JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, J. - Aggrieved by an order dated 13th March, 1978 dismissing his revision in proceedings arising under U.P. Act 13 of 1972, the petitioner Shanti Swarup and others have approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioners are landlord of shop No. 413 (old/17/145 (new) Daresi No. 2, Agra. The said shop was originally in the tenancy of one Sri Bhola Nath. On 19th December, 1973 Bhola Nath made an application intimating that he was going to vacate the accommodation. Respondent No. 3 Kanhaiya Lal son of Harde Ram moved an application on the same date praying that the shop be allotted to him. The Rent Control and Eviction officer obtained a report from the Rent Control Inspector and on its basis declared the accommodation to be vacant. Notice were issued to the petitioners which were returned with the endorsement that they had refused to accept service thereof. The notice were then a fixed in the presence of two witnesses. However, as there was no opposition and the only application made for the allotment of the accommodation being that of Kanhaiya Lal, the Rent Control and Eviction officer by his order dated 26th December, 1973 allotted it in his favour. Thereafter the allottee entered into possession of the same. 3. On 9th January, 1974 the petitioners filed an appeal before the District Judge Agra, who, in view of change in the law, treated that appeal as a revision. Although the memorandum of appeal revision was filed in the year 1974, the matter remained pending in the court of the District Judge for about our years and eventually 8th March, 1978 was fixed for hearing of the case. On that date, on the request of the petitioners the case was adjourned and 13th March, 1978 was fixed for its hearing. On 13th March, 1978, when the case was taken up for hearing, counsel for the petitioners expressed his inability to argue the appeal and formed the court that he wanted to move an application for Transfer of the case. He requested that the case may accordingly be adjourned to a future date. When the court expressed its inability to accept the request of the counsel for adjournment of the case and called for the counsel to argue the case, he left the court without arguing the appeal/revision. He requested that the case may accordingly be adjourned to a future date. When the court expressed its inability to accept the request of the counsel for adjournment of the case and called for the counsel to argue the case, he left the court without arguing the appeal/revision. The District Judge then went through the record and found that as the vacancy had been intimated by the outgoing tenant; a report had been made by the Rent Control Inspector con firming the Bank vacancy : notices were issued to the landlord which came back with the endorsement of refusal and thereafter the notices had been a fixed, and that it was only thereafter that the Rent Control and Eviction officer allotted the accommodation to Kanhaiya Lal, it did not appear that he committed any error of jurisdiction. He pointed out that if the petitioners wanted to dispute the factum of vacancy and to challenge the allotment order on that basis, it was open to them to apply for the review of the allotment order, under section 16(5) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. In those proceedings he could obtain an adjudication either about there being no material justifying making of the allotment order as also of the controversy with regard to proper service of notices upon them. Material that existed on the record when the Rent Control and Eviction officer made the allotment order indicated that the case was made after complying with the procedure prescribed in the Act and could not be said to be without jurisdiction. He, therefore, dismissed the revision by his order dated 13th March, 1978. 4. Aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. In my opinion the petitioner deserves to be dismissed on the short ground that having regard to petitioners' conduct before the revisional court, he has disentitled himself to claim relief from this Court. In the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners bad an opportunity to argue the appeal/revision before the District Judge and to press all the point (which he now seeks to raise), before, him. When the case was called on for hearing before the District Judge, he declined to argue case on the ground that the court did not, as desired by him, adjourn the hearing of the case. When the case was called on for hearing before the District Judge, he declined to argue case on the ground that the court did not, as desired by him, adjourn the hearing of the case. In case the petitioner was not satisfied with the order refusing to adjourn the hearing, he might have raised his grievance in respect thereof while seeking relief against the order ultimately passed by the court, but then his counsel was not at all justified in walking away from the court without arguing the case. If a party does not press its case when it has an opportunity to press it. Surely it can not expect that the High Court will exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution at its instance. 6. However, I have also heard the learned counsel for the petitioners on the question as to whether for the petitioners on the question as to whether the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction officer suffers from any error of jurisdiction. 7. Main ground taken by the petitioners' counsel, for contending that the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction officer is without jurisdiction, is that before making the allotment order, no notice in connection with the allotment proceedings was served upon the petitioners, and that the service report to the effect that the petitioners had refused to accept the notice was wrong and fraudulent. This submission necessarily involves investigation of fact. Suffice it to say that it was open to the petitioners to have moved the Rent Control and Eviction officer under section 16(5) of the Act to review the allotment order passed by him on this ground. If he had moved such an application, this controversy about acts could have been, after taking evidence, decided by the Rent Control and Eviction officer himself. So long as the report of the process server to the effect that the petitioners refused to accept notice was there on the record and there was no reason for the Rent Control and Eviction officer to suspect for doubt the correctness of the report, he had ample jurisdiction under the Act to proceed with the making of the allotment order. 8. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that inasmuch as the petitioners did not come to know of the allotment order within seven days of the allottee occupying the disputed accommodation, it was physically impossible for him to move the application for review of the allotment order, within the period of limitation for moving such application, prescribed by the Act. Accordingly this Court should not refuse to go into and resolve this dispute in a writ petition either on the ground that the petitioners should have moved an application under section 16(5) of the Act for that the controversy involves adjudication of disputed question of Act. I am unable to accept this submission. Section 16 subsection (5) clause (a) runs thus : "where the landlord or any other person claiming to be lawful occupant of the building or any part thereof comprised in the allotment for release order satisfies the District Magistrate that such order was not made in accordance with clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be, of subsection (1), the District Magistrate may review the order : Provided that no application under this clause shall be entertained later than seven days after the eviction of such person." In the case of Niran Kumar Das v. District Judge Pilibheet, AIR 1977 Allahabad 47, it has been held that the words 'claiming to be lawful occupant' apply only to other persons. They do not apply to landlords. Accordingly, it was open to the petitioners to move an application for review of the allotment order passed in this case. The proviso which lays down that no application under this clause shall be entertained later than seven days after eviction of such person obviously refers to 'any other person' i.e. to a person other than the landlord who, in pursuance of the allotment order, has become liable to be evicted from the accommodation in question. Limitation mentioned in provision has no application to a case where the application or review of the order is made by a landlord for a person who has not been evicted from the disputed accommodation in pursuance either of an allotment or a release order. In this case neither the landlord nor any other person, claiming to be in lawful occupation of the accommodation, has been ejected in pursuance of the impugned allotment order made by the Rent Control and Eviction officer. In this case neither the landlord nor any other person, claiming to be in lawful occupation of the accommodation, has been ejected in pursuance of the impugned allotment order made by the Rent Control and Eviction officer. Accordingly, the limitation prescribed in the proviso to section 16(5)(a) for moving an application for the review of the allotment order cannot be made application. The landlords were thus not prevented from approaching the Rent Control and Eviction officer for review of his order on this ground. 9. In the circumstances, I agree with the District Judge that the impugned allotment order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction officer did not suffer from any error of jurisdiction and it was not liable to be interfered with. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs,