ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. -Both these petitions are connected. They arise out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. Smt. Lakshmi Devi who is the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 5834 of 1978 was treated as the tenure-holder and a notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was issued to her. Objections were also filed by one Ravindra Kumar who is the transferee from the aforesaid tenure-holder. Ravindra Kumar is the petitioner in the other connected Writ Petn. No. 6823 of 1978. The said objections were decided by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 26th June, 1976, a true copy whereof is Annexure I to the petition. Thereafter, the said tenure-holder Smt. Lakshmi Devi and the said Ravindra Kumar filed two separate appeals and both of them were decided by one common judgment dated 22nd April, 1978, a true copy whereof is Annexure II to the petition. Now the said Smt. Lakshmi Devi and the said Ravindra Kumar have come to this Court in the said two separate but connected writ petitions. In support thereof, I have heard Sri R. P. Goyal, learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned standing counsel has made his submissions. 3. In the petition of Ravindra Kumar only one contention is involved. It relates to a sale deed dated 12th. Jan., 1970 which was ignored by the authorities below. This sale deed was executed by the said tenure-holder Smt. Lakshmi Devi in favour of Ravindra Kumar. In the other petition, besides restating the aforesaid contention, which is common to both the petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasised two more contentions. In other words there are two additional contentions which are involved in the petition of Smt. Lakshmi Devi. These two contentions are : (1) That some land was wrongly treated as irrigated land and the same should have been treated as un-irrigated. (2) That Plot No. 27 was wrongly not treated as grove. 4. In all, therefore, there are three contentions which have to be examined. 5. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in my view there is merit only in the contention that some land was wrongly treated as irrigated. (2) That Plot No. 27 was wrongly not treated as grove. 4. In all, therefore, there are three contentions which have to be examined. 5. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in my view there is merit only in the contention that some land was wrongly treated as irrigated. So far as the remaining two contentions are concerned, it should be seen that findings of fact have been recorded and irrespective of whether they were correctly arrived at on the material and evidence on record, in this extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, I cannot interfere in such findings. See Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ) and Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Lakshmibai R. Tarte ( AIR 1975 SC 1297 ). It should be seen that in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras ( AIR 1957 SC 49 ) the Supreme Court laid down that a finding of a Benami Transaction is a pure finding of fact. It is not even a mixed finding of fact and law. In the instant case both the authorities below did not accept the genuineness of the transaction alleged to have been brought into existence by the said sale deed dated 12th Jan., 1970. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this connection emphasised certain aspects of the matter. He contended that the document was executed prior to 24th Jan., 1971 and the provisions of S. 5 (6) were not at all applicable to the facts of the case. He further pointed out that the authorities below were labouring under miss(inception that they were called upon ,to consider the controversy in the context of Section 5 (6). Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on decision, reported in Akhtar Sultan Begam v. The Prescribed Authority (I9T9 AM LJ 515). 6. Learned counsel contended that it was not a case to which the Expln. 2 to S. 5 (6) of the Act was attracted. In this connection, the learned counsel draw my attention to Khatauni extracts 1381 to 1063 F. Where the name of Ravindra Kumar has been recorded but the said Khatauni does not support the contention of the learned counsel that the mutation had been done before 24th Jan., 1971. The entry of 1381 F. shows that the authorities below were right in saying that Expln. The entry of 1381 F. shows that the authorities below were right in saying that Expln. 2 to Section 5 (1) was attracted to the facts of the case. The authorities below have clearly recorded a finding that the sale deed was not genuine and the possession remained in the hands of the tenure-holder Smt. Lakshmi Devi. In view of this clear finding and the applicability of Expln. 2 of S. 5 (1), it was open to them to have come to the conclusion that the transaction was a purely Benami one. Lastly, he contended that it is not inconceivable that a person residing in one District should purchase land in another District. In my opinion, all these questions fell for consideration before the authorities below and it was open to them to have held that the manner in which Ravindra Kumar was situated, the transaction was not a real one but only an ostensible one. Once the evidence has been considered by the authorities, I do not think that in this extraordinary jurisdiction any interference can be made in such a finding. The case on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance is distinguishable on the facts of the case and there was no question of any adequacy of consideration regarding the gift deeds. The learned Judge himself observed that the controversy about ostensible nature of a transaction would be a controversy of fact. In the facts of the instant case, as has been observed, the authorities have clearly recorded a finding that the tenure-holder continued to be in actual cultivators possession and it was open to him to have come to such a finding and to have ignored the document despite the fact that certain documents were being placed to show that the payment of revenue etc. was done in the name of the ostensible owner. 7. The second contention which the learned counsel raised relates to an alleged grove. Again, it should be seen that it is a finding of fact. 8. In Hari Om v. Addl. Civil Judge (1978 RD 184) : (1978 All Lj NOC 53) Mr. Justice H. N. Seth laid down that a finding regarding grove is a finding of fact and that no interference could be made in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 8. In Hari Om v. Addl. Civil Judge (1978 RD 184) : (1978 All Lj NOC 53) Mr. Justice H. N. Seth laid down that a finding regarding grove is a finding of fact and that no interference could be made in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. To the same effect is the ratio laid down in Mansab Ali v. Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad (1979 All WC 223) : (1979 All LJ 350) and Surat Singh v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge (1979 All LJ 196). The Supervisor Qanungo who appeared in the witness-box clearly stated that the dispersal of trees in the big area of Plot No. 27 was such that they did not constitute a grove. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that the Khasra entries in a particular year showed that only 1? Bighas was actually cultivated. However, that is a question of interpretation and it is possible that the rest of the area might not have been cultivated but did not still constitute a grove. Obviously, I cannot draw any inference in these matters and it was open to the authorities below to have placed reliance on the testimony of the Supervisor Qanungo who stated that he had been on the spot. Therefore, the second contention is not accepted. 9. Learned counsel lastly contended that Plots Nos. 16, 18, 38, 29, 27, were wrongly treated as irrigated. It seems to me that in view of the Division Bench pronouncements of this Court, this controversy was not examined and determined by the authorities below in the light of the requirements laid down in S. 4-A as interpreted by the Division Bench pronouncement. These pronouncements are as follows:- (1) Shiva Ram Singh v. State (1979 All WC 257 : (1979 All LJ 565). (2) Jaswant Singh v. State (1978 All WC 577) : (1979 All LJ 25). (3) Kallu v. State (1979 All WC 579) : (1979 All LJ 1113). 10. Accordingly, I allow Writ Petn. No. 5834 of 1978 Smt. Lakshmi Devi v. State of U. P. in so far as the aforesaid plots were held to be irrigated by the authorities below. The judgment of the Appellate Court dated 22-4-1978 shall stand quashed in so far as the said controversy in respect of the aforesaid plots is concerned. 10. Accordingly, I allow Writ Petn. No. 5834 of 1978 Smt. Lakshmi Devi v. State of U. P. in so far as the aforesaid plots were held to be irrigated by the authorities below. The judgment of the Appellate Court dated 22-4-1978 shall stand quashed in so far as the said controversy in respect of the aforesaid plots is concerned. The case is remanded to the Appellate Court with a direction was each of the said plots shall be dealt with separately and the Court shall state in what manner both the requirements laid down in any of the three categories of Section 4-A stand satisfied or do not stand satisfied. Thereafter the particular plot shall be held to be irrigated or un-irrigated in the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid Division Bench pronouncements of this Court. The ceiling area and the surplus land of the tenure-holder shall be determined thereafter. It is made clear that no other controversy shall be allowed to be raised before the Appellate Court hereafter. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. The connected Writ Petn. No. 6823 of 1978 shall stand dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.