of any kind against him and on facts of that case even the opposite party 2, sub-tenant, was not held guilty of contempt. This case as well does not in any way help the case the non-applicant. 19. In Babulal Parekh v. M/s. Lachminarayan Swalram and others (supra, 2) the undertaking was given to the Court by the Manager of the defendant and there was no undertaking given by the defendant. The Manager of the defendant was not a party to the suit and by him no undertaking taken in his personal capacity so it was held that he is not punishable in contempt on violation of the undertaking by the defendant, though the Manager gave the undertaking on behalf of the defendant. 20. Thus, from what I have discussed above, in the present case I hold that the non-applicant gave an unconditional and unqualified undertaking the Court and further it cannot be doubted that there has been breach of that undertaking. Admittedly, possession of shop No. 6 has not been delivered by the non-applicant to the applicant. 21. The next question to be examined is as to whether there has ban a wilful breach on the part of the applicant of her undertaking. Sari Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, urged that in the circumstances of the case it cannot be found that there has been a wilful breach by the non-applicant of the undertaking given by her. The next question to be examined is as to whether there has ban a wilful breach on the part of the applicant of her undertaking. Sari Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, urged that in the circumstances of the case it cannot be found that there has been a wilful breach by the non-applicant of the undertaking given by her. The non- applicant approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court where from execution of the decree was stayed on 7-5-1980 and that stay continued upto 6-10-1980 and in the meantime her son Richhpal Singh instituted a suit in which the execution of the decree stands stayed, though there were intervening periods in which there was no stay of the execution of the decree and no restraint order against the applicant, but still when her son was enforcing his own independent legal right and was asserting possessing over the disputed shop, as is evident from the report of the Commissioner, although the non-applicant was prepared to deliver the possession, it should not be found that there was any wilful breach of her part. The non-applicant could not oust her son from the disputed shop and further she remained under the impression that when the Court allowed two months' time, thereafter the decree will be executed and possession would be taken by the landlord-decree-holder in execution of the decree. 22. In my opinion, the above submissions have no force and do not merit acceptance. Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, with vehemence and emphasis at his command submitted that on 13-3-1980 the undertaking was given by the non-applicant in the presence of his counsel Shri M. C. Bhoot knowing fully well the consequence of the undertaking and the consequence of its breach. He urged that it cannot be presumed and inferred that the undertaking is without any effect. Shri Maloo pointed out that showing of helplessness on the part of the non-applicant, is all farce and a made up story and a a false representation to the Court. Had the non-applicant been not in a position to deliver vacant possession, she should not have given an undertaking. The plea is further negatived by the fact that she did not aver before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that she is in possession of the disputed shop along with the other members of the family. Had the non-applicant been not in a position to deliver vacant possession, she should not have given an undertaking. The plea is further negatived by the fact that she did not aver before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that she is in possession of the disputed shop along with the other members of the family. She asserted her own possession and her own business being run in the said shop. Her preparedness to deliver possession, is meaningless. It is she, who is behind litigation and it is at her instigation and instance that her son been filed the suit. If such a plea is allowed to prevail, then it would mean that there would be successive suits instituted by each individual member of the family and the undertaking given by the non-applicant would be rendered nugatory and would be of no consequence. Even on 26-11-1980 she showed her preparedness to deliver possession. When she was unable to deliver possession, she should have stated to the Court that she is not in a position to deliver vacant possession as Richhpal Singh is in possession of the premises, to whom she cannot oust. According to Shri Maloo there has been a deliberate, flagrant and blatant breach of undertaking by the non-applicant irrespective of any restraint order. The question of breach of undertaking should he examined independent of any suit filed by Richhpal Singh and any restraint order issued in that suit. He supported his submissions by reference to some cases. 