JUDGMENT Mahavir Singh, J. 1. THIS is a revision by Pritam against the dismissal of his appeal against his conviction under Section 394 IPC and a sentence of three years' R. I. and a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to undergo a further R. I. for three months. 2. THIS revision is being pressed only on a point of law. It is pointed out that in this case two judgments were given by the learned Sessions Judge. One was given on 13-6-1979. By this judgment described as a operative portion of the order and after mentioning the order of the trial court and also mentioning having heard the parties in the appeal, he had observed that there was no merit in the same and that the appeal deserved to be dismissed. He then mentioned as follows :- "Therefore this operation of the judgment is being pronounced today. Detailed judgment with reasons shall be given later on. The appeal is dismissed. Let the accused be taken into custody forthwith to serve out his sentence." Then there is again an endorsement "Operative portion of the judgment signed, dated and pronounced in open court today." The other judgment was given on 18-6-1979. It is described simply as judgment. It is in the ordinary form of the appellate judgment giving all the facts and reasons. At the end he mentioned as below :- "This appeal has got no merit and deserves to be dismissed. The operative portion of the judgment has already been pronounced by me on 13-6-1979. Now this detailed judgment with detailed reasons is being given. Let the parties' counsel be informed." 3. THE contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that under law there could be only one judgment and not two in a case and therefore, the earlier judgment described to be as operative part of the judgment was the judgment in the eye of law. On that date it was pronounced and parties were intimated and warrant was prepared for the appellant for serving out the sentence, but this judgment was invalid being against the mandatory provisions of Section 354 CrPC as it did not contain reasons for dismissal of the appeal. The judgment dated 18-6-1979 in which reasons were given, could not be a part of this judgment as no court is empowered to add anything after giving the judgment. The judgment dated 18-6-1979 in which reasons were given, could not be a part of this judgment as no court is empowered to add anything after giving the judgment. Rather the court is so prohibited by Section 362 CrPC. 4. BEFORE dealing with these submissions, the relevant part of law relating to judgment may be pointed out. Section 353 CrPC deals with the judgment. It deals with the manner in which, the judgment is to be pronounced. Section 354 deals with the language and the contents of the judgment. Section 353 provides the following three modes of pronouncement of the judgment :- (a) By delivering the whole of the judgment; (b) By reading out the whole of the judgment; (c) by reading out the operative pari! of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language which is understood by the accused or his pleader. Manner (a) implies that the judgment is being dictated in open court. Sub-section (2) of Section 353 is also relevant in this regard. It provides that where the judgment is delivered under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the presiding officer shall cause it to be taken down, in short-hand, sign the transcript and every page thereof as soon as id is made ready, and write on it the date of delivery of the judgment in open court. 5. MANNER (c) also presupposes that the entire judgment is written but to save time only operative portion is being read. 6. IN cases of (b) and (c), the judgment is to be dated and signed by the presiding officer and if it is not written in his own handwritings then enery page shall be signed by him. Thus there is on provision under the Code for dictating only a smaller part of the judgment giving only the conclusion about the case and preparing a detailed judgment with reasons in accordance with Section 354 CrPC later. 7. THE learned Assistant Government Advocate contends that though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the pronouncement of judgment have not been followed, it is merely an irregularity and is curable under Section 465 CrPC unless there is failure of justice which in this case does not exist. 8. 7. THE learned Assistant Government Advocate contends that though the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the pronouncement of judgment have not been followed, it is merely an irregularity and is curable under Section 465 CrPC unless there is failure of justice which in this case does not exist. 8. IN order to find out as to when there is a mere irregularity or when there is a patent defect of procedure therein, a reference may be made of two pronouncements of the Supreme Court, namely Surendra Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 194 and I. I. Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1880 . In I. I. Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra (supra) the judgment was said to have been dictated in court but it was mot transcribed for about nine months and then it was dated and signed. It was held that the omission of dating and signing of judgment in open court at the time of pronouncement was only procedural irregularity and is curable under Section 537. The earlier case in Surendra Singh v. State of U. P. (supra) was approved. The observation of the Privy Council in Firm Gokul Chand v. Firm Nand Ram, AIR 1938 PC 292 was also approved. In that case also the defect was of only omission to sign the judgment by one of the Judges of the Bench but the judgment was ready on the date of pronouncement. In Surendra Singh v. State of U.P.