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1980 DIGILAW 41 (HP)

SHAKSHI LAL AND ANOTHER v. NARESH KUMARI

1980-07-02

H.S.THAKUR, V.D.MISRA

body1980
JUDGMENT V. D. Mishra, CJ.—Does a female Hindu buying a widows estate in a house becomes a full owner thereof after the coming into force of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? This is the question which falls for decision in this case. 2. Smt. Keshri widow of Radhakishan, sold the house in dispute to Naresh Kumari on 29-1-1954 for Rs. 3,000/-. Shakshi Lal and others, reversioners of Radhakishan, filed a suit against Naresh Kumari and Shrimati Keshri challenging the sale. It was averred that Shrimati Kesri was a limited owner having a vidows estate in the house and there was no legal necessity to sell the house. The trial court decreed the suit holding that there was no legal necessity to sell the house and, therefore, the sale was void against the reversioners interest. Naresh Kumari appealed. During the pendency of the appeal Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force on 17th June 1956. Thereafter Shrimati Kesri died on 22nd May 1957. The appeal was dismissed on 11th June, 1958. 3. Shakshi Lal and others filed the suit against Naresh Kumari on 10th June, 1959 for possession of the house in dispute on the basis of the declaratory decree obtained by them. The suit was decreed on 30th June, 1962. Shrimati Bhatti, mother of Naresh Kumari, was impleaded as defendant No. 2 on the plea that she was in possession of the house with Naresh Kumari. The suit was decreed by the trial court. Naresh Kumari appealed. Appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Kangra Division at Dharamsala and the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs now challenge the decision in this second appeal. 4. The learned Additional District Judge accepted the appeal holding that the sale of the house "even though made without legal necessity and not binding on the reversioners, was nevertheless binding on the alienor so as to pass her own interest i.e. her life interest to defendant No. 1 and that defendant No. 1 had thus acquired the house in dispute by purchase before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act. 1 would further hold, that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the house in dispute at the time of commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and that she was entitled t© such possession under the law as Smt. Kesri was still alive at that time and hence by irtue of the provisions of section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act defendant No. 1 became absolute owner of this house." 5. It is not disputed before us that though Smt. Keshri was alive when the Hindu Succession Act came into force, she could not become the full owner of the house in question under section 14(1) of the Act since she was not in possession thereof after having sold her interest to Naresh Kumari. However, Mr. Vaidya, learned counsel for Naresh Kumari, contends that since Naresh Kumari had acquired the house in question before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, she becomes the full owner thereof under section 14(1). At this stage section 14 may be read: "14. (I) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.—In this sub-section, "property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a evil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." It will be noticed that sub-section (2) places a restriction on sub-section (1) in case the property has been acquired in one of the modes laid down in sub-section (2; and the terms, inter alia, of the instrument prescribed a restricted estate in such property. 6. 6. Naresh Kumari derives her interest under the sale deed in question. The sale has been found void as against the reversionary interests. It may be recalled that Shrimati Kesri had purported to make Naresh Kumari an absolute owner of the house in dispute by the said sale deed. She could do so in case she was selling the property for legal necessity. A Hindu widow had this right. However, it was found that the sale was not for legal necessity and was, therefore, void. In other words, she had conveyed only her own interest to Naresh Kumari. It is thus clear to us that Naresh Kumari had acquired tae property in question vide a sale deed which has been found to convey only the limited interest of Shrimati Kesri. It is true that the Supreme Court in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi, [A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1944] laid down that "sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (I)........." It was, however, further held that "so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under the gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property." 7. In the instant case, as already observed, Naresh Kumari has admittedly acquired her interest for the first time under the said sale deed. She, therefore, is governed by sub-section (2) of section 14, and so she cannot get the benefit of sub-section (1). The sale deed, as already held in the previous suit, had conveyed a limited interest to Naresh Kumari. The widow could not convey more than she had. This legal position is no more in doubt. The Supreme Court in Kalishanker Das and another v. Dhirendra Nath and others [A.I.R. 1954, Supreme Court 505], ruled: "The position, therefore, is that if there is no necessity in fact or if the alienee could not prove that he made bonafide enquiries and was satisfied about its existence, the transfer is undoubtedly not void but the transferee would get only the widows estate in the propety which does not affect in any way the interest of the rever-sioner. In such a case an alienee from the transferee cannot claim to acquire any higher rights than what his transferor had." The learned Additional District Judge having come to right conclusion on this aspect, fell into an error in not considering the effect of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. As already stated, Naresh Kumari is not entitled to the benefit of sub-section (1) and does not become the full owner of the house in dispute. 8. The reversioners having obtained a declaratory decree in their favour that the sale was void as against their interests despite the alienation by the widow, they are entitled to file a suit for the possession of the property after the death of Shrimati Kesri, [see Lachman v. Thunia, A.I.R. 1972 H.P. 69 Full Bench]. 9. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restore the decree of the trial court. The appellants will be entitled to costs. Appeal allowed.