23. It would be proper to examine the validity and force of the submissions of Shri Maloo in the light of the case law cited by Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant. 24. In Gaur Gopal Dutt and others v. Smt. Shantilata Mitra and others (A. I. R. 1976 Calcutta 475 ), the facts were that a sublease was granted by the petitioner to one Satyendra Nath Mitra for a term of 8 years. A suit for ejectment was instituted on the ground of default and a consent decree was passed on 10-7-1958 and it was provided that the judgement debtor would vacate and deliver up peaceful possession of the premises the applicants on the expiry of the period covered by the option in the terms of the lease. After the passing of the decree the judgment-debtor died leaving behind him his widow, sons and daughters. After the passing of the decree the judgment-debtor died leaving behind him his widow, sons and daughters. In execution application a further consent decree was passed on 10-7-1958 extending the time to vacate the premises till 30-12-1965. Then on 15-2-1966 another consent order was passed before Mr. Justice Sankar Prasad Mitra as he then was, in the application for execution of the decree dales 10-7-1958, wherein the respondents gave a solemn undertaking to Court to vacate and deliver up possession of the premises by 31-7-1911. On 7-6-1967, an application was moved by the respondents in getting a discharge from the said undertaking given in 15-2-1966 and for an injunction restraining the applicants from eviction respondents. On that application an interim order was passed by the Justice A.N. Sen, which was vacated. Thereafter a suit was filed 7-7-1967, in which it was prayed that the order dated 15-2-1966 of the Justice Sankar Prasad Mitre be declared void and unenforceable. The respondents obtained in interim stay but that was dismissed by Mr. Justice A.N. Sen on 18-8-1967. An appeal was preferred against the order of dismissal of the stay application. On 19-2-1968 the Rule Nisi was obtained for Contempt of Court for breach of undertaking dated 15-2-1966. The appal filed by the respondents was disposed of and the hearing of the suit is expedited and the applicants were restrained from executing the said consent decree dated 10-7-1958, till disposal of the suit. The suit was decreed, but on appeal the decree was set aside. Leave to appeal of the respondents was dismissed Then respondents applied to the Hon'ble Supreme Court was special leave, which was also dismissed on 3-2-1975. The respondents eve Mrs. Sabita Ghose took out an application under Section 17-D of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and got a stay of execution of the decree, which was dismissed on 16-5-1975. An appeal was referred, in which the respondents obtained all interim order and the application for Contempt was heard during the pendency of that appeal. An argument nu advanced in that case that there is an interim order of stay so the Court should not pass any order in the application in any event until the disposal of the said appeal. An argument nu advanced in that case that there is an interim order of stay so the Court should not pass any order in the application in any event until the disposal of the said appeal. In that connection it was observed that an undertaking to Court is a matter between the Court and the person who the undertaking to Court and they are entirely different and separate. Stay of execution of a decree simpliciter will not stay the operation of the order of Court regarding the undertaking. Therefore, under Section 17-D rebut was staved by that Court is the execution of the decree by the procedure laid down it Civil Procedure Code and during the pendency of the appeal the execution of the decree has been stayed, but an application under section 17-D cannot override the solemn undertaking given to Court. It was further observed in that case as under : " It will be a sad day for the Court if the Court allows the solemn undertaking given to this Court to be mere papers signifying hing. The parties and litigants must know and appreciate they should not be allowed to treat the solemn undertaking given to this Hon'ble Court like a child's play. Undertaking Court and legal rights are entirely different and separate matters." It was also observed that if one is allowed to get away so easily from solemn undertaking, then undertaking to Court loses all significance. In that case the contemners Samirendra Nath Mitra and Samirendra Nath Mitra were held guilty of contempt and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed on each one of them and they were also ordered to suffer imprisonment for a fortnight each and it was also observed such an imprisonment will not be carried oat they conform to their undertaking to Court and vacate the Premises it, suit and put the applicant in possession thereof within a week. 25. The next important decision cited by Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant is, Saleemuddin and another v. Sharfuddin and others (AIR 1980 Delhi 39 ). In that case an application for ejectment was moved by Sharafuddin and Shahabuddin against their tenant Mohammed Din and or order of eviction was passed on 18-8-1967 on the ground of bona fide requirements. No appeal was filed by the taunt against that order, so the same became final. In that case an application for ejectment was moved by Sharafuddin and Shahabuddin against their tenant Mohammed Din and or order of eviction was passed on 18-8-1967 on the ground of bona fide requirements. No appeal was filed by the taunt against that order, so the same became final. In 1968 the tenant Mohammed Din died leaving behind a widow, three sons and two daughters. The widow also died in January, 1975. On 27-2-1976 on. of the tenant's son and daughter, namely, Saleemuddin and Mst. Ameequan, filed objections under sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Rent Control (An-ENND- Sol) Act, 970, claiming to be covered by the definition of the term tenant' and could not therefore be ejected in execution of the eviction order. The objections were dismissed and their appeal was also dismissed. Thereupon the stay was granted on the appellants' furnishing securing or the due performance of the decree and one Saffuddin, father-in-law of Saleemuddin, gave a surety bond. The objectors carried the matter to the High Court in the second appeal, which came for hearing before B. C. Misra, J. The objectors did not press their appeal and Saleemuddin asked for time to vacate the premises by 31-12-1977. To this effect he gave an undertaking to the court, which was accepted. The court dismissed the appeal and directed that the order of eviction will not be executed before 31-12-1977. A few days before 31-12-1977, Hassenuddin, another son of Mohd. Din filed a suit for declaration claiming that the eviction order passed against Mohammed Din was inexecutable against him. An interim injunction restraining the landlords from executing the eviction, was sought, but was refused, and an application was moved by the landlord for execution. One Mohd. Shariff filed objections in the execution proceedings. The objections were pending and on 6-2-1978 the landlords moved the contempt application against Saleemuddin on the basis of the undertaking given by him before B. C. Misra, J. An argument in advanced that Saleemuddin in helpless in delivering possession as member of the family of Haseenuddin, who is now lodged in jail, are residing in the disputed premises and they do not vacate and allow him to deliver the possession. Saleemuddin took a position in his objection that Haseenuddin is not residing in the premises in dispute at all, so it was observed that how can it now be urged with any show of reason that Saleemuddin is unable to deliver the possession. It was observed Saleemuddin gave a solemn undertaking to the court to vacate the premises by 31-12-1977. He was not unmindful of the fact that if he committed default in honouring his undertaking, he will be liable for consequences of the breach of the undertaking given to the court. It found that the breach is wilful and that he has broken the terms of undertaking. He is setting up Haseenuddin's possession and takings behind him. It was further observed that this is a case of blatant of the undertaking given to and accepted by a court of law. The learned counsel was present on 7-4-1977. He also made a statement on the terms. Avadh Behari, J., also observed that Haseenuddin's suit had Sariff's objections are engineered proceedings, which seems to have brought at the instance of Saleemuddin. These observations were to, tut the learned Judge stated that he does not think that the is without a reasonable basis. He further proceeded to observe that:- "the course of proceedings as the conduct of the parties their relationship all suggest that the suit and the objections intended to delay delivery of possession. In any event Saleemuddin is not released from his undertaking. Once has given an undertaking to the court he is bound by terms found my decision on Saleemuddin's undertaking given in the court on 7th April, 1977 and the breach of that. The terms of the undertaking and the breach are clot question. Saleemuddin is guilty of the breach of the taking. The breach of an undertaking is liable to be by the same punishment as breach of an injunction. Saleemuddin is therefore punishable in contempt. This conclusion." 26. On behalf of Saleemuddin helplessness on the part of contemner was pleaded and it was urged that though technically there is also not wilful. The learned Judge did not agree and observed that : "It is a case of wilful, deliberate and flagrant breach of the undertaking given to a court of law. This conclusion." 26. On behalf of Saleemuddin helplessness on the part of contemner was pleaded and it was urged that though technically there is also not wilful. The learned Judge did not agree and observed that : "It is a case of wilful, deliberate and flagrant breach of the undertaking given to a court of law. The entire course of proceedings right from 1976 when the objections were filed clearly shows that by one device or other the landlords have been kept out of possession. Even the undertaking before this Court has not been fulfilled. The court has been mocked at with impunity. If this breach is not wilful and deliberate how else shall we characterise it." 27. The learned judge found Saleemuddin guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 2,000/- under section 12 of the Act. 28. In the present case, as well, the facts abundantly show that the suit is an engineered one. Richhpal Singh is none else other than the son of the non-applicant. The litigation for eviction of the premises is going on since the time of Attar Singh, the husband of the non-applicant and it was in 1966 that a new tenancy was created after abatement of the earlier suit. The plea of non-applicant regarding devolution of the tenancy on the heirs of deceased Attar Singh was negatived by all the courts and the decree became final after rejection of the Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Despite such a long course of litigation, it appears that the non-applicant was not satisfied and with an intention to retain the premises got the suit instituted by her son. If the non-applicant was not in a position to deliver vacant possession, she should not have given undertaking. It is not her case that her son occupied the premises forcibly after giving of the