(supra) the Supreme Court observed, in para 10 as follows :- ''Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or in the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the language must be there: that can neither be blurred nor left to interfere and conjecture nor it can be vague. All the rest, the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and sealing all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter can be cured, but not the hardcore. Namely, the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally, declared in a judicial way in open court. (Italicised supplied by me). The exact way in which this is done does not matter. Namely, the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally, declared in a judicial way in open court. (Italicised supplied by me). The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving the notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection." Thus the irregularities can be said to consist only in the mode of pronouncement or delivery and not in the mode of the contents of the judgment being ready either in writing oi by dictation in open court at that very time. 9. LOOKED at from this point of view the defect in the judgment of 13th June, 1979 is not merely in the form of pronouncement or of delivery. It is in the hardcore, i. e. in the intimation of contents which was not declared in accordance with law provided under Section 353 CrPC shown above. The judgment which should have included reasons therein was neither ready on that date nor it had been dictated in open court. All that was delivered was the operative portion. That alone was signed, dated and pronounced. 10. THE Supreme Court in another case in Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430 has observed that absence of the reasons in the judgment or in an order supposed to decide the matter makes the order a nullity, that is, it is not a mere procedural irregularity curable under Section 537 of the old CrPC equivalent to Section 465 of the present CrPC. The judgment dated 18th June 1979 cannot be a part of the judgment of 13th June, 1979 because under Section 396 CrPC no court can alter the judgment after delivery of the same except in a. case of clerical or arithmetical error. So that judgment cannot be regarded a part of the judgment of 13th June, 1979. 11. A reference to the case law on the point in issue may also be referred to. The earliest case of this court brought to my notice is Queen Empress v. Hargovind Singh, ILR (14) Allahabad 242. In this case operative portion of the judgment was pronounced in open count. 11. A reference to the case law on the point in issue may also be referred to. The earliest case of this court brought to my notice is Queen Empress v. Hargovind Singh, ILR (14) Allahabad 242. In this case operative portion of the judgment was pronounced in open count. The reasons of the judgment were given somedays later, though it was shown to have been given on the same date on which the operative portion was pronounced but it was not found to be so. It was held that the judgment was illegal and not curable. This case has also been referred to by the Supreme Court in I. I. Sodawala v. State of Maharastra (supra). It was distinguished from the Sodawala case because the question involved in the two cases were different. In I. I. Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra (supra) case, the judgment was dictated in open court and the defect was only signing and dating the judgment whereas in Queen Empress v. Hargovind Signh (supra) case, the judgment had been given after some days. Thus, it was not overruled and so that case on the point in question still remains. 12. REFERENCE then may be made to the later decision of this Court in Dhondha Kandoo v Sita Ram, AIR 1932 Alld. 660 which is a single Junge decision of this court. Here also the facts were somewhat similar. The operative portion of the judgment was pronounced in open court. The judgment was, however, written subsequently. It was held that it was a mere irregularity. I would have thought of referring this case to a Larger Bench because I do not agree with the view taken in this case but it does not appear necessary for two reasons. In this case reference was made to the earlier case of Queen Empress v Hargovind Singh (supra) which is a case of three judges and in which the facts are also similar but it was distinguished. It was said that it was a case of conviction whereas this case was of acquittal, that is, according to the learned Judge a different procedure may be adopted in case of acquittal and that would be a mere irregularity if judgment is written later. The present case is one of conviction and so according to this case itself it stands distinguished. The present case is one of conviction and so according to this case itself it stands distinguished. There is however, no distinction in a judgment of conviction or acquittal, for no different provisions for two kinds of judgments are given in the CrPC. 13. THE other reason is that in Surendra Singh v State of U.P. (supra) it has been mentioned that defect about declaration of the contents is the hard core and is not curable. Only defect in form and manner of delivery are curable. So that view stands overruled by the Supreme Court. 14. IN Madras, there have been some conflicting judgments. In Bandanu Atchayya v. Emperor, 1 CrLJ 566 and In re : Athipalayan, AIR 1960 Mad. 507 the judgments which were written subsequently to the pronouncement of the operative portion were held to be illegal. In A. T. Sankeralinga Mudalliar v. Narayana Mudalliar, AIR 1922 Mad, 502 the view was different. The operative portion of acquittal was pronounced one day and the judgment was given later and it was held that there was merely an irregularity. In the judgment of Athipalayan number of cases including Bandanu Atchhayya v. Emperor (supra) were referred to but this Sankeralinga Mudalliar v. Narayana Mudalliar (supra) case was not referred. The Supreme Court case in Surendra Singh v. State of U. P. (supra) was, however, referred and followed. Some other High Courts in Jhari Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Patna 148 and Gulla v. Emperor, AIR 1942 Lahore 100 also held that writing of judgments later after the pronouncement of the operative portion made the judgments illegal. Thus there is consensus amongst different High Court with the view which I have taken and it is also in accordance with the view of the Supreme Court. 15. THE revision is, therefore, allowed and both the appellate judgments dated 13-6-79 and 18-6-79 are set aside. The appeal therefore is remanded and it be reheard and disposed of according to law. The same judge, who had given the judgments, would not hear this appeal as he had already formed an opinion. Revision allowed.