undertaking by her. She asserted her own possession in the disputed shop in her stay application before the Supreme Court. In para 2 she stated as under:- "That the petitioner is in possession of the disputed shop, being Shop No. 6. It is not her case that her son occupied the premises forcibly after giving of the undertaking by her. She asserted her own possession in the disputed shop in her stay application before the Supreme Court. In para 2 she stated as under:- "That the petitioner is in possession of the disputed shop, being Shop No. 6. The petitioner is running her business of repairs of motor vehicles and motor parts in the said shop and if she is evicted therefrom she will be put to an irreparable loss, as this business is the only source of livelihood of the petitioner and her family." From her undertaking as well as from what she stated in her stay application in the Supreme Court, supported by an affidavit and from what she represented in this Court on 26-11-1980, it is clear that she claimed to be in possession and she did not represent that she is not in a position to deliver vacant possession. A question was put during the course of the arguments to the learned counsel for the applicant as to whether the non-applicant was in a position to deliver vacant possession on 13-3-1980 upto 13-5-1980 or not, the reply was that the non-applicant cannot say as to whether she was in a position to deliver vacant possession. From the undertaking it will be inferred that she was in a position to deliver vacant possession and there was no impediment or hinderance in her way to deliver vacant possession. Thus, having regard to course of proceedings, the conduct of the non-applicant, her relationship with Richhpal Singh it can he reasonably found that Richhpal Singh has instituted a suit at the instance of the non- applicant and she cannot be allowed to take shelter of that litigation for not complying with undertaking given by her to Court. Such a view is not only reasonable and probable, but appears to be the only true and correct view. 29. In the next case Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai and others (supra), the appellant gave a solemn undertaking to the Court in revision proceedings to hand over certain premises in his possession. In view of the undertaking the revision was dismissed. 29. In the next case Chhaganbhai Norsinbhai v. Soni Chandubhai Gordhanbhai and others (supra), the appellant gave a solemn undertaking to the Court in revision proceedings to hand over certain premises in his possession. In view of the undertaking the revision was dismissed. There was a breach of the undertaking and it was hell that : "There is nothing in the conditions of the undertaking to imply that it was merely a consent order passed upon an agreement between the parties to which the order of the Court had been superadded. It was clearly a case of express undertaking to the Court incorporated in the order." 30. In that case the appellant surrendered the possession after initiation of contempt proceedings, but it was observed that that made no difference to the initial wrong committed. With regard to the nature of the order being based on consent, it was observed that the learned counsel for the appellant took up the impossible position that it was a mere agreement between the parties, to which the order of the Court had been appended. Their Lordships agreed with the High Court that this is a case of perverse and deliberate flouting of undertakings given by a litigant, who, evidently, had no intention to abide by them, and this feature of the case .was also noticed that the appellant gave no sign of even regret at any stage not to mention an apology of any kind. So the High Court rightly observed that it had no option except to convict the appellant and to sentence him to three months' imprisonment in civil jail. 31. Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, also referred to Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka and another v. Kapurchand Ltd. (AIR (37) I950 Bombay 336 ), in which the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dissented from the view taken in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhary v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (supra). 32. He also referred to Lala Baijnath Prasad v. Lala Shyam Sunder (1961 (2) Cr. L. J. 222) , in which the decision in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhary v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (supra) was distinguished and Sukumar Mitra's case (supra) was dissented and the reasoning given in that case was not accepted. 33. 32. He also referred to Lala Baijnath Prasad v. Lala Shyam Sunder (1961 (2) Cr. L. J. 222) , in which the decision in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhary v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (supra) was distinguished and Sukumar Mitra's case (supra) was dissented and the reasoning given in that case was not accepted. 33. Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, further referred to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Kuldip Rastogi and another v. Vishwa Nath Khanna, (AIR 1979 Delhi 202) . It was observed in that case that the word 'wilful' has the same meaning in the law of contempt as in other branches of the law and there is no reason why in the matter of contempt it should have some special or peculiar meaning. Quoting Bown, L. J., In re Young and Harston's Contract (1855) 31 Ch. D. 168 , that it 'is not a term of art' and considering the ordinary meaning of 'wilful', as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, that for which compulsion or ignorance or accident cannot be pleaded as an excuse, intentional, deliberate...., and after referring to some English and Indian Law, it observed that, 'Contumacious' is used as a synonym, and not for the purpose of adding something more to the meaning of 'wilful' than it otherwise bears." 34. As regards the purpose, object and jurisprudential philosophy behind action for contempt, Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the apps referred to the Advocate General. State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another (AIR 1980 S. C. 946 ), in which in para 7 it was observed as under: "Every abuse of the process of Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of a Judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice we must ray, is a Contempt of Court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the procession of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. It may be that certain minor abuses of the procession of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the expression ` 'Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed and interfered 'with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage." Per Frank Further, J., in Offut v. U. S. (1954) 348 US 11 . "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, awhile those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope". Per Judge Curtis Raleigh quoted in Jennison v. Baker, (1972)1 All ER 997 at p. 1006." 35. I need not encumber the judgment by dealing with the two cases cited by Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, on the question as to when the powers of committal for contempt of Courts should be exercised. 36. If the submission of Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, and the facts of the present case are considered in the light of the case law discussed above and the view expressed, as above, 'I am clearly and firmly of the opinion that there has been a wilful breach of undertaking by the non-applicant. 36. If the submission of Shri Maloo, learned counsel for the applicant, and the facts of the present case are considered in the light of the case law discussed above and the view expressed, as above, 'I am clearly and firmly of the opinion that there has been a wilful breach of undertaking by the non-applicant. After rejection of Special Leave Petition, it was the bounden duty of the non-applicant to comply with the undertaking, without loss of time Thus, in the light of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the non-applicant is guilty for Contempt of Court. 37. Now the next question is as to what order should be passed. 38. Shri. Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant, submitted that under sub-section (3) of section 12, for sentence of imprisonment, the Court must give special reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation. Sentence of imprisonment is an exception and in normal circumstances, sentence of fine should be imposed. Reliance was placed by him on a decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Pushpaben and another v. Narandas V. Badiant and another (AIR 1979 S. C. 1536 ). Shri Singhvi, learned counsel for the non-applicant submitted that in that case the accused was acquitted in view of the compromise between the parties and the accused gave an undertaking to the Court that he shall repay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the complainant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case found no special reason for sentencing the appellants to jail and reversed the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court and sentenced the appellants to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default, 15 days' simple imprisonment. 39. The present is a case of breach of undertaking in a matter of delivery of possession. After a long and protracted litigation and un-conditional undertaking was given for handing over the vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant. Shelter for non-compliance of undertaking is being taken by the non-applicant by resorting to one device or the other. The conduct of the non-applicant is most reprehensible. In order to maintain the majesty of law and dignity of courts and respect for the judicial system, breaches of undertaking to courts should not be lightly viewed. Shelter for non-compliance of undertaking is being taken by the non-applicant by resorting to one device or the other. The conduct of the non-applicant is most reprehensible. In order to maintain the majesty of law and dignity of courts and respect for the judicial system, breaches of undertaking to courts should not be lightly viewed. There has been no sign of regret or repretence or contrition. Sentence of fine alone would be of no consequence and the undertaking will never be complied with thereby. Thus, having regard to particular facts and circumstances of the case sentence of imprisonment is a must. 40. Accordingly, I sentence the non-applicant Govinder Kaur to a simple imprisonment of one month. But this imprisonment will not be carried out if the non-applicant conform to and comply with the undertaking given to the Court and hand over vacant possession of shop No. 6 to the applicant within a week from today. The non-applicant shall, however, further pay a fine of Rs. 500/-(rupees five hundred and shall also pay the costs of this application to the applicant.Contempt petition allowed